Word on the Street: The Persistence of Leftist-dominated Protest in Europe

Classic studies of protest politics have traditionally defended the dominant left-wing orientation of protesters. However, some recent research has highlighted the general spread of protest by the increasing participation of right-wing individuals. Has this process meant an ‘ideological normalisation’ of protesters? The present article tackles this question by examining competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between ideology and political protest. Through a hierarchical multilevel design, the article tests whether left-wing (or right-wing) supporters are more likely to stay at home when left-wing (right-wing) parties are in power and whether they intensify their protest activities when they are more distant from the government’s ideological position. The article shows that left-wing individuals protest more under right-wing governments than under left-wing governments and yet, they are the group which protest the most also under left-wing governments. Both party mobilisation and values appear to be behind these individuals' greater propensity to participate regardless of the governments' ideological orientation.     

Adam Smith or Machiavelli? Political incentives for contracting out local public services

Why do some local governments deliver public services directly while others rely on providers from the private sector? Previous literature on local contracting out and on the privatization of state-owned enterprises have offered two competing interpretations on why center-right governments rely more on private providers. Some maintain that center-right politicians contract out more because, like Adam Smith, they believe in market competition. Others claim that center-right politicians use privatization in a Machiavellian fashion; it is used as a strategy to retain power, by ??purchasing?? the electoral support of certain constituencies. Using a unique dataset, which includes the political attitudes of over 8,000 Swedish local politicians from 290 municipalities for a period of 10 years, this paper tests these ideological predictions together with additional political economy factors which have been overlooked in previous studies, such as the number of veto players. Results first indicate support for the Machiavellian interpretation, as contracting out increases with electoral competition. Second, irrespective of ideological concerns, municipalities with more veto players in the coalition government contract out fewer services.     

Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

An important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods, primarily education and health care. In Norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector. The development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes. The important revenue sources of the local and county governments, grants and income tax revenue, have been controlled nationally, and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900–1990. The approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income-elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength. The decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups, and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome. The analysis shows how politics matter, and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30% more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run.     

Contract–Management Capacity in Municipal and County Governments

Under pressure to do more with less, governments across the country have moved from direct service provision to providing services by contract. Proponents argue that contracting can reduce costs and improve flexibility and customer satisfaction. Critics point to a growing number of failed contracts, arguing there are numerous pitfalls associated with contracting. Missing from these debates is a discussion of how governments' managerial capacity can improve contract performance. In this article, we identify specific capacities that governments can use to harness the promise of contracting while avoiding its pitfalls. We present analyses of data on municipal and county government contracting activities that show how governments invest in contract– management capacity in response to several internal and external threats to effective contract performance. Because government investment in contract–management capacity is uneven—that is, some governments invest in less capacity even when circumstances would call for more—our analyses may help to explain why some contract arrangements are more successful than others.     

Alternative Methods of Service Delivery in Small and Rural Municipalities

Data from approximately 1,000 small, mostly rural municipalities in Illinois, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin address local choices on production and contracting arrangements for a wide range of services. The results suggest that the use of both for‐profit contractors and cooperative agreements with other governments correlate negatively with population size. Small municipalities are less likely to use competitive bidding processes, compare costs between production options, or report that privatization produces savings. Median income, rural geography, and ideology show statistically significant associations with contracting decisions. Respondents generally consider themselves “satisfied” with services provided by contract, although satisfaction levels are lower than those associated with self‐provision of the same services. Citizen satisfaction associated with services delivered by other governments is lower than those provided by private contractors, suggesting that no trade‐off in service quality is directly attributable to for‐profit contractors.     

