<Emphasis Type="Italic">Alice’s Adventures</Emphasis>, Abductive Reasoning and the Logic of Islamic Law

How does a Muslim jurist think the law and how, accordingly, he judges a fact? Using Alice in Wonderland as hermeneutical device to explore the logic of fiqh, this article identifies a divergence between Western and Islamic legal thinking in the application of abduction as key form of inference in the law of Islam. In particular, looking at the fact/law relation in symbolic terms, the article highlights how, while a dichotomy between fact and law characterizes Western legal thinking, fiqh upholds a connection between the “real” and the “right” (?aqq), where the effort (ijtihād) in understanding sharī‘ah postulates the actualization of the “rule” (?ukm) in God’s creation. Thus, if sharī‘ah pre-scribes the Law, not only is the rule discovered through the sources (u?ūl), but the right has to be justified through a verdict de-scribing the fact, for the law to be validly stated for the given situation. In this sense, abduction as explanatory “hypothesis” (Peirce) and “inference to the best explanation” (Harman) of sharī‘ah provides an account for the probabilistic nature of fiqh, its ramification (furū‘) through verdicts, as well as for the epistemic and narrative function of the tradition as core aspects of the logic of Islamic law. At the same time, doubts can be raised about the compatibility between this logic and the deductive logic of modern state law, as a sub-product of Western legal thinking.     

How Can the Word “Cow” Exclude Non-cows? Description of Meaning in Dignāga’s Theory of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Apoha</Emphasis>

Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha) is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenaga?i. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence (anvaya) of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence (vyatireka) of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected (yukta) with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣa</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dharma</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣadharma</Emphasis>

This essay asks what the terms mok?a and dharma mean in the anomalous and apparently Mahābhārata-coined compound mok?adharma, which provides the title for the ?āntiparvan’s third and most philosophical anthology; and it further asks what that title itself means. Its route to answering those questions is to look at the last four units of the Mok?adharmaparvan and their three topics—the story of ?uka, the Nārāya?īya, and a gleaner’s subtale—as marking an “artful curvature” that shapes the outcome of King Yudhi??hira’s philosophical inquiries of Bhī?ma into a ”return” to this world to take up the topic of the fourth anthology, a King’s generous giving, in the Anu?āsanaparvan’s Dānadharmaparvan. Usages of the term mok?a in the narratives in these units are considered in the light of The Laws of Manu’s usage of mok?a to define the “renunciatory asceticism of a wandering mendicant” after the fulfillment of one’s debts (Olivelle et al., in Life of the Buddha by A?vagho?a, 2008). Usages of mok?adharma are discussed in conjunction with its overlapping term niv?ittidharma. With the term dharma itself, it is a matter of finding the best contextual translation. A pitch is made that these four units, and particularly the Nārāya?īya, should no longer be thought of as “late” additions.     

The Identity of Person and World in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Caraka Saṃhitā</Emphasis> 4.5

This paper examines the puru?a concept in the Caraka Sa?hitā (CS), an early text of Ayurveda, and its relation to Indic thinking about phenomenal worldhood. It argues that, contrary to the usual interpretation, early Ayurveda does not consider the person to be a microcosmic replication of the macrocosmos. Instead, early Ayurveda asserts that personhood is worldhood, and thus the person is non-different from the phenomenal totality (spatial and temporal) of his existence. This is confirmed by the CS’s several definitions of puru?a, which are alternately posed in terms familiar to Vai?e?ika, early (pre-“classical”) Sā?khya, early Buddhism, and Upani?adic monism. It is likewise confirmed by the Ayurvedic logic of sāmānya (translated as “identity”), which governs the meaning of the list of person-to-world correspondences in CS 4.5 and its often misinterpreted claim, puru?o’yam lokasa?mita?. Finally it is confirmed in the program of Ayurvedic therapeutics, which aims at establishing various kinds of “appropriateness” for the sake of effecting samayoga—the “harmonious joining” of person and world.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Karman</Emphasis>-Theory in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> Prolegomena to an Inquiry into the Culture and the Condition of Philosophical Reflection About Human Life and the Requirements of Liberation

After delimiting the topic by reflecting on the heuristic function of the concept of “theory” in “Delimiting the Topic” section, the paper considers the literary aspects of karman-theory in the Mahābhārata in “Literary Characteristics” section (treating questions, characters, episodes, tracts, metaphors, and intertextuality). “Axioms, Theorems, Domains” section then lists the elements or axioms that fall under the umbrella term “karman-theory.” Next, dealing with contexts and collocations, “Contexts, Collocations” section combines the consideration of literary and theoretical aspects of the matter. “Historical Perspective” section then argues for the inclusion of a historical perspective in the study of karman-theory. The “Conclusion”, section, formulates provisional results and poses further questions.     

