Health Care Capital Financing Agencies: The Intergovernmental Roles of Quasi-Government Authorities and the Impact on the Cost of Capital

During the decade 1983-1992, approximately $1.4 trillion of municipal bonds were sold in 87,000 in separate issues, primarily to finance capital projects for education, electric power, transportation, health care, housing, and other public and private purpose activities. Approximately two-thirds of these financings were originated by financing authorities, quasi-government agencies which are the creation of state legislature. Despite the growing role played by quasi-public authorities in capital finance, their impacts have not been studied systematically. We first describe the issuers of tax-exempt debt in the health sector and then derive measures for describing the mix of issuers between state and local levels, and between both government and quasi-government sectors. We present abbreviated test results of the impact that different mixes have on the cost of capital. First, competition is good: using a Herfindahl index analysis we show that states with less concentrated issuers have a lower cost of capital than those with a more concentrated market, including state-level finance monopolies. On the other hand, we cannot assert unequivocally that market deconcentration, in and of itself, should be a goal. For instance, there are economies of scale in the health care finance industry that allow larger (often state-level) issuers to lower the cost of capital.     

Municipal Debt Issues in Foreign Markets: Managing Currency and Interest Rate Risk

Since the mid-1980s, there has been an acceleration of state and local government interest in the taxable bond market as a source of capital. This has resulted from, among other factors, restrictions imposed on economic and industrial development loan programs resulting from the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Increased state and local government involvement in the taxable bond markets has increased competition for such capital between the public and the private sectors. In turn, the developing capital competition has expanded into overseas securities markets. Private sector corporations have frequently accessed foreign capital markets to take advantage of lower interest rates and reduced financing costs. By contrast, state and local governments have accessed such markets only recently. This article discusses the policy issues considered by a state or local government entity when it decides to borrow funds in foreign markets and discusses the issues involved in managing currency and interest rate risk when issuing municipal bonds in foreign markets. It includes a review of the hedging techniques used by the Kentucky Development Finance Authority (KDFA) to protect against changes in the Yen/Dollar exchange relationship on a recent Samurai bond issue sold by KDFA as an example of such a transaction.     

Testing the Effects of Sale Method Restrictions in Municipal Bond Issuance: The Case of New Jersey

Can state governments save money by restricting the practice of selling tax‐exempt bonds through negotiation, or do such regulations impose additional costs? Circumstances in New Jersey recently created a natural experiment to test this proposition. This study finds significant cost savings for those issues sold through competition both before and after such restrictions were put in place. All else equal, issues sold competitively after the policy change did not have significantly higher interest costs, despite a shift in volume toward competitive sales, suggesting that there exists room for increased use of competitive sales without incurring a cost penalty.     

Federal Intervention in the Municipal Bond Market: The Effectiveness of the Build America Bond Program and Its Implications on Federal and Subnational Budgeting

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) included several new federal programs intended ostensibly to “unfreeze” the credit markets as a result of the global financial crisis. One such program, the Build America Bond (BAB) program, aimed to lower the borrowing costs for state and local governments by increasing their access to capital and providing a more generous federal subsidy than the traditional indirect tax exemption subsidy. BABs are taxable bonds sold by subnational governments, which carry a 35 percent direct federal payment subsidy to the borrower. In creating this program, the federal government hoped that the large direct federal subsidy along with greater potential investor interest in taxable securities would result in lower borrowing costs for state and local governments vis‐à‐vis traditional tax‐exempt bonds. This research study examines the relative effectiveness of the BAB program and details the various quantitative and qualitative implications on federal and subnational budgeting by moving from an indirect to a direct federal subsidy approach in facilitating state and local government capital raising.     

