Defendants pleading insanity: an analysis of outcome

The authors examined the cohort of all defendants pleading not guilty by reason of insanity over a 12-month period in Baltimore City's superior trial court. During that time, 143 of the 11,497 defendants indicted (1.2%) pled not criminally responsible. Fourteen of those defendants (10%) were subsequently found not guilty by reason of insanity. The authors found marked agreement between the prosecution and defense with only two cases leading to full trials where the issue of insanity was argued. The evaluating physician's opinion as to criminal responsibility and Axis I diagnosis, and the most serious underlying charge discriminated between those defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity and those defendants found guilty or not guilty by the court. Other demographic factors such as age, number of dependents, educational level, severity of illness, and criminal background did not discriminate between the two groups.     

Measuring the effects of the guilty but mentally Ill (GBMI) verdict

We studied effects of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) legislation on use of the insanity defense in Georgia using data on all defendants entering an insanity plea before (1976–1981) and after (1982–1985) the introduction of the GBMI verdict. In contrast to earlier studies, our results indicated that GBMI did decrease the likelihood of an insanity verdict and affected the composition of those found not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendants pleading insanity and found GBMI were typically white males with a serious mental disorder, charged with murder or robbery in which an unrelated female victim was involved. The data also indicated that defendants who pleaded insanity and were found GBMI received harsher sentences than their guilty counterparts. We conclude that the GBMI verdict will make the insanity plea a less appealing option for mentally ill defendants.     

Implicit theories of criminal responsibility

Three questions relevant to insanity decisions were examined: (a) What informational cues are weighed most heavily in the attribution of criminal responsibility? (b) How do verdict forms influence these attributions? And (c) How do individuals' beliefs about insanity and responsibility influence decision making? Undergraduate subjects (n=181) responded to vignettes portraying an act by a mentally disordered defendant. Psychiatric jargon was avoided, so that attributions were not a function of diagnostic terminology. It was found that, under the traditional scheme of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) vs. guilty, level of mental disorder (schizophrenia vs. personality disorder) was the primary determinant of insanity decisions. Also, insanity judgments were more likely to be made for acts performed without planful intentionality. Under the alternative scheme of NGRI vs. guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) vs. guilty, mental disorder still controlled NGRI verdicts; a bizarre act increased the likelihood of a GBMI over a guilty verdict; and the GBMI verdict option reduced markedly the proportion of psychotic defendants found NGRI and the proportion of personality disordered defendants found guilty. There were no significant differences between diagnostic groups in the likelihood of being found GBMI. Most subjects preferred to utilize the GBMI option as a compromise verdict even in the face of very severe mental illness. Attitudinal data revealed considerable variation in agreement with the classic moral logic of the insanity defense and accounted for a significant amount of the variance in insanity decisions. The implications for both social policy and future research are discussed.     

The insanity defense: effects of abolition unsupported by a moral consensus

The insanity defense reflects the moral judgment that some criminal defendants do not deserve criminal sanctions because of mental incapacity. This Note examines the alternative formulations, such as guilty but mentally ill and diminished responsibility, that some states have enacted in the face of growing controversy over the insanity defense. It observes that the alternatives, if used in lieu of the insanity defense, distort the criminal law and do not comport with the legal doctrine of responsibility, which eschews punishing mentally ill defendants. The Note concludes that the insanity defense should not be abolished unless the moral consensus changes regarding the criminal responsibility of mentally ill defendants.     

Two year's experience under Utah's mens rea insanity law

The author examined the records of the seven defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) under Utah's mens rea insanity law during the first two years of its operation. In all of the cases the attorneys, judges, and experts seemed unaware of the new law or confused about its meaning. Examination revealed that the findings of insanity were negotiated with either ignorance of or indifference to the mens rea law. Under the mens rea NGI law, the rate of insanity findings for Utah increased.     

The social construction of criminal responsibility and insanity

This study examines the effects of judicial instructions (traditional American Law Institute [ALI] not guilty by reason of insanity [NGRI] instructions contrasted with ALI instructions supplemented with the guilty but mentally ill [GBMI] alternative) and case information cues (delusional content and planfulness) on student and community subjects' attributions of responsibility. GBMI instructions substantially reduced the probability of NGRI and guilty verdicts in response to vignettes portraying highly psychotic defendants and altered the pattern of variability in responsibility construal ratings. Variation in delusional content cues (self-defense versus non-self-defense) influenced ratings of criminal appreciation but did not affect the verdict distributions. Less planfully commited crimes resulted in higher proportions of insanity verdicts. However, individual differences in responsibility construals of the defendant and in attitudes toward the insanity defense were stronger predictors of verdicts than the design variables, suggesting that individual differences in social-moral cognition are at least as relevant to the attribution of responsibility as are case cues or legal frames of reference. Contrary to previous studies,Witherspoon death penalty attitudes were not related to verdicts, but people without conscientious scruples toward the death penalty were more likely to render guilty verdicts.     