Proof of a Sentient Knower: Utpaladeva’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi</Emphasis> with the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vṛtti</Emphasis> of Harabhatta Shastri

Utpaladeva (c. 900–950 C.E.) was the chief originator of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology of monistic Kashmiri ?aivism, which was further developed by Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1020 C.E.) and other successors. The Aja?apramāt?siddhi, “Proof of a Sentient Knower,” is one component of Utpaladeva’s trio of specialized studies called the Siddhitrayī, “Three Proofs.” This article provides an introduction to and translation of the Aja?apramāt?siddhi along with the V?tti commentary on it by the nineteenth–twentieth century pa??it, Harabhatta Shastri. Utpaladeva in this work presents “transcendental” arguments that a universal knower (pramāt?), the God ?iva, necessarily exists and that this knower is sentient (aja?a). He defends the Pratyabhijñā understanding of sentience against alternative views of both Hindu and Buddhist schools. As elsewhere in his corpus, Utpaladeva also endeavors through his arguments to lead students to the recognition (pratyabhijñā) of identity with ?iva, properly understood as the sentient knower.     

Issues on Nibbāna with Special Reference to Verse No. 1074 of the Upasīvamāṇavapucchā in the Suttanipāta

This paper discusses verse 1074 of the Suttanipāta’s (Sn v. 1074) Upasīvamā?avapucchā. While various interpretations of the verse are possible due to a lack of textual sources to draw from for interpretation, I attempt to understand this verse—which describes the state of nibbāna using the metaphor of an extinguished fire—through a philological examination of the text itself and other contemporary ones. Specifically, I focus on whether the verse implies that nibbāna takes place in the present life or at and after the end of life by examining the compound nāmakāya and the phrase attha? paleti that appear in it. Arguing that the former term is a dvandva meaning “name-and-body” and that the latter means “goes down” (implying the end of life), I conclude that in this verse the Buddha is discussing nibbāna at and after the end of life. However, I do not deny that different interpretations are possible. When dealing with an ancient verse, the interpretation of one word can affect one’s understanding of the verse itself or the sutta overall, possibly leading to perspectives on early Buddhist thought completely different from the original meaning or original intention of the author of the sutta. Taking this into consideration, this paper adopts a meticulous approach to philologically examining early Pāli texts.     

Once Again on the *Hetucakraḍamaru: Rotating the Wheels

The little versified treatise on the elements of Buddhist logic, often referred to as the Hetucakra?amaru, is usually attributed to Dignāga. It is only available in a Tibetan translation and quotations from a few of its verses are extant in Sanskrit sources. On the basis of a novel interpretation that is based on a critical edition of the text, we argue that there is a good reason why its title was Hetucakra?amaru - a ?amaru is a two-headed drum. The “heads” of the drum are circular and they refer to the sapak?a and vipak?a conditions of the logical reason (hetu). These “wheels” can be turned clock-wise and counter clock-wise. The nine positions that are located on the wheels do remind one of a dharmacakra, which has a center and eight positions that are placed around it as if it were a compass. We illustrate our interpretation of the text by means of various diagrams.     

Transgression and Standard Theories: Contributions Toward Penal Abolition

In this paper I propose a transgression theory and a standard theory toward penal abolition. I argue that given the ubiquity of “crime” in human relationships, to speak of “criminal behavior” as deviant nullifies the concept deviance (abnormal, out of the ordinary, etc.). After demonstrating that empirically the opposite is the case, I argue for a transgression theory (that most human beings regularly act in ways that transgress the norms and laws they establish) and propose a standard theory (that human beings are both maintainers and transgressors of the social orders they establish). My paper challenges the foundational language (constructions) of “criminal justice” logic that ignore the continuity of the past in the present (white supremacy, neocolonialism, racial capitalism, and gendering enslavement), and that fortify discourse and practice from recognizing, eliminating and standing accountable by rectifying centuries of white privilege, heteronormativity, and the oppression of nonwhite bodies.     

Conceptuality and Non-conceptuality in Yogācāra Sources

This paper investigates the Yogācāra notions of “conceptuality”, represented by terms such as vikalpa, on the one hand, and of “non-conceptuality” on the other. The examination of the process of thinking as well as its absence has played a central role in the history of Yogācāra thought. The explanations of this process provided by Yogācāra thinkers in works such as the Yogācārabhūmi, the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and the Mahāyānasa?graha appear to be mainly concerned with the contents and the components of thoughts, categorizing them into different classes. These lists are far more than arbitrary collections. Instead they are meant to represent exhaustive summaries of a person’s conceptual experience. The first part of the paper focusses on conceptuality, exploring (mostly Abhidharmic) definitions of the relevant terms and ideas. The second part is mainly an investigation of the question which parts of the Buddhist path to liberation were considered to involve conceptual activity and which were described as non-conceptual.     

Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Concepts

The present paper is a kind of selective summary of my book The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (2014). [1.–2.] It deals with questions of origin and early development of three basic concepts of this school, viz., the ‘idealist’ thesis that the whole world is mind only (cittamātra) or manifestation only (vijñaptimātra), the assumption of a subliminal layer of the mind (ālayavijñāna), and the analysis of phenomena in terms of the “Three Natures” (svabhāvatraya). [3.] It has been asserted (H. Buescher) that these three basic concepts are logically inseparable and therefore must have been introduced conjointly. [4.] Still, from Vasubandhu onward treatises have been written in which only one of the three concepts is advocated or demonstrated to be indispensable, without any reference to the other two being made. Likewise, in most of the earlier Yogācāra treatises, the three concepts occur in different sections or contexts, or are even entirely absent, as vijñaptimātra in the Yogācārabhūmi (except for the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra quotation) and ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and Madhyāntavibhāga. [5.] It is therefore probable that the three concepts were introduced separately and for different reasons. [5.1.] As regards the concept of the “Three Natures”, I very hypothetically suggest that it was stimulated by the Tattvārthapa?ala of the Bodhisatvabhūmi. [5.2.1.] In the case of ālayavijñāna, I still think that my hypothesis that the concept (term + idea) originated from a problem emerging in connection with the “attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti) holds good and has not been conclusively refuted, but I admit that Prof. Yamabe?s hypothesis is a serious alternative. [5.2.2.] An important point is that in the Yogācārabhūmi we come across two fundamentally different concepts of ālayavijñāna, the starting point for the change being, probably, the fifth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra. [5.3.] As for ‘idealism’, we may have to distinguish two strands, which, however, tend to merge. [5.3.1.] The earlier one uses the concept cittamātra and emerges as early as in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-sa?mukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra in connection with an interpretation of visions of the Buddha Amitāyus. [5.3.2.] The later strand introduces the concept vijñaptimātra and seems to have originated in the eighth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra in connection with a reflection on the images perceived in insight meditation. [5.3.3.] In texts like the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra, concepts from other Mahāyānasūtra strands (like abhūtaparikalpa) become prominent in this connection, and it is only in the Mahāyānasa?graha that the use of vijñaptimātra is finally established.     

More Norms,Less Justice: Refugees,the Republic,and everyone in between

The paper argues for conflating refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) as two sides of a work-in-progress postcolonial state. To be sure, aliens, refugees, IDPs, and stateless persons are separate legal entities. Nevertheless, this fragmented normative regime stands testimony to more laws and less justice. Many Asian states have no domestic refugee law. India, a common law system, takes a case by case approach as refugees are given “temporary shelter on humanitarian considerations”. Ironically, a work-in-progress postcolonial state sustains even de jure citizens as de facto stateless persons; the erstwhile Indo-Bangla enclaves for more than half a century were an apt example. Surely, the raison d’être of international law on refugees is to end human suffering, if needed, by transcending the absence of positive laws. A constitutional and political desire to minimise human suffering alone could cut the rigour of such positivist legal narratives. The Delhi High Court seemingly walked that path in Koul v Estate Officer noting “refugees and IDPs appear to be similarly situated”. Rising terrorism has made states increasingly believe in a security narrative all the same. A simultaneous emergence of a demographic anxiety particularly in India’s North-eastern states increasingly pits aliens and refugees against the domiciled indigenous and tribal people.     

Malingered Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and the Effect of Direct Versus Indirect Trauma Exposure on Symptom Profiles and Detectability

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is arguably prone to malingering due to its subjective and heterogeneous nature. Various factors can influence PTSD symptom profiles including trauma type and trauma exposure. However, it is unknown whether trauma exposure influences malingered PTSD symptom profiles. We used a malingering simulation design with trauma type controlled to compare (1) PTSD symptom profiles (Posttraumatic Stress Checliklist-5; PCL-5) at the syndrome, symptom cluster, and individual symptom levels and (2) symptom validity profiles (Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology; SIMS) at the overall and subscale level, as a function of direct and indirect trauma exposure. Seventy-three participants were randomly assigned to either the direct (“witnessed” trauma) or indirect (“learned about” trauma) condition. Participants were coached about symptoms and instructed to simulate PTSD. PCL-5 profile analyses revealed that simulators in the direct exposure group reported greater overall PTSD severity. Significant differences were found on cluster D (changes in cognition and mood) and individual symptoms including intrusive thoughts, amnesia, difficulty experiencing positive emotions, and risk-taking. No differences were identified for any other symptom scores nor for the symptom validity profile, except for the SIMS total score (direct: M?=?33.0, SD?=?12.8, indirect: M?=?26.5, SD?=?13.9, t(71)?=?2.06, p?=?.043, d?=?.48). These findings indicate that trauma exposure can influence malingered PTSD profiles at the syndrome, symptom cluster, and individual symptom levels (small effects), but, with one exception for a summary score, it does not produce a detectable difference on symptom validity testing. This study may provide insight for clinicians into the how malingered PTSD profiles can manifest as a result of direct and indirect trauma exposure; however, further research is strongly indicated.     

