CORPORATE TAX CUTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Accurate policy evaluation is central to optimal policymaking, but difficult to achieve. Most often, analysts have to work with observational data and cannot directly observe the counterfactual of a policy to assess its effect accurately. In this paper, we craft a quasi‐experimental design and apply two relatively new methods—the difference‐in‐differences estimation and the synthetic controls method—to the policy debate on whether corporate tax cuts increase foreign direct investment (FDI). The taxation–FDI relationship has attracted wide attention because of mixed findings. We exploit a quasi‐experimental design for Russian regions, which were granted autonomy to reduce corporate profit tax in 2003, enabling them to simultaneously experiment with different tax policies. We estimate both the average and local treatment effects of two types of tax cuts on FDI inflows. We find that, on average, relative to the absence of tax cuts, nondiscriminatory tax cuts on direct investment profit increase FDI, but discriminatory tax cuts on selected government‐sanctioned investment projects do not. Yet for both types of tax cuts, local treatment effects vary dramatically from region to region. Our research has important implications for the design of tax policy and fiscal incentive, and the assessment of fiscal policy reforms.     

THE HEARTLANDS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE US STATES

Abstract: Over recent years the American states have re-emerged as centres of policy innovation and reasserted themselves within the federal system. In contrast, at least until Bill Clinton's accession to the presidency, the federal government has lost the initiative. Indeed, Clinton's accession from what in the past would have been regarded as an obscure southern governorship symbolises the shift of the states to the centre stage of American politics. This article considers the reasons for this shift, stressing the generational change among the governors, the new economic and social challenges faced by the states and the increasing withdrawal of the federal government from the state sphere. In terms of the prospects for the future of American federalism, federal government is likely to withdraw further under Clinton, reversing the trend of earlier Democratic presidencies. Indeed, thanks to the efforts of governors like Clinton, state governments are now better equipped than ever before to shoulder new responsibilities. Their tax base has widened, though many states have faced difficult budgetary situations in the early 1990s. The organisation and structure of most state governments have been modernised, if slowly given the obstacles inherent in the separation of powers. The new breed of governor has a more managerial approach than earlier generations, and contemporary governors have sought to centralise their power within the executive branch. As state legislatures have also asserted their influence over the executive branch, gubernatorial influence has usually been enhanced at the expense of other power centres within the executive.     

THE EFFECT OF RECENT TAX CHANGES ON TAXABLE INCOME: CORRECTION AND UPDATE

This article is a Commentary on Bradley T. Heim ( 2009 ), The effect of recent tax changes on taxable income: Evidence from a new panel of tax returns,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28, 147–163. doi: 10.1002/pam.20406 . This note provides corrected estimates of the elasticity of taxable income to the net of tax share using a panel of tax returns that follows a random sample of taxpayers from 1999 to 2005, spanning the EGTRRA 2001 and JGTRRA 2003 tax changes. Two errors were corrected: the specification of income splines, and the subtraction of capital gains income from the dependent variable. Though the original results are largely robust to the first change, they are not robust to the second. The corrected estimates suggest that the elasticity of taxable income to the current year's net of tax share is small and statistically insignificantly different from zero.