论卡特政府时期美国全球战略发生历史性转变的内在根源(Ⅱ)

吉米·卡特是美国历史上少有的在执政期间真正有意致力于推动世界和平的总统之一。他为抑制美苏军备竞赛,裁减军备与缓和当时的国际紧张局势做出了不懈的努力。他的这些努力使他后来荣膺诺贝尔和平奖。然而,由于卡特的这种外交方针触犯了当时美国国内某些极端保守势力的利益,在国际上又遭到苏联霸权主义的扩张带来的冲击,使他在执政期间屡屡遭受外交政策上的挫折。分析美国外交政策史上这一特定时期的种种内在和外在的因果联系,对于我们今天更深入地了解美国外交政策的内在动因具有极为重要的参照意义。     

蓬佩奥:史上最差国务卿!

他将美国外交政策推入谷底,正把自己变成"人类公敌"。2020年3月30日,美媒《华盛顿邮报》将"史上最差国务卿"的头衔颁给了蓬佩奥,用来讽刺他在疫情期间毫无建树。半年多之后的8月31日,该报再评蓬佩奥,称"史上最差"国务卿将美国外交政策推入谷底,让美国孤立程度达到巅峰。     

美国台海问题研究述评(2001～2009)

两岸关系在2000～2008年台湾民进党执政时期发生剧烈的变化,这一时期也是美国布什政府的主要执政期(2001～2009)。在九一一恐怖事件的冲击下,布什政府的外交政策与对外关系产生了重大变化,其中涉及中美关系中最为敏感的台湾问题。     

中美关系解冻的舆论准备 ——富布赖特的"中国听证会"

美国的政治体制和安排决定了参议院外交委员会主席能够对美国外交政策发挥举足轻重的影响。富布赖特在担任参议院外交委员会主席期间,主持参议院“中国听证会”,邀请美国的中国问题专家和学者出席,向政府决策者和普通公众更全面地展示中国,帮助他们正确地认识中国。他主持的听证会在美国社会引起了强烈反响。可以毫不夸张地说,富布赖特的“中国听证会”为尼克松任上开始的中美关系解冻进行了舆论准备。     

意识形态在美国外交政策中的地位

意识形态在美国外交政策中占有十分重要的地位,它一方面是美国的外交"理念",是目标之一,是判定根本国家利益的依据;另一方面是推行外交政策的重要工具.在美国外交政策中,意识形态是国家利益的重要组成部分,但不是最基本的部分,与国家安全、经济利益相比处于次要地位.在美国外交政策指导思想中,无论是理想主义还是现实主义,乃至孤立主义、国际主义、民族主义、实用主义,都有意识形态的一席之地.     

"布什主义"的走向与中美关系

布什政府外交政策的核心是以单边主义、“政权更迭”和先发制人式预防战争为特征的“布什主义”,其目的是追求美国的绝对军事优势和美利坚帝国。本文在对“布什主义”的实质,产生的学理背景和社会根源,以及其内在的矛盾和外部的阻力进行分析的基础上,推测未来几年美国外交政策走向和对中美关系的可能影响。本文认为,布什的美国远比一个新兴的崛起大国更加危险,但“布什主义”的内在矛盾、美国有限的资源和国内政治制度决定了它的前途并不看好。“布什主义”对中美关系影响有限,美国已开始接受中国崛起的事实,并试图通过接触,适应日益崛起的中国,保证其对华政策有双重保险。     

一种新的阐释美国外交政策的方法--读《美国外交政策及其如何影响了世界》

人们在对美国外交政策进行分析、阐释和预测时所面临的问题之一是 ,如何以一种适当的方法来解读错综复杂的当代美国外交政策。《美国外交政策及其如何影响了世界》① 一书体现了为应对这一问题而进行的努力。该书作者、美国对外关系委员会的美国外交政策高级研究员沃尔特·拉塞尔·米德向人们提出具有启迪意义的阐释方式。一米德在书中提出的一个核心论点就是 ,正确理解后冷战时期的美国外交政策 ,关键在于承认并理解美国的外交政策传统。米德认为 ,自美国独立以来 ,对外政策在美国的历史进程中发挥了重要作用 ,相对于其他大国 ,美国对外政…     

