Aggregation technology of common goods and its strategic consequences: Global warming, biodiversity, and siting conflicts

The analysis of common goods needs to look closely at the characteristics of the goods in question and the social situations in which they are provided. Different characteristics lead to different strategic constellations and therefore to different opportunities for institutional solutions to the problems of provision. Basic differences in strategic constellations can be shown clearly by employing matrix games. In this paper a particular attribute of common goods, their aggregation technology, is systematically analyzed. Three variations in this dimension are exemplified by cases from environmental policy. It becomes clear that the analysis of one specific attribute of a good will seldom suffice to predict empirical behavior. Nevertheless, rigorous game theoretic analysis provides valuable insights into the links between the characteristics of common goods and the need for institutions.     

'All for One and One for All': Transactions Cost and Collective Action

Rational choice analysis of collective action predicts that individual members of a large group will not contribute voluntarily towards a common cause; members of large groups attribute no significance to individual action. Large groups are mobilised by the attraction of private goods and services; private interest, rather than identity with a common cause, is the stimulus. Yet the efficacy of such selective incentives depends on the signal that erstwhile 'profits' (from the provision of private goods) are dedicated to achieving a collective goal. At the same time, the signal that collective action is 'non-profit' enhances the intrinsic value of the act of participation. When the impact of individual action on outcome is difficult to discern, individuals rely on low-cost signals relating to process . There are incentives to identify with the pursuit of a common cause when collective action is deemed 'non-profit' and a common goal is non-rival.     

Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?

We provide an explanation why centralisation of political decision making results in overspending in some policy domains, whereas too low spending persists in others. We study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over local public goods provision. If all of the costs of public goods are shared through a common budget, policy makers delegate bargaining to ‘public good lovers’, resulting in overprovision of public goods. If a sufficiently large part of the costs can not be shared, underprovision persists because policy makers delegate bargaining to ‘conservatives’. We derive financing rules that eliminate the incentives for strategic delegation.     

Political-economic context and partisan strategies in the German federal elections, 1990–2002

This contribution develops a theory of the impact of differentiation on integration and unity among EU member states and discusses empirical evidence from four policy areas. According to the theory, the centripetal effects of closer co‐operation among willing EU members on initially unwilling non‐participants are strongly influenced by the character of the respective policy area in terms of public goods theory. The eventual participation of initially reluctant member states, which leads to the re‐establishment of long‐run unity despite short run differentiation, is most likely in policy areas involving excludable network effects, and most unlikely in areas dealing with common pool resource problems (the four remaining types of goods ranking in between these two extremes). The theoretical conclusions are supported by empirical evidence from four EU‐related policies: the successful three show strong characteristics of excludable network goods (EMU, Schengen and the Dublin Convention), while the one which has proved extraordinarily difficult so far involves a common pool resource problem (tax harmonisation).     

农村公共品供给效率实证研究

运用公共服务满意度理论对农村公共品供给效率进行评价研究。研究认为,效率既是主体行为结果的投入产生的比较效果,又是一个对于主体行为而言的相对概念。农村公共品供给效果,既包括物质性效果,也包括精神效果,即公共品受众的感觉效果。在农村公共品供给效率评价中,从农民主体而言,只有农民认为有用的公共品,才是有效率的。相反,即使政府反复认定有用并强制去供给的公共品,当农民认为没有用时,农民依然感觉它是无效率的。利用126个乡(镇)农户对农村公共品供给效率"满意度"评价(CSI)抽样调查数据,运用CSI-Probit回归模型对农户的农村公共品供给效率"满意度"及其影响因素进行了实证分析,得出:当CSI值处于同一类型的市(州)时,其影响因素表现出明显的共性特征。总体而言,CSI的主要影响来自农民受教育年限、医疗可及性、农民收入水平、农户有效灌溉面积率、农户距乡镇政府的距离、农林技术站服务次数以及被调查者年龄等因素。     

Private Actors and the State: Internationalization and Changing Patterns of Governance

This article investigates the implications of political and economic internationalization on patterns of governance from a statecentric perspective. The actual patterns of governance in internationalized environments can be related to the respective governance capacity of public and private actors, which hinges in turn on the strategic constellation underlying the provision of a public good. The specific strategic constellation varies in three dimensions: the congruence between the scope of the underlying problem and the organizational structures of the related actors, the type of problem, and the institutional context, all of which involve a number of factors. With this concept in mind, we identify four ideal-typed patterns of governance, enabled by different configurations of public and private capacities to formally or factually influence in various ways the social, economic, and political processes by which certain goods are provided.     

