Studying the reach of deterrence: Can deterrence theory help explain police misconduct?

This article reports the first perceptual deterrence study of a sample of police officers. The study investigated the influence of traditional deterrence considerations, extralegal sanctions, and impulsivity on the intention to commit several hypothesized acts of police misconduct. The results were largely consistent with perceptual deterrence findings from samples of college students, experienced offenders, and corporate managers. In particular, this study found that both legal and extralegal sanction threats potentially deter police misconduct. Further, it found that impulsivity diminished the deterrent influence of both sanction forms. The study also found that some of the effects of the explanatory variables depended on whether officers had prior punishment experience. The article discusses the implications of its findings for combating police misconduct and for deterrence research generally.     

Industrious rebels and captains of deterrence: defiance interpreted through a Veblenian reformulation of strain theory

Strain and Defiance are criminological theories that lay ambivalent emphasis on the notion of “rebellion,” which is to say that they both regard mutinous behavior as being motivated by positive or negative ends alike. Individuals rebel, say, by stealing in order to achieve higher status (economic strain); or they may violently antagonize authority as a way to “salvage dignity” in an environment in which they have no social stake whatsoever (defiance). Conversely, they may responsibly protest to oppose blind consumerism (strain); or they may civilly disobey racist laws (political defiance). It is here argued that both theories may be construed as special cases of a general problem, which Thorstein Veblen had already diagnosed in 1899. Veblen depicted social dynamics as a battle between the deterring forces of conservatism, which are animated by an overpowering predatory-pecuniary instinct, and those of progressivism, which rely, on the other hand, on an (ever more enfeebled) instinct of cooperation and workmanship. In this Veblenian model, civil defiance represents a challenge of the peaceable middle-class to the rule of the elite, whereas economically-strained defiance is the expression of the attempt of (middle to low) classes possessed by a pecuniary drive to emulate the status of the elite itself.     

Plea bargaining and deterrence: An institutional approach

Previous economic analyses of plea bargaining have largely ignored its impact on the deterrence of crime. Instead, they have focused on the bargaining between a defendant and a prosecutor once a crime has been committed. This article remedies this deficiency by asking how the practice of plea bargaining influences the determination of criminal punishment and thereby the supply of crime by rational offenders. The key question examined is, how do the ex post objectives of prosecutors affect the ability of legislatures to implement criminal punishments aimed at achieving optimal deterrence? Various prosecutorial objectives are considered in answering this question.     

Saturated enforcement: The efficacy of deterrence and drunk driving

Deterrence theory generally finds support among studies focusing on changes in apprehension certainty, in punishment celerity, or in punishment severity. However, scientific evidence establishing a clear deterrent effect of criminal justice institutions on criminal behavior remains problematic partly because of measurement, design and/or experimental control difficulties. This study attempts to overcome some of these methodological difficulties by measuring deterrence in a drunk driving enforcement program in a small Wisconsin city. It demonstrates a statistically significant relationship between a carefully designed enforcement program and driver response measured by accident rates. This finding is contrary to some recent studies challenging the efficacy of enforcement efforts aimed at traffic accident reductions. A general discussion of deterrence and enforcement amplifies the findings and conclusions. A word of caution is added regarding the findings.     

Perceptional foundations of deterrence: The case of prostitution

The authors conducted a survey to determine community perceptions about the certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment with regards to the crime of prostitution. A representative random sample of Mecklenburg County, which includes Charlotte, North Carolina, was taken and 850 individuals responded. The results revealed that (1) citizens perceive sanctions against prostitution violations as being applied only infrequently; (2) most respondents perceive the time from violation to arrest as being relatively short but slower as the offenders proceed through the system, and (3) the severity of punishment is not perceived as being harsh. The authors argue that the low likelihood of apprehension, both actual and perceived, plus the mild sanctions may partially account for prostitution’s continued survival.     

Police patrol and the deterrence of crime

A nonrecursive model of the deterrent effect of police presence was formulated and tested for 26 cities. Victimization data were employed as measures of crime, unpublished FBI data on the number of police patrol units as the measure of levels of police presence, and data for 11 exogenous variables were derived from FBI and census reports. It was found that per capita, police are a positive function of rates of violent crime and that clearance rates are a positive function of police presence. However, some offenses that have traditionally been thought to be deterrable are not inversely related to clearance rates. The equations were re-estimated using official measures of crime and found to be more consistent with the deterrent hypothesis. It is suggested that official data may generate a spurious correlation. Finally, caution is suggested in consideration of alternative forms of police presence.     