肯尼迪-约翰逊时期的外交与第三世界

冷战时期美国对第三世界的政策,是同美国冷战战略密切相关的。肯尼迪-约翰逊时期对第三世界的外交政策完全服务于美国全球遏制战略和遏制中国的政策目标。美国在实现这些政策目标的过程中,军事反应、军事援助、经济援助等成为最重要的手段。在与苏联和中国争夺第三世界的斗争中,美国使用这些手段,反对他们认定是亲共产主义或共产主义的民族解放运动以及有关的事态发展。总体而言,肯尼迪和约翰逊的外交政策在相当程度上忽视了第三世界国家试图在战后国际体系中寻求恰当位置的努力。这一时期美国对第三世界的外交虽然有所成就,但也充满了危机、挫折、痛苦和失败,外交决策者和普通的美国人为遏制战略付出了前所未有的代价。     

关于苏日关系正常化谈判的俄国档案(1956年9月至10月)

这里刊登的是14件关于1956年9-10月苏日关系正常化莫斯科谈判的俄国解密档案。 1951年上台执政的日本首相鸠山一郎不同意吉田执政年代实行的过分依赖美国的外交政策。因此他首先提出与苏联谈判实现关系正常化的问题,并认为协调与苏联和中国的关系,将使日本得以实行更加独立于美国的外交政策。与此同时,斯大林以后的苏联新领导人在对外政策方面采取了取向缓和的方针,这不仅表现在停止朝鲜战争,改变对南斯拉夫的态度,以及重新构架与西德的关系等问题上,实现对日关系正常化也是这个新方针的一部分。     

单边主义与多边主义的相互转换--试析多边主义在布什第二任期回归的可能

孤立主义是美国外交传统也是美国单边主义外交政策的基础.虽然20世纪下半叶多边主义主导着美国的外交政策,但是以孤立主义为基础的单边主义依然时隐时现.当前布什政府否定多边主义而推行单边主义外交政策与美国传统的孤立主义影响,新保守主义的新帝国主义论的理论准备,以及强权政治论的作用紧密相关.但布什政府的单边主义外交政策在实践中遭到挫折,受到了国内外的深刻质疑,同时由于国际政治经济体系的全球化和数字化发展,多边主义在布什第二任期的外交政策中有着回归的可能.     

1958年苏联从罗马尼亚撤军始末

1944年苏军进入罗马尼亚后,对其战后初期的政治、经济和社会都产生了很大的负面影响。1955年罗马尼亚首次要求苏联撤军,结果遭到赫鲁晓夫的强硬拒绝。经过不懈努力,1958年苏联终于同意罗方要求。苏联之所以同意撤军,主要是出于和平攻势的需要,也考虑到罗马尼亚处在一个不容易受西方国家攻击的地理位置,同时也是对罗马尼亚忠诚的"奖赏"。苏军的撤出为罗马尼亚以后独立自主政策的实施大开了方便之门。     

The recent situation in East Asia and Cambodia

A military coup in July 1997 mounted by Hun Sen against his co‐prime minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, derailed plans for Cambodia to join ASEAN, an outcome that was unfortunate not only for Cambodia but for the region as a whole, according to Yukio Imagawa. Ambassador of Japan to Cambodia from 1992 to 1996, Imagawa was closely involved in the Cambodian peace process from the time of the Paris Peace Talks in 1989. In this paper, he examines the factors that caused dissension within the Cambodian government in the years following the success of the 1993 UN‐sponsored election, and throws light on the efforts of the international community to ensure the continuance of peace and of democratic government in Cambodia     

Poland and Hungary, 1956: A Comparative Essay Based on New Archival Findings

Why did the Soviet Union intervene in Hungary in 1956 but not in Poland? This article reviews the “historical thesis”, “personality thesis”, and “neutrality thesis”. It concludes that, while the new archival sources do not radically alter these three older theses, they do yield some insights. Wladyslaw Gomulka was perhaps less successful in deterring the Soviet leaders during the latter’s 19 October visit to Poland and less secure politically in his own country than originally thought. In addition, Imre Nagy may not have been as progressive, given his initial opposition to the very decisions for which he has gone down in history as having made.     

Nasser's Dilemma: Egypt's Relations with the United States and Israel, 1967–69

The article examines the American political efforts to bring about an agreement between Israel and Egypt between 1967 and 1969 and analyses the reasons for their failure. But it does not focus exclusively on the Americans; it also outlines the alternatives for Egyptian action during the period in question and looks at the political and military steps taken by Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. The main conclusion is that despite Egypt's dependence on the Soviet Union for economic aid and the rebuilding of the decimated Egyptian army, Nasser knew that the only route to a political process to regain Sinai ran through the United States. His diplomatic efforts were all derived from this insight. At the same time, the Egyptian president's attempts to exploit American pressure to his benefit, as he had done in 1957, was undercut by his overestimation of his bargaining chips, a mistake that was one factor in the collapse of the efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement in the region.     

