Proportional Representation in the Welsh Assembly

The proposed rule for electing members to the Welsh Assembly gives each voter two votes, to cast at the Parliamentary constituency level, and at the bigger European constituency level. Half of the members are to be elected for the Assembly by a form of proportional representation, where party support is calculated by aggregating the two votes. The voters will be allowed to cast the second vote for a different party than the one for which they voted at the parliamentary level. This additional degree of freedom can frustrate the objective of obtaining better correspondence between party support and the number ofseats.     

Election Inversions under Proportional Representation

It has been shown by Peter Kurrild‐Klitgaard, using several empirical examples under the Danish electoral system, that proportional representation (PR) can produce ‘election inversions’ such that a coalition of parties collectively supported by a majority of voters fails to win a majority of parliamentary seats. However, Kurrild‐Klitgaard's examples result from imperfections in the Danish PR system introduced to serve goals other than proportionality. In this article, Kurrild‐Klitgaard's analysis is carried a step further by showing that election inversions can occur even under the purest type of PR – namely, one with (i) a single national constituency, (ii) no explicit seat threshold, and (iii) a highly proportional electoral formula. Inversions result from the unavoidable ‘whole number problem’. Recent election data from Israel and the Netherlands is examined and examples of inversions under their relatively pure PR systems are found. Inversions are also found after recalculating seat allocations without a threshold, and on the basis of the most proportional electoral formulas and when the analysis is restricted to seat‐winning parties. Kurrild‐Klitgaard's Danish data is then re‐examined in the same fashion, as is the most recent apportionment of seats in the United States House of Representatives, and more examples of inversions are found.     

Proportional Representation and the Framers

Techniques for conducting elections developed since 1800 have raised a question about the soundness of the American framers’ majoritarianism. John Stuart Mill notably argued that the framers’ desire to reward merit, as opposed to party loyalty, would be better served by a system of proportional representation that gave deserving minorities a voice. This article considers the likelihood that a system such as Mill proposed would have the results he hoped for; it concludes that such a system is more likely to worsen problems with the existing system of representation than to solve them.     

Proportional Representation with Citizen Candidates

We construct a simple model incorporating bothcitizen-candidates and proportional representation andinvestigate its properties in a basic case with auniform distribution of citizen ideal points and purepolicy motivations, and in further cases which allowof office rents and other distributions ofpreferences. The idea of citizen-candidates, developedby Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate(1997), endogenises the decision to stand as acandidate and allows explicit study of the number andtype of candidates as an equilibrium phenomenon. Theidea of proportional representation allows a moreflexible relationship between the pattern of votescast and the final policy outcome, and also providesa richer model of political representation. Ourdiscussion points to the widespread possibility ofequilibria involving non-median policy outcomes;provides insights into the relationship betweenproportional representation and the equilibrium numberof candidates; and also provides an explicit accountof the trade-off between candidate benefitsdistributed on a winner-take-all basis and those thatare mediated through proportional representation.     

Women and Sport in Scandinavia: Policy, Participation and Representation

Throughout the 20th century women have gradually gained access to sporting activities but it is only in recent decades that they have become widely represented in the decision-making bodies of sport. How can we account for this development and the weak position of women in sport? The perspective in this article is historical and three levels of explanation are considered. To what extent can the developments be explained as the result of public policy, the organization and policy of the voluntary associations and federations and by the action or predispositions of (groups of) women themselves. The article presents an overview of the state of the art in the research on women and sport in Scandinavia in the sense that new data have been collected and existing research and writings are being reviewed. By questioning central myths about sport and politics, and about the roles women play, it is shown that the role of women in sports is related bom to gaining access to the sporting activities per se and to the fora where decisions are being made, and that this access has been hampered as well as facilitated by government policies and policies of associations and interest organizations of the sports world. Government policies, however, cannot account for the remarkable changes in physical participation and democratic representation of women in sports which has taken place during the past century. The policies of the voluntary sports associations and federations are of greater importance. But the key to the understanding is found among the women themselves. So it is argued that physical performance and involvement in management and decision-making are dependent not only on formal structures and the policies of governments and interest organizations, but to a large extent upon the way in which women see themselves. This argumentation rests on the available data and a critical reading of the literature and research on women and sport in Scandinavia.     

Perceptions of Fairness and Support for Proportional Representation

This paper explores the causes and consequences of evaluations of the political system and support for electoral system change. In 1993, New Zealand voters adopted a referendum that fundamentally changed the way representatives are elected, moving from a plurality to a proportional (PR) electoral system. We examine the role of cynicism about the political system in adopting PR and how electoral change may shape evaluations of the political system. We expect that political minorities and those dissatisfied with the current performance of government are more likely to be cynical about the fairness of the political process and that these evaluations are related to support for PR. In turn, supporters of the referendum should judge the political system more favorably once the reform is implemented. Using panel data from the 1993 and 1996 New Zealand Election Studies, we find that support for PR is based on more general evaluations of the fairness of the political system and partisan self-interest. Those who supported PR and are politically aware are also more likely to have an increase in favorable evaluations of the political system.     

Governing for the Mainstream: Implications for Community Representation

In this paper I begin by examining the role of extra-parliamentary institutions of representation within Australian democracy. I suggest that such institutions are an important supplement to majoritarian political institutions in ensuring that 'weak voices' are heard in the policy process. I then look at the impact of the Howard government on such extra parliamentary forms of community representation, drawing parallels with contemporaneous developments in Canada. I find that changes were in fact initiated under Labor governments, seeking to impose managerialist models on community-based representation. The further controls introduced by the Howard government have, however, seriously reduced the capacity of community-based peak bodies to represent their constituencies. These constraints create the danger of a less inclusive democracy, where the voices of those outside the mainstream can be ignored or misrepresented.     

