‘Somewhat more disruptive than we had in mind’1: The Boundary Commission for England's 2011 Proposed Redistribution of Parliamentary Constituencies

In February 2011 the UK Parliament passed an Act that both reduced the number of MPs to be elected to the House of Commons and significantly altered the rules for the definition of Parliamentary constituencies. After six redistributions in which organic criteria—MPs representing places with a community of interest—dominated the redrawing of constituency boundaries, the new rules gave precedence to an arithmetic criterion: all constituencies must have electorates within 5 per cent of the national quota (average). Seven months later the Boundary Commission published its initial proposals for a new set of 502 constituencies implementing these new rules. This paper evaluates the amount of change to the country's electoral map that this involves, identifies the main features of the new constituency configurations, and assesses their likely impact on UK political life.     

Can the Boundary Commissions Help the Conservative Party? Constituency Size and Electoral Bias in the United Kingdom

As part of a strategy to remove perceived biases operating against it in the system used for elections to the House of Commons, the British Conservative party is promoting a revision of the rules used by the Boundary Commissions to ensure greater equality in constituency electorates. A Bill designed to achieve this—and also to reduce the size of the House—was introduced to the House of Lords in 2007. This paper critiques that Bill and suggests an alternative formulation that would better achieve the goal, whilst identifying a number of operational difficulties that its implementation would involve.     

A Proposal for Simultaneous Reform of the House of Commons and House of Lords

The disproportional electoral system of the House of Commons is increasingly contested, while the undemocratic composition of the House of Lords has been criticised for a century. I first argue that simultaneous reform of both chambers creates the opportunity for far more optimal outcomes than possible under attempts to reform just one chamber. I then argue that bicameralism should continue so that the UK can be represented in two, currently convoluted, ways: as a singular polity in partisan terms and as both an aggregate of constituencies and union of nations, in geographic terms. The former would best take place in a reformed House of Commons, responsible for government formation, and composed of around 300 MPs elected by ‘pure’ proportional representation. The latter would best take place in a reformed House of Lords of around 300 peers, elected by plurality voting from single-member constituencies. Together, these reforms would improve governance, representation, legitimacy, accountability and the robustness of the union, while retaining celebrated facets of the status quo such as simplicity and the direct constituency link.     

The Options for Devolution Finance: The Choices for the New Government

The debate about the financing of devolved government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has acquired a new vigour since 2007, with commissions and reviews taking place in Scotland, Wales and at Westminster. Although of considerable constitutional as well as political importance, the technical detail has obscured many of the wider issues involved. This paper surveys the options now open to the UK government, as it prepares its response to the Welsh Holtham Commission, a bill implementing the Calman Commission's recommendations for Scotland, and looks at ways of altering corporation tax in Northern Ireland. It examines six options that in principle are open to the UK government, and argues that the range of options open to the UK government are narrower than they often appear, and that pressure for it to act is such that it will no longer be possible to avoid far‐reaching action.     

Goodbye to All That

This article is the retirement reflections of an MP of thirty‐eight year's standing. The story is mainly one of the decline of the Commons, a decline in the number of ‘big beasts’ and in the calibre of members and the quality of debates to the level of five‐minute harangues and the custard pie‐throwing of Prime Minister's Question Time. The House has lost its functions of staging the national debate and checking the executive to the media but has gained a new role as a national audit of government's performance and policies through the select committee system. MPs are working harder. Fewer now have outside jobs. They are more focused on their constituencies and though they have fewer powers there, and nationally more and better staff, they also have less respect and less influence. Personally, the end of what has been a long‐fighting national retreat from social democracy has been a rear‐guard action against the emergence of a colder, harder, neoliberal world. Retirement means relegation to watching that from the sidelines, not ringside.     

Alastair Campbell,exit stage left: Do the ‘Phillis’ recommendations represent a new chapter in political communications or is it ‘business as usual’?

That there has been a breakdown in trust between government, the media and the people in the UK is now a commonplace axiom—indeed, it was the starting point of the Review of Government Communications undertaken by Bob Phillis in 2003 at the promptings of the House of Commons Select Committee on Public Administration. The Review reported in February 2004, and the government has indicated that it intends to accept the majority of its recommendations. The Review was supposed to usher in a new era in the relationship between government, the media and the people but this might turn out to be a false expectation. Because the Review was based on a number of false assumptions, it runs the risk of creating a system which entrenches some of the worst aspects of the old system without achieving any significant improvements. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Parliament on its Knees: MPs' Expenses and the Crisis of Transparency at Westminster

In May 2009, revelations made in The Daily Telegraph about the way that MPs had used and abused the House of Commons expenses and allowances regime threw the British political system into turmoil, forced the resignation of the Speaker of the Commons along with a number of implicated MPs, and ignited talk about a crisis in parliamentary democracy and a collapse of public trust in politics. This article explores the events that led to this situation, from the structure of MPs pay and allowance system, the Freedom of Information context that framed the disaster, and the crisis of transparency which the House of Commons has itself precipitated. It argues that, talk of parliamentary reform aside, MPs must radically rethink the way that they approach their representative role and the nature of their broader engagement with the public they claim to serve.     