PēTeris STUčka and the National Question

Pēteris Stu?ka, the main Latvian theorist of Marxism, Chairman of the Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic, and an instigator of mass terror, repeatedly claimed to be against all nationalisms, even when “under a socialist label”. But when it came to his native Latvia, Stu?ka was not so quick to subscribe to Leninist internationalism in practice as he was in theory, often demonstrating conflicting views and attitudes, and at times behaving in a manner that would have made any Latvian nationalist proud.     

Soviet policy toward the two Koreas, 1985–1991: The new political thinking and power

This research explores the evolution of the Soviet Union’s Korea policy between 1985 and 1991, focusing on the correlation between Gorbachev’s shifting power position within the Soviet leadership and the development of the Soviet Union’s new policy toward the two Koreas. Soviet leaders utilized policy issues (foreign and domestic) to mobilize support in their internal power struggle. Conversely, they needed to establish a firm power base before launching new policies. Thus, power and policy in the Soviet political system often enjoyed a mutually reinforcing relationship, and foreign policy issues became entangled in the domestic political process. As Gorbachev’s power position improved and his reform policy (new political thinking) was refined, Soviet policy toward the two Koreas correspondingly evolved in three phases: (1) Gorbachev rising: the formulation of the new political thinking (March 1985–summer 1988); (2) Gorbachev ascendant: the implementation of new political thinking (fall 1988–summer 1990); and (3) Gorbachev in decline: the continuing momentum of the new policy (fall 1990–December 1991). In late 1990–1991, Soviet Korea policy was characterized by an undisguised tilt toward Seoul. Nevertheless, the Soviets did not consider Soviet relations with the two Koreas to be a zero-sum game. Moscow sought to establish a balanced relationship with both Pyongyang and Seoul, and hoped to play an active role in peace and security on the Korean peninsula.     

Oil,War and European Initiatives for Peace in the Middle East 1973–74: British Attitude and Perspective

The Arab–Israeli wars since 1948 resulted in several peace treaties between Israel and its neighbours brokered by the US, the Soviet Union and European countries in an attempt to achieve a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. All efforts however proved ultimately futile, with the resumption of war several years after each peace treaty had been signed. For example, after the Six Day War of 1967, all parties agreed to accept a peace treaty based upon United Nations Resolution 242. However, six years after the tabling of the resolution, war broke out again on October 1973. Another long process of peace settlement ensued which culminated in the Camp David Accords, brokered by President Jimmy Carter. These peace accords, signed between President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel on 17 September 1978, led directly to the Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979. Despite its success, the 1979 treaty yet again failed to achieve the just and lasting peace settlement that had been expected. In all these treaties, the core issues of the conflict, such as the Palestinian refugee problem and the status of East Jerusalem, failed to be resolved. This article examines the British attitude and perspective towards the peace settlement after the 1973 war, focussing on the proposal for an International Peace Guarantee and the initiative of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. Based upon declassified archival records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office available at the National Archives in England, it unveils the attitude of the British government towards the UN Resolutions as well as its collective initiatives with the European Community to establish a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.     

Understanding Israel's Long Conflict in Lebanon: The Search for an Alternative Approach to Security During the Peace Process

The Arab‐Israeli peace process pointed to a resolution of the Middle East's most persistent conflict, as the Rabin and Peres governments developed a sensitivity to the Arab‐Israeli ‘security dilemma’, but by 1996 the process was deadlocked. Events stalled progress, but so did ingrained attitudes that continued to shape policy that was inconsistent with the peace process. The following article explains some of the Realist norms and values at the root of security thinking in Israel, and charts their inertia in Israeli policy during the peace process, focusing on its approach to Lebanon. The article gives an insight into why Rabin and his successors struggled to find an alternative policy towards Lebanon, and how this prolonged the Arab‐Israeli conflict. The efforts of the Netanyahu and Barak governments to find a solution to the policy problem of Lebanon are outlined.     

Who needed the October 1973 war?

Scholars and pundits believe that Anwar Sadat went to war in October 1973 because Israel left him no choice. The Israeli government rejected his peace proposals during 1971–73, and Sadat initiated the war in order to demonstrate his refusal to agree to the status quo and to the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the territories it occupied in June 1967. However, when the peace treaty signed between Israel and Egypt in March 1979 is carefully studied, it appears the terms of the treaty were in fact much closer to the Israeli position and terms as presented before the 1973 war than to those set by Sadat. Careful reading of the relevant documents in general and Sadat's claims and arguments in particular will show that it was actually Sadat who needed the war, and he needed it not in order to force Israel into a political process, but for himself, so as to accept terms he could not accept without a war.