Legislative agenda-setting in parliamentary democracies

Various strands of literature in comparative politics regard governments as the only noteworthy initiators and mainsprings of legislative policy making in parliamentary democracies. Opposition activity in policy making is more often associated with the intention to prevent, rather than to shape, policy. Does this perception reflect real‐life politics? To answer this question, this article discusses different arguments that link institutional and policy‐related characteristics to the incentives and constraints of different government and parliamentary actors to initiate or co‐sponsor legislative bills. More specifically, it relates policy‐, office‐ and vote‐related incentives, as well as institutional and resource constraints of legislative actors, to the likelihood that these actors will take the lead in legislative agenda‐setting. These arguments are confronted with original data on the universe of all legislative bills in four parliamentary systems over one and a half decades. The article concludes that opposition and, in particular, bipartisan agenda‐setting is indeed rare. Yet, in contrast to widely held maxims, it is neither absent nor spurious, but related to the allocation of power and the intensity of ideological conflict both within and between the (coalition) government and parliament.     

Switzerland's Future in Europe: Isolation or Constitutional Change

In order to move closer to the European Community and eventually to join it, Switzerland must reshape its political institutions. A major constitutional reform should provide for a real head of government, adapt direct democracy to the constraints of supra-nationality, and simplify the legislative process. In the ongoing debate in Switzerland, the question is not so much whether such reforms are necessary, but when they should occur. The author argues that the dominant doctrine of negotiating first with the EC and reforming later is not realistic. The so-called "double majority referendum," which is necessary for ratifying membership either in the European Economic Space or in the EC itself, is given as an illustration. This ratification procedure is not in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote," and is clearly biased against Europe.     

Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech

Participation in legislative debates is among the most visible activities of members of parliament (MPs), yet debates remain an understudied form of legislative behavior. This study introduces a comparative theory of legislative speech with two major implications. First, party rules for debates are endogenous to strategic considerations and will favor either party leadership control or backbencher MP exposure. Second, in some systems, backbenchers will receive less time on the floor as their ideological distance to the party leadership increases. This leads to speeches that do not reflect true party cohesion. Where party reputation matters less for reelection, leaders allow dissidents to express their views on the floor. We demonstrate the implications of our model for different political systems and present evidence using speech data from Germany and the United Kingdom.     

Public attitudes toward economic conditions and their impact on government behavior

This article reviews extant studies of the impact of economic conditions on government electoral behavior in the Western democracies. Three conclusions are reached: (1) in representative democracies there exists a consistent relationship between the economic situation and citizen evaluation of government; (2) the proposition that governments are interested in achieving their selfish goals in elections fares well compared with the competing proposition that governments are interested in the state of the economy as such; and (3) governments and voters are not the only actors in politico-economic decisions: bureaucracies and interest groups may make government incapable of changing its policies quickly in the face of stiff resistance from this multitude of other actors. Their inclusion in relevant models is a necessary next step in research designed to understand better the functioning of modern democratic societies.This paper was written while the author was at GSIA, Carnegie-Mellon University.     

The optimal size of government

In the economic analysis of the theory of government, two views of government are evident. The Pigovian view sees government as a benevolent actor striving to correct for the inadequacies and excesses of an unrestrained marketplace. The ‘Public Choice’ view of government portrays government as the tool of special interest groups as likely to generate distortions as to correct them. In this paper, a model of government that incorporates both views will be developed and then empirically tested. The model developed assumes that all expenditures by the government are inputs into the private sector production. Treating government expenditures as inputs into the production of private sector output, there is some optimal size of government that maximizes private sector output. The model incorporates a general production function for private sector output. Output is a function of private labor, private capital, and government expenditures. The Pigovian and Public Choice views of government are reflected in the assumed impact of G on the marginal productivities of L and K. The model is tested using United States data and a Cobb-Douglas production function. Estimates indicate that the 1983 level of government expenditures exceeds by 87 percent the level that would maximize private sector output. Reducing government from $ 491 billion to $ 263 billion and shifting the freed labor to the private sector would increase output from $ 1187 billion to $ 1451 billion.     

Ideologies, vested interest groups, and postal saving privatization in Japan

The privatization of Japan’s postal saving system has been a politically charged issue since it first started being debated in the late 1980s, and yet it provides a useful setting in which political economy of economic policy-making can be investigated empirically. Analyzing the pre-election survey of the House of Representatives candidates in 2003 and also the voting patterns of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members on a set of postal privatization bills in 2005, this paper asks why some politicians fiercely opposed (or supported) privatization. The econometric results show that multiple factors are important: the private interests of local postmasters and postal workers, politicians’ fundamental ideologies on the size and role of government, party disciplines and factional affiliations within the LDP. Legislative behavior on postal privatization in Japan, thus, turns out to be one case in which legislative behavior is more complex than any single theory predicts.     

