Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament

Although the political salience of nuclear disarmament has fallen dramatically since the end of the Cold War, the threat posed by nuclear weapons today remains at least as great as it was before 1989. The growing number of states either armed with or actively developing nuclear weapons programmes has placed existing control and monitoring frameworks under strain. In this article, Baroness Williams, a long time campaigner for multilateral nuclear disarmament, discusses the nature of today's nuclear threat and particularly the political challenge presented by states whose behaviour is not predictable. If further proliferation is to be prevented, the international community must renew its efforts at implementing a robust regime of control. The IAEA must be given the authority and the resources necessary to conduct inspections anywhere in the world without prior warning. At the same time, the world's nuclear states powers must begin genuine efforts at disarmament.     

The last Nuclear Security Summit

The fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC marked the culmination of a seven-year process of improving the security of nuclear and radioactive materials that terrorists might seek to target or acquire. While progress was made in enlisting some governments to take voluntary measures, additional work is needed to engage more parties and secure more materials. It will probably take another bold initiative from the next US administration to set this in motion.     

Nuclear deterrence: Bankrupt ideology

This article argues that nuclear deterrence is a contemporary ideology (an elaborately-developed set of convictions, socio-politically central, stable over time, idealistic in intent, widely and emotionally embraced). And vulnerable. Vulnerable to the critique of the social scientist who can raise questions about the reliability of nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone. Vulnerable to the critique of the moral philosopher who can raise important questions about the propriety of nuclear deterrence and the programmatic activities it underlies.     

Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-based Threat Assessment

The assumption that policies reducing the proliferation of fissile materials will automatically reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is fallacious. Even if moderately successful, anti-proliferation initiatives have a limited impact on the illegal flow of nuclear materials and are not likely to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors. Current policies focus on the containment of fissile materials rather than on non-state-actors that may wish to acquire them. Concentrating principally on management, accounting, storage and transfer procedures, policy-makers seem to ignore the fact that the primary threat of nuclear terrorism stems not from the availability of the materials but from the potential willingness of some groups to acquire them. This article attempts to shift the focus of discussion from state-centric models of analysis to a threat or actor-based model of analysis. In doing so, the article seeks to identify risk factors, which in combination may indicate a willingness by non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition it hopes to provide the basis for more effective threat assessments.     

Strategic Nuclear Forces: Unrealistic Planning

The Department of Defense has embarked on a program of strategic modernization that will demand substantial budgetary growth for strategic forces—roughly 29 percent after inflation—during the 1990s. However, defense funding overall is unlikely to grow during the next several years. This article projects the funding that the Bush Administration's strategic modernization plans would demand, assesses the feasibility of these plans given budgetary limits, and describes some options which would reduce this funding.