作为技术的法律方法

在我国 ,法律方法论一直是一门处于边缘位置、发展迟缓落后的学科 ,主要原因在于 ,人们始终把法律方法论作狭义的理解 ,对其角色的工具性、实用性定位 ,在观念上的单一陈旧 ,严重制约和影响着对法律方法论理论体系的建构。法律方法论要从困境中走出来 ,必须进行检讨与重构。     

追问法律方法论学科的意义

在我国 ,法律方法论一直是一门处于边缘位置、发展迟缓落后的学科 ,主要原因在于 ,人们始终把法律方法论作狭义的理解 ,对其角色的工具性、实用性定位 ,在观念上的单一陈旧 ,严重制约和影响着对法律方法论理论体系的建构。法律方法论要从困境中走出来 ,必须进行检讨与重构。     

法律方法与法学的实践回应能力

在我国 ,法律方法论一直是一门处于边缘位置、发展迟缓落后的学科 ,主要原因在于 ,人们始终把法律方法论作狭义的理解 ,对其角色的工具性、实用性定位 ,在观念上的单一陈旧 ,严重制约和影响着对法律方法论理论体系的建构。法律方法论要从困境中走出来 ,必须进行检讨与重构。     

审判解释:法官最基本的法律方法

在我国 ,法律方法论一直是一门处于边缘位置、发展迟缓落后的学科 ,主要原因在于 ,人们始终把法律方法论作狭义的理解 ,对其角色的工具性、实用性定位 ,在观念上的单一陈旧 ,严重制约和影响着对法律方法论理论体系的建构。法律方法论要从困境中走出来 ,必须进行检讨与重构。     

法律方法论:检讨与重构--以学科为视角

[编者按]在我国,法律方法论一直是一门处于边缘位置、发展迟缓落后的学科,主要原因在于,人们始终把法律方法论作狭义的理解,对其角色的工具性、实用性定位,在观念上的单一陈旧,严重制约和影响着对法律方法论理论体系的建构.法律方法论要从困境中走出来,必须进行检讨与重构.     

西方法律方法论教材及其启示

法律方法论是法学人才培养的必要课程.在我国,法律方法论很大程度上是从国外引入的一个研究领域和学科.在西方各国法学教育中,各具特色、较为成熟的法律方法论教材有多种版本.我国法律方法论教材编写则刚刚起步,还存在很多明显不足.因此,需要从教材名称、教材目的、教材体系、教材写法及特色等方面,对西方法律方法论教材成果予以吸收借鉴,以使我国法律方法论教材及学科走向成熟与完善.     

法律方法与几个相关概念的比较

在我国法学研究中,法律方法、法学研究方法、法学方法论、法律方法论等概念经常被混淆。文章通过比较法律方法与法学研究方法、法律方法与美国的法律方法课程、法律方法与法学方法论(法律方法论)等概念及其所对应的研究领域,阐明我国的法律方法研究,与世界各国法学界与法律界所关注的法律方法,都是围绕法律人实施法律的工作技艺与思想方法而展开的,重点是研究和探讨法律实施中的各种有效且有益的具体制度与思想方式,这一特点决定了它不同于更为宏观的法学研究方法与法学方法论(法律方法论);同时,由于我国开展法律方法研究迫切需要解决的是与我国法律实施相关的问题,因此,我国的特殊性,决定了我国有关法律方法的研究,主要是针对我国法治建设所面临的具体问题,故而,又不同于美国的法律方法课程。正是在与相关概念的区别中,展现出法律方法研究独特的价值。     

推理与解释：寓于其中的法律思维

法律解释与法律推理是两种相对独立的法律方法,它们对法治建设有着不同的意义。法律解释的功能是要充分展示法律文本的各种可能意义,而法律推理则强调结论的必然得出。由于二者都强调根据法律进行解释或推理,因而拥有大体相似的思维走向,但作为不同的方法却有着许多细微的区分。正是这些既相互联系又有区别的方法(如法律发现、法律解释、法律论证、价值衡量、法律推理等)构成了法律方法论体系。当我们对这些法律方法有了深入系统的了解后,方法论向本体论的转向就水到渠成了。     

法律发现——司法过程中使用的一种法律方法

在传统法学研究方法中,阶级分析方法、比较研究方法、演绎推理等方法是经常使用的主要研究方法,近些年来,随着人们对法学方法论研究的深入,法律逻辑分析、法律推理等方法已越来越广泛的被人们所采纳。然而,在司法过程中被人们经常运用的法律发现方法却很少引起人们的广泛关注。在传统的司法过程中,人们往往比较注重法律解释和法律推理方法,而对法律发现方法却被人们所忽视。实际上在司法过程中确实存在着法律发现方法,它不仅是法律方法之一,而且在司法过程中起着重要的作用。     

法学话语中的法律解释规则

法律解释方法的核心是法律解释规则,即各种理解、解释和运用法律的规则。几乎所有关于法律解释方法的理论,其目标都是探寻法律解释规则的构建与运用。为了证成这一判断,梳理与不同意识形态相匹配的具体法律方法很有必要。这种概括不是对法律方法纯粹历史的考察,重心在于说明法律解释规则的实践意义。我国的法律方法论研究即将进入第二个发展阶段,即在关注一般理论研究的基础上,开始法律解释规则及其运用研究。这是展现法学理论和法律方法论实用品格的开始。对法律解释规则的认识可以从多个角度展开,重点从法治意识形态、法律方法的进化以及与相近概念的比较三个方面进行诠释。     

