Bündnisse für Arbeit: Nationale Handlungsfähigkeit im europäischen Regimewettbewerb

In recent years, new forms of tripartite concertation between governments, employers’ confederations and trade unions have re-emerged in the form of social pacts. The paper aims at explaining the emergence of social pacts under the impact of European regime competition. It argues that governments increasingly seek structural reforms of the labour market in order to solve the employment crisis. These structural reforms are however hardly attainable without the co-operation of the social partners. Using tripartite agreements, governments try to get the acceptance of trade unions to a reform policy which is conducive for employment growth. While social pacts are struck under the impact of regime competition, the political exchange between trade unions and governments does not have to foster this competition, but social pacts can facilitate European co-ordination of employment policies, since they strengthen the role of social partners.     

Europeanization or Party Politics? Explaining Government Choice for Corporatist Concertation

This article assesses whether changes in government choice for policy concertation with trade unions and employers are better explained by international or domestic factors. We compare patterns of corporatist governance in a strongly Europeanized policy domain (labor migration policy) and in a weakly Europeanized policy domain (welfare state reforms) over the last 20 years in Austria and Switzerland. We show that there is no systematic difference in patterns of concertation between the two policy sectors and that factors linked to party politics play a bigger role in the choice of governments for concertation. If the base of party support for policies is divided, governments are more prone to resort to corporatist concertation as a way to build compromises for potentially controversial or unpopular policies. By contrast, ideologically cohesive majority coalitions are less prone to resort to concertation because they do not need to build compromises outside their base of party support.     

Explaining Reforms of Parliamentary Minority Rights: A Theoretical Framework with Case Study Application

How can we explain institutional reforms that redistribute institutional power between the parliamentary majority and minority? This paper proposes an informal theoretical model to explain such reforms in European parliaments based on congressional literature and inductive explanations from case studies. The article argues that political parties as the relevant actors pursue institutional reforms based on their substantive goals, their current and expected future government status, transaction and audience costs of reforms, second-order institutions that regulate the relative influence of actors in changing parliamentary rules, and the institutional status quo. Hypotheses derived from this model are tested with a qualitative case study of all standing order reforms in the Austrian parliament from 1945 to 2014. The empirical analysis finds support for various hypotheses and their underlying causal mechanisms. As Austria constitutes a least-likely case, the evidence provides strong support for the theoretical model.     

When trade unions succeed: Cases of blocked liberalisation in the common market

Despite the generally accepted weakness of trade unions at the European Union level, an analysis of two high profile cases – the Services Directive and the Port Directive – shows that trade unions are able to mobilise effectively at the European level and, within constellations of actors, crucially impact EU decision making. In contrast to common claims that a lack of access to EU institutions makes such groups powerless, it is argued here that the exclusion of large opposing societal groups from consultations is neither a quick nor a sure fire recipe for dismantling opposition. On the contrary, it politicises the process and may lead to opposing groups mobilising in more contentious ways.     

Judicial Reform – A Neglected Dimension of SSR in El Salvador

ABSTRACT

Security Sector Reform is an integral part of peace-building but the focus of international actors tends to be on formal state security providers. This article argues that reforms in the judicial system are key for the non-violent transformation of societal conflicts. Based on historical institutionalism a theoretical argument links justice and peace. Reforms of the judiciary need to be an integral part of SSR because otherwise reforms in the military and the police can easily be undermined or turned back. A case study on El Salvador provides empirical insights on the interrelation between reforms of these institutions.     

The clash of government structure and racial politics in the City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson

Drawing on a qualitative case study of the political actors who authorized Richmond, Virginia's minority contractor ordinance, this article analyzes the discontinuity between their efforts to redistribute political resources into the black community and the municipal government structure established by the progressive reform movement and reinforced by the Supreme Court ruling in the City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson. It argues that the specific points of contention are the progress reforms that eliminated political patronage and required parsimonious tax structures. Pervious research noted the benefits and/or constraints on the redistributive efforts of black politicians/ regimes arising from coalitions in governments structured by progressive reforms. This research, in contrast, argues that we must look to the political structure itself as a source of constraints also. Thus, as affirmative action policies like the one in the City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson are outlawed, racial minorities will find their efforts to achieve social, and especially economic, equality limited by the dictates of the political system itself.     

Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of the majority’s most preferred candidates is the measure of majority power; and the minimal share of voters that allows the minority to veto each of their least preferred candidates is the measure of veto power. We find tight bounds on such minimal shares for voting rules that are popular in the literature and used in real elections. We order the rules according to majority power and veto power. Instant-runoff voting has both the highest majority power and the highest veto power; plurality rule has the lowest. In general, the greater is the majority power of a voting rule, the greater its veto power. The three exceptions are: voting with proportional veto power, Black’s rule and Borda’s rule, which have relatively weak majority power and strong veto power, thus providing minority protection. Our results can shed light on how voting rules provide different incentives for voter participation and candidate nomination.

