The Partisan Usage of Parliamentary Salaries: Informal Party Practices Compared

It is widely acknowledged that political parties in European democracies have become increasingly dependent on state resources, most notably direct state funding. Yet cross-national studies on parties' usage of state resources that are not earmarked for partisan purposes, which require the assessment of informal, intra-organisational practices, are still rare. This article looks at one such practice across 33 parties in five European democracies: namely the ‘taxing’ of national MPs' salaries. Under this practice, candidates who enter elected office on a party ticket are obliged regularly to donate a fixed share of their public salaries to party coffers. The empirical analysis shows that the presence of a taxing rule is more likely in parties with a strong extra-parliamentary organisation, while a leftist ideology facilitates the collection of high salary shares from parliamentarians. Moreover, where party entanglement with the state is particularly pronounced, the partisan usage of parliamentary salaries is easier irrespective of their organisational dispositions. Finally, while in unitary systems national headquarters are usually able to monopolise control over national MPs' contributions, in federal systems regional party executives are able to insist on their share of these payments.     

Institutional dynamics in loosely coupled federal systems: The cases of Argentina and Venezuela

This article takes up recent work on path dependence and dynamism in federal systems. It argues that historical institutionalist suppositions derived from tightly coupled federations cannot be extended to loosely coupled federal systems, as are found in Latin America. Loose coupling means that interaction between actors and state levels is contentious and informal. Loosely coupled federations are less prone to path dependence and exhibit a strong propensity to institutional dynamics, especially after decentralization. In this article, the focus is on the relationship between party system and federal structure to show how the interaction between both components in the context of loose coupling can lead to swift shifts towards centralization or decentralization. By examining two cases, Argentina and Venezuela, the relevant mechanisms of institutional interaction are carved out and the resulting dynamics are reconstructed.     

Ideological congruence over government mandates under majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems

The existing literature on ideological congruence has typically looked at congruence immediately after elections when governments are formed. This article goes beyond that comparative static approach by examining changes in citizen-government ideological congruence between two fixed points in time, namely at the beginning and end of government mandates. Building on a veto player approach and dynamics of party competition under majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, the results indicate, first, that government positions are more stable in between elections, as the number of parties and their ideological distance increase in cabinet. Second, it appears that single-party and homogeneous coalition governments decrease ideological congruence between elections under low levels of polarisation, while they increase congruence under very high levels of polarisation. Third, it was found that governments under majoritarian systems slightly decrease congruence between elections while congruence stays stable on average under PR systems. The different levels of party system polarisation across majoritarian and PR electoral systems mostly explain this difference.     

The Federal Structure of Australian Political Parties

Australian parties reflect the combination of British responsiblegovernment and elements of American federalism embodied in theconstitution. Despite considerable symmetry in party competitionfor all seven parliaments, party organizations must functionwithin electoral systems complicated by state differences andbicameralism. The extra-parliamentary federal organizations,which began as weak confederations, have gradually gained ascendancyover state parties, particularly within the Labor parties. Yetthis shift of power to national party organizations is lessmarked than the increase in Commonwealth government activities.Such developments have not made for complete Commonwealth dominationbut the intermeshing of state and federal responsibilities hasincreased the need for bargaining between the two planes ofgovernment and decreased the areas in which independent decisionsby either are possible. Frequent elections, in which federaland state issues can rarely be separated, strengthen these trendsand make bargaining between federal and state leaders withineach party as important as bargaining between governments.     

Try Federalism

The present article follows up a previous study (Anckar 1998) which showed a strong association between size and party system fragmentation. The aim of the article is to see whether the explanatory power of size can, in fact, be attributed to a federal form of government. 77 countries with free party systems constitute the research population. The dependent variable has three components: number of parties, electoral support for the leading party, and the 'effective number of parties' calculated according to the Laakso-Taagepera formula. Preliminary tests reveal that federal states have a more fragmented party system than unitary states. However, when controlling for size, electoral system, the 'effective threshold,' and presidentialism, the results clearly show that federalism is overshadowed by size and also, to a lesser extent, by the effective threshold.     

Congruence between voters and parties: The role of party-level issue salience

The level of congruence between parties and their voters can vary greatly from one policy issue to another, which raises questions regarding the effectiveness of political representation. We seek to explain variation in party–voter congruence across issues and parties. We focus on the hypotheses that (1) average proximity between the positions of voters and the party they vote for will be highest on the issues that the party emphasises in the election campaign and that (2) this relationship will be stronger for niche parties. We test these hypotheses using data on the policy preferences of voters, party positions, party attention profiles and salience on concrete policy issues in four countries: The Netherlands, Ireland, Germany and Sweden. Overall, we find that voter–party proximity tends to be higher on issues that the party emphasises. As these are the issues where parties typically have the greatest policy impact, this implies that the quality of representation is highest where it matters most. There is some limited evidence that the positive relationship between issue salience and proximity is stronger for niche parties. In sum, the quality of policy representation varies strongly with party-level issue salience and to a lesser extent with the type of political party.     