Direct Versus Indirect Federal Bond Subsidies: New Evidence on Cost of Capital

The longstanding debate surrounding the most effective way for the U.S. federal government to subsidize state and local government capital‐raising received renewed attention in recent years due to the passage and subsequent expiration of the taxable Build America Bond (BAB) program. Recent academic studies, as well as reports from the U.S. Treasury Department, claim that the direct subsidy approach as evidenced by the BAB program provides greater bond borrowing cost benefits to state and local governments compared to traditional tax‐exempt bonds. This research investigates the extent to which such borrowing cost benefits may be overstated since it appears previous studies did not adequately account for the early call optionality of tax‐exempt bonds.     

Fragmentation and the growth of local government

An assumption of the post-World War II metropolitan reform movement was that fragmentation of metropolitan regions into multiple local governments was wasteful and inefficient, increasing the cost and size of government. More recently, ‘polycentrists’ have argued that the competition between multiple governments in metropolitan regions can in factreduce the growth in government by providing a competitive check on the excessive demands of local bureaucrats for more resources. In this article, I explore the effects of fragmentation on growth in the size of suburban municipal government budgets and in the number of services offered. Competition inherent in more fragmented metropolitan regions is shown to slow the expansion in local government expenditures and service levels.     

Is private production of public services cheaper than public production? A meta‐regression analysis of solid waste and water services

Privatization of local government services is assumed to deliver cost savings, but empirical evidence for this from around the world is mixed. We conduct a meta‐regression analysis of all econometric studies examining privatization of water distribution and solid waste collection services and find no systematic support for lower costs with private production. Differences in study results are explained by differences in time period of the analyses, service characteristics, and policy environment. We do not find a genuine empirical effect of cost savings resulting from private production. The results suggest that to ensure cost savings, more attention be given to the cost characteristics of the service, the transaction costs involved, and the policy environment stimulating competition, rather than to the debate over public versus private delivery of these services. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

三方互动：规范我国地方政府间竞争的思考

在我国当前的制度环境下,地方政府在竞争中可以采取4种策略:约束“掠夺之手”、减少公共品的供给、将危机转嫁给不具流动性的要素、树立壁垒干预市场。规范地方政府间竞争应当避免地方政府采用第3、4种策略。为限制地方政府树立壁垒干预市场,从中央层面来看,需要建立全国统一大市场,推行以公平为基础的政策、制度化中央与地方的权力分配;从地方层面来看,需要转变地方政府职能,加强地方公共财政建设,构建地方特色;从社会层面来看,为限制地方政府转嫁竞争危机,需要充分发挥居民在地方政府间竞争中的裁决作用,发挥民营经济的力量以及发挥第三部门的力量。     

Privatization and cost reduction

In this paper several examples of government contracts with private firms are examined to see how experience conforms to a principal-agent model of cost minimization via competitive bidding and how important are the many qualifications to the model. Fifteen cases of local government contracting are examined.The course of private contracting is not always smooth — as judged by the many contract disruptions observed and by the number of cities that believe they are no longer saving money by contracting and those which have resumed public production. It also seems to be the case, however, that competition generally reduces initial costs, that in many cases cost savings persist, that it is possible to stimulte competition, and that providing for continual interaction, as contrasted with simply monitoring performance, can prevent disruption.     

The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services

States and municipalities have privatized services in an effort to improve their cost‐effectiveness and quality. Competition provides the logical foundation for an expectation of cost savings and quality improvements, but competition does not exist in many local marketplaces—especially in the social services, where governments contract primarily with nonprofit organizations. As government increases its use of contracting, it simultaneously reduces its own public‐management capacity, imperiling its ability to be a smart buyer of contracted goods and services. This article examines two questions about the privatization of social services based on interviews conducted with public and nonprofit managers in New York state: Does social services contracting exist in a competitive environment? And do county governments have enough public‐management capacity to contract effectively for social services? The findings suggest an absence of competition and public‐management capacity, raising the question of why governments contract when these conditions are not met.     

The cartelization of local governments

Intergovernmental competition can enhance efficiency. Centralization of government expenditures inhibits intergovernmental competition because it makes governments more homogeneous, and so cartelizes local governments. Cartelization reduces Tiebout competition, and limits benchmark competition in which one government??s performance can be compared with neighboring governments. Measuring fiscal centralization as the ratio of local to state and local government expenditures within the state, the evidence shows that more fiscal decentralization is associated with higher levels of state per capita income. Cartelization of local governments negatively impacts income.     