A Monstrous Inference called Mahāvidyānumāna and Cantor’s Diagonal Argument

A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipak?a) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.     

Preference for the Diversity Policy Label Versus the Affirmative Action Policy Label

Study 1 assessed associations with the labels “diversity policy” (DP) and “affirmative action policy” (AAP) and perceptions of potential policy components. Student and community participants (N = 143) completed a survey assessing associations with one of the policy labels. Both policies evoked similar associations such as “race/minorities” and “equality/equal opportunity,” but the AAP was more often associated with “bias/inequality/discrimination,” “unfairness,” and “racism/prejudice.” When rating potential policy components, reverse discrimination was considered more likely under the AAP. In Study 2 we explored the evaluation of equivalent policy components associated with different policy labels. Student participants (N = 126) rated the policy labeled as the DP more favorably than the AAP. Both studies suggest more favorable attitudes toward the DP label.     

The Use of the Biblical Oath and Its Development

The use of the oath in Jewish law reflects the religious nature of this system of law: in case a litigant cannot receive justice from the human judges s/he is entitled to call on God by swearing an oath. I begin this survey of the use of oaths in Jewish law with a discussion of the nature of “swearing an oath” based on biblical stories and biblical rules that regulate the use of oaths outside court. I then focus on the use of the oath in court; I survey the domain of circumstances in which an oath is accepted by Jewish law as evidence according to the Bible, the Mishna, Gemara, and codifications. Finally, I exemplify how the oath is used in practice in the 20th century by one case from Rabbi Saul Ibn Dannan’s responsa book “Hagam Shaul”.     

Compensation System Experience at 12 Months After Road or Workplace Injury in Victoria,Australia

Seeking or receiving compensation after injury is frequently associated with poor recovery. Previous research has shown that the stressful nature of compensation procedures and perceived injustice may cause secondary harm. This study examined compensation system experiences in compensation claimants in Victoria, Australia, and explored the relationship between these experiences and injury outcomes. One hundred and sixty compensable patients (120 male, 75.0 %) aged 18–67 years (M?=?43.01, SD?=?14.31), hospitalized for an injury in a motor vehicle crash (n?=?137) or at work (n?=?23), participated. Participants completed questionnaires about compensation system experience, pain, and psychological symptoms 12 months after injury. Principal component analysis (PCA) of the compensation system experience items revealed three components explaining 66.64 % of the variance in compensation experience: (1) “negative procedural experience” (47.29 %), (2) “compensation supported recovery” (10.43 %), and (3) “positive procedural experience” (8.92 %). Worse experience on all components was associated with worse pain (severity, interference, catastrophizing, disability) and psychological symptoms (anxiety, depression, PTSD, perceived injustice). Compensation system experience reflected both negative and positive procedural factors, and feeling supported through recovery. Most participants reported having positive experiences; however, those who were frustrated or stressed from compensation procedures had worse pain and psychological health outcomes. While this association is likely to be bidirectional with “non-recovery” also impacting on compensation experience appraisals, compensation schemes should nonetheless address modifiable sources of procedural injustice (e.g., arduous paperwork and approvals processes) and reinforce procedures that generate perceptions of support (e.g., timely and appropriate access to health services).     

Cultural Cognition and Public Policy: The Case of Outpatient Commitment Laws

What explains controversy over outpatient commitment laws (OCLs), which authorize courts to order persons with mental illness to accept outpatient treatment? We hypothesized that attitudes toward OCLs reflect “cultural cognition” (DiMaggio, P. Annl Rev Sociol 23:263–287, 1997), which motivates individuals to conform their beliefs about policy-relevant facts to their cultural values. In a study involving a diverse sample of Americans (N = 1,496), we found that individuals who are hierarchical and communitarian tend to support OCLs, while those who are egalitarian and individualistic tend to oppose them. These relationships, moreover, fit the cultural cognition hypothesis: that is, rather than directly influencing OCL support, cultural values, mediated by affect, shaped individuals’ perceptions of how effectively OCLs promote public health and safety. We discuss the implications for informed public deliberation over OCLs.