Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy

This article explains why dissatisfaction with the performance of individual politicians in new democracies often turns into disillusionment with democracy as a political system. The demands on elections as an instrument of political accountability are much greater in new than established democracies: politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics of undesirable candidates who view this period as their “one‐time opportunity to get rich.” After a repeatedly disappointing government performance, voters may rationally conclude that “all politicians are crooks” and stop discriminating among them, to which all politicians rationally respond by “acting like crooks,” even if most may be willing to perform well in office if given appropriate incentives. Such an expectation‐driven failure of accountability, which I call the “trap of pessimistic expectations,” may precipitate the breakdown of democracy. Once politicians establish reputations for good performance, however, these act as barriers to the entry into politics of low‐quality politicians. The resulting improvement in government performance reinforces voters’ belief that democracy can deliver accountability, a process that I associate with democratic consolidation. These arguments provide theoretical microfoundations for several prominent empirical associations between the economic performance of new democracies, public attitudes toward democracy, and democratic stability.     

The September 2015 Regional Elections in Russia: A Rehearsal for Next Year's National Legislative Races

The September 2015 elections in the regions of Russia resulted in victories for the major pro-government party, United Russia, in 11 regional legislative elections and brought success to incumbent chief executives in 21 gubernatorial elections. The performance of United Russia was better than in the previous series of regional elections, which is particularly important given that in many respects, the 2015 regional elections served as a rehearsal for the 2016 national legislative races. The results of the elections generally attested to the efficiency of political and institutional manipulation tools developed by the Russian authorities in recent years.     

Economic Integration,Party Polarisation and Electoral Turnout

Recent research provides evidence that economic integration has a negative effect on electoral turnout. Taking up these recent findings, this article explores the causal chain in more detail. Specifically, it argues that one way by which economic integration affects the calculus of voting is through the positioning of political parties. The expectation is that the polarisation between parties on an economic left–right scale is lower the more integrated an economy is. Consequently, electoral turnout should be lower with less polarisation in the party system. The article employs aggregate-level data from legislative elections in 24 developed democracies. Using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project, evidence is found not only that economic integration has a negative effect on party polarisation as measured on an economic left–right dimension, but also that this in turn exerts a negative effect on electoral turnout.     

Electoral alliances: Party identities and coalition games

The emergence of electoral alliances competing for plurality seats has been one of the main consequences stemming form the introduction of the new electoral laws for the Senate and the Chamber of deputies in Italy. This paper analyzes the politics of electoral alliances at the general elections of April 1996, focusing on two factors: the making of electoral alliances and their internal arrangements for coalition management. From both points of view, the elections have shown some important new developments, including a simplification in the number of coalitions. But although the centre–left alliance was able to broaden its range, the centre–right lost the Lega Nord and suffered the split of Movimento sociale–Fiamma tricolore on its right. Moreover, the centre–right alliance also suffered from a lack of cohesion, wasting its previous coalitional capability. As in the 1994 elections the politics of electoral alliances proved to be a key factor in the electoral competition.     

Electoral alliances: Party identities and coalition games

Abstract The emergence of electoral alliances competing for plurality seats has been one of the main consequences stemming form the introduction of the new electoral laws for the Senate and the Chamber of deputies in Italy. This paper analyzes the politics of electoral alliances at the general elections of April 1996, focusing on two factors: the making of electoral alliances and their internal arrangements for coalition management. From both points of view, the elections have shown some important new developments, including a simplification in the number of coalitions. But although the centre–left alliance was able to broaden its range, the centre–right lost the Lega Nord and suffered the split of Movimento sociale–Fiamma tricolore on its right. Moreover, the centre–right alliance also suffered from a lack of cohesion, wasting its previous coalitional capability. As in the 1994 elections the politics of electoral alliances proved to be a key factor in the electoral competition.     

The Party Faithful: Partisan Images,Candidate Religion,and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification

We argue that the factors shaping the impact of partisanship on vote choice—“partisan voting”—depend on the nature of party identification. Because party identification is partly based on images of the social group characteristics of the parties, the social profiles of political candidates should affect levels of partisan voting. A candidate's religious affiliation enables a test of this hypothesis. Using survey experiments which vary a hypothetical candidate's religious affiliation, we find strong evidence that candidates’ religions can affect partisan voting. Identifying a candidate as an evangelical (a group viewed as Republican) increases Republican support for, and Democratic opposition to, the candidate, while identifying the candidate as a Catholic (a group lacking a clear partisan profile) has no bearing on partisan voting. Importantly, the conditional effect of candidate religion on partisan voting requires the group to have a salient partisan image and holds with controls for respondents’ own religious affiliations and ideologies.     