     

The Political Foundations of Trust and Distrust: Reforms and Protests in France

This article argues that the high level of protest activity in France is, at least partly, the result of distrust between the government and the trade unions, and that such distrust is inevitable in a society where unions are sometimes strong enough to mobilise against the government but not confident in their own future strength. This trust problem can be overcome if governments are willing to make institutional changes that commit them to future policies, but such political engineering is costly and unstable, which explains why governments sometimes prefer open confrontation. The empirical part of the paper analyses four French social and labour market reform initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s, demonstrating that the ideas developed in this article help to explain important features of contemporary French policy-making.     

Pension Reform in Germany and Austria: System Change vs. Quantitative Retrenchment

This article first outlines the differences in outcome of pension reform in Germany and Austria. The 2001 German pension reform cut benefits very little, but it started a system changing transformation process by strengthening the second (occupational pensions) and third pillar (private pensions). The 2003 Austrian pension reform, pushed through against major opposition from the labour unions, contains very few elements of policy innovation, but benefits have been cut back much more significantly than in the German case. The paper explains the difference in outcomes (system change in Germany, retrenchment in Austria) by looking at the structure of political institutions. The federal government in Austria is much less constrained by formal veto players than the German government, which had to engage in extensive coalition-building to get the pension bill through the second chamber of parliament. Therefore the influence of informal veto players (mainly unions) was much higher in Germany. The impact on the reform outcome was the positive discrimination of occupational pensions and less severe cuts in the benefit levels. The concluding thesis is that for successful and long-term sustainable welfare state reform, a small number of formal veto players is a valuable resource. A large number of formal veto players is an obstacle to retrenchment reforms, although it might encourage policy innovation, because political actors will look for other policy venues to increase their leverage.     

Veto Players and Civil War Duration

Civil wars show a remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within days; others continue for decades. What explains the extreme intractability of some wars while others are resolved quickly? This article argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult. This veto player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new dataset containing monthly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II. The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players and the duration of civil war.     

Sharing the Rewards,Dividing the Costs? The Electoral Consequences of Social Pacts and Legislative Reform in Western Europe

Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysing whether governments’ pursuit of pacts affects their vote share and increases the probability that they gain re-election for 16 West European countries between 1980 and 2012. It is found that the presence of social pacts has a significant and positive effect on incumbents’ vote shares at the next election and also results in a higher probability of re-election. These results are conditioned by government type: While all types of governments benefit electorally from pacts, the electoral penalties from the pursuit of unilateral legislation on policy reforms harm single-party majorities the most, minority governments moderately, and coalition majorities the least.     

Churches as Societal Veto Players: Religious Influence in Actor-Centred Theories of Policy-Making

The article argues that the study of western democracies benefits from a conceptualisation of Christian churches as societal veto players characterised by three features: their power, which depends on their potential for mobilisation; their preferences, which can be deduced from churches' official statements and which are often outside the political spectrum; and their coherence, which determines the size of their indifference curve. Conceptualised as societal veto players, churches can be included in actor-centred theories of policy-making. Particular attention should be paid to veto points, church–state relations and religious parties, as these are the features of the political system that affect churches' behaviours. A comparative study of churches' roles in stem-cell policies illustrates the use of the concept. The study shows that the Catholic Church is a ‘stronger’ veto player than protestant churches, but that this stronger role can have paradoxical effects on the resulting policies and the policy process.     

Political Strategies and Fiscal Retrenchment: Evidence from Four Countries

Political strategy matters – especially in the case of unpopular reforms. This is the main argument of this article. It shows that the analysis of political strategies gives complementary insights into the causal mechanisms of reform politics. It helps us to understand how political actors successfully implement unpopular reforms. The article provides empirical evidence for this claim by means of an analysis of adjustment efforts in Sweden, Belgium, Canada and France during the 1990s. It is shown that governments acted strategically in two areas: they used strategic manoeuvres in the political sphere in order to circumvent veto players. And they employed strategic organisation and communication in the public sphere in order to dampen the risk of being punished by voters for the implemented policies.     

Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe

Veto player theory generates predictions about governments’ capacity for policy change. Due to the difficulty of identifying significant laws needed to change the policy status quo, evidence about governments’ ability to change policy has been mostly provided for a limited number of reforms and single‐country studies. To evaluate the predictive power of veto player theory for policy making across time, policy areas and countries, a dataset was gathered that incorporates about 5,600 important government reform measures in the areas of social, labour, economic and taxation policy undertaken in 13 Western European countries from the mid‐1980s until the mid‐2000s. Veto player theory is applied in a combined model with other central theoretical expectations on policy change derived from political economy (crisis‐driven policy change) and partisan theory (ideology‐driven policy change). Robust support is found that governments introduce more reform measures when economic conditions are poor and when the government is positioned further away from the policy status quo. No empirical support is found for predictions of veto player theory in its pure form, where no differentiation between government types is made. However, the findings provide support for the veto player theory in the special case of minimal winning cabinets, where the support of all government parties is sufficient (in contrast to minority cabinets) and necessary (in contrast to oversized cabinets) for policy change. In particular, it is found that in minimal winning cabinets the ideological distance between the extreme government parties significantly decreases the government's ability to introduce reforms. These findings improve our understanding of reform making in parliamentary democracies and highlight important issues and open questions for future applications and tests of the veto player theory.     

Fishing from the same schools: Parliamentary recruitment and consociationalism in the first and second Italian republics

This article addresses several issues surrounding the politics of flexibility in Spain. First, it argues that the strategic role of trade unions develop and condition public policies on labour market reform by couching their strategies in terms of the post‐war labour market strategies and structures of the state, especially as governments attempt to move away from established forms of fordist regulation. Hence, second, a broader political and historical perspective is required that understands the complex political dynamics of state‐labour relationships and their structuring over time. The state's role and its labour market presence becomes itself the object of distinct political interventions and calculations by unions, governments and employers. Any discussion of a ‘post‐fordist’ state, determined to increase the flexibility of the labour market, must look at the complex and difficult ‘transitional’ process.     

Trade unions and social capital in transitional communist states: The case of China

In the study of social capital in Asia, it has been common to see kinship networks as the formation of social capital relations that create trust within society or within Asian states. This paper explores social capital surrounding industrial conflicts to see how unions relate to social capital formation in the context of recent reforms in state socialist China. This paper will argue that in the face of spontaneous outbursts of rapid social capital formation, as in industrial conflicts, the role of institutional agents is important for sustaining social capital. In China, the traditional model of the states bureaucratic trade unions has proved poorly adapted to coping with rapid social capital formation, either as organizer or suppressant. In the case of new workplaces, however, without the history of cynicism and state corporatism, the official unions that seek to represent members and sustain social capital are able to do so quite effectively. To build social capital, it is not necessary to destroy existing trade unions in China but to reorient their focus from bureaucratic centralist to representative organizations.     

‘Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction: Explaining the suppression of minority rights in Western European parliaments, 1945−2010

When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority-friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single-country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence.     

The Retreat from Government Support for Social Dialogue in the Australian Public Service

This article explores the impact of the Coalition government's federal public sector reforms since 1996 in the Australian Public Service (APS). Under the Labor governments from 1983 to 1996, a range of measures operated to facilitate the development of social dialogue practices in the APS. There were also various mechanisms for consultation, information sharing and employee participation in decision-making, such as the Joint Council and Departmental Councils, statutory provisions for Industrial Democracy Plans, award provisions for consultation over business restructuring and support for consultative structures under enterprise bargaining and health and safety legislation. Nearly all of these measures have been dismantled or downgraded since the Coalition government came to office, especially those requiring consultation with trade unions or providing unions with a central role in participative mechanisms. It is argued here that the government's reforms have involved a substantial reduction in formal support for social dialogue in the APS, and a rejection of the benefits that such an approach offers.     

Unions in Restructured States: Laborism in Australia and Economic Liberalism in the United Kingdom

There have been major reforms in the public sector in both Australia and the United Kingdom from the 1980s onwards. In each case, governments restructured their state sectors. These initiatives brought about not only widely acknowledged changes in organisation but also changes in the labour process and class relations as well as differing prospects for state sector trade unions.     

Is South Korea as Leftist as It Gets? Labour Market Policy Reforms under the Moon Presidency

Considering its conservative past, South Korea is undergoing an unprecedented turn to the left. Since priority was given to economic growth from the 1960s until the beginning of the 1990s, a close alliance between big business and government has characterised the country's labour market. Since the 1997 financial crisis, however, two decades of liberal and conservative governments have pushed a neoliberal agenda of labour market flexibilisation, which has resulted in growing inequality in a dualised labour market and left the trade unions in a marginal role. Following a rapid turn of events that led to the impeachment of conservative president Park Geun‐hye, left‐leaning President Moon Jae‐in seems determined to roll back this legacy of labour oppression with the strong support of trade unions and young voters. His administration is pushing for policy change with a series of expansionary active labour market policies aimed at promoting stability and full‐time employment. This article highlights the social‐democratic character of these reforms and the constraints in implementing them.