When Is a Gerrymander Not a Gerrymander: Who Benefits and Who Loses from the Changed Rules for Defining Parliamentary Constituencies?

Members of the British Labour party have, not for the first time, criticised the Boundary Commissions’ proposals for new constituency boundaries as gerrymandering. This represents a misuse of the term: the Commissions have produced recommended constituencies in the context of new rules for such redistributions that give precedence to equality of electorates across all seats and the boundaries of those constituencies have been defined without any reference to the likely electoral consequences. The Conservatives, who were responsible for the change in the rules to emphasise electoral equality, wanted to remove a decades‐long Labour advantage in the translation of votes into seats because of variations in constituency size, and the Commissions’ implementation of those rules has achieved that. A Labour advantage has been removed but not replaced by a Conservative advantage: in terms of electoral equality between the two, the playing field has been levelled. Labour's claim to have been disadvantaged by decisions on the electoral register is also examined; the disadvantage is probably only small.     

Report of the Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons (the McKay Commission)

The report of the McKay Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons is reviewed. The Commission, which contained experts on parliamentary procedure, raised a number of important and difficult questions; the answers are less impressive than the questions. In view of the difficulties of any scheme, including that proposed by the Commission, for what is popularly known as “English Votes on English Laws,” policymakers should revisit one of the options that was specifically ruled out of McKay's terms of reference. This would be a reduction in the numbers, but not the powers, of MPs from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the way that applied to Northern Ireland between 1922 and 1979.     

Duverger's Law, Penrose's Power Index and the Unity of the UK

As predicted by Duverger's Law, the UK has had two-party competition for long periods in most electoral districts. However, there are different patterns of two-party competition in different districts and more than two effective parties in the Commons. Since 1874, parliament has always contained parties wishing to modify the Union and contesting seats only outside England. By calculating the Penrose power index for all parties in the House of Commons for all general elections since 1874, we identify when such parties were pivotal. We explain various legislative changes (for example the Crofters Act 1886, the first three Irish Home Rule Bills, the Parliament Act 1911) and non-changes (for example the failure to enact female suffrage before 1914) by reference to the Penrose index scores. The scores also explain how and why policy towards Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland changed and did not change in the 1970s.     

The Welsh Liberal Democrats: From Government to Opposition and Then Back Again?

For over 50 years from 1945 onwards, the Liberal Party and then the Liberal Democrats were either in decline in Wales or struggling to survive from election to election. Since 1997, however, there has been a steady evolution in the party's electoral and political strength. Over this past decade, the Welsh Liberal Democrats, as a state party, have experienced a change in electoral fortunes that has on occasions put them into national political power well in advance of their federal counterparts in England. As an autonomous state party within a federal structure, the Welsh Liberal Democrats have been able to take like a duck to water to the arrival of devolution in the form of the Welsh Assembly. This article examines how the evolution of the party has occurred and, in particular, the role that has been played by the Welsh Liberal Democrat Assembly Members in Welsh politics. The article also explores not only the strengths but also the weaknesses that still dog the Welsh party as it seeks once more to become a major force in Welsh politics.     

Feminising British Politics: Six Lessons from Devolution in Scotland and Wales

Modest levels of female representation at the House of Commons are in sharp contrast to the Nordic‐levels of representation achieved in the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales since devolution in 1999. One apparent advantage of devolution is the opportunity that it provides for lesson‐learning across jurisdictions. This article offers six lessons on women's political representation—three positive and three negative—drawn from the experience of devolution in Scotland and Wales. We draw conclusions from these lessons, including the need to keep parties under scrutiny to ensure they deliver on their rhetorical commitments. We also postulate that gender equality might prove too important to be left to political parties and consider whether there is a need to consider stronger measures such as mandatory quotas.     

Estimating Ideal Points in the British House of Commons Using Early Day Motions

This article develops a new method for estimating the ideological preferences of members of the British House of Commons. Existing methods produce implausible results due to high levels of party cohesion and strategic voting on the part of opposition parties. To circumvent these problems, this article estimates MP preferences using Early Day Motions (EDMs) as an alternative to roll‐call votes. The Bayesian ideal point model for the decision to sign an EDM takes into account both policy preferences and signing costs. The estimates obtained have greater face validity than previous attempts to measure preferences in the House of Commons, recovering the expected order of parties and of members within parties. The estimates successfully predict voting behavior in the House of Commons. As with other Bayesian ideal point methods, this approach produces natural uncertainty estimates and allows for easy calculation of quantities of interest such as member ranks.     