Dynamiken von Gesetzgebungsinitiativen der Bundes- und Landesparteien im deutschen Föderalismus. Eine Analyse für den Bereich der Rechte Minderjähriger, 1990 bis 2014

The article explores how parties influence legal change in federal systems. Analysing 310 initiatives to change German legislation concerning minors’ rights (which fall into federal and land jurisdiction) for the period from 1990 to 2014, the study opens up empirically a new legislative domain which has been largely ignored by political science so far. It investigates the initiating parties, issues, positions, timing, and cross-level government constellation and corroborates that parties in Germany coordinate their legislative initiatives across lands and levels. At the same time, the data indicate that German land parties are not mere agents of the federal parties and do not utilize the länder level for law-making against federal majorities. The many federal and länder initiatives instead give room for discourse and provide incentives for (re)adjusting party positions which in the long run fosters legal changes.     

MP behavior in mixed-member electoral systems

Previous research has argued that representatives in mixed-member electoral systems adjust their behavior to the mode of their election, the so-called mandate divide. MPs elected in single-member districts focus on their district, whereas those elected through closed party lists focus on their party. Yet this ignores that candidates in mixed-member systems can run in a district and on their party's list concurrently. This paper presents a model of how the prospects of re-election in the district and through the party list affect the relationship between voters, candidates, and parties. It is shown that the dual candidacy option results in candidates focusing on their party in most instances. The model is applied to a novel data set on the allocation of federal road construction projects in Germany.     

Der Einfluss von Koalitionsaussagen,programmatischen Standpunkten und der Bundespolitik auf die Regierungsbildung in den deutschen Ländern

Party politics at the German state level plays a decisive role for patterns of party competition and for legislative decision-making at the federal level. This article analyses the impact of party politics at the state and the federal level on the formation of coalition governments in the German Laender. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset that covers information on the state parties’ programmatic positions, their pre-electoral alliances, and the structure of party competition on the federal level in the time period between 1990 and 2007. The results reveal that the programmatic positions of state parties have a decisive impact on government formation. Other relevant factors are the parties’ relative strength, their coalition preferences and the partisan composition of government and opposition on the federal level.     

Political Parties and Intergovernmental Relations in 1984: The Consequences of Party Renewal for Territorial Constituencies

Democratic and Republican efforts at party renewal have differedin approach, but both can be recognized as intergovernmentalphenomena having significant implications for American federalism.The Democratic Party's national charter and delegate selectionrules, for instance, have federalized the governing structureof the party. The national Republican Party organization hasdeveloped such a large base of financial resources andcampaignservices that state Republican parties and candidate committeeshave begun to accept national party authority along with itsmoney. Moreover, as national, state, and local parties and candidatesincreasingly coordinate their delegate selection, finance, andother campaigh activities, they may transform the decentralizedparty system that has been a protector of state and local influencewithin the federal government. National ideological constituencieswithin both party organizations may rival territorial and functionalconstituencies for the attention of federal elected officials.     

Electoral consequences of declining participation: A natural experiment in Austria

Participation rates have declined sharply across developed democracies. But the precise impact of this decline on party systems has proven difficult to study due to endogeneity concerns. This paper seeks to address this issue by leveraging a natural experiment in Austrian parliamentary elections. By examining instances in which compulsory voting was gradually repealed in a federal setting, I isolate the causal relationship between turnout decline and subsequent shifts in party vote share. The findings suggest that turnout decline is not associated with a significant redistribution of votes between parties. The clearest visible effect is a consolidation of the party system, with a mild shift in votes from minor to mainstream parties. Evaluating the findings, the paper argues that characteristics of proportional representation systems insulate parties against the consequences of declining electoral participation.     

Asymmetric federalism and economic voting

Although federal arrangements adopt a multiplicity of forms across and within federations, this article suggests that some models of power division are better than others at enhancing clarity of responsibility and electoral accountability. This conclusion is the result of exploring responsibility attribution and economic voting in a state where decentralisation arrangements vary across regions: the Spanish State of Autonomies. Using electoral surveys and aggregated economic data for the 1982–2012 period, the empirical analysis shows that regional economic voting is most pronounced in regions where decentralisation design concentrated authority and resources at one level of government, whereas it is inexistent in regions where devolution followed a more intertwined model of power distribution. The implication of the empirical findings is that the specific design of intergovernmental arrangements is crucial to make electoral accountability work in federations.     

