Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act

When do campaign contributions matter? This article advances the claim that a group that gives campaign contributions to US Members of Congress is more likely to achieve legislative success when (1) a single legislator can deliver to the group (2) a private benefit (3) without attracting negative attention. Using an original data set based on the written comments of nearly 900 interest groups lobbying the US Senate Finance Committee on health reform legislation in 2009, I link group requests to corresponding legislation. The analysis shows a significant relationship between lobby groups' campaign contributions and their legislative success, and at distinct units of analysis—the group, the side, and the group-senator dyad. The relationship is particularly strong in predicting senators’ amendments in committee. The rare data presented here offer compelling evidence that interest groups' legislative victories are sometimes connected to campaign contributions in a way that previous studies could not identify.     

The Impact of District Magnitude on Campaign Fundraising

The number of legislators elected in a single district influences many aspects of state legislative elections. However, there is a dearth of research on how district magnitude influences campaign fundraising. We theorize that the greater competition for funds in multimember districts results in candidates raising less money and encourages them to be more entrepreneurial in their fundraising efforts. Specifically, we expect multimember district candidates to raise contributions from more diverse sets of interests than candidates in single‐member districts, raise more funds out of state, and create more unique financial constituencies. Using data on candidates for Maryland's House of Delegates in 2006 and 2010, we find support for our hypotheses.     

The Power of an Hour: Effects of Candidate Time Expenditure in State Legislative Elections

Using survey data from more than 500 legislative candidates in 17 states during the 2008 election, I examine whether state house candidates who devote more time to their campaign win a larger share of the major‐party vote. Consistent with previous work studying campaign spending in state legislative elections, I find a positive and significant association between campaign time and vote percentage for challengers—but not incumbents—in incumbent‐contested elections.     

Campaign fund-raising abuses and money laundering in recent U.S. elections: Criminal networks in action

This study describes some of the campaign fundraising abuses perpetuated by Republican and Democratic operatives in connection with recent U.S. elections. Efforts to conceal the source of campaign contributions or to evade contribution and spending limits involved a variety of money laundering techniques including the use of shell companies, straw donors, and the funnelling of money through political action committees and non profit tax-exempt organizations. In addition to the brazen sale of political access, some of the more serious infractions involved the infusion of foreign money into the Republican and Democratic National Committees as well as the Clinton-Gore reelection campaign. The author concludes the crimes that were committed are explained best as organized criminality manifested as complex networks of patron-client relationships.     

Testing Spatial Models of Elections: The Influence of Voters and Elites on Candidate Issue Positions

This research tests spatial models of electoral competition using survey data on state legislative candidates' policy positions and ideology in eight U.S. states. Our data support several hypotheses: 1) candidates' issue positions do not converge; 2) party elites have more extreme positions than do candidates; 3) candidate issue positioning is a function of party‐elite issue positions and union involvement in the campaign, as well as constituency characteristics; and 4) when candidates rely heavily on elite resources during their campaign, elites become more important in shaping candidate issue positions.     

Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure

Why do majority parties choose to add extreme dead on arrival bills to their legislative agendas rather than enactable legislation? Majorities in Congress choose this strategy in order to accrue political support from their allied interest groups who reliably reward this legislative behavior. By examining all bills that receive floor consideration from 2003 through 2012, as well as interest group scorecards and campaign commercials, I find support for my theory. Dead‐on‐arrival bills generate electoral benefits for majority‐party lawmakers, are more politically valuable than other bills, and are more often used to credit rather than punish legislators.     

The Impact of Unified Party Government on Campaign Contributions

This article examines the connection between unified party government and campaign contributions. Our central argument is that unified party government confers a substantial, but previously overlooked, fundraising advantage to intra‐chamber majority parties. We examined data on corporate campaign contributions to U.S. House incumbents and state legislators in 17 different legislative chambers. We found a strong fundraising benefit accruing to intra‐chamber majority status across all of these legislatures, but the benefit is heavily conditioned by the presence of unified or divided government. The results offer important implications for our understanding of the financial balance of power in American politics and for the vast scholarly literature on unified party government.     

The Incidence and Timing of PAC Contributions to Incumbent U.S. House Members, 1993‐94

In this article, we discuss how donor and recipient characteristics affected the incidence and timing of political action committee (PAC) contributions to incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1993‐94 election cycle. We contribute to the campaign finance literature by modeling the timing of contributions, which is important because timing affects the perception of political actors about the competitiveness of elections and the loci of power among members of Congress, interest groups, and between members of Congress and interest groups. Split‐population event history models allow us to compare and contrast determinants of whether and when contributions are made across various types and sizes of PACs.     