Doomed to Defeat? Electoral Support and the Conservative Party

This article recaps the main trends in public opinion and electoral support for the Conservative party since the last general election in June 2001 by examining the overall polling data relating to party popularity. The article also considers by-elections, local elections and leadership change, as well as the most recent elections in 2004. The various challenges the party faces as it attempts to position itself as a credible alternative government to the Labour party under Tony Blair are considered.
Given the clear biases of the electoral system used for the House of Commons, which are certain to benefit Labour substantially even if the Conservatives get close to them in terms of overall vote share, or indeed even overtake them, it still seems unlikely that such success will be sufficient to achieve much more than to reduce Tony Blair's House of Commons majority in 2005.     

Electoral Reform and Party System Change: An Analysis of Nordic Elections with Two Different Electoral Systems

Electoral system reforms are frequently discussed in various parts of the world, although major electoral system changes have been quite rare in established democracies. This article aims at predicting how the party systems in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden would change if elections were conducted under a plurality system or a mixed‐member majoritarian system. To this end, results of the last parliamentary elections are recalculated. The analyses show that the Nordic party systems would be subjected to drastic change. In Denmark, plurality elections would create a two‐party system; in Finland, Norway and Sweden, one party would be much larger than the others. Keskusta and Arbeiderpartiet would be superior to the other parties in Finland and Norway, respectively, whereas Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet would almost take complete control over the Swedish legislature. In practice, smaller parties would have to team up with larger ideologically similar parties. Under a mixed electoral system, several small and medium‐sized parties would survive, but in most countries, the main competition would take place between two basic political alternatives. Smaller parties are well‐advised to go against electoral system reforms that involve single‐member districts.     

Institutionalising Gender Equality in Spain: From Party Quotas to Electoral Gender Quotas

This article accounts for the particular steps Spain took to institutionalise gender equality in political representation. While some West European countries, where the ‘incremental track’ was considered too slow or too ineffective, recently shifted to the ‘fast track’ (notably, Belgium, France, Italy and Portugal), Spain adopted a legislative quota in 2007, when women's representation had already reached very high levels. Indeed, 10 years earlier, the quotas adopted by left-wing Spanish parties in the late 1980s had already reached parity and triggered a contagion effect within the party system. Comparatively speaking, Spain has followed the incremental track in a narrow time frame since democracy was restored in 1978. Finally, although the legal quota reform encountered political and juridical opposition, Spain managed to introduce it without the need for constitutional reform.     

Political Candidates and the Energy Issue: Nuclear Power Position and Electoral Success

Members of parliament are key actors for the implementation of energy transitions, such as phasing out nuclear power. Before legislators can cast their maybe decisive vote in parliament, they need to run for office and actively strive for election. This paper assesses what political candidates oppose renewable energy transitions and questions whether the energy issue matters in national elections, and thus has consequences for the implementation of new sustainable energy sources. We analyze these questions by first describing the specific characteristics of political candidates. The paper then evaluates the relevance of the energy issue for electoral success in three national elections in Switzerland (2007, 2012, and 2015). Based on candidate data from the voting advice application smartvote.ch, we find that female candidates support ETs more than men do; that especially the French‐speaking part of the country is more in favor of a nuclear phase‐out, and that younger candidates are also more open toward restructuring the energy system than older candidates are. Our models further show that the energy issue does not matter in elections, independently from its salience in the respective election campaigns. Candidates are thus relatively free to choose their position on the issue and do not have to fear consequences at the ballot. However, candidates of center parties, in contrast to the pole parties, are sensitive to the energy issue and reflect public mood in their positions.     

Legislative Victory, Electoral Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights

Previous studies indicate that in cases of relatively low issue salience, the interest group model best explains lesbian and gay antidiscrimination policy in the American states. The analysis of state and local public policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation concludes that for cases of high issue salience, the morality politics model best describes outcomes. The interest group politics model is used here in a case study of Wisconsin's passage of a comprehensive antidiscrimination policy, while the morality politics model is used to investigate the electoral outcomes of anti‐gay ballot initiatives in several states. The results of this analysis conform with prior research—when lesbian and gay issues are not salient, the interest group politics model best explains resulting policy, however, under salient conditions, the morality politics model best describes outcomes. Finally, the implications of this research for social scientists and activists are discussed.     

State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement

Most state constitutions contain detailed restrictions on thelegislative process. Violations of some of these restrictions(e.g., single-subject requirements) are reflected on the faceof a final enactment. Other violations (e.g., alteration ofa bill to change its original purpose) are not evident in thefinal enactment, but require investigation of the legislativeprocess. State courts have developed a variety of approachesto these second types of violations, from excluding all evidencebeyond the enactment to permitting any evidence of constitutionalviolations. The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act was passedin apparent violation of both types of constitutional restrictions.The legislative debates reflected legislators' attitudes aboutsuch restrictions, but the Pennsylvania courts refuse to enforcethem. After surveying other judicial approaches, the articlediscusses the legislative and executive obligation to followconstitutional restrictions, regardless of judicial enforcement.The article then advocates increased judicial enforcement, whilemaintaining proper deference to the legislature.     

