法律哲学与政治哲学

一、法律和政治或许法律哲学可以被理解为政治哲学的一个分支?这两者之间显然存在着关联。法律体系是政治体系的一个组成部分,而奇怪的是政治学的研究者们竟始终对它的实施不感兴趣。法律、法律适用、法律构成、立法机关、法院、司法判决、法律推理、法治,如此等等,都是政治学研究的重要课题。立法机关和法院是政治机构,法治是政治理念,司法判决和法律推理是一定社会的政治文化的组成部分,是人们展示的政治实践和政治技能。的确,它们都不是政治学的研究者们感兴趣的主题。政治学研究者的兴趣点,在于像政党这样的非法律的组织,像自由与繁荣这…     

FRUSTRATED CONTRACTS AND LEGAL FICTIONS

“Someone says to me: ‘Show the children a game.’ I teach them gaming with dice, and the other says, ‘I didn't mean that sort of game.’ Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind when he gave the order?” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 33, trans., (1953)).     

INFORMATION COSTS AND LEGAL SERVICES

Most of the current debate on the effective provision of legal services ignores the centrality of information costs. It is argued that conventional controls do not address this issue, especially where clients are infrequent users of legal services and the services required are nonroutine. In this segment of the market for legal services there is an "adverse selection" problem that will drive down the quality of legal services. Existing methods of ensuring quality legal services to this segment of the market are unlikely to be effective. It is suggested that only legal agents with incentives and opportunities to acquire information can mitigate the adverse selection problem. The English bifurcation of lawyers into barristers and solicitors partly performs such a function and provides a model for possible innovations in the North American context.     

APPLICABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL NORMS

We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law. This revised version was published online in November 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

APPLICABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL NORMS

We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law.     

SURRENDER OF JUDGMENT AND THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

The aim of this paper is to take the first steps toward providing a refurbished consent theory of political authority, one that rests in part on a reconception of the relationship between the surrender of judgment and the authoritativeness of political institutions. On the standard view, whatever grounds political authority implies that one ought to surrender one's judgment to that of one's political institutions. On the refurbished view, it is the surrender of one's judgment – which can plausibly be considered a form of consent – that makes political institutions practically authoritative.     

SURRENDER OF JUDGMENT AND THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

The aim of this paper is to take the first steps toward providing a refurbished consent theory of political authority, one that rests in part on a reconception of the relationship between the surrender of judgment and the authoritativeness of political institutions. On the standard view, whatever grounds political authority implies that one ought to surrender one's judgment to that of one's political institutions. On the refurbished view, it is the surrender of one's judgment – which can plausibly be considered a form of consent – that makes political institutions practically authoritative. This revised version was published online in November 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.