Measuring multi‐level regulatory governance: Organizational proliferation,coordination, and concentration of influence

As regulation increasingly results from the interplay of a wide array of different actors operating at different levels, it has become crucial to focus on how these constellations of regulatory actors operate. Although this research field presents huge potential for theoretical development, we still lack the measurement techniques to allow systematic comparative research. We contribute to filling this gap with four indices measuring crucial characteristics of multi‐actor regulatory arrangements: (i) the scope of organizational proliferation; (ii) the extent of coordination between regulatory actors; (iii) the amount of influence that each individual regulatory actor has on the sector regulation; and (iv) the extent to which the regulatory influence is concentrated in the hands of one or a few actors. We argue that our indices are sufficiently systematic, reliable, and flexible to be applied in a variety of research contexts relating to multi‐level and multi‐actor regulatory governance.     

Polls,coalition signals and strategic voting: An experimental investigation of perceptions and effects

Polls and coalition signals can help strategic voters in multiparty systems with proportional representation and coalition governments to optimise their vote decision. Using a laboratory experiment embedded in two real election campaigns, this study focuses on voters' attention to and perception of polls and coalition signals. The manipulation of polls and coalition signals allows a causal test of their influence on strategic voting in a realistic environment. The findings suggest that active information acquisition to form fairly accurate perceptions of election outcomes can compensate for the advantage of high political sophistication. The theory of strategic voting is supported by the evidence, but only for a small number of voters. Most insincere vote decisions are explained by other factors. Thus, the common practice to consider all insincere voters as strategic is misleading.     

Innovations in the provision of public goods and services

Current efforts at administrative reform in both developed and developing countries have invariably focused on the critical issue of provision of public goods and services. The accumulated experience and attendant innovations are therefore vast. Few attempts have been made to pull this experience together and draw salient features which might be of use to newcomers to the task of improving provision of public goods and services. This article draws on a panel of experts and government officials convened by the author who have reflected and/or experimented with innovative approaches to public good and service provision. After discussing the role of the state, market and civil society relative to public goods and services, the article lays out a set of basic institutional options for innovations in provision. The article concludes with some strategic considerations on the sequencing of steps to achieve successful market-based innovations in the provision of public goods and services in the context of the minimalist and the strong but restrained state. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Decision Theoretic Model of Public Opinion: Guns, Butter, and European Common Defense

Why do individuals support the public policies they do? We argue that individuals can have quite sophisticated policy preferences and that not correctly modeling those preferences can lead to critically misspecified empirical models. To substantiate this position we derive and test a decision‐theoretic model that relies upon three critical assumptions: (1) policies affect the provision of multiple goods about which individuals care; (2) individuals have diminishing returns to scale in those goods; and (3) preferences over at least some subset of those goods are correlated. Using this model, we demonstrate that arbitrarily small secondary policy effects can confound predictions over primary policy effects. Thus, not considering even arbitrarily small policy effects can cause one to conclude that evidence is consistent with one's theory when in fact it is inconsistent or vice versa. Testing this theory on support for forming a European common defense, we find evidence consistent with our model.     

Funding Global Public Goods: The Dark Side of Multilateralism

The funding of global public goods, such as climate mitigation, presents a complex strategic problem. Potential recipients demand side payments for implementing projects that furnish global public goods, and donors can cooperate to provide the funding. We offer a game‐theoretic analysis of this problem. In our model, a recipient demands project funding. Donors can form a multilateral program to jointly fund the project. If no program is formed, bilateral funding remains a possibility. We find that donors rely on multilateralism if their preferences are relatively symmetric and domestic political constraints on funding are lax. In this case, the recipient secures large rents from project implementation. Thus, even donors with strong interests in global public good provision have incentives to oppose institutional arrangements that promote multilateral funding. These incentives have played an important role in multilateral negotiations on climate finance, especially in Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011).     

Parties for Rent? Ambition,Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies

Party switching by legislators has been common in many countries, including the Philippines, Italy, Nepal, Ecuador, Russia, and Japan. While frequently dismissed as simply an indicator of a weak parties, switching provides a unique window on party systems. To the extent that we understand affiliation decisions, we gain insight on the way politicians use parties to advance their careers. In this article I offer a model of party-membership patterns, where decisions to switch party or to stay put are a function of the strategic interaction of legislators and endogenous party leaders. I test the model on the case of Brazil, where switching is common. Results suggest that Brazilian legislators use parties to maximize pork, ideological consistency, and short-term electoral success, but which of these matters most depends on constituents, i.e., legislators use parties for different purposes in different electoral environments. The approach developed here could easily be applied to study legislative behavior in other political systems.     

End user computing in Asian countries: Policy lessons for development administration

End user computing requires policy initiatives very different from those needed for computerization in order to deal with the specific issues of initiation, development and institutionalization. Microcomputers provide a service and not goods or savings and require an emphasis on the dynamics of the system, where both strategic issues and operational priorities have to be set. The process is organizational, rather than a technological or a planning exercise. It requires governments to guide the change through deliberate decision making. The objective has to be to obtain the support of users at different levels. In this paper Asian experiences are compared with Western experiences to determine a framework for looking at the process. The limited set of strategies for success have also been identified.     

