Eminent domain power and afterwards: Leviathan’s post-taking opportunism

This paper investigates post-taking procedures, a research area not yet fully explored. It discusses the economic implications underlying the landowner’s ‘repurchase right (RR)’ which can be invoked upon the occurrence of a so-called ‘change in use after taking.’ RR is compared with the government’s discretion regarding such changes. The lack of post-taking accountability tends to create power ripe for abuse, and RR appears to be an effective device for constraining Leviathan’s opportunism. Finally, a parsimonious estimation supports that, under the overriding-RR regime, there exists the systematic post-taking opportunism whereby ‘original public projects are changed into inappropriate projects.’     

Do indicators influence treaty ratification? The relationship between mid-range performance and policy change

Treaties are a valuable tool for policymakers because they are both legally binding on, and symbolically powerful signals of, commitments of states that ratify. Why states choose to ratify treaties is unclear, although social pressures appear to play some role. This article argues that global performance indicators can influence the ratification process, but that the effect varies depending on where states fall on these measures. In the mid-range of a scale, fast ratification has significant benefits and relatively few costs. However, indicators have less of a catalysing effect at the extreme ends of the scale, where the costs are higher and the benefits are lower. This article uses policy performance indicators as independent variables in duration analyses of the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003) and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (2000). It finds states in the mid-range of the indicator are faster to ratify than states that are not ranked, whereas the other categories are statistically insignificant. These findings imply that indicators matter for those in the middle, but not as much for those at the extremes. This finding enriches our understanding of treaty ratification and has potential implications for performance metrics as a tool to promote policy change for those states in the middle, highlighting the strengths and limitations of indicators as a force for change.     

The Franco‐German relationship and economic and monetary union: Using Europe to ‘Bind Leviathan’

This article explores the interaction between the institutional, strategic and cognitive dimensions of the Franco‐German relationship on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It begins by spelling out its institutional setting and its context of structural power. These sections highlight the main informal rules that have shaped the relationship and help explain the choice of negotiating strategies to reconcile their objectives and secure influence on the design and content of EMU. The next section focuses on the cognitive dimension of the relationship, identifying the nature of Franco‐German objectives, their basis in differences of inherited beliefs and problems in reconciling them. In the final section the nature of the political theory underpinning EMU is clarified and explained and the kind of challenge that it poses for French policy makers as it tests the limits of the republican state tradition. More broadly, EMU is an attempt to redefine the relationship between state and Europe and state and society, bringing with it new political meanings.     

Intra-industry trade and protectionism: the case of the buy national policy

This article examines the factors that lead governments to open up their public procurement markets to international competition with a particular emphasis on the effect of intra-industry trade. Contrary to the conventional notion that intra-industry trade entails less political pressure for protectionism than inter-industry trade, I argue that such notion does not prevail in the case of discriminatory public procurement. Firms in a market with a high degree of intra-industry trade are more likely to resist the removal of discrimination than would firms in a market with a high degree of inter-industry trade. Empirically, I find support for the argument both at sub-national and cross-national settings.     

The relationship between government and opposition in the bundestag and house of commons in the run‐up to the Maastricht Treaty

This article analyses modes of interaction between government and opposition in the German Bundestag and the British House of Commons in the run‐up to the Maastricht Treaty, and the implications of co‐operation or a lack thereof for the parties involved. The article is based on the premise that the government—opposition relationship is not derived solely from power relationships and institutional factors, but is also a matter of democratic legitimacy. Three indicators are used to ascertain the level of government—opposition co‐operation: the creation of parliamentary committees, information exchange and incentive management. Based on an institutional analysis and interviews with legislators, the finding is that although parties in Germany and the UK have created parliamentary committees dealing with European affairs, only in the former did the government utilise the new tool for co‐operation with the opposition, in terms of information exchange and incentive management. Consequently, informal co‐operation in Germany brought about an outcome compatible with the interests of the parties involved. By contrast, the lack of co‐operation with opposition parties in Britain led to an extreme parliamentary crisis.     

Pacific drift: Southeast Asia and the US‐Australia relationship

There has been much discussion of the economic rise of Asia and an emerging Pacific community. This is nowhere more true than in Australia and the United States. And yet an interesting by‐product of the tremendous change in Asia is that it has contributed directly to a drift in the bilateral relationship between Canberra and Washington. Notwithstanding the universally enthusiastic official rhetoric about Asia, the region is in fact of much greater importance to Australia than the United States. It is no coincidence that as Australia finds itself being increasingly pulled towards Asia, its traditionally very close relationsip with the United States is gradually weakening. This trend can be illustrated by focusing on developments in Southeast Asia and the differential way they are affecting US and Australian interests in three key policy areas: trade, politics and human rights, and security.     

Does public sector efficiency matter? Revisiting the relation between fiscal size and economic growth in a world sample

This paper revisits the relationship between fiscal size and economic growth. Our work differs from the empirical growth literature because this relationship depends explicitly on the efficiency of the public sector. We use a sample of 64 countries, both developed and developing, in four five-year time periods between 1980 and 2000. Building on the work of Afonso et al. (Public Choice 123:321–347, 2005), we construct a measure of public sector efficiency in each country and each time period by calculating an output-to-input ratio. In addition, we get an estimate of technical efficiency of public spending for 52 countries from 1995 to 2000 by employing a stochastic frontier analysis. Using these two measures, we find evidence of a non-monotonic relation between fiscal size and economic growth that depends critically on the size-efficiency mix.     

