State nursing home enforcement systems

This study presents interview and statistical data from a telephone and fax survey of state agency officials and statistical data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) system. State survey activities for nursing facilities were reviewed and the number and types of intermediate sanctions issued by states in 1999 were reported, along with barriers to the use of such sanctions. Using five selected enforcement measures to create a summary score, states were classified by quartiles based on the stringency of their nursing facility enforcement activities. Controlling for the number of complaints as a proxy for quality, the predictors of a summary of state enforcement actions were: percentage of population at age eighty-five and above. Democratic governors, higher percentages of chain facilities, and lower facility occupancy rates. Regional differences in enforcement patterns also were shown. Many federal policies and resource constraints were identitied as barriers to effective regulation. The findings identified nursing facility survey and enforcement issues that need to be addressed by policy makers.     

Policy Innovation or Vertical Integration? A View of Immigration Federalism from the States

Since 2005, state legislatures have passed hundreds of immigration bills, and state officials have argued that their efforts attempt to solve immigration crises caused by federal inaction. The state–federal clash over immigration seems to confirm scholarship suggesting deepening lines of conflict in the federal system since the 1990s. The question remains, however, whether this explosion in state immigration laws signifies a move by states to tailor their own solutions to immigration issues. This article explores whether states are serving as laboratories of innovation for immigration policy. The study analyzes over five hundred immigration bills passed between January 2006 and December 2008, and engages in a comparative analysis of three immigration policy areas (immigration law enforcement, employment regulations, and drivers' licenses) where there exist varying degrees of state autonomy from national policy and thus distinctive possibilities for states to offer creative approaches to immigration issues. The findings suggest little evidence of policy innovation at the state level, although a handful of states are challenging federal supremacy in immigration matters.     

Let the Sunshine In,or Else: An Examination of the “Teeth” of State and Federal Open Meetings and Open Records Laws

Public access laws are at the heart of transparent democracy, in place to ensure that government meetings and records are open to the public. However, compliance with these laws is often problematic, a fact that can be attributed, in part, to ineffective remedies available for violations of state and federal open government laws. This study examines the enforcement provisions of the public access laws in jurisdictions across the United States to explore the remedies available, including equitable relief such as injunctions and mandamus, actual and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and civil and criminal sanctions. Structural difficulties were revealed that can make these remedies toothless for people unlawfully denied access. The article concludes by suggesting improvements such as enhanced and uniform penalties, more consistent enforcement, and alternatives to litigation.     

从美国的环境执法看非强制行政

在环境执法领域,美国行政机关充分运用市场机制等经济协调手段、金融手段以及行政奖励诱导和鼓励投资者遵守环境法规,并通过信息公开加强执法者与管理者的交流、沟通,促进、鼓励公众参与环境立法和执法,这种非强制行政执法模式取得了良好成效。美国的非强制行政理论与模式对于我国建立以人为本的行政执法机制、促进法律运行的现代化有重要借鉴意义。     

美国联邦环境法的公民诉讼制度

公民诉讼制度作为自力救济措施是美国环境保护法律制度中的特色之一。该制度赋予公民借助法院的权力 ,监督行政机关执行环境保护法律以达到加强执法或消除污染、改善环境的目的。研究该制度对我国加强环境保护法律的执行、提高公众的环境保护意识具有一定的作用。     

Antitrust Law and Distributive Politics in the American States

State enforcement by state attorneys general (AGs) has become a major component of American antitrust law. Much has been written about state antitrust enforcement, but existing accounts of AG incentives and behavior are incomplete. As elected officials in forty‐three states, AGs must represent their constituents and, therefore, will be drawn to cases that maximize the level of settlement reward—cases with large, wealthy defendants. I hypothesize and find that state AGs represent their constituents along ideological lines, but this relationship is conditioned by case characteristics that involve the potential settlement reward. Moreover, incentives to participate are likely to be higher when there are clear violations of the law, as in price‐fixing cases, rather than in merger cases, where no wrongdoing has necessarily been established. The study adds to our understanding of antitrust law but also has implications for how distributive politics shapes political responsiveness to the electorate.     