BUREAUCRATS AS PURCHASERS OF HEALTH SERVICES: LIMITATIONS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR FOR CONTRACTING

Contracting out of health services increasingly involves a new role for governments as purchasers of services. To date, emphasis has been on contractual outcomes and the contracting process, which may benefit from improvements in developing countries, has been understudied. This article uses evidence from wide scale NGO contracting in Pakistan and examines the performance of government purchasers in managing the contracting process; draws comparisons with NGO managed contracting; and identifies purchaser skills needed for contracting NGOs. We found that the contracting process is complex and government purchasers struggled to manage the contracting process despite the provision of well‐designed contracts and guidelines. Weaknesses were seen in three areas: (i) poor capacity for managing tendering; (ii) weak public sector governance resulting in slow processes, low interest and rent seeking pressures; and (iii) mistrust between government and the NGO sector. In comparison parallel contracting ventures managed by large NGOs generally resulted in faster implementation, closer contractual relationships, drew wider participation of NGOs and often provided technical support. Our findings do not dilute the importance of government in contracting but front the case for an independent purchasing agency, for example an experienced NGO, to manage public sector contracts for community based services with the government role instead being one of larger oversight. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Government capacity to contract: health sector experience and lessons

Using case-study material of contracting for clinical and ancillary services in the health care sector of developing countries, this article examines the capacities required for successful contracting and the main constraints which developing country governments face in developing and implementing contractual arrangements. Required capacities differ according to the type of service being contracted and the nature of the contractor. Contracting for clinical as opposed to ancillary services poses considerably greater challenges in terms of the information required for monitoring and contract design. Yet, in some of the case-studies examined, problems arose owing to government's limited capacity to perform even very basic functions such as paying contractors in a timely manner and keeping records of contracts negotiated. The external environment within which contracting takes place is also critical; in particular, the case-studies indicate that contracts embedded in slow-moving, rule-ridden bureaucracies will face substantial constraints to successful implementation. The article suggests that governments need to assess required capacities on a service-by-service basis. For any successful contracting, basic administrative systems must be functioning. In addition, there should be development of guidelines for contracting, clear lines of communication between all agents involved in the contracting process, and regular evaluations of contractual arrangements. Finally, in cases where government has weak capacity, direct service provision may be a lower-risk delivery strategy. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political competition,party polarization,and government performance

Lack of party competition may impair government efficiency. If the voters are ideologically predisposed to cast their votes in favor of one political party, they may reelect an underperforming incumbent. Party polarization may magnify this effect since the median voter faces a higher cost of selecting a better, but ideologically distant incumbent. Alternatively, if the electorate is evenly divided between parties, polarization may induce parties to invest more effort in improving their election prospects. The current paper analyzes efficiency in Norwegian local governments. Efficiency has been measured by means of panel data on government service output over a 10-year period. Electoral dominance has been measured as number of elections wherein one party bloc receives at least 60 % of the votes, measured over six consecutive elections. Party polarization is defined as the ideological distance between the two party blocs, and it is measured on basis of survey data on the ideological preferences of elected politicians. Lack of party competition reduces efficiency, the effect being stronger in governments where more party polarization exists. These agency losses are larger in high-revenue municipalities.     

Government-to-Government Contracting: Stewardship,Agency, and Substitution

ABSTRACT

This paper provides empirical evidence detailing the distinctive nature of service delivery provided through contracts with other governments. The results of a survey of Ohio city and county managers both confirm and stand in contrast to implications derived from stewardship theory. Consistent with stewardship, our data demonstrate that contracts with public sector service partners generate less intensive monitoring by contracting governments than do services contracted with private entities. In contrast to stewardship theory, we find that contracting governments do not use other governments for services requiring intensive monitoring. In an era of accountability and results-oriented management, reliance on trust may not satisfy constituents who seek evidence of effective service delivery. The inability of the contracting government to affect another government's service delivery reduces the attractiveness of that government as a contracting partner. If the tools of stewardship prove to be inadequate, the imposition of carrots and sticks appropriate for a principal-agent relationship could undermine the trust central to stewardship. Given these tensions, it is not surprising that governments are contracting less with other governments.     

Contract Management Capacity Breakdown? An Analysis of U.S. Local Governments

Research indicates that successful government contracting depends on sufficient internal management capacity. Numerous studies have examined the decision to contract out and its pitfalls, but few have tracked government contract management capacity. This study explores whether a change is observable in the capacity of U.S. local governments to engage in effective contracting from 1997 to 2007. The authors discuss whether this change represents a decline or degradation, and in which form and type of government it occurred. Using data from 537 local government units, the analysis reveals that some aspects of capacity have declined as local governments continue to contract out for highly complex services. The authors speculate on the reasons behind the findings and suggest capacity enhancement strategies.     