Organisational Continuity and Electoral Endurance: The Communist Party of Cyprus

Many scholars have identified stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) as ardent supporters of Europe. This support has been explained as a result of positive developments in supranational integration that convinced these actors that Europe could facilitate the achievement of their territorial demands. Other work, however, leads to an expectation that SNRPs that mobilise within island regions that are geographically distant from the European centre of power (Brussels) will adopt more Eurosceptic positions. This article aims to test these competing hypotheses about the positioning of SNRPs on Europe. It does so by examining the attitudes of SNRPs in two island regions in the Mediterranean: Corsica and Sardinia. The findings suggest that SNRPs in both places cannot be adequately categorised as either Europhile or Eurosceptic. The article examines the role of several context- and actor-specific factors in shaping the complex positioning of island nationalists in Corsica and Sardinia on the issue of Europe.     

How to Manage a Party Brand: Empirical Perspectives on Electoral Probability and Internal Conflict

What happens when political party branding is modeled according to the preferences of either voters or party members? Employing the concept of brand identity and the analytical GAP model, this empirical study details the consequences of brand management decisions by political parties using the example of the two biggest parties in Germany. Strategic branding decisions have an impact not only on voting probabilities but also on their internal conflict potential, such as when a branding decision conflicts with the internal image a party maintains among its members. It thus can be highly beneficial for a political party to encourage its members to communicate their image of the party to other voters.     

Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting

Almost all legislators are subordinate to party leadership within their assemblies. Institutional factors shape whether, and to what degree, legislators are also subject to pressure from other principals whose demands may conflict with those of party leaders. This article presents a set of hypotheses on the nature of competing pressures driven by formal political institutions and tests the hypotheses against a new dataset of legislative votes from across 19 different countries. Voting unity is lower where legislators are elected under rules that provide for intraparty competition than where party lists are closed, marginally lower in federal than unitary systems, and the effects on party unity of being in government differ in parliamentary versus presidential systems. In the former, governing parties are more unified than the opposition, win more, and suffer fewer losses due to disunity. In systems with elected presidents, governing parties experience no such boosts in floor unity, and their legislative losses are more apt to result from cross-voting.     

Applicant Perceptions of State Priorities in the Illinois Small Cities CDBG Program: Implications for Local Targeting

The State of Illinois has targeted economic development as amajor priority in the Small Cities Community Development BlockGrant program, although the state still accepts applicationsfor public facilities and housing rehabilitation. This articleexamines the impact of this state priority on the applicationbehavior of small cities. We find that grant applicants perceivethat the state's economic development emphasis decreases theirability to be successful in obtaining housing rehabilitationgrants. This perception has had an impact on subsequent applicationbehavior. Cities no longer apply for grants that are most likelyto benefit directly those with low and moderate incomes.     

Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840–1940

The modern history of divided government in America suggests that the framers succeeded in creating a government unresponsive to popular passions. Yet in the nineteenth century the party winning the presidency almost always captured control of the House of Representatives. Why and how could nineteenth century national elections be so responsive that they resemble parliamentary outcomes? We identify electoral institutions present in the states that directly linked congressional elections to presidential coattails. Specifically, we estimate the impact of state ballot laws and the strategic design of congressional districts on presidential coattail voting from 1840 to 1940. We find that presidential elections, as mediated by state electoral laws, strongly account for unified party control of the House and the presidency throughout the nineteenth century.     

Sponsoring Private Member's Bills in Finland and Estonia: The Electoral Context of Legislative Behaviour

This article examines the degree to which sponsored private member's bills (PMBs) in parliament can be explained by electoral incentives. Such bills are a peculiar piece of draft legislation – technically simple, topically unimportant and with negligible passage rates. Yet members of parliament (MPs) sponsor them in large numbers. One possible explanation for this behaviour is the electoral context arising out of the variance in electoral district size and electoral list types, which makes a strong personal reputation comparatively more important for some MPs. Sponsoring bills that have no realistic chance of becoming actual regulations could be a form of personal reputation‐building and/or vote‐seeking behaviour. Evidence is examined on the sponsoring of such bills in Finland between 2003 and 2007 and in Estonia between 1999 and 2007 in order to determine if the electoral context explains why some MPs do this more frequently. The results suggest that the electoral system does have an effect. MPs who have been elected under rules where personal reputation is not central in getting elected are less likely to sponsor such bills the larger their electoral district becomes.