Vitalizing Democracy at the Grassroots: A Contribution of Post-War Women’s Movements in Japan

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the socio-political significance of women’s collective activities in Japan. I attempt to demonstrate that the Japanese women’s movements act as a role of democratic agency through their commitment to social reform and to changes in the political status quo. In the first three sections, I give an overview of Japanese women’s movements from the early post-war period to the present day, categorizing them into three types: the elite-initiated, second-wave feminist, and non-feminist participatory. Subsequently, I discuss the confrontation and reconciliation between feminists and non-feminists. In the final section, I examine what role the women’s movements play in socio-political reforms in terms of civil society discourse, and I conclude that the diversity of Japanese women’s movements has contributed to strengthening democracy at the grassroots.

Japan’s Political Economy and Koizumi’s Structural Reform: A Rise and Fall of Neoclassical Economic Reform in Japan

For five years of his premiership, Jun’ichiro Koizumi bravely fought against politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups to promote his structural economic reform. Fortunately, by the time he retired, Japanese economy got out of the depression. But the tide changed. In the July 2007 Upper House elections, the public was opposed to structural reform that Koizumi and Abe had advocated. Now it is not clear where Japanese political economy is likely to go. This paper will take a long-term view on the evolution of Japan’s political economy, and try to understand Jun’ichiro Koizumi’s structural reform in that long-term context.

Japan’s Quest for “Soft Power”: Attraction and Limitation

Japan is seeking to project its “soft power” through the allure of manga and anime in its public diplomacy. The production, diffusion and global consumption of manga and anime are driven by market forces and consumer tastes and not by the Japanese state. However, the latter is seeking to harness this popular culture to burnish Tokyo’s international image. Despite the attractiveness of Japanese pop culture and other more traditional forms of public diplomacy, Tokyo’s pursuit of “soft power” and a good international image is undermined by its failure to overcome its burden of history.

Demystifying the Park Chung-Hee Myth: Land Reform in the Evolution of Korea’s Developmental State

The developmental state literature emphasises the importance of state autonomy and capacity, with a particular focus on a Weberian type of meritocratic bureaucracy. Existing studies of South Korea’s economic development generally credit Park Chung-hee for establishing such a state. This article questions this assessment with careful process tracing of the development of a meritocratic bureaucracy in the country. The findings suggest that the contrast between the predatory Rhee regime (1948–1960) and the developmental Park regime (1961–1979) has been exaggerated. Meritocracy in South Korea’s bureaucratic recruitment and promotion systems developed gradually over several decades, including during Rhee’s regime as well as the short democratic episode (1960–1961). What then explains the evolution of a developmental state in Korea? This article suggests that land reform contributed to not only creating social structural conditions favourable to state autonomy but also promoting the development of a meritocratic bureaucracy by propelling rapid expansion of education and by mitigating the extent of political clientelism.     

Nakasone Yasuhiro’s “Autonomous Defense” and the Security of Japan

Former Prime Minister of Japan Nakasone Yasuhiro advocated autonomous defense throughout the post-WWII period. Nakasone’s concept of autonomous defense (jishu boei) went beyond the idea of enhancing national defense capabilities—it was accompanied by a rich and varied internationalism that strove toward assuaging neighboring countries’ concerns toward Japan’s remilitarization. Nakasone also actively engaged major western powers in the global debate over nuclear issues during his term as prime minister, and it went beyond the confines of Japan’s bilateral security relationship with the United States. Thus, Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept reflected both the development of postwar Japan and the many turbulent changes in the postwar global security landscape. This essay follows the evolution of Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept during his political career from 1950 to the end of his premiership in 1988 and concludes with an overall assessment of his initiatives regarding Japanese security.     

Establishing a Social-Darwinist Mentality in Japan’s Paternalist State: The Potential of Resistance by a Counter-Public

ABSTRACT

From a historical perspective, the welfare net in Japan was established from above without democratic participation and expanded only slowly. This expansion in many cases was aimed at enhancing national cohesion, especially during war time. During the current neoliberal era, Japan’s paternalistic welfare state has been able to put into practice the dismantling of national pension and health-care systems without the need for any theoretical re-orientation. In response, counter-publics have engaged in protest and resistance. By doing so, the victims of modernization and those who are socially weak and disadvantaged in multiple ways are able to regain their self-esteem and personal integrity.     