Content, Controversy, and Control: Politics and the Evolution of Antitrust Enforcement

Recent history of antitrust enforcement is often explained through the rise in the influence of economic efficiency. This history is better understood as evolution among three enforcement conceptions. Until the mid-1960s, the emphasis was advocacy, zealous prosecution to produce just outcomes. By the mid-1970s enforcement practice tended to follow academic standards. The 1980s saw a shift toward a democratic motivation guided by elected officials or appointees. Each conception both possesses philosophical legitimacy and generates rewards to proponents; both are necessary for a conception's adoption and success. We describe this policy evolution, concluding with observations on its merits and reversibility.     

Trial Penalties in Federal Sentencing: Extra‐Guidelines Factors and District Variation

The guarantee of the right to a jury trial lies at the heart of the principles that underlie the American criminal justice system's commitment to due process of law. We investigate the differential sentencing of those who plead guilty and those convicted by trial in U.S. District Courts. We first investigate how much of any federal plea/trial sentencing differences are accounted for by substantial assistance to law enforcement, acceptance of responsibility, obstruction of justice, and other Guideline departures. Second, we investigate how such differences vary according to offense and defendant characteristics, as well as court caseloads and trial rates. We use federal sentencing data for fiscal years 2000–02, along with aggregate data on federal district court caseload features. We find that meaningful trial penalties exist after accounting for Guidelines‐based rationales for differentially sentencing those convicted by guilty plea versus trial. Higher district court caseload pressure is associated with greater trial penalties, while higher district trial rates are associated with lesser trial penalties. In addition, trial penalties are lower for those with more substantial criminal histories, and black men. Trial penalties proportionately increase, however, as Guideline minimum sentencing recommendations increase. We also supplement our analysis with interview and survey data from federal district court participants, which provide insights into the plea reward/trial penalty process, and also suggest important dimensions of federal court trial penalties that we cannot measure.     

Reforming Natural Gas Fracking Regulations in 2017–2018: How Should States Enforce Regulations?

While much scholarly work has been published on hydraulic fracturing regulatory frameworks, there is little discussion on the enforcement mechanisms of these regulations and statutes. This article explores state hydraulic fracturing regulations and the expansion of a criminal framework to enforce compliance. More specifically, this article takes a comparative look at fracking enforcement regimes in California and several states with the most hydraulic fracturing activities. First, the article discusses fracking's economic benefits and environmental issues. The article then analyzes federal regulations, (which essentially leaves the bulk of regulation and enforcement to state and local governments) and state enforcement systems in California and the four states with the most fracking wells (Texas, Wyoming, Pennsylvania, and Colorado). California, a state that is pushing for more renewable resources, has robust regulations under Senate Bill 4. In the end, states that rely heavily on fracking should reform the enforcement mechanisms to disincentive noncompliance. Regulatory regimes in the other states appear to have deficiencies that could be remedied by adopting stricter enforcement mechanisms—such as criminal sanctions—that would disincentivize noncompliance, which could lead to large-scale environmental disasters. This article postulates that a model system incorporating a variety of methods including increased criminal enforcement could provide for proper remedies, justice, and deterrence. An ideal enforcement framework for effective deterrence should focus on transparency, flexibility, trusted delegation, and proportionality.     

论政府环境责任的缺陷与健全

政府环境责任的缺陷和不足,是环境保护领域政府失灵、环境法律失灵的一个重要原因。我国政府环境责任的缺陷主要体现在"重政府经济责任,轻政府环境责任"、"重企业环境义务和追究企业环境责任,轻政府环境义务和追究政府环境责任"、"重政府环境权力,轻政府环境义务"等八个方面。通过阐明健全政府环境责任的法理基础、指导思想和原则,提出建立健全政府环境责任的体系和制度的建议。     

The Politics of Racial Disparity Reform: Racial Inequality and Criminal Justice Policymaking in the States