Criminalizing Organizations: Towards Deliberative Lawmaking

With threats from diverse criminal organizations on the increase and current state approaches being of variable effectiveness, legislatures now need to take a more systematic and deliberative approach to framing policy and legal responses to criminal groups. This article proposes a typology of legislative approaches to the whole spectrum of criminal groups that would facilitate a more holistic assessment of what to do about gangs, organized crime, and terrorist groups. It clarifies the advantages and disadvantages of different legal approaches and paves the way for further research on more nuanced and effective laws on criminal organizations for the future.     

Leadership PAC Contribution Strategies and House Member Ambitions

Leadership political action committees (PACs) are committees headed by federal politicians but separate from the politicians' personal campaign committees. Like other PACs, leadership PACs receive donations from individuals and groups, then make contributions to the political candidates that they support. Previous research indicates that member contribution strategies reflect both party‐based and personal goals. Using a range of data from before and after the 1994 “Republican Revolution,” this study fills a void in the existent research by testing whether or not House members with leadership PACs switch contribution strategies once their party status changes. My analysis reveals that a shift in party status tends to produce a subsequent shift in contribution strategy. My findings also suggest that members, while acting within a party‐based framework, may target their contributions in ways that also reflect their personal goals.     

Campaign contributions in Texas Supreme Court races

One of the most disturbing features of an elective judiciary is judicial campaign finance. This paper explores the financing of the 1988 Texas Supreme Court races, probably the most expensive partisan judicial election campaign in history. It examines the sources of the funding of those six seats on the court in terms of competition among interest groups for control of the court. It also examines proposed reforms in the system of campaign finance and points out that those reforms are not neutral tools of good government, but that instead they have massive political implications for the interests vying to influence the direction of tort law in the state.     

Elements of the Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in the Roberts Court

This article considers the organizations, financial patrons, and lawyers involved in two significant campaign finance cases decided by the Roberts Court: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. The research indicates that these elements of the support structures for litigation on both sides of these cases, like the justices to whom they direct their advocacy, fall into well‐defined opposing and partisan camps. It also suggests that strategic case selection on the challengers' side, the diversity of organizations supporting their positions, their network and coordination, and a simple and powerful frame around which to rally may have contributed to their success and to the Roberts Court's fundamental reshaping of campaign finance doctrine.     

Living With Republican Party of Minnesota V. White: The Birth and Death of Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions

In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Supreme Court of the United States declared unconstitutional a Minnesota judicial canon prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their views on issues likely to come before them. This triggered legal action in other states and a debate not only over speech rights, but over the state of the judiciary as well. With the growing presence of interest groups in judicial elections and increasing campaign spending, it is no surprise that polls show that more than 70% of voters believe money influences judicial decisions. This article examines the history of judicial selection and canons on speech through a lens of First Amendment theory, focusing on practical responses to the precedent set in White. It is critical that states take action to restore public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the courts. Merit selection, campaign finance reform, strict recusal standards and a better informed public are viable alternatives to speech-restricting canons.     

Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change

Most of the work of public interest law organizations does not make money. How do these organizations survive, given the economic realities of law practice? Drawing on survey data from a national random sample of public interest law firms, we investigate how funding models vary across public interest organizations and how funding sources affect these organizations’ activities. We find funding structures have, over time, shifted away from foundation support toward government grants. Compared to other organizations, however, conservative organizations draw significantly less of their budget from federal and state grants, and significantly more of their budget from private contributions. Conservative organizations are significantly less likely than other organizations to rely on funding that prohibits engaging in class actions, receiving attorney's fees, or lobbying. Respondents reported that funding restrictions hamper their ability to negotiate favorable settlements, bring about systemic change, and represent vulnerable client communities. We close with a comparative institutional analysis of different funding models.     

The Limitations of Disability Antidiscrimination Legislation: Policymaking and the Economic Well‐being of People with Disabilities

Although Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to address, in large part, the declining economic well‐being of people with disabilities—twenty years later—the trend has not reversed. To shed light on this puzzle, we use multilevel models to analyze Current Population Survey data from 1988 through 2012 matched with state‐level predictors. We take a more nuanced approach than previous research and consider institutional factors related to the creation, enforcement, and interpretation of legislation, as well as individual demographics and employment situations. Our results show continual gaps in employment and earnings by disability status connected to the enactment of state‐level antidiscrimination legislation, the number of ADA charges brought to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the results of ADA court settlements and decisions. Our findings suggest a complex relationship between legislative intent and policy outcomes, showcasing the multilayered institutional aspects behind the implementation of disability antidiscrimination legislation.     