Moral wrongfulness and insanity: a New Zealand sample

Introduction: This study sought to identify the common characteristics amongst defendants found legally insane, compared to those who were psychiatrically evaluated yet convicted of their crime. Method: A retrospective review of court-ordered psychiatric court reports and legal outcomes was conducted, for all defendants referred for insanity evaluations in the largest city in New Zealand (and its surrounding rural regions) for a 7-year period. Results: The majority (60%; 37) of those referred for evaluation were found legally insane. The opinion regarding moral wrongfulness was the single factor that differentiated successful insanity defendants from those who were found guilty. Conclusions: Despite the centrality of the insanity defence to forensic psychiatry, few studies internationally consider characteristics of those found insane, particularly in comparison with those who are found guilty. Psychiatrically evaluated defendants in this sample were relatively homogenous, perhaps due to the court liaison nurse screening process.     

Detention Patterns of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants

This study examines the detention patterns of the insanity defendant who is successful with the plea and hospitalized, or unsuccessful and incarcerated. Further comparisons are made with felony defendants who never entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). From existing data it is unclear to what extent detention may vary if the plea is successful as compared to if it is not successful. Of all defendants who entered a plea of NGRI in Erie County, New York (Buffalo) between 1970 and 1980, 128 were institutionalized as a result of their disposition. Sociodemographic, institutionalization histories, arrest, and disposition information were collected and analyzed for all 128 individuals. The research evaluates differences in the likelihood and length of either institutionalization or incarceration and in the rates of release between successful NGRI defendants, those who entered the plea unsuccessfully, and those who did not plead NGRI. From the findings reported here the authors conclude that pleading NGRI in Eric County may not be quite as advantageous for a defendant as commonly is believed.     

A comparison of insanity defense standards on juror decision making

Following the Hinckley acquittal, 17 states and the federal government made changes to the insanity defense, including revising the standard, reassigning the burden of proof, and altering the standard of proof. Two studies were conducted to determine whether the specific insanity standard (including the assignment of burden of proof and standard of proof) employed had a significant effect on mock jurors' verdicts. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense instructions was measured and the factors jurors used to decide whether to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were also assessed. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense standards was very low. When asked to identify the factors they considered important in determining whether to find a defendant NGRI, only three elements of insanity defense standards were identified as significant. The results may have important implications for policy decisions regarding the insanity defense.     

Characteristics of successful and unsuccessful insanity pleas

Thirty men acquitted not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were matched on type of violent crime and compared to 30 men who unsuccessfully raised the insanity defense. Demographic, legal process, and psychological variables were compared. Eighty percent of successful acquittees previously had been found incompetent to stand trial, compared to only 33% of those found guilty and sentenced to prison. Ninety-six percent of NGRI acquittees opted for trial before a judge rather than a jury; 76% of cases raising an unsuccessful defense were heard in front of a jury. Unsuccessful attemptees also had significantly higher IQ scores and personality profiles characterized by acting-out potential and intact reality testing compared to profiles of NGRIs. The ability of the legal system to identify those meeting criteria for the insanity defense is discussed.     

Criminal defense counsels,district attorneys,and the insanity plea: A modest difference of opinion

This research examines differences between samples of 166 city and county prosecutors and 118 defense attorneys from Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky concerning their views toward the insanity plea in felony cases. Currently, tests for insanity used by the states are the M’Naghten rule, the ALI Model Penal Code test, and the Smith “irresistible impulse” test or combinations thereof. Defense counsels greatly favor the prosecution bearing the burden of proving a defendant’s sanity, while a majority of prosecutors believe that this is the defense counsel’s responsibility. Twenty-five percent of the prosecutors surveyed believed that it is the prosecutor’s responsibility to show by clear and convincing evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendants are sane and capable of bearing the responsibility for their crimes alleged. Philosophical and practical arguments about the burden of proof issue are examined. Preferences of defense counsels and prosecutors for different insanity tests are explored, finding that a majority of attorneys favor the more recent ALI test.     

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who really are insane.     

Decision making and examiner bias in forensic expert recommendations for not guilty by reason of insanity

Source of nomination (prosecution, defense, judge) was varied in a fictional not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) case distributed to 180 community forensic evaluators in a state employing theM'Naghten rule. Differences among examiners by appointment for the final NGRI judgment was not significant; interrater reliability for psychopathological symptomatology was .73. Discriminant analysis revealed significant differences in the decision-making process between evaluators recommending sanity and those endorsing insanity, as well as between psychiatrists and psychologists.     

