Bandwagon effects in British elections, 1885–1910

This article investigates possible bandwagons in actual elections rather than the usual opinion poll data. Until 1918, British general elections were staggered over a fortnight or more. We use the eight general elections between 1885 and 1910 to investigate whether there was a general bandwagon or underdog effect as the election progressed. We find that any bandwagon effect was in favor of the party which eventually won the election, not the party gaining seats compared with last time. We also find that a typical election featured an initial bandwagon effect which peaked about halfway through the election and then declined. Its decline appears to be due both to declining enthusiasm for the leading party and to later polls occurring in places where voters were less prone to get on a bandwagon in the first place. The weakening of the bandwagon was correlated to distance of the constituency from London, although it revived to some extent in Scotland.     

Parliamentary procedure: principal forms and political effects

A standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is that the party designated to make the first move—the formateur party—will determine the bargaining outcome. Most empirical studies of parliamentary coalition formation have paid surprisingly little attention to the formation process. In this paper we model government formation as a two-stage unordered discrete choice problem that better reflects this process. The first step involves the selection of a formateur party, and the second involves the choice of partners by the predicted formateur. We evaluate several hypotheses for the two stages, using a data set of all cabinets formed in the Western European countries from 1970 to 2006. In our analyses of formateur selection, we find that party size is clearly the dominant feature. In the second stage, we show that when predicting government composition it is fruitful to add information drawn from a first stage analysis.     

Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Theories from psychology suggest that voters’ perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate’s position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters’ perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives generally liked candidates an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we extend the standard Downsian model in order to investigate under what conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition.     

The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment

This is the first study that assesses the economic effects of direct democratic institutions on a cross-country basis. We find that total spending as well as spending on welfare is lower in countries with mandatory referendums, consistent with the previous literature. But we also find that countries with national initiatives appear to spend more and be more corrupt. Finally, budget deficits, government effectiveness, productivity and “happiness” appear unrelated to direct democracy. Institutional detail thus matters a great deal. In general, the effects of direct-democratic institutions become stronger if the frequency of their actual use is taken into account. Effects are usually stronger in countries with weak democracies.     

What's left after right-wing extremism? The effects on political orientation

Does radical right political violence favour or hinder public support for right-wing stances? Numerous existing studies have demonstrated that Islamic terrorism provokes a conservative shift, increases nationalism and induces negative sentiments towards immigration. However, little is known about the consequences of far-right terrorism, despite its incidence in Western societies. We leverage four waves of the British Election Study (BES) and use a quasi-experimental design to analyse individual political orientations shortly before and after terrorist attacks. We find that respondents distance themselves from the ideology associated with the perpetrator and shift away from ideological positions at the right end of the political spectrum. Furthermore, respondents are less likely to report nationalistic attitudes and immigration skepticism, core tenets of extremist right-wing political ideologies. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of the perpetrators and their driving goals are crucial factors shaping the impact of terrorism on public sentiments.     

The economic effects of federalism and?decentralization—a cross-country assessment

This paper explores the idea that institutional details matter and that attempts to estimate the economic effects of federalism by employing a simple dummy variable neglect potentially important institutional details. Based on a principal component analysis, seven aspects of both federalism and decentralization are used as variables for explaining differences in (1) fiscal policy, (2) government effectiveness, (3) economic productivity, and (4) happiness. The results show that institutional details do, indeed, matter. Different aspects of federalism impact on the outcome variables to different degrees. This study adds to our knowledge on the transmission mechanisms of federalism and decentralization.     

Channelling attention and choice? Examining effects of consideration sets on electoral decision-making

This article sheds light on the utility of consideration set modeling in analyzing electoral decision-making in multi-party systems against the background of the German federal election in 2013. The results show that large portions of the German electorate choose a party comprised by their consideration set over the course of the campaign. The size of consideration sets does not precipitously decline as Election Day approaches, however. The analysis also suggests that the composition of voters' consideration sets slightly affects their exposure to campaign communication and their evaluation of campaign events and gaffes. Finally, the evidence demonstrates that consideration sets virtually did not condition the impact of campaign reception and evaluations of campaign events on voting behavior. The overall results suggest that consideration set modeling deserves further exploration in future research.     

Preference votes without preference? Institutional effects on preference voting: an experiment

A classical question of political science is to what extent electoral systems influence voting behaviour. Yet, many of these studies examine how different electoral systems affect the election results in terms of vote distribution across parties. Instead, we investigate how electoral rules affect intra party preference voting. Given the importance of the debate on the personalization of politics, insight into how electoral rules shape intra-party choice is a valuable contribution to the literature. In our study, we focus on the effect of two specific rules: the option to cast a list vote and on a single versus multiple preference votes. The results of experiments conducted in Belgium and the Netherlands show that electoral rules indeed influence voting behaviour with regard to intra party preference voting, although differences exist between the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, we find that the option to cast a list vote equally affects votes for the first candidate on the list, as well as lower positioned candidates. This suggests that preference votes might be less preferential than has often been assumed.     