No Accounting for Tax Avoidance

In the 2010–15 Parliaments, the UK House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts held hearings and investigated some of the operations of the tax avoidance industry. Its reports have been highly critical of the role of big accountancy firms in designing, marketing and implementing tax avoidance schemes which have enabled their clients to avoid taxes. The Committee's recommendations set a reform agenda but drew a lukewarm response from the government. An examination of the Committee's reports provides an indication of the trajectories of future debates and policies.     

Blair's Commission for Africa: Problems and Prospects for UK Policy

This article examines the recommendations contained within the Commission for Africa's report Our Common Interest , and asks what they might mean for the UK's Africa policies. After discussing the choice of the Commissioners and summarising the main recommendations made in their report, the article identifies some of the central problems raised but not resolved by the Commission in the relation to issues of security, political economy and governance. The article concludes that the Commission's report raised the profile of an important set of issues but neither resolved them conceptually nor set out a persuasive plan to implement its numerous recommendations. In particular, the Commission did not convincingly explain how neo-patrimonial regimes in Africa could be reformed to ensure that they pursue genuinely national development policies instead of the current strategies that benefit their supporters and weaken their political opponents.     

‘Respect for Law and Sausages’: How Parliament Made Section 31 of the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 on the Sale of Employment Rights

The Parliamentary debates on the clause which became section 31 of the Growth and Enterprise Act 2013 (allowing employees to agree to sign away employment rights for shares in the employing company) show that scrutiny by the House of Commons is very poor, and that scrutiny by the House of Lords is intense and very well‐informed. If the Government loses the argument on a Bill in the House of Lords, it will lose the vote. However, during Parliamentary ping‐pong (the back‐and‐forth process of amendment of a Bill between the two Houses) the Commons, and the Government, will normally get their way, however weak the policy proposal, provided that concessions on detail are made, unless the issue is regarded by the Lords as one of fundamental principle.     

Reforming the Conventions Regarding Parliamentary Scrutiny of Ministerial Actions

Parliamentary scrutiny of government ministers is limited by the convention that one house of parliament cannot compel a member of the other house to appear before it. This convention limits the Senate's capacity to examine ministers who are members of the House of Representatives. It has its origins in UK parliamentary practice, and is given alleged legal force in Australia by virtue of section 49 of Australia's constitution. That section effectively says that Australia's current parliamentary powers, privileges and immunities are those of the UK House of Commons in 1901.
However analysis of UK practice prior to the twentieth century reveals a surprising picture. Far from protecting members of one house from the other house's inquiries, it would seem that invitations issued by one chamber to a member of the other were never refused, an element of 'custom and practice' now conveniently overlooked. Furthermore, the purpose of the powers had nothing to do with protecting ministers. On the contrary, their origins He in a desire to ensure the strength of parliamentary accountability. If modern Australian practice is to be true to historical House of Commons practice, consideration should be given to ensuring that each chamber does have guaranteed access to ministers of the other house.     

AN APPROACH TO THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE WELSH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Abstract The character and ideology of the Welsh nationalist movement have changed drastically since the founding of an independent party in 1925. This paper seeks to utilize a developmental typology in analyzing data obtained from interviews with nationalist activists in examining such changes. In this way, it is possible to understand how Welsh language militants, 'respectable' cultural nationalists, middle-of-the road party workers from rural Wales, and south Wales radicals coexist and cooperate within the fabric of organized nationalism. The investigation of the social dynamics of the movement renders comprehensible both the causes of internal organizational strength and the electoral difficulties facing Plaid Cymru.     

Elected Second Chambers and Their Powers: An International Survey

In May 2011, Britain's Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government published proposals for reform of the House of Lords. In a White Paper and draft bill they set out detailed plans for a largely or wholly elected second chamber. These marked the latest stage in a long‐running debate on Lords reform. The government's proposals aim to change the composition of the second chamber, suggesting that there will be no change to its powers or the conventions governing relations with the House of Commons. But this expectation has been disputed. The House of Lords presently does not make full use of its powers, and many anticipate that it would if its members became elected. This paper reviews the composition of all second chambers internationally, showing that wholly directly elected chambers make up the minority, and that both mixed chambers and indirect election are common. It then reviews the formal powers of all largely and wholly elected chambers. This shows that amongst parliamentary systems the formal powers of the House of Lords are relatively great. But second chamber powers, as well as their composition, vary widely.