The future of crime in the united states from now to the year 2000

Societal factors are identified which are driving toward qualitative and quantitative changes in the pattern of crime in the United States. Some of these factors will amplify while others will diminish the importance of current categories of crime. They will also lead to new crimes or increased relative significance to certain crime categories. On the other hand, the interaction of these factors also may lead to the virtual extinguishment of some crimes or to their removal from the rosters of illegality. Against that background some opportunities and needs for public policy decisions and related research are suggested.Presented at the First Assembly of The World Future Society, Washington, D.C., May 14, 1971.The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not imply endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion by the National Science Foundation, Departments of the U.S. Government, or any organization with which the author is associated.     

Comparative technology and public policy: The development of the nuclear power reactor in six nations

This essay proposes an analytic framework to compare the development and commercialization of a number of advanced civilian technologies. This framework emphasizes the multiple institutional actors and their objectives that such technology developments manifest and reflect. The construct is then illustrated in the context of the development and diffusion of the nuclear power reactor in six nations. The major policy observations deal with the finding that there are distinct developmental stages; furthermore, government policies had best recognize these stages with their particular requirements, so that policies can be formulated which are appropriate to these conditions.The research for this paper was performed under a grant from the National Science Foundation while the author was a member of the research staff of The Rand Corporation. The views expressed are the author's own and are not necessarily shared by The Rand Corporation, the Solar Energy Research Institute, nor their respective research sponsors.     

Participation in hard times: how constrained government depresses turnout among the highly educated

Existing studies on electoral turnout in times of economic crisis have predominantly focused on disadvantaged voters. However, during the recent economic crisis, turnout among highly educated citizens has strongly declined as well. Existing resource-based theories of political participation cannot account for this. This article suggests that the anticipation of government inefficacy is an important driver of abstention among highly educated. Where governments are severely constrained, these citizens anticipate that the hands of future governments will be tied. Hence they are more likely to abstain out of frustration or rational calculations. The study uses the recent economic crisis as test case, as it entails particularly acute constraints on several European governments. The cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence – based on ESS survey data and different measures of government constraint in 28 European countries – provides ample support for the argument.     

Is the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo

A controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London (2005) which did not limit the use of state's eminent domain powers, led to an unprecedented legislative reaction by almost all 50 states. Of all, New York State stands out as one of the single states not to respond with a legislative amendment. In this study, I ask whether the state's predation was greater in the years following these legal and political developments, in light of the freedom which was granted to local politicians by both the Supreme Court and the state's legislators. The article hypothesizes that contrary to common perceptions, judicial decisions impact local government actions even when no limits on the use of powers are being posed. I use rigorous statistics and scrupulously defined data to expand scholarly understanding of the aftermath of the judicial decision in Kelo. The main finding is that the decision has in fact affected political behavior, but in the opposite direction than commonly expected: politicians in New York City acted consistently with public opinion, which was hostile too Kelo, not by changing the law, but by changing their practice. Studying all known taking exercises in New York City between 1991 and 2019, the paper finds no increase in the number of development projects involving condemnations after 2005. In fact, the probability of a taking for economic development or urban renewal dropped by 90%. The use of eminent domain for such projects declined even when both state and federal courts refrain from interposing any actual limit on its use. The paper lends qualified support to an alternative assertion that takings decisions by government officials are largely shaped by planning and political needs and that officials are sensitive to revealed public preferences even when there is no constitutional or legal impediment on their exercise of power.     

PBB in American Local Governments: It's More than a Management Tool

Despite academic findings that performance information seldom is used in appropriations decisions, many professional organizations and governments continue to press for integrating performance information into local public management, planning, and budgeting processes. Is it possible to reconcile such inconsistencies? Looking beyond the executive–legislative relationship and departmental appropriations, the author examines the budget implications of applying performance information at the subdepartmental program level. Case analysis of Indianapolis’s IndyStat initiative underscores that performance measurement application is positively related to intradepartmental program budget changes. Hence, performance‐based budgeting (PBB) can improve local budgeting despite severe political constraints. Still, successful use of PBB requires strong executive leadership, and its effects remain less visible at the departmental level or within the wider political arena of legislative bargaining. The author concludes by recommending some rethinking of the current analytical focus of PBB both in future research as well as recommended practice.     

Toward a social indicators model of aggregate American political behavior: 1948–1976

Using time series data from 15 post-World War II congressional elections, a nine-equation social indicators model of aggregate American political behavior is estimated. Six exogenous social and economic conditions and nine endogenous political variables are linked in a schematic flow across three sectors of the national polity. Findings indicate that relatively short-term social and political conditions exert greater effects on election outcomes than do long-term partisan alignments. The party composition of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government affects defense expenditures as a proportion of all budgetary outlays, but has only weak impact on health and education expenses. Criticisms and suggestions for future work are discussed.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the American Sociological Association Meetings in San Francisco in August 1975.     

The influence of local and national economic conditions on French legislative elections

This article's aim consists in building and estimating a model which explains and forecasts the outcomes of the French legislative elections by department. This model, which constitutes the first attempt for such a geographical level, emphasises the role of the economic and political factors in the explanation of the legislative vote. The model seems to be very accurate in forecasting the elections of the past at the local and national level. Furthermore, its behaviour for the 2002 election was very satisfactory. This model is therefore a reliable alternative to the vote intention polls as an electoral forecasting instrument.     