Tradable Permits for Common‐Pool Resources: An Assessment

Scholars often attribute deterioration in common‐pool resources (CPRs) to ill‐defined property rights and suggest privatization and tradable permit markets as a solution to the commons problem. CPRs are heterogeneous, differing in physical characteristics and use patterns. Regulating their use requires tailored policy solutions that cohere with these characteristics. This paper examines factors that contribute to a well‐performing tradable permit market. While the literature offers rich empirical analyses of individual tradable permit markets, it has not provided an analytical framework enabling comparative analysis of these markets. This paper develops and employs an analytical framework for comparing across markets. The comparative analysis of market performance suggests that markets are not successful in all environmental problems and all demand situations. Further, it shows that even some markets frequently cited as exemplary successes have been that for nonmarket‐related reasons. On the other hand, this comparative analysis identifies sources of success for markets that partial analytical frameworks would have predicted to fail.     

Strategizing in small group decision-making: Host state identification for radioactive waste disposal among eight southern states

Experimental work in economics has long focussed attention on strategic interaction amongst individuals. A robust result is that a large fraction of participants in public goods experiments act cooperatively. This paper tests for the extent of strategic behavior in a non-laboratory setting. These data were generated when representatives from eight southeastern states voted to identify one state as host for a regional disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste. We find that no state plays its dominant (free-riding) strategy, but none plays in a completely cooperative fashion either. This result is similar to that found in laboratory public goods experiments.     

Determinants of democratic successes and failures in Africa

Abstract.  This article, first, identifies democratic, authoritarian and 'praetorian' political system types in Africa on the basis of major current indicators. It then systematically tests a broad variety of hypotheses concerning the historical, social-structural, socio-economic, political and institutional determinants and performance characteristics of these system types. A macro-quantitative synopsis attempts to identify the most 'parsimonious' overall constellations of factors in this regard. This is supplemented by a macro-qualitative analysis of major 'conjunctural' conditions identifying the main groups of cases and their determining factors in a 'contradiction-free' manner. The conclusions point to the decisive importance of 'governance' aspects in the future.     

Innovation and Innovators Inside Government: From Institutions to Networks

Innovation and innovators inhabit an institutional space, which is partially defined by formal positions and partially by informal networks. This article investigates the role of politicians and bureaucrats in fostering innovation inside government and provides an empirical explanation of who the innovators are, whether this is mostly an attribute of position or role, or mostly an effect of certain forms of networking. The study uses original data collected from 11 municipal governments in Australia in order to define and describe the normative underpinnings of innovation inside government and to show the importance of advice and strategic information networks among politicians and senior bureaucrats (n = 947). Social network analysis is combined with conventional statistical analysis in order to demonstrate the comparative importance of networks in explaining who innovates.     

POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM

Abstract This paper juxtaposes two important political solutions to the collective action problem in the context of a common set of core assumptions. Once the core assumptions have been discussed, the distinction between the consumption and the production problems associated with public goods provision is elaborated. These assumptions and this distinction are applied to a comparison between a theory of individualistic anarchy, and a theory of competitive political entrepreneurs. Revisions of both are required to enable them to be placed within this framework. While the two theories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive they can, between them, be used to understand public goods provision in a number of different circumstances.     

The Captive or the Broker? Explaining Public Agency–Interest Group Interactions

The literature offers individually valid yet collectively inconsistent hypotheses concerning the nature of public agencies' responsiveness to interest groups. This article analyzes the nature of this responsiveness by examining the brokerage potential of public agencies among interest groups. Such a brokerage potential is hypothesized to follow from agencies' preferences for policy goods as well as the tendency of interest groups to seek access to public agencies. It combines analyses of agencies' demand for policy goods with interest groups preferences for seeking access to specific policy venues. The analyses are based on survey data of national civil servants and interest groups in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands. The findings suggest that both strategic preferences as well as organizational routines positively correlate with a brokerage potential while interaction patterns within and with the organizational environment of public agencies can constrain their brokerage potential in several distinct ways.     

Do Politicians See Eye to Eye? The Relationship between Political Group Characteristics,Perceived Strategic Plan Quality,and Strategic Consensus in Local Governing Majorities

Although strategic consensus is a core concept in strategic management research, empirical evidence is lacking on (1) the degree of strategic consensus in public organizations, (2) how strategic consensus is impacted by group characteristics specific to public strategic decision‐making groups, and (3) how strategic plans impact these relationships. An analysis of multisource data from 1,075 governing majority members nested in 256 Flemish municipalities (Belgium) indicates that within‐group strategic consensus varies among governing majorities and is negatively impacted by political diversity and political power, but these relationships are mediated by perceived strategic plan quality. The results indicate that the idiosyncrasies of public decision‐making groups can impede high levels of strategic consensus, but strategic plans can attenuate this effect by fulfilling a boundary‐spanning role.