Richard Nixon and Economic Nationalism in Latin America: The Problem of Expropriations, 1969-1974

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Nixon administration confronted the problem of how best to protect US economic interests in Latin America during a period of rising economic nationalism. After extensive debate, the president approved a policy designed to deter expropriations and rein in nationalist economic sentiment by threatening to terminate US and international financial assistance to countries that expropriated American holdings without prompt and adequate compensation. As it turned out, however, this policy was little short of a disaster. Nixon's stance heightened American unpopularity during a period when US credibility in Latin America was already on the wane, and failed to have any restraining effect on either the number of expropriations by Latin American countries or the strength of economic nationalism in the area. Informed by domestic and bureaucratic pressures and the same ideological proclivities that have long characterized American relations with the underdeveloped world, Nixon's policy on the expropriations issue ultimately proved ineffective and even pernicious to US interests in Latin America.     

Britain and Japan: Long-Range Images, 1900-52

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed in 1902 was revised substantially in 1905 and 1911. It survived the First World War and did not lapse until 1923. For two decades, it enabled Britain to withdraw its navy from East Asia, leaving its commercial interests to the protection of Japan. Meanwhile it enabled Japan to expand its influence in Korea and China. There was not an immediate breach of the alliance, but interests clashed in China in the difficult world of economic collapse in the 1930s. When they failed to come to an accommodation, Japan declared war on Britain in 1941. After the war, Britain shared with the United States the task of policing the military occupation of Japan. But when that occupation came to an end in 1952 during the anxious days of the Korean war, the vast majority of Japanese believed that their country's future rested with Washington.     

Master of the Game: The Relationship between the United States and Iran Revisited, 1969-1972

ABSTRACT

How and why did the Richard Nixon Administration end up with an Iran policy more in line with the preferences of the Shah of Iran than of the United States? At its onset, the Administration did not have a clearly defined or formalised Persian Gulf policy. Attempts to create over-arching guidelines regarding American conduct toward Iran were of little consequence, as the pro-Iranian inclinations of leading decision-makers led to day-to-day decisions that strongly favoured the Shah. This limited room for manoeuvre amounted to little more than acceptance of what was already established procedure. The Shah’s strenuous lobbying of American decision-makers, using their common Cold War considerations to his advantage and the effective sidelining of critical voices within the Nixon Administration, explain this outcome.     

A western cold war: the crisis in Iceland's relations with Britain, the United States, and NATO, 1971-74

The article explores the crisis in Iceland's relations with the Western Alliance following a left-wing government's decisions, in 1971, to expand Iceland's fishery limits and to demand the withdrawal of US military forces. This sparked a cod war with Britain and a diplomatic stand-off with the United States, with NATO in the middle. It analyzes the motives behind Iceland's behaviour - especially the tension between a pro Western foreign policy course and a domestic anti Western nationalism - the Western response within the context of alliance politics and the democratic peace theory, and the role of international mediation and domestic political realignments in diffusing the crisis.     

China's changing images of Japan, 1989-2001: the struggle to balance partnership and rivalry

Chinese views of Japan, both official and popular, grew morenegative after the end of the cold war. From 1989 to 1993 theJapanese side bears much of the blame for failing to overcomethe distrust of the Chinese people. When the major deteriorationin Japan's image occurred from 1994 to 1998, however, it wasChina's leadership that was chiefly responsible, arousing nationalistemotions. When China's leaders sought to reverse this processfrom 1999 to 2001 they were unsuccessful both because of theintensity of public emotions and the lack of reassurance fromthe Japanese leadership and public. Divisions inside China revealthe hesitation of leaders to foster a realistic image of Japan.By tracing the content of changing Chinese perceptions, we canobserve the effects of overconfidence and insensitivity in eachstate and recognize the difficulty at times of uncertain nationalidentity of finding a coordinated strategy for expanding mutualtrust.     

日本高调举办日非峰会的战略意图

5月28—30日,“非洲发展东京国际会议”（TICAD）第四次会议在日本的横滨市召开,共有52个非洲国家的代表应邀与会,其中包括40位非洲的国家元首或政府首脑。此外,日本还诚邀55个国际机构、22个捐助国、12个亚洲国家和16个非洲区域组织的代表参加此次主题为“努力打造充满活力的非洲——希望与机遇的大陆”的日非峰会。TICAD始于1993年,每五年在日本举行一次,     

In Pursuit of a Pacific Strategy:British Planning for the Defeat of Japan, 1943-45

This article seeks to explain why the British pushed for a role in Pacific operations during the Second World War when it faced other strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, as well as a powerful American military that maintained tight control over operational decision-making. Although several quarters in Whitehall, including the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had doubts about the necessity of a Pacific strategy, there were sensible reasons behind pursuing such a course. It would illustrate to an “anti-imperialist” America that Britain was not only interested in recovering its colonial possessions but also prepared to fight the Japanese on their homeland. More importantly, taking part in the main operations would allow the British to claim a voice at the peace table while helping to encourage the Americans to cement their close working relationship with Britain in the postwar period.     

日本政治经济外交形势及政策取向

一2 0 0 0年仍是日本多事的一年。政局乱 ,改革难 ;经济“有景无气” ,缺乏活力 ;外交虚多实少 ,重点突而不破。“朝大野小”的格局被打破 ,自民党与民主党两大阵营形成对峙 ,多党参政的联政框架继续维持。 6.2 5大选之后 ,日本朝野在众议院势力分布发生明显变化。自民党 2 34席、民主党 1 2 9席、公明党 31席、自由党 2 2席、日共 2 0席、社民党 1 9席、保守党 7席、无党派 2 1席。这便形成了自民、公明、保守三联合执政党与民主、自由、日共、社民四在野党的直接对抗的局面。执政三党的议席数较选前大幅度减少 ,由 335席骤减至 2 72席 ,自…     

Typing Politics: The Role of Blogs in American Politics,by Richard Davis

The purpose of this paper is to advance our understanding of how negativity affects voters’ assessments of the positions candidates take on issues. We argue that the inferences people make about candidates’ positions on issues differ depending on whether the information they encounter comes from attack or self-promotional statements. Specifically, we posit that attacks offer two pieces of information to voters—insight into the positions of the target and the sponsor—whereas, positive information only affects perceptions of the sponsor. Further, we contend that attacks offer important correctives to candidates’ often misleading self-promotional claims. By drawing attention to the differences between the informational content of negative and positive appeals, we offer new insights into the inferences voters make about candidates’ positions on issues. We support these claims using data from an internet-based experiment employing a nationally representative sample of nearly 4,000 people. The paper concludes by teasing out a series of implications that arise from these insights.     

解析德国、日本长期护理保险制度的差异

有庞大的老龄人口存在就必然面临着老龄人口的长期护理照料的问题。为了解决这一问题,德国、日本先后于1995年1月1日、2000年4月1日启动长期护理保险法案。但是通过对德国与日本的长期护理保险制度的考察,可以看出两个制度之间的内容还是有很大差异的,具有制度覆盖面悬殊、护理保险的缴费率一高一低、日本长期护理保险制度的设计更为详尽、严格等显著特征。究其原因,乃建制理念迥然相异、建制动因不尽相同的结果。