Racial inequalities in criminal justice are pressing problems for policymakers. Prior literature suggests elected officials promulgate punitive, racially disparate criminal justice policies due to partisanship and racial fears, but scholarship has yet to explain how and why elected officials address racial problems in criminal processing. This article introduces the framework of racial disparity reform policymaking. A racial disparity reform is a policy that seeks to reduce distinctions in criminal justice institutions’ treatment of racial groups. Elected officials pursue these policies due to ideological beliefs in civil rights ideals and political interests in appearing to solve social problems. Using an original database of policy enactments, this article first presents the distribution and types of reform measures adopted by elected officials in all 50 states between 1998 and 2011. It then examines social and political explanations for when state legislatures and executives adopt racial disparity reforms. Policy enactment is predicted by worsening problems of racial disproportion in criminal processing, Democratic control of elected branches, and the absence of judicial efforts to improve racial fairness within a state’s criminal justice system. Similar dynamics encourage the development of different measures types within policies. Such ideological and problem-solving explanations for racial disparity reform show a potential for elected officials to forge more racially just criminal justice practices.     

The politics of discretionary Medicaid spending, 1980-1993

Why do some states choose to spend more than four times as much as others to provide health care to the disadvantaged? Political scientists who have traditionally explored this question by analyzing trends in overall Medicaid expenditures lumped states' discretionary spending in with other money that states are mandated to spend. Analyses of total expenditures found that socioeconomic factors drove spending but that party control of state legislatures made no difference in health policy making. By isolating discretionary state Medicaid expenditures from total spending figures, I reexamine the influences of political as well as economic and demographic factors. The often-doubted importance of party control becomes clear. This study investigates spending patterns in the discretionary portions of state Medicaid programs in forty-six states from 1980 to 1993 and analyzes both incremental program changes and absolute differences in state spending. To discover how greatly the researcher's choice of dependent variables can affect results, optional spending is separated from total spending levels and the variation is modeled in both. Focusing not on the spending that the federal government requires of state officials but on the policies that state officials actually choose allows a balanced exploration of both political and economic effects on welfare expenditures. This research also provides new insights about which forces will shape policy decisions if more and more control of the public health care system is devolved to the states.     

Legislators as Lobbyists

Public policy is produced by elected and unelected officials and through the interactions of branches of government. We consider how such interactions affect policy implementation and representation. We argue that legislators try to influence bureaucratic decisions through direct communication with federal agencies, and that such contact is effective and has consequences for policy outcomes. We provide empirical evidence of this argument using original data about direct communication between members of Congress and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) along with decisions made by the DOL regarding trade and redistributive policies. We find that direct contacts influence DOL decisions, and the agency is more likely to reverse previous decisions when requested to do so by legislators. Our results challenge key assumptions and findings in the previous literature and have important implications for interbranch relations and informal means of control over the implementation of national policy.     

Fragile Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China's Industrial Pollution Law

Official statistics and independent survey data show that in the last decade China has witnessed a remarkable change in its enforcement of environmental pollution violations, moving toward more formalistic and coercive law enforcement with more enforcement cases as well as higher fines. The data also show that there is considerable regional variation with coastal areas having more and higher punishments than those inland. This article explores these findings, seeking to understand the explanation and meaning of these temporal and regional variation patterns. The study shows how enforcement varies when there is a convergence of governmental, social, and economic institutional forces. The article argues that the basis for such convergence has been fragile, as national pressures have lacked consistency and local community and government support evaporates when dominant sources of income are at stake.     

Republication of Foreign Government Statements: The Fair Report Privilege in U.S. Libel Law Reexamined

Whether news reports concerning foreign government proceedings enjoy the same level of protection from tortious liability as reports concerning domestic government proceedings is a question of great consequence for media in the United States, especially given the ever-increasing globalization of political and economic affairs. A growing number of libel cases generated by international journalism based in documents and meetings of government officials in other nations are testing the well-established fair report privilege in state and federal courts. This article, after analyzing the history, cases and commentary on the subject, concludes by recommending a liberal privilege for such reporting.     

Overview of penal response towards tax compliance in Nigeria

Tax offences and penalties are created to tackle tax non-compliance. Tax penalties bear civil liabilities while tax offences portends criminal sanctions. This paper employs the deterrence theory of penalty to determine whether tax penalties and enforcement agencies are effective in ensuring tax compliance in Nigeria. It is found that the dwindling economic situation in the country has diminished the deterrent effect of pecuniary tax sanctions. Hence, there is need to review the tax statutes. Corroborative effort between tax authorities would facilitate the probability of detection and punishment of tax offenders, thereby improving tax compliance in Nigeria.     