Error minimization and deterrence in agency control

In the presented oversight model, in which a regulatory agency may collude with regulatees, a watchdog organization may scrutinize the agency’s decision-making and find evidence speaking for collusive behavior. Found evidence is of a specific, stochastic quality. Courts will overturn the administrative decision when the evidence presented in court exceeds a minimum quality standard set by the political principal. Lowering the quality standard increases the odds of finding evidence of sufficient quality and, hence, leads to increasing collusion deterrence and to a lower probability of acquitting collusive administrators (type I error), but also to a higher probability of convicting an innocent administrator (type II error). It is shown that, when welfare-maximization gives rise to an interior solution, the welfare-maximizing standard of evidence is lower than the one that merely minimizes the costs of legal errors without taking deterrence costs into account, but will imply incomplete deterrence. However, conditions can and will be identified under which both error cost minimization and complete deterrence coincide with welfare-maximization.     

The challenge of cyber attack deterrence

National security planners have begun to look beyond reactive, tactical cyber defense to proactive, strategic cyber defense, which may include international military deterrence. The incredible power of nuclear weapons gave birth to deterrence, a military strategy in which the purpose of armies shifted from winning wars to preventing them. Although cyber attacks per se do not compare to a nuclear explosion, they do pose a serious and increasing threat to international security. Real-world examples suggest that cyber warfare will play a lead role in future international conflicts. This article examines the two deterrence strategies available to nation-states (denial and punishment) and their three basic requirements (capability, communication, and credibility) in the light of cyber warfare. It also explores whether the two most challenging aspects of cyber attacks – attribution and asymmetry – will make cyber attack deterrence an impossible task.     

Statistical measurement of the deterrence effect: A regression framework

When the dependent variable is a ratio, and its numerator also appears as the denominator of an explanatory variable, doubts exist with respect to the bias of the estimated effect. Although the problem arises in many contexts, it is posed here in the context of estimating the deterrence effect of punishment on crime. This is the context in which Logan (1978) suggests the method of “part-correlation.” By expressing this method in a regression framework, the results of the analysis of specification error are drawn upon to simplify Logan's procedure, proper measures are derived, and results are generalized. Finally, the effects of measurement errors are introduced and the bias examined.     

Problems and justifications of the theory of Drstisrsti

Journal of Indian Philosophy -     

Information,apprehension, and deterrence: Exploring the limits of police productivity

The capacity of police departments to solve crimes and apprehend offenders is low for many types of crime, particularly crimes of profit. This article reviews a variety of studies of police apprehension and hypothesizes that an important determinant of the ability of the police to apprehend criminals is information. The complete absence of information for many types of crime places fairly clear upper bounds on the ability of the police to effect solutions.To discover whether these boundaries are high or low we analyzed data from the 1973 National Crime Panel about the types and amount of information potentially available to police through victim reports and patrol activities. The evidence suggests that if the police rely on information made readily available to them, they will never do much better than they are doing now. On the other hand, there appears to be more information available to bystanders and passing patrols than currently is being used, which suggests that surveillance strategies and improved police methods for eliciting, recording, and analyzing information supplied by victims and witnesses might increase the probability of solving crimes and making arrests. In light of this we review a few possibly helpful innovations suggested in the literature on police productivity and procedure.     

Situational deterrence and claim padding: results from a randomized field experiment

While it is generally argued that threats of legal sanctions are more effective with offenders involved in economic crimes than with delinquents committing more conventional crimes, such an affirmation rests on weak empirical evidence. Also, most studies supporting this proposition were conducted with non-experimental designs, thus, undermining the interval validity of the results. On the other hand, studies base their predictions on individual factors and do not incorporate contextual factors. To overcome those limitations, a randomized field experiment was implemented in four insurance companies to incorporate contextual factors into the dynamics of deterrence. This study assessed the effect of a written threat (a deterrent letter reminding insured persons of the punishment for insurance fraud) on claim padding behaviours of insured persons filing claims for residential theft. A deterrent-letter project was implemented in four insurance companies, with claims randomly assigned to the experimental or the control group. Cases belonging to the control group were managed as usual, while individuals in the experimental group received the written threat. The experimental design made sure that the deterrent stimulus was exactly delivered to the insured persons when they had the opportunity to exaggerate the value of their claims. Findings demonstrate that claimants in the experimental group were less likely to pad their claims than were those in the control group. The letter was effective, regardless of the means of delivery. In conclusion, the administration of a written threat at the moment of criminal opportunity appears to be an effective strategy for preventing economic crimes.