Contracting Out Local Services: A Tale of Technical and Social Services

Governments face a fundamental choice between in‐house production and contracting out for the delivery of services to citizens. This article examines the importance of ideology, fiscal pressure, and size for contracting out in technical and social services. The analysis builds on a panel data set covering municipal spending on services in all 98 Danish municipalities. The authors find that contracting out is shaped by ideology in social services but not in technical services, which indicates that social services are the contemporary ideological battlefield of privatization. The analysis further reveals that economically prosperous municipalities are more likely to contract out social services, whereas contracting out of technical services is not influenced by economic affluence. Finally, larger municipalities contract out more in technical services but less in social services, demonstrating that the size effect is contingent on the transaction cost characteristics of the service.     

Nonprofit organizations as contracted local social service providers in eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States

Today nonprofit organizations (NPOs) are an important provider of social services in some countries in the eastern Europe‐CIS region. Based on field reports from seven countries in the region, we find that the pattern is highly variable, however; and only in central Europe and Croatia are local governments contracting with NPOs to deliver services. More commonly, local governments give grants to NPOs for this purpose. But in some countries local governments provide essentially no support to NPOs for social service delivery. This article outlines the case for NPOs being contracted as service providers, and inventories the current situation in the region with respect to local governments. It concludes with a discussion of the possible reasons for the low incidence of contracting by local governments with NPOs as service providers. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contractualism, Democracy and Ethics

Contractualism, as concept and practice, may be defined in different ways (Yeatman 1995, 1998). In this article I am concerned with contracting out or outsourcing as it is otherwise known. That is, I focus upon the process whereby functions undertaken formerly by government are now performed by private or voluntary organisations in a contractual relationship with public service departments and agencies. Whereas departments and agencies once provided a full panoply of services directly, government purchasers now select providers by tendering competitively for an expanding range of employment, education, health, social welfare and local government services. Contractualism, then, involves the recon-figuation of public service provision to favour quasi-commercial rather than bureaucratic forms.     

Outsourcing Oversight: A Comparison of Monitoring for In-House and Contracted Services

The public sector contracting literature has long argued that outsourced services need to be and, in fact, are subject to a more elevated level of scrutiny compared to internally delivered services. Recently, the performance measurement and management literature has suggested that the twin themes of accountability and results have altered the management landscape at all levels of government. By focusing on performance monitoring, the implication is that monitoring levels for internally provided services should more closely approximate those for contracted services. The analysis provided here yields empirical comparisons of how governments monitor the same service provided in-house and contracted out. We find evidence that services provided internally by a government's own employees are indeed monitored intensively by the contracting government, with levels of monitoring nearly as high as those for services contracted out to for-profit providers. In contrast, however, we find strong evidence that performance monitoring by the contracting government does not extend to nonprofit and other governmental service providers, each of which is monitored much less intensively than when comparable services are provided internally. For such service providers, it appears that monitoring is either outsourced along with services, or simply reduced.     

A Political Perspective on Contracting Out: The Politics of Good Times. Experiences from Danish Local Governments

Privatization has been on the political agenda for the last two decades. The literature points to two major explanations of privatization. One explanation is political-ideological, considering privatization to be a Liberal-Conservative strategy. Economic crisis or fiscal stress is the other main explanation of privatization. The two theses are investigated by evaluating the determinants of contracting out in Danish local governments. The analysis shows that fiscal stress is strongly, but inversely related to contracting out, while Liberal-Conservative political leadership is not associated with higher levels of contracting out than Social Democratic governance. Thus, the richer a local government becomes, the more it contracts out. Although party politics is not decisive for contracting out, the motivation seems to be political rather than economical. Specifically, it is argued that in a strongly decentralized public sector with influential public employees, contracting out is possible in good times when revenue and public expenditure are easier to increase, which reduces public employee resistance to contracting out.     