Moderate,extreme, or both? How voters respond to ideologically unpredictable candidates

Candidates and parties often face a choice between endorsing policies that appeal to their core constituencies or generate support from more diverse groups of voters. While the latter strategy may make overtures to a wider set of citizens, existing literature says little about how the overall mix of issue positions affects electoral support. We argue that candidates who endorse diverse sets of policy positions appear unpredictable to voters and incur subsequent electoral penalties. Using data from the 2006 congressional elections, we find that ideological predictability substantially increases electoral support at both the individual and aggregate levels and that voters perceive greater ideological congruence from more predictable candidates. Our results have important implications for candidate and party strategies and suggest that voters are responsive to the mean and the variance of candidates’ policy stances.     

Expected utility or learned familiarity? The formation of voters' coalition preferences

In most modern parliamentary democracies, it is unlikely that single party governments will be formed, meaning that a voter's preferred party presumably has to share cabinet offices and negotiate policy compromises in a coalition government. This raises the question of how voters evaluate potential (coalition) governments, especially since recent studies have shown that coalition preferences influence voting behaviour. In this paper, we combine theories of voting behaviour, government formation and political learning to derive expectations regarding the factors that may impact voters' coalition preferences. We test our hypotheses by analysing survey data from the German federal and state levels. The results of a mixed logit regression analysis support our arguments: Voters' coalition preferences not only depend on the perceived policy distance between the positions of voters and the most distant party within combinations of parties, but also on predominant patterns of government formation.     

From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies

While direct state funding of political parties has been a prominent theme in cross‐national research over the last decade, we still know little about party strategies to access state resources that are not explicitly earmarked for partisan usage. This article looks at one widespread but often overlooked informal party practice: the ‘taxing’ of MP salaries – that is, the regular transfer of fixed salary shares to party coffers. Building on notions of informal institutions developed in work on new democracies, the theoretical approach specifies factors that shape the acceptability of this legally non‐enforceable intra‐organisational practice. It is tested through a selection model applied to a unique dataset covering 124 parties across 19 advanced democracies. Controlling for a range of party‐ and institutional‐level variables, it is found that the presence of a taxing rule and the collection of demanding tax shares are more common in leftist parties (high internal acceptability) and in systems in which the penetration of state institutions by political parties is intense (high external acceptability).     

The Continued Relevance of Local Parties in Representative Democracies

This article assesses the value of local parties. It asks why political parties value their local sections. It also considers the ways in which local parties can benefit society. Local parties act as a democratic training ground for party members, are a conduit for political communication and provide parties with a range of resources. They also act as problem solving agencies; they ensure that policy is responsive to local needs; they provide an additional channel of communication and accountability; and they link citizens with the state. The article ends with an appeal to party scholars to refocus their attention towards local parties.     

The Federation — What Makes It Work and What Should We Be Thinking About for the Future

The Australian Federation is unique. Like all federations there is a division of powers between the various levels of government. However, unlike almost all other federations, the Australian Federation requires the cooperation of the states and the Commonwealth in order to achieve their institutional functions. This federal system can properly be described as 'cooperative federalism'. An understanding of the role of the states within this federal system suggests an urgent need for major constitutional reform at the state level.     

The mobilising effect of political choice

Political choice is central to citizens’ participation in elections. Nonetheless, little is known about the individual-level mechanisms that link political choice and turnout. It is argued in this article that turnout decisions are shaped not only by the differences between the parties (party polarisation), but also by the closeness of parties to citizens’ own ideological position (congruence), and that congruence matters more in polarised systems where more is at stake. Analysing cross-national survey data from 80 elections, it is found that both polarisation and congruence have a mobilising effect, but that polarisation moderates the effect of congruence on turnout. To further explore the causal effect of political choice, the arrival of a new radical right-wing party in Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), is leveraged and the findings show that the presence of the AfD had a mobilising effect, especially for citizens with congruent views.     

Party system nationalisation and social spending

Party systems diverge in their levels of nationalisation. While in some countries parties obtain similar levels of electoral support in all districts, in others parties get very asymmetric electoral shares across districts. The distributive consequences of this have been seldom studied. The argument tested here is that when political parties have nationalised electorates they have stronger incentives to provide social policies that spread benefits all over the territory. This argument is tested in 22 OECD democracies for the period 1980?2006. The results show that, regardless of the electoral system in place, there is a positive relation between party system nationalisation and social spending.