法律理性与法律的技术化

现代法律制度的每一个建构性要素及其运作过程的每一个环节,都表现出很强的技术性特征,这使得法律成为一种典型的社会技术。法律技术铸成了法律的确定性,使法律规范系统化;它划定了行为合法与不法的界限,使人们对自己的行为后果更有预期。可以说,技术化是法律理性在形式方面最重要的表现,而实践的特点决定了理性必然是形式理性与实质理性的统一,作为法律价值的载体和法律目的的支持系统,法律技术本身也是法治的基本条件之一。因此,法律的技术性特征及其意义应当受到重视,法律技术的功能也有待于我们加以深入地研究。     

法理和情理

情感并非只能是任性的和不公正的,并非不能作为法律价值的终极来源.从中国儒家的传统哲学思想出发,一种"中和"的情感是可能通过修身渠道获得的,它可以称为情理.以修身作为治国根本,实质上是奠定社会形而上的价值基础的根本.情理可从修身中被发现,并进入日常生活的正义认知中.在法律推理中,情理可以弥补现代法律的价值亏空.     

Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists

There is a widespread view that one does either theory or empirical work, and that theory and empiricism represent distant concerns, opposing worldviews, and perhaps distinct mentalities or personalities. This prevalent view has deep roots and is also the result of pragmatic and understandable tendencies toward division of intellectual labor. Against this view, this essay suggests that the relations between theory and empirical study ought to be understood as more intimate and that making legal theory an explicit focus can improve empirical scholarship. We pursue this claim by articulating a basis for legal theory and by showing how that basis illuminates both the application and design of empirical research on law. Legal theory, we argue, follows jurisprudence in interrogating the law as a set of coercive normative institutions. The upshot of this approach is a recognition that an interdisciplinary analysis of law must rely on both a theory (explicit or implicit) of the way law's power and its normativity align and an account of the way in which this discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally. We thus argue that legal theory is necessary in order to draw fruitfully on empirical research and further claim that legal theory provides guidance both for setting up an empirical research agenda on law and for designing research into specific topics.     

Legal Positivism and Legal Disagreements

This paper deals with the possibility of faultless disagreement in law. It does this by looking to other spheres in which faultless disagreement appears to be possible, mainly in matters of taste and ethics. Three possible accounts are explored: the realist account, the relativist account, and the expressivist account. The paper tries to show that in the case of legal disagreements, there is a place for an approach that can take into account our intuitions in the sense that legal disagreements are genuine and at times faultless.     

法律发展与法律知识化

法律发展首先必须面对合法化与价值诉求问题，而这一切又无不与作为基础的法律主体的知识立场密切相关。如何谋求“法律知识化”、话语合法化以及法律主体的价值立场的有效运作，是法律文明、有效发展的必要途径，也是法律发展话语摒弃规则主义弊端制约而建构自我所不可回避的挑战。从西方国家的经验看，现代法治的确立与以理性化为核心的法律知识化过程密不可分，法律知识化由知识对法律的关系提升、扩展为一种法律观，再由一种法律观落实为一种价值观、方法论，并由此引导法律主体追求和建设一种新的法律文明。更为重要的是，“法律知识化”使法治成为近代法律发展的本质性，把知识化原则导入法律发展领域，从而实现了法律发展的革命性变革。     

Legal Transplants and Legal Downloads

Online legal education has the potential to address a global audience. But little attention has been paid so far to the question of how teaching methods developed in one jurisdiction interact with the substantive law of another legal system. This paper challenges the assumption of the independence of substantive law and law teaching on the basis of a comparative evaluation of online law tutorials in Scotland and Germany. It concludes that the transplanting legal education, as transplanting substantive law, can have unpredictable consequences.     

Legal Principles and Legal Theory

Current legal theory is concerned with the presence of principles in law partly because they are at the core of Dworkin's criticisms of Hart's rule of recognition. Hart's theory is threatened by the possibility that the identification of some principles follows an extremely relaxed rule of recognition, or even no rule at all. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive test to ascertain what is the case in actual practice. On the other hand, the evaluative arguments which support Dworkin's proposal of principled adjudication are forceful but not conclusive. Moreover, since ultimate controversy over values is plausible, judicial discretion may sometimes be inevitable.     

Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited

This article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal reasoning that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, and tries to show that this is the reason why not only Hart, but also writers like Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz have failed to offer a theory of legal reasoning that is compatible with legal positivism as a theory of law. They have faced a choice between an explanation of legal reasoning that is incompatible with the core of legal positivism or else strangely sceptical, insofar as it severs the link between general rules and particular decisions that purport to apply them.     

Global Legal Interaction and Legal Cultures

Abstract . The legal discourse of a steadily growing European legal community and universal legal harmonization is misleading since it abstracts completely from the cultural dimension of law which consist of patterns of interpretation and behavioral routines with respect to law. The article makes use of abundant literature in administrative sciences, international management research and socio-psychological studies in Intercultural Communication in order to propose indicators for a comparison of legal cultures in the areas of European legal integration, international commercial transactions and international lawyering.