Comparative Metropolitan Organization: Service Production and Governance Structures in St. Louis (MO) and Allegheny County (PA)

For many observers, a large number of governments in a metropolitanarea is thought to equate to "fragmentation," and fragmentation,to ineffective organization and poor performance. Other observersfind a large number of local governments to mean competitionand consequent pressures for efficiency. The number of localgovernments, however, is only one dimension of the structureof a metropolitan area. We identify and measure key structuralcharacteristics of "fragmented " metropolitan areas, employinga comparative study of two metropolitan city-counties: St. LouisCityand County, Missouri, and Allegheny County (Pittsburgh),Pennsylvania. We argue that these areas, with their many unitsof local government, "work" by means of integrating structuresbuilt by local governments together with county and state governments.Counties, in particular, are a useful focus for study of metropolitanrelationships because they often provide the institutional framewithin which integrating structures are built.     

Expenditure effects of metropolitan tax base sharing: A public choice analysis

This research explores probable budgetary consequences from the introduction of an institutional change which requires communities in metropolitan areas to pool any growth in the commercial-industrial tax base so that all cities benefit from new development irrespective of where the development occurs. Sharing of the tax base has been suggested as a means to overcome fiscal disparities among local governments in metropolitan areas and to reduce competition for new industrial development, thus, promoting ‘orderly development’ of the urban area. An alternative view of the institutional change focuses on the consequences of removing the tax base from the control of the local unit of government and suggests that based upon existing studies of government size and the cost of public services, government managers will be less responsive to the wishes of the citizen/taxpayer after the introduction of tax base sharing. The efficiency aspects of local government finance are examined and based upon data for the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, the expenditure effects are estimated. The empirical evidence suggests that while revenue flows are altered in the metropolitan areas, the primary impact of tax base sharing has been to expand the level of government expenditures, not equalize interjurisdictional tax rates.     

Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government

Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature. Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most importantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such institutional competition between the government and an independent agency can be found at the Swiss local level, where finance Commissions compete with the government. In some parts of Switzerland, local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda, which are then voted on by the citizens. Thus, they become strong competitors to the government. We econometrically investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 Swiss cantons. We find the power of the local finance commission to have an economically relevant, statistically significant and robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures.     

The flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods

In this paper, we explore how the ability of bureaucrats to extract resources from their community may be limited by competition in the local market for public goods. Specifically, we examine intergovernmental aid as a resource bureaucrats seek to control. Intergovernmental aid has been found to be more stimulative of local government expenditures than predicted by neo-classical economic theory. In this research, the ‘flypaper effect’ is used as an indicator of the ability of bureaucrats to control local resources in excess of local demand and preferences. We empirically relate variation in the flypaper effect to the extent of competition in the local market for public goods. Competition does not consistently limit the flypaper effect. The implications of this finding for theories of competition in the local market for public goods are then discussed.     

Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan? New evidence from local property tax competition

This paper reexamines whether fiscal decentralization constrains Leviathan government. Using panel data for Pennsylvania, we compare actual property tax rates to the Leviathan revenue-maximizing rates for municipalities, school districts, and counties. Using spatial econometric methods we also estimate the degree of spatial dependence at the three levels of local government. We find that fiscal decentralization results in stronger intergovernmental competition and lower tax rates. We also find evidence of collusion among school districts that exhibit high interdependence but also high tax rates. This calls into question the current literature??s blind use of spatial dependence as a measure of intergovernmental competition.     