You just made it: Individual incumbency advantage under Proportional Representation

Using close election outcomes, we identify a personal effect of incumbency on the probability of seeking election, and seeking and winning office in subsequent elections for elected officials in an Open List Proportional System. In many cases Danish local elections creates an as-if random distribution of candidates that are elected or not, which is an ideal setting for a Regression Discontinuity design. The incumbency advantage has been studied to a great extent, though primarily in pluralistic electoral systems, while more recent studies have extended the scope to Proportional Representation systems. This study adds to this budding literature by showing an advantage in a new context and focusing on candidate level electoral returns under conditions where candidates are arguably least likely to benefit from incumbency.     

Voting Paradoxes under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Eight Danish Elections

Voter preferences for eight general elections for the Danish parliament are analysed using survey data to investigate the possible presence of five types of social choice paradoxes that may occur in list systems of proportional representation. Two serious paradoxes fail to manifest themselves, while three others occur with different frequencies. One paradox always occurs – namely, for the social ordering of political parties based on pair-wise comparisons to be significantly different from that of the allocation of seats according to a principle of proportional representation. This result challenges the common view that a party receiving more seats than another must be presumed to be the one preferred by a majority.     

Electoral Justice as a Criterion for Different Systems of Proportional Representation

Studies of the properties of different electoral systems have generally concentrated upon the question of proportionality. This article introduces the concept of electoral justice which also incorporates the decision-making process into models of proportionality. Hypotheses derived from the concept are then tested against post-1945 Finnish electoral data.     

Coalition-Targeted Duvergerian Voting: How Expectations Affect Voter Choice under Proportional Representation

Inspired by analyses of majoritarian systems, students of consensual polities have analyzed strategic voting due to barriers to party success, namely, district magnitude and threshold. Given the prevalence of coalition governments in proportional systems, we analyze a type of strategic voting seldom studied: how expected coalition composition affects voter choice. We identify Duvergerian behavior by voters targeted at the coalition formation stage. We contend that when voters perceive their preferred party as unlikely to participate in the coalition, they often desert it and instead support the lesser of evils among those they perceive as viable coalition partners. We demonstrate our argument using data on coalition expectations from the 2006 Israeli elections. We find an appreciable albeit differential effect of coalition expectations on voter choice. Importantly, results hold controlling for ideological and coalition preferences. Lastly, we explore a broad cross-national comparison, showing that there is less, not more, proximity voting where coalitions are prevalent.     

Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties

This article examines the relationship between electoral systems and extremist political parties. Focusing on the West European parties of the extreme right, it first investigates the extent to which district magnitude and electoral formula - the two main dimensions of electoral systems - influence the scores of these parties. It then considers the overall impact of the disproportionality of the electoral system. The article concludes that whilst proportional electoral systems do undeniably make it easier for extremist parties to gain legislative representation, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that they promote extremism. Instead, the share of the vote going to extremist parties appears unrelated to the type of electoral system employed.     

Proportional Representation,Majoritarian Legislatures,and Coalitional Voting

Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives. In proportional representation systems, voters face more complex incentives as electoral outcomes don’t translate as directly into policy outcomes as in plurality rule elections. A common approach is to assume electoral outcomes translate into policy as a vote‐weighted average of all party platforms. However, most of the world’s legislatures are majoritarian institutions, and elections in PR systems are generally followed by a process of coalition formation. Results obtained using this assumption are not robust to the introduction of even minimal forms of majoritarianism. Incentives to engage in strategic voting depend on considerations about the coalitions that may form after the election, and the voters’ equilibrium strategies are shaped by policy balancing and the postelectoral coalition bargaining situation, including considerations about who will be appointed the formateur.     

Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation

Proportional representation systems affect the extent to which elected legislators exhibit various attributes that allow them to earn a personal vote. The sources of variation in personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) lie in informational shortcuts voters use under different electoral rules. List type (closed or open) and district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a district) affect the types of shortcuts voters employ. When lists are closed, legislators' PVEA are of decreasing usefulness to voters as magnitude (and hence the number of candidates on a list) increases. When lists are open, legislators' PVEA are increasingly useful to voters as magnitude increases, because the number of candidates from which voters must choose whom to give a preference vote increases. As predicted by the theory, the probability that a legislator will exhibit PVEA—operationalized as local birthplace or lower-level electoral experience—declines with magnitude when lists are closed, but rises with magnitude when lists are open .     

The Impact of Proportional Representation on Government Effectiveness: The New Zealand Experience

It is often claimed that proportional representation (PR) undermines government effectiveness, including decisional efficacy, fiscal prudence, electoral responsiveness and accountability. Drawing on New Zealand's experience since the introduction of a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1996, this article examines the impact of the new voting system on government effectiveness. Although government durability has been substantially reduced and the policy-making process has become more complex, governments under MMP appear to be no less able to address major policy problems or respond to changing economic circumstances. Moreover, New Zealand has maintained continuous fiscal surpluses under MMP — a radical departure from the protracted, and often large, deficits that characterised the previous two decades under a majoritarian electoral system.     

Why Geographically-Targeted Spending Under Closed-List Proportional Representation Favors Marginal Districts

Research on geographically-targeted spending under closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) is characterized by debate over whether ruling parties target core supporters or swing voters. We show that when CLPR is used in multiple districts and separate competitions are conducted in each, parties can reverse the formula through which votes are converted into seats to calculate how many additional votes they need to capture an additional seat. This enables parties to rank districts according to how close they are to winning an additional seat. We then show that under divisor-based formulae, parties will find they need fewer additional votes to capture another seat in districts where they captured fewer seats (‘marginal districts’). We posit that in these systems, ruling parties will steer geographically-targeted spending toward marginal PR districts and we present evidence of this from Japan.