科学发展观与公共财政

科学发展观是我国政府的一种执政理念和施政原则。公共财政是政府的分配行为，其直接体现了政府的意志。科学安排公共财政是落实、支撑与强化政府科学发展观的直接体现。因此，探讨科学发展观问题，从财政角度进行分析是非常必要的。本文在对公共财政基本内涵进行阐述之后，分析了科学发展观与公共财政之间的关系，最后就如何运用科学发展观统领公共财政提出了几点建议。     

Resolving China’s Island Disputes: A Two-Level Game Analysis

Although territorial disputes have been much studied, the application of “two-level game” analysis in peace research and conflict resolution is still relatively unexplored. In this essay, I seek to use the analytical propositions derived from this “two-level game” bargaining framework to explain the success, failure, or partial resolution of sovereignty negotiations over China’s island claims to the disputed islands of the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Amur/Ussuri rivers, and South China Sea. This essay will focus on the interaction between governments and domestic nationalist groups, the role of institutions, and the strategies of negotiators to explain the development of the territorial disputes. I will evaluate how different political and social preferences, historical memories, economic priorities, side payments, and institutional constraints affect inter-state bargaining behavior and relations between the government and different segments of society. Basically, I am interested in finding out what significant roles national, sub-national and transnational actors can and do play in aggravating, minimizing, terminating or preventing conflicts over island claims involving China. Dr. Chien-peng Chung is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Sociology of Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He is the author of Domestic Politics, International Bargaining, and China’s Territorial Disputes (London & New York: Routledge, 2004).     

Models of Political Accountability and Concepts of Australian Government

Models of political accountability are drawn from views about the nature of government. Too often, however, these views are flawed and/or not made explicit. In particular, the traditional model of government accountability - which will be outlined below - misunderstands the British 'parent' system of responsible government. One immediate task for those interested in accountability is to map the basic features of the Australian system (best understood as 'executive federalism') in order to provide foundations for new accountability models. As well as delaying the map drawing task, the dominance of the traditional account has also 'crowded out' other concepts of accountability. The 'efficiency' and 'democracy' approaches will be discussed below as basically complementary addition to the current Australian debate over accountability. It is thus argued here that a more eclectic approach drawing from diverse but longstanding strands in the public administration tradition can not only enrich the debate but also help to throw light on new public policy developments such as contracting out.     

Black electoral power,white resistance,and legislative behavior

This paper examines the relationship between black electoral power and white legislative behavior in Mississippi. The initial theoretical foundation is provided by the work of William R. Keech. Keech's implicit model is presented and a more elaborate model which views black payoffs as a function of black electoral power and white resistance, and the political generation of white legislators is developed and tested. A typology of electoral contexts is constructed, and the impact of such contexts on the relationships between the key variables is examined. The findings suggest that the processes responsible for the curvilinear relationship between black electoral power and black payoffs are more complex than previous research has implied and that the nature of electoral contexts may have a substantial influence on these processes.     

Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006

This paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short-term economic performance. I employ data on annual GDP growth in 21 OECD countries over the 1951–2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests. In countries with two-party systems GDP growth is boosted before elections and, under leftwing governments, in the first two years of a legislative period. These findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two-party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance. My findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short-term economic performance.     

Restructuring non‐metropolitan local government in South Africa

South Africa's first local government elections held in November 1995 and June 1996 cemented the transition from apartheid to democratic local government. The focus at that time was on the deracialization and democratization of local governance, which was successfully achieved. Local government since then, however, has failed to fulfil its mandate as the delivery arm of government, nor has the hoped‐for rapid transformation of the local sphere of government materialized. In seeking an explanation for this perceived inadequacy, attention has tended to focus on the limited financial and administrative capacity of newly elected councillors and council staff. Although the lack of capacity does present a barrier to the achievement of effective local government, the constraints municipalities encounter in their geographic composition and administrative formation provide the structural dimension of municipal constraint. The White Paper on Local Government published in March 1998 seeks to address these structural constraints and, through an ambitious legislative process, chart a path to ‘developmental’ local government. This article identifies the constraints experienced by non‐metropolitan municipalities and analyses the likely impact of the government's restructuring programme for the achievement of viable and sustainable local government in South Africa. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Politics of Fiscal Responses to the Crisis of 2008–2009

The national fiscal responses to the economic crisis of 2008/2009 varied considerably. Some countries reacted with a strong demand stimulus, others intended to slash public expenditures, while a third group pursued mildly expansionary policies. There are strong reasons for governments to pursue a mildly expansionary policy. If governments depart from this default strategy in favor of a significant counter‐cyclical policy, they must be able to swiftly make decisions. Therefore, effective use of counter‐cyclical policy will be unlikely in cases where lengthy negotiations or significant compromises between governing parties with different views on economic and fiscal policy are likely. Therefore, a major determinant of the expansionary strategy is a unified government, usually in form of a one‐party government. If governments opt for pro‐cyclical policy in a major economic crisis, they do so because they have few other viable options. In this situation they tend to shift blame to international organizations.