Reassessing Privatization Strategies 25 Years Later: Revisiting Perry and Babitsky's Comparative Performance Study of Urban Bus Transit Services

Privatization appeals to citizen and politician desires for more cost-effective methods of service delivery. For this reason, it is important for public administrators to know when gains can be made by contracting out or privatizing services and when it is better to keep service provision in house. This article assesses the viability of contracting out and privatization of transit services. Following up on the 1986 work of James Perry and Timlynn Babitsky, which used data from the early 1980s, the authors revisit whether certain service delivery arrangements are more efficient and effective than others in the provision of transit services. Twenty-five years later, they find results similar to those of Perry and Babitsky's original study. Neither the type of government nor whether an agency contracts out has much impact on the efficiency and performance of urban bus services. The main difference between the two studies is that private transit agencies are no longer more efficient or effective than public providers.     

Political Partisanship and Welfare Service Privatization: Ideological Attitudes among Local Politicians in Sweden

This article ties in with a growing international literature examining the link between party politics and welfare service privatization in modern welfare states. In recent decades, a central aspect of policy change in Sweden is that private actors have come to produce publicly financed welfare services on a more regular basis. This overall privatization trend is furthermore characterized by substantial geographical variation across Sweden's 290 municipalities. The ideological attitudes of local politicians have been recognized as particularly important for understanding this development. This article examines the extent to which local politicians’ ideological attitudes regarding welfare service privatization are best explained with a partisan approach emphasizing between‐party polarization as opposed to a critical perspective that points to the proclaimed significance of ideological consensus between left and right parties in certain municipal contexts. Using multilevel modelling and survey data collected from elected politicians in municipal governments, the empirical findings show substantial differences in attitudes between Conservatives and Social Democrats, irrespective of municipal characteristics – most notably the degree of welfare service privatization. Hence, the results strongly indicate that the partisan approach is much more fruitful compared to the consensus approach as a general explanation for local politicians’ attitudes towards welfare service privatization in Sweden. Accordingly, a conclusion is that comparisons at the subnational level within countries are important as a complement to country‐comparative studies when attempting to understand the link between political partisanship and welfare service privatization in modern welfare states.     

Municipalities’ Choices of Service Delivery Modes: The Influence of Service,Political, Governance,and Financial Characteristics

This study investigates the influence of service, political, governance, and financial characteristics on municipalities’ choices of four service delivery modes (in-house, inter-municipal cooperation, municipality-owned firm, and private firm) in the Dutch local government setting. The results show that as a service involves more asset specificity and more measurement difficulty, the likelihood that municipalities contract this service out is lower. Also, although some differences in preferences are found between boards of aldermen and municipal councils, for both political bodies a more right-wing political orientation is shown to be positively related to privatization of services. Furthermore, contracting out is also shown to be related to the governance model of municipalities, as services of municipalities that (in general) put relatively less emphasis on input, process, and output performance indicators, and more on outcome performance indicators, are more likely to be privatized. Finally, the results also show that services of municipalities that have a better financial position are less likely to be contracted out to a private firm.     

Local and Regional Governance: Back to Basics

Local government has been transformed in Victoria — forceably amalgamated, stripped for a time of its democratic basis, required by law to embrace contracting out and greater private provision of services. This article describes this dramatic process, considers the implications and identifies a positive future for local and regional government.     

Outsourcing Public Service Delivery: Management Responses in Noncompetitive Markets

Capturing the benefits of competition is a key argument for outsourcing public services, yet public service markets often lack sufficient competition. The authors use survey and interview data from U.S. local governments to explore the responses of public managers to noncompetitive markets. This research indicates that competition is weak in most local government markets (fewer than two alternative providers on average across 67 services measured), and that the relationship between competition and contracting choice varies by service type. Public managers respond to suboptimal market competition by intervening with strategies designed to create, sustain, and enhance provider markets. In monopoly service markets, managers are more likely to use intergovernmental contracting, while for‐profit contracting is more common in more competitive service markets. The strategies that public managers employ to build and sustain competition for contracts often require tangible investments of administrative resources that add to the transaction costs of contracting in noncompetitive markets.