The Trump Administration and Japan: Challenges and Visions for Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy in the New Era

It is possible that Donald Trump’s success in the US presidential election of November 2016 will touch off the greatest transformation in world politics since World War Two. This is because, for the first time, the presidency of the United States—a country that since World War Two has consistently upheld the liberal world order—has been won by a man who asserts that the US national interests will take precedence over international cooperation.

If so, Japan could be one of the most profoundly affected countries. Japan has thus far accepted its status as a junior partner within the US security framework and—without any significant military power of its own—has devoted itself to economic development.

Although it is difficult to predict what Mr. Trump’s policies will be, there is a possibility, based on the statements he has made to date, that he will be calling for Japan to become more self-reliant. Although his comprehension of the Japan-US security arrangements is fraught with misconceptions, there is ample possibility that he will ultimately opt to maintain the current Japan-US security framework. However, given that the average defense expenditure of NATO countries is 2% of their GDPs, and that the average expenditure of OECD countries on official development assistance (ODA) is 0.7% of their GDPs, it is highly questionable whether Mr. Trump will approve of Japan’s level of defense spending (less than 1% of its GDP) or of its level of spending on ODA (approximately 0.2% of its GDP).

It would not be such a bad thing for Japan to become more self-reliant in terms of security. It is almost unnatural for Japan to maintain this relationship as it is, in the form that it has taken since before Japan’s postwar reconstruction. However, in the context of international relations in East Asia, it has long been taken for granted that this is Japan’s basic stance. Changing this will be no easy task—either domestically or in terms of Japan’s relations with neighboring countries.

In these respects, the authors of this paper decided to consider the question of how Japan should develop its foreign and security policy, and to offer some proposals in this regard.     

Japan’s Bilateral FTAs: No Obstacle to Progress in the Doha Round

This paper examines Japan’s FTAs with Mexico and the Philippines in the context of parallel negotiations in the Doha Round. Although the limited results produced by these FTAs represent an inferior outcome to what might be achieved with multilateral trade liberalization, there is no evidence that these agreements have weakened the political will of Japanese export interests to push ahead with trade liberalization in the WTO or increased the leverage of protectionist interests in opposing that goal. The greatest hope for increased Japanese flexibility in WTO agricultural talks lies in accelerated reform of domestic farm policy rather than reduced emphasis on pursuit of FTAs.

“Be a Mighty Hard Message”: Toni Morrison’s Beloved and the Exploration of Whiteness in the Post-Apartheid Classroom

In post-apartheid classrooms students sometimes regard systemic racial oppression as distant history. They often note that they “did” apartheid at school. This paper considers how teaching Toni Morrison’s Beloved can prompt a profound self-examination in both black and white South African students. Beloved demands the active participation of the “born free” generation in a deliberate, serious engagement with the traumatic historical past. Furthermore, Morrison’s interrogation of white behavior, white constructions of black people, and the threat of racialized violence that whiteness contains within it, can productively challenge white racial identity. Teaching this novel has provided some insight into the continued articulation of white privilege and aversive racism among white South African students. Some are unnerved, express resistance, or refuse the novel’s inquiry into race. I discuss how I encourage my students to heed Morrison’s call to engage with historical memory so as to move towards a more viable future.     

Australia’s Army Nurse: Locating a Woman as the Heart of Sacrifice in the Hall of Memory

This article contests the misconception that the Hall of Memory of the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, represents an irreligious space. While accommodating the expectations of a post-secular society, this belief fails to recognise the influence of Christianity upon the generation that experienced World War I and developed the memorial practices that arose in response to it. Veteran-artist M. Napier Waller embedded complex religious symbolism in the scheme of three windows he designed and executed for the hall. Drawing on his individual experience of battle, personal philosophy of art and the medieval customs of his forebears, Waller told the story of Australia’s experience of the war and aligned a nation’s sacrifice with that of Christ: His Crucifixion, Resurrection and Ascension are symbolised in the south, west and east windows, respectively. The inclusion of a nurse was central to Waller’s plans and required he manipulate the men creating the memorial to achieve his goal. In doing so, he neutralised the greatest threat to his vision: its founder, Charles Bean, and located a woman of many identities—a Martial Madonna—as the heart of national sacrifice in Australia’s premier war memorial.     

The Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy Lacks a Strong Driving Force for Building Inflation Expectations

The Bank of Japan has been failing to create the 2% inflation expectations. This article presents the author’s views about why the Bank of Japan’s monetary easing measures have not led to achievement of the inflation target of 2%, as well as on measures required to achieve the 2% inflation (and base wage increases of over 3% which is the flip side of a 2% inflation). The major points of this article are outlined below.

First, while many Japanese economists pay little attention to importance of mild inflation, the achievement of mild inflation of 2% is vital in ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment. Its achievement would enable lowering of real interest rates (i.e., reducing the real interest rate to minus 2% as against the 0% nominal interest rate) in the situation where the nominal interest rates are drifting at the lower limit against a backdrop of various economic shocks. It would also facilitate reduction in real wages against the downwardly rigid nominal wages, thereby helping companies revive their businesses, and also facilitating adjustments in the overall economy.

Second, the reasons why the current Bank of Japan’s monetary easing measures have been unsuccessful in attaining the inflation target of 2% are as follows: 1) most of the Japanese do not understand the importance of mild inflation and so the specific content of the inflation target (achieving 2% inflation and base wage increases of over 3%) is not clearly shared; 2) on top of the fact that deflation/zero inflation has become rooted in Japan’s economy over the past two decades, Japan has never adopted a monetary policy that would anchor a mild inflation expectation of 2% (until 1990, the Bank of Japan’s primary task was to be mindful of curbing the accelerating cost-push inflation associated with wage growth); and 3) the current Bank of Japan’s monetary policy lacks a strong driving force for building inflation expectations to induce a change in people’s behavior.

Third, in order to build mild inflation expectations of 2% under such circumstances, it is important that the parties concerned with employer’s associations and labor unions become fully aware of this target so that the 2% inflation and base wage increases of over 3% becomes a code of conduct. On that basis, the government and Bank of Japan need to clearly demand substantial base wage increases with concrete numerical targets combined with the achievement of mild inflation towards the goal of building inflation expectations.

Fourth, I propose as the first step that, along with the economic measures recently taken, the government and the central bank either mediate or participate in a specific attempt to build a consensus between the employer’s associations and labor unions on achieving, in a neutral manner, inflation of 2% and base wage increases of (at least) 2%. The aim is to establish an inflation of 2% and base wage increases of over 3% as a new code of conduct shared by employer’s associations and labor unions through continued labor-management agreement.

It is desirable that mild inflation is attained gradually by stimulating aggregate demand continuously, if time and cost permit and if the international environment tolerates weak yen. However, the current economic environment would not allow it and the leeway to ease monetary policy has also been limited. It is also difficult to continue to boost aggregate demand through fiscal policy in a sustained manner against a backdrop of a low birthrate and aging population. Although successful achievement of mild inflation is not a panacea for all economic problems, unless we first achieve mild inflation and restore the function of monetary policy, we will not be able to implement the subsequent structural reforms of the labor markets, etc. or fiscal consolidation, which are both painful. And thus, the long-term economic outlook of Japan is dismal. The author strongly hopes that the Abe Cabinet and Bank of Japan under the leadership of Governor Kuroda implements a drastic regime change similar to the one launched by the Roosevelt administration, overcome deflation and achieve mild inflation, restore the function of monetary policy at the earliest possible time, and get on the path to a true revitalization of the Japanese economy.     

Orientalism and binary discursive representations of Tunisia’s democratization: the need for a “continuity and change” paradigm

ABSTRACT

Mainstream analyses of Tunisia’s post-2011 democratic transition have been largely divided along two mutually exclusive narratives. There are those hailing the country as ‘the Arab Spring’s only success story’ on the one hand and those sounding sensationalist alarms about the country’s democratization failure and return to authoritarianism on the other. This is consistent with, and perpetuates, a problematic zero-sum binary in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) scholarship between either a linear democratization process or authoritarian resilience. Furthermore, these reductionist representations highlight the failure of predominant democratization theories to account for the nuances and complexities of democratic transition. This paper critically examines the binary discursive representations of Tunisia’s democratization and explores their underpinning in two competing Orientalisms: the classic Orientalism underscoring an ontological difference (and inferiority) of the ‘Arab world’ to the West, and a liberal civilizing Orientalism which, while acknowledging an ‘essential sameness’ between the West and the ‘Arab world’, places the West as the temporal pinnacle of democracy and the normative monitor of democratic success. This paper thus rejects the binary discursive representations of Tunisia’s transition and advocates for a more nuanced narrative which accounts for the patterns of continuity with and change from authoritarian structures within the democratization process.     