A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits

In a wage bargaining model, a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages. Therefore, the benefit structure significantly influences profits and trade union utility, raising the question as to how the benefit structure is determined in the political process. We consider a government that chooses the earnings relationship in order to maximize its political support. Our model predicts a strong earnings relationship under right-wing governments and a weak relationship when unions are influential. Using panel data for 19 OECD countries, we find support for these theoretical predictions. Moreover, we show that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness.     

Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons

This paper highlights important lessons gained from the research program of Elinor Ostrom, and demonstrates the close connection between public choice and the work on collective management of the commons for which Lin was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. Although our primary focus is on Lin’s research on self-governance and the “commons,” an overarching goal is to capture the intellectual journey of participants in the Ostrom Workshop, who continue to be guided by the inspiring examples set by Lin and Vincent Ostrom.     

Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy

We investigate whether the effect of government corruption is conditional on a country’s institutional structure. Federal systems have an additional layer of government, making lobbying relatively more costly. We investigate whether the effect of government corruption on environmental policy (in the form of restrictions on energy use) is conditional on a federal system being in place. Using 1982–96 data from 11 industry sectors in 12 OECD economies we find that while greater government corruption reduces the stringency of environmental policy, the effect declines in federal systems.     

Does polarization affect even the inattentive? Assessing the relationship between political sophistication,policy orientations,and elite cues

In this paper we focus on how individuals’ level of political sophistication conditions how they respond to growing elite polarization. The party coalitions in the electorate have become increasingly ideologically sorted. We assess whether all citizens have sorted into the ideologically “correct” partisan camp or whether this phenomenon is limited only to the highly sophisticated. Using a combination of ANES and DW-NOMINATE data we show that individuals of all sophistication levels have become more likely to identify with and vote for the party that best matches their policy orientations as a function of increasing elite-level polarization. Our findings suggest that the effects of increasing polarization are felt throughout the electorate.     

US state government privatization: Implications for social equity and inequality?

Privatization of state government services is commonplace, but our understanding of its effects is limited by data availability. We study the relationship between American state government contracting and public sector wages. Governments have used public sector employment to support a variety of goals, including social equity and economic development, but privatization, as a new public management (NPM) reform, may shift the focus. Our empirical analysis shows that state privatization of service delivery is associated with decreases in the public sector wage premium, but that these effects are not driven by gender, race, or low-levels of educational attainment. The fidelity of the implementation to NPM values conditions these effects. We also find that contracting service delivery is associated with a lower public sector wage premium for middle-class workers.     

Organized interests and the state: A disintegrating relationship? Evidence from Denmark

Abstract. It has proven difficult to determine the direction in which corporatism is moving. This discussion is marred by two shortcomings: A bias towards the macro–level and the lack of a clear distinction between the stages of the policy process. Trying to remedy these shortcomings, this paper follows the development of corporatism over the twenty years since 1980 and uses this material to illuminate the causes of the development of corporatism. The analysis consists of a comparative study of seven Danish policy areas. By focusing on the meso–level within one country we gain the methodological advantage of being able to hold constant a number of variables at the macro–level which are difficult to control for in cross–national analyses. We are thus in a position to illuminate the explanatory value of a number of commonly advanced explanations of corporatism: partisan influences; state traditions; and policy specific factors. These explanations are all found wanting. The paper concludes by suggesting an alternative explanation more consistent with the Danish data, namely that corporatism be studied from a perspective placing politicians and agency at center stage.     

Bread and the attrition of power: Economic events and German election results

Aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of real per capita disposable income. Each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately two percentage points of votes in Germany. No other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model. However, attrition of power reduced the vote share in election years 1961, 1994 and 1998.     

Strategic entry deterrence and terrorism: Theory and experimental evidence

Using a two stage rent-seeking framework, we present a simple model of strategic entry/terrorism deterrence and test the model using laboratory experiments. Our contest success function highlights the potential for strategic spillovers. The theory illustrates that, relative to a cooperative outcome, negative externalities lead to over-spending on deterrence and positive externalities lead to under-spending on deterrence. Our experimental results are broadly consistent; subjects in the negative externality treatment had higher expenditures. In contrast to theoretical predictions, participation decisions, while primarily driven by the probability of winning a contest, were influenced by a subject’s ability to participate in multiple contests.     

US–China dialogue and the tenuous bilateral relationship

Despite recent diplomatic efforts by Washington and Beijing to keep the bilateral relationship on an even keel, China has continued to behave assertively in the Asia-Pacific and Chinese President Xi Jinping has effectively promulgated his own vision for a regional and global order. In the absence of a robust or coherent US policy for the region, China appears to have gained the upper hand in terms of the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.     

Intelligence reform commissions and the producer–consumer relationship

Since 1949 intelligence reform efforts have resulted in extensive studies on every aspect of the intelligence community. One common aspect of commission comment has been how policy-makers interact with the intelligence products, commonly known as the producer–consumer relationship. Decades of successive commissions identify the same or similar problems with the relationship and recommend organizational changes aimed at improving the analyst – policy maker interaction. Eventually, the same issues arise because most structural reforms are incapable of addressing critical aspects of this relationship. Future efforts should first consider previous commission results as well as understand what reforms can and cannot impact this relationship.     

Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey

Public choice economists began studying anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. Following early public choice economists, many economists are researching how individuals interact without government. From non-public-interested explanations of the creation of government to historical studies of internalizing externalities under anarchy, public choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective of human interaction with and without government. Although the economics of politics receives more attention, the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in public choice.