Alleged brain damage, diminished capacity, mens rea, and misuse of medical concepts.

As focus on the insanity defense diminishes, defendants may place emphasis on a lack of knowing or purposeful behavior in order to negate a criminal charge. This use of a mens rea defense in accord with Model Penal Code principles is exemplified by the current New Jersey statute. Such a defense may result in a lesser charge or a finding of not guilty. In addition to reviewing applicable law, this report presents a sex offense case in which remote brain damage was invoked as a purported basis for incapacity to formulate the required intent; the study also raises the issue of the inappropriate or questionable use of medical principles, a practice that diminishes professional credibility in the courts and in the community.     

Plea decision-making: the influence of attorney expertise,trustworthiness, and recommendation

ABSTRACT

Attorney recommendations influence defendant plea decisions; and the degree of influence likely rests on the perceived trustworthiness and level of expertise of the attorney (factors of source credibility). We explored attorney source credibility factors and how these characteristics influence defendants’ plea decision-making. MTurk participants read a hypothetical plea scenario and were asked to imagine themselves as the defendant in a DWI/DUI case making a plea decision; in the scenario, we manipulated the defense attorney’s level of trustworthiness, expertise, and plea recommendation. There was a significant interaction between attorney recommendation and trustworthiness on defendants’ plea decisions; participants who were advised to accept the guilty plea were more likely to plead guilty when the attorney was high in trustworthiness compared to low in trustworthiness. Attorney trustworthiness did not affect plea decisions for defendants advised to reject the guilty plea. Importantly, attorney trustworthiness affected defendants’ decision to follow the attorney’s recommendation and ultimate plea decision (regardless of expertise), and attorney expertise affected defendants’ confidence in their decision (regardless of trustworthiness). Results suggest individual-level characteristics of defense attorneys affect the influence of the attorney and their recommendation, and ultimately defendants’ plea decision-making.     

论中国死刑案件中的精神病抗辩

随着权利话语的流行与国家对被告人权益保护的增强,中国死刑案件中的被告方在庭审阶段频频提出精神病抗辩,意图减轻罪责或不负刑事责任。然而,实践中却显示出如下悖论:被告方虽时时提出抗辩,但法庭却不愿启动精神病鉴定程序。这一现象的原因在于:当前被告方提出精神病抗辩的证明责任分配不明;被判无罪精神病人的监管难题与强制治疗措施缺乏;精神病鉴定一再反复导致法官无以判案等等。因此,在我国近年越来越重视死刑案件审判程序的背景下,有必要重构被告人精神病抗辩的合理制度,使其在维护被告人正当权益的前提下也不至于无章可循、变得过度泛滥。     

Limitations on the ability to negotiate justice: attorney perspectives on guilt,innocence, and legal advice in the current plea system

In the American criminal justice system the vast majority of criminal convictions occur as the result of guilty pleas, often made as a result of plea bargains, rather than jury trials. The incentives offered in exchange for guilty pleas mean that both innocent and guilty defendants plead guilty. We investigate the role of attorneys in this context, through interviews with criminal defense attorneys. We examine defense attorney perspectives on the extent to which innocent defendants are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current legal framework and investigate their views of their own role in this complex system. We also use a hypothetical case to probe the ways in which defense attorneys consider guilt or innocence when providing advice on pleas. Results indicate that attorney advice is influenced by guilt or innocence, but also that attorneys are limited in the extent to which they can negotiate justice for their clients in a system in which uncertainty and large discrepancies between outcomes of guilty pleas and conviction at trial can make it a sensible option to plead guilty even when innocent. Results also suggest conflicting opinions over the role of the attorney in the plea-bargaining process.     

Guilty plea hearings and judicial supervision: Some differences between federal and state judges regarding Rule 11 and a defendant’s right to due process

Samples of 120 district court judges from six randomly selected circuit court jurisdictions were compared with 62 circuit and criminal court judges in Tennessee concerning their compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.S.C.A., 1986) governing guilty plea hearings. Among other things, Rule 11 provides that judges will inquire of defendants in open court about the voluntariness of their guilty pleas, whether they understand that they are waiving several important constitutional rights, whether there is a factual basis for the guilty plea, whether they realize they have a right to an attorney, and whether they understand the nature and consequences of the charges against them. It was found that federal judges are substantially in compliance with these provisions of Rule 11, although full compliance was not observed for all issue areas. By comparison, Tennessee trial judges adhered to these provisions (duplicated in the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure verbatim) much less frequently. Various reasons for these discrepancies are discussed, as are some implications for defendant’s access to due process and certain constitutional guarantees.