Party Politics and the Common Good in Swedish Local Government

Local government in Sweden is usually classified as the northwest European type of local government, together with the local government systems of the other Nordic countries and Britain. In the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium, Swedish local government has been especially susceptible to the ideas of 'new public management' (NPM). At the same time there has been a long-ongoing trend of increasing party-politicisation of local councils. In this paper a selection of five local authorities are examined in order to see how party politics and party-politicisation are confronted by the new organisational doctrines. It is concluded that in this respect the doctrines guiding local government organisation can be characterised by three common traits: the legitimacy of particular interests is denied in favour of the common good of the locality; it is denied that conflict and competition between political parties perform any democratic function; finally, when it comes to the relation between politics and administration there is a common confession of the management-by-objectives doctrine. Somewhat surprisingly, these three principles guide organisation and politics not only in those authorities most enthusiastically adopting NPM but also in the authorities implementing organisational reforms based on more communitarian principles and even organisationally conservative municipalities not even considering any organisational change. One interpretation of this contradictory observation may be that NPM concepts and ideas have also found their way into local doctrines that are based on quite different principles. Another interpretation is that there is a consensus tradition in Swedish political culture that can also account for similar results in municipalities not explicitly introducing an apolitical organisation doctrine.     

从GDP锦标赛到二元竞争:中国地方政府行为变迁的逻辑——基于1998—2006年中国省级面板数据的实证研究

在中国经济持续30多年高速发展中,地方政府是发展的主要动力,但从上世纪90年代末以来,地方政府在发展经济中所产生的负面效果越来越明显,中央出台了一系列政策去调整和引导地方政府行为,促使地方政府增加社会保障开支以促进社会公平。采用1998—2006年中国省级面板数据进行定量分析以考察地方政府行为的影响因素和变化。研究显示,地方政府在社会保障的财政开支上主要受当地经济发展状况和中央政府的重视程度影响;地方政府在回应中央政府政策调整的过程中,其行为并不同于"晋升锦标赛"所归纳的以GDP增长为主要目标的一元竞争模式,而是演变为在社会公平和经济发展的双重目标下,地方政府分别参与不同目标竞争的二元竞争模式。在既往对中国地方政府行为考察的政治激励和财政激励基础上提出了影响地方政府行为的激励结构、中央与地方的互动关系和地方所处的社会经济情况的分析框架,通过对地方政府行为变化的分析提出二元竞争模式以弥补"GDP晋升锦标赛模式"对地方政府行为解释力的不足。     

The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain

This paper investigates the link between local budget outcomes and the intensity of party competition, measured as the margin of victory obtained by the incumbent in the previous local election (i.e. the difference between the vote share and 50%). Two competing hypotheses are tested in the paper. On the one hand, the Leviathan government hypothesis suggests that the lower the intensity of party competition is, the greater is the increase in the size of the local public sector, irrespective of the ideology of the party in power. On the other hand, the Partisan government hypothesis suggests that the incumbent will find it easier to advance its platform when intensity of competition is low (i.e., parties on the left/right will increase/decrease the size of the local public sector when the intensity of the challenge from the opposition is low). These hypotheses are tested with information on spending, own revenues and deficit for more than 500 Spanish local governments over 8 years (1992–1999), and information on the results of two local electoral contests (1991 and 1995). The evidence favors the Partisan hypothesis over the Leviathan one. We found that, for left-wing governments, spending, taxes and deficits increased as the electoral margin increases; whereas, for right-wing governments, a greater margin of victory led to reductions in all these variables.     

Party competition and citizens' political attitudes in the American states

Democratic theorists argue that vigorous competition between candidates/parties is essential for democracy to flourish because it engages citizens' political interest and ultimately makes elected officials more accountable to their constituents. Using data on citizens' perceptions of government responsiveness to their political opinions from the American National Election Studies and the Ranney measure of party competition for control of state government, we examine the effects of competition on citizens' political attitudes from 1952 to 2008. Our analysis reveals that citizens feel government is more responsive to them when there is greater competition between the two parties for control of government in their state. However, this relationship is confined only to citizens who identify with the party that controls government in their state. We also find that the relationship between competition and efficacy is strongest among citizens with lower levels of education and income. These results suggest that vigorous competition for control of state government can have important implications for citizens' political attitudes.