The Changing Character of Disaster Victimhood: Evidence from Japan’s “Great Earthquakes”

ABSTRACT

Japan is periodically wracked by “Great Earthquakes” (daijishin) – seismic events so destructive that they leave massive amounts of textual and graphic evidence, much of it produced by people who did not experience the events directly. Using this cache of information, it is possible to see how the idea of the “disaster victim” has changed over time and circumstance. My paper traces this role across five Great Earthquakes that spanned roughly 150 years (1855–2011), a period convergent with modern Japan. I will argue that the sense of who and what has been victimized by the shaking of the earth – who has suffered, what weight to attach to their loss, what actions to take and emotions to feel regarding their situation – has changed regularly, and surprisingly, over this rather short period. There is, in other words, no common Japanese experience of victimhood, even in the context of one disaster type over a relatively short historical period. The article is one contribution to an as-yet unexamined history and comparative study of the modern role of disaster victim.     

Militarizing Japan’s Southwest Islands: Subnational Involvement and Insecurities in the Maritime Frontier Zone

Abstract

This paper sheds light on a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan’s recent security changes by examining the subnational level where the impact has been far-reaching. It focuses on Japan’s maritime frontier zone: the Yaeyama Islands located at the southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago and administered as part of Okinawa Prefecture. It argues that while Yaeyama militarization has been primarily a national response to China’s portrayed assertiveness in the East China Sea, it has also been facilitated by the strategic actions of local political elites, in cooperation with sympathetic extra-local forces. Political elites from two islands, Yonaguni and Ishigaki, have been motivated primarily by diverging material and ideational factors. Yonaguni elites have viewed militarization largely through the prism of “compensation politics.” Their counterparts in Ishigaki have been driven by more ideological objectives, seeking militarization for deterrence purposes and otherwise transforming the island into a rightist breeding ground in defence of Japanese territory. Yaeyama militarization has not only diminished enthusiasm for seeking autonomy and enhancing economic security through microregional cooperation, but has also enhanced local-level insecurities while creating and exacerbating divisions.     

‘This is a Prison…A Death in Life’: Reza Shah’s troubled exile on the Island of Mauritius

Reza Shah, the feared and powerful master of Iran for nearly two decades, spent the last years of his life in lonely exile, on the island of Mauritius, then in South Africa. His life in exile was hardly a happy one. The place and conditions of his exile were dictated not by himself but by the British, and the relationship between the two remained uneasy. Britain’s handling of Reza Shah – the degree and freedom and choice they were prepared to allow him and his family – were determined by the exigencies of war. Reza Shah sought to loosen the bonds of British control. In Tehran, his son and successor, Mohammad Reza Shah, also played a role. He used what leverage he had with the British to help ease the conditions of his father’s exile, while he endeavored to protect Iran’s interests under a difficult foreign occupation. The push-and-pull of cross-purposes entailed by this triangular relationship defined Reza Shah’s life in exile in both Mauritius and Johannesburg. This article examines the Mauritian period of his exile.     

Hiding in Plain Sight? Japan’s Militarization of Space and Challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine

ABSTRACT

Japan’s security discourse – despite accelerating shifts in its security stance over the last two decades, and more recently, under the Abe administration – remains dominated by views of essential continuity and maintenance of the “Yoshida Doctrine.” The case of Japan’s militarization of space is used to create a framework for systematically dismantling default assumptions about the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine. The militarization of space serves as a driver of broader trends in Japan’s security policy manifested in the procurement of dual-use assets in launch systems, communications and intelligence satellites, and counterspace capabilities necessary for active internal and external balancing with the US–Japan alliance; the strengthening domestically of security policymaking institutions; and the jettisoning of anti-militaristic norms. Japan’s increasingly assertive military stance, bolstering of the US–Japan alliance and cessation of hedging, facing down of China’s rise, and departure from the Yoshida Doctrine as grand strategy are thus revealed as hiding in plain sight.