REEVALUATING THE CUSTODY-THERAPY CONFLICT PARADIGM IN CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH SETTINGS*

It has become almost axiomatic in sociological analyses of interactions between mental health and criminal justice personnel that their respective ideologies are inherently contradictory and produce conflict within organizations in which both groups are working. Because key components of the mental health system have changed dramatically since the seminal research in this area was conducted and because these concepts were never tested in certain criminal justice organizations, many commonly accepted generalizations about custody-therapy conflicts warrant new examination. Interview and questionnaire data from a national sample of 43 county jails with mental health programs were analyzed. In contrast to earlier research, fundamental conflicts between mental health and correctional staff were not frequent. Rather, Pondy's concept of frictional Conflicts, which are not fundamental to either individual interactions or organizational operations, were more typical. Jails, as short-term people-processing organizations, cannot be assumed to fit organizational research results generated from state prisons.     

When Voters Pull the Trigger: Can Direct Democracy Restrain Legislative Excesses?

Direct democracy is sometimes described as a “gun behind the door,” but how do legislators react when voters pull the trigger? Leveraging the high‐profile referendum defeat of a controversial law passed by the Ohio legislature, I examine how legislators respond to voter disaffection. Using interest groups to “bridge” votes before and after the election, I show that the measure's defeat induced moderation on the part of the Republican legislative majority, while leaving the behavior of opposition Democrats largely unchanged. The results suggest that direct democracy has the potential to restrain legislative excesses and alleviate polarization in state legislatures.     

A tale of two states: how U.S. state legislatures consider restorative justice policies

This paper explores recent state legislative processes in Colorado and Texas related to bills proposing support for restorative justice as a juvenile diversion tool for criminal courts. It uses two maximum variation case studies to explore issue statements related to theoretically-supported factors likely to influence the adoption of restorative justice legislation, and draws conclusions about the importance of political partisanship, economic strain, and key figures such as policy entrepreneurs, advocacy coalitions, and interest groups in legislative decision-making. Emerging themes suggest that support for restorative justice policies is at least sometimes bipartisan and is unlikely to be motivated by economic interests. Collaborative processes within a traditionally adversarial system distinguished successful restorative justice decision-making in Colorado.     

PARTISAN POLITICS,ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND IMPRISONMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATES OVER TIME*

The now well‐documented explosion in prison populations over the last 30 years has spurred significant attention in the literature. Early research focused primarily on economic explanations. More recently it has focused on political explanations of prison growth. Here we extend research on political explanations of imprisonment by drawing on the literature on state politics and public policy. We argue that the effect of partisan politics on punishment is conditional on how much electoral competition legislators face. We test this hypothesis using annual state level data on imprisonment from 1978 to 1996. Our findings show that the effect of Republican state legislative strength on prison admissions depends on time and the level of competition in state legislative elections. We argue that these findings suggest the need for a more nuanced understanding of the link between partisan U.S. politics and imprisonment.     

Partners No More: Relational Transformation and the Turn to Litigation in Two Conservationist Organizations

The rise in litigation against administrative bodies by environmental and other political interest groups worldwide has been explained predominantly through the liberalization of standing doctrines. Under this explanation, termed here "the floodgate model," restrictive standing rules have dammed the flow of suits that groups were otherwise ready and eager to pursue. I examine this hypothesis by analyzing processes of institutional transformation in two conservationist organizations: the Sierra Club in the United States and the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI). Rather than an eagerness to embrace newly available litigation opportunities, as the "floodgate" model would predict, the groups' history reveals a gradual process of transformation marked by internal, largely intergenerational divisions between those who abhorred conflict with state institutions and those who saw such conflict as not only appropriate but necessary to the mission of the group. Furthermore, in contrast to the pluralist interactions that the "floodgate model" imagines, both groups' relations with pertinent agencies in earlier eras better accorded with the partnership-based corporatist paradigm. Sociolegal research has long indicated the importance of relational distance to the transformation of interpersonal disputes. I argue that, at the group level as well, the presence or absence of a (national) partnership-centered relationship determines propensities to bring political issues to court. As such, well beyond change in groups' legal capacity and resources, current increases in levels of political litigation suggest more fundamental transformations in the structure and meaning of relations between citizen groups and the state.