Theory and Practice of Regulatory Enforcement: Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in British Columbia*

Data about the activities of occupational health and safety officials in British Columbia is utilized to explore competing explanations for the overwhelming prevalence of persuasion over punishment in regulatory enforcement. By plotting the compliance histories of individual firms, this study demonstrates that many offenders repeatedly commit the same infraction. Few of these repeat offenders are punished. These findings suggest that the very limited use of penalties is not a result of the vast majority of firms being good apples induced to comply by mechanisms of social control other than punishment. Rather, there appears to be institutionalized tolerance of widespread violations. The enforcement deficit may be partly explained by such aspects of regulatory structure as the ongoing relationship between regulated firms and field officers who are the gatekeepers of the penalty process.     

The Application of the Transcendental Meditation Program to Corrections

In 1976, Lockheed Corporation was charged with making secret payments of at least $25 million to Japanese officials during the early 1970s. It was alleged that these payments were made in order to secure aircraft sales contracts with several Japanese airlines. At that time, Lockheed executives claimed that Japanese officials insisted that consideration of Lockheed as a contractor would require advance payments to several government officials. In spite of this claim, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 which treats these payments as bribery, rather than extortion, and prohibits them with the threat of criminal penalties. During the last 10 years, Japan has tried and convicted 15 former government officials of bribery and other crimes in the Lockheed affair. This paper assesses the effects of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in regulating business conduct, and the validity of the claims by Lockheed and the Japanese officials 10 years later, now that the trials are over.     

Consequences of Decentralization: Environmental Impact Assessment and Water Pollution Control in Indonesia

After having been one of the most centralized states in the world for more than thirty years, in 2001 Indonesia introduced a sweeping program of decentralization with important consequences for the management of the industrial sector. This article explores whether the decentralization process has led to substantial changes in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and enforcement of water pollution law. Its main findings are that the general division of authority in both fields has become less fragmented and that differences between districts have increased, but, in practice, not so much has changed as one would have expected. For EIA, "horizontal" disputes between sectoral agencies have been supplanted by "vertical" disputes between different levels of government. Monitoring and sanctioning of industrial water pollution have mainly continued within the scheme of the provincial program started under Soeharto's centralized regime, with still few initiatives at the district level. If any, such initiatives are usually driven by public complaints. On the other hand, there are indications that in the longer run the institutional changes may have more significant effects on EIA and enforcement practice. For EIA, these seem to be negative; for enforcement of water pollution regulation this depends much on the situation within a district or a province.     

Organized economic crime and corruption in Urkraine: The problem of countermeasures

The collapse of communism in Ukraine created opportunities for organized criminal groups to expand their economic criminal activities in the “shadow economy” by penetrating all levels of public and economic administration. Ukrainian law enforcement agencies are poorly equipped to handle this increase in criminal activity, especially with respect to uncooperative foreign and domestic economic institutions. State machinery for regulation and control of industry and commerce was easily accessible to organized crime through bribing of state officials, who received no supervision during economic restructuring. Notwithstanding the active assistance of corrupt government officials, organized economic crime has benefited from chaos and lost government control as the result of recent economic reforms in Ukraine. Researchers in this study hypothesize that the social and economic disorder, as well as a common and justified mistrust of state officials, fosters a pessimism and erodes moral standards, which in turn fosters criminal activity. Of late, judicial sentencing for those convicted of economic crimes has become lighter while many economic criminal cases are never investigated or prosecuted in the first place. In order to combat large-scale corruption, there must be better supervision of government officials and better monitoring of foreign economic transactions. One of the most disastrous consequences of the collapse of the Ukrainian communist system has been the widespread increase of economic crime. This phenomenon is self-sustaining, penetrating all levels of Ukraine's economy and administrative sectors. Criminal activity helps to sustain the shadow economy in Ukraine, which has been estimated by various sources to constitute 50 to 60 percent of the economy. Law enforcement and administrative efforts have been largely futile in curbing this corruption. Nevertheless, it is possible to overcome the criminal social and economic order that has become ingrained in this “shadow economy.” This paper seeks to propose policy solutions for Ukrainian economic crime and corruption that could be implemented at the national level.