Rethinking the partisan effects of higher turnout: So what's the question?

Controversy persists over the link between turnout and the likelihood of success of Democratic candidates (e.g., DeNardo, 1980, 1986; Zimmer, 1985; Tucker and Vedlitz, 1986; Piven and Cloward, 1988; Texeira, 1992; Radcliff, 1994, 1995; Erikson, 1995a, b). We argue that the authors in this debate have largely been talking past one another because of a failure to distinguish three quite different questions. The first question is: “Are low turnout voters more likely to vote Democratic than high turnout voters?” The second question is: “Should we expect that elections in which turnout is higher are ones in which we can expect Democrats to have done better?” The third question is the counterfactual: “If turnout were to have increased in some given election, would Democrats have done better?” We show the logical independence of the first two questions from one another and from the third, and argue that previous researchers have failed to recognize this logical independence – sometimes thinking they were answering question three when in fact they were answering either question one or question two. Reviewing previous research, we find that the answer to the first question once was YES but, for more recent elections at the presidential level, now appears to be NO, while, for congressional and legislative elections, the answer to the second question appears generally to be NO. However, the third question is essentially unanswerable absent an explicit model of why and how turnout can be expected to increase, and/or analyses of individual level panel data. Thus, the cross-sectional and pooled data analyses of previous research are of almost no value in addressing this third question.

     

Precision-guided or blunt? The effects of US economic sanctions on human rights

Public Choice - This study analyzes the consequences of economic sanctions for the target country’s human rights situation. We offer a political economy explanation for different types of...     

Does WIC work? The effects of WIC on pregnancy and birth outcomes

Support for WIC, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children, is based on the belief that "WIC works." This consensus has lately been questioned by researchers who point out that most WIC research fails to properly control for selection into the program. This paper evaluates the selection problem using rich data from the national Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System. We show that relative to Medicaid mothers, all of whom are eligible for WIC, WIC participants are negatively selected on a wide array of observable dimensions, and yet WIC participation is associated with improved birth outcomes, even after controlling for observables and for a full set of state-year interactions intended to capture unobservables that vary at the state-year level. The positive impacts of WIC are larger among subsets of even more disadvantaged women, such as those who received public assistance last year, single high school dropouts, and teen mothers.     

When and why does education matter? Motivation and resource effects in political efficacy

Education increases political engagement because it bolsters motivations and cognition on the one hand, and relative resources on the other. However, personality traits have recently been found to partially confound the education effect. Focusing on internal and external political efficacy allows us to disentangle the different effects of education. It is argued in this article (a) that personal dispositions confound the cognitive and motivational effect of education, which is the predominant effect of education on internal efficacy, but not resource effects which are important for external but not internal efficacy; and (b) that resource effects are context‐dependent whereas cognitive and motivational effects are not. Accordingly, the article shows that the competitive context in which individuals find themselves conditions the effect of education on external, but not on internal, efficacy.     

The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini

Persson and Tabellini (The Economic Effects of Constitutions, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003) show that presidential regimes and majoritarian election systems have important economic effects. Here, the number of countries is expanded and more recent data is used. In replicating and extending their analyses, we find that the effect of presidential regimes vanishes almost entirely. With regard to electoral systems, the original results are largely confirmed: majoritarian (as opposed to proportional) electoral systems lead to lower government expenditure, lower levels of rent seeking but also lower output per worker. The institutional details, such as the proportion of candidates that are not elected on party lists and district size, are particularly important.     

Transparency: from Bentham’s inventory of virtuous effects to contemporary evidence-based scepticism

There is growing enthusiasm for transparency in public affairs. Discourses idealising the value of transparency are part of the rhetoric of advocates of ‘good governance’. However, there is little discussion of the justifications for transparency. The view that transparency underpins legitimacy is similar to that of the advocates for ‘publicity’ in the initial era of representative government, when transparency (or publicity) became a crucial issue in political debates. This article identifies the intellectual roots of claims for transparency through a retrospective examination of the initial pleas in its favour. It concentrates on Jeremy Bentham, who provided an extended inventory of reasons for publicity. We examine Bentham’s major arguments and how they are currently analysed. We conclude that the virtuous effects of transparency are today qualified by criticisms in scholarly work which emphasise the possible costs and perverse effects of the search for transparency or demonstrate that it may fail to deliver the expected benefits.     

The fiscal effects of statehood: New Mexico and Arizona, 1903–1919

The residents of US territories often vote against statehood for fear government will use its greater sovereignty to impose a heavier tax burden. On the other hand, public choice theory predicts that fiscal decentralization limits government’s size. The financial reports of New Mexico and Arizona were examined before and after statehood in 1912. Graphical and regression analyses of the ratios of receipts and expenditures to property values and US GNP suggest that the relative price of government rose far more in the two new states than in a control state, Nevada, thus supporting the claims of statehood’s opponents.     

Inconsistent effects of a feature on home prices—lang's two‐market explanation

Abstract

In his 2005 article “Valuing the Suburbs: Why Some ‘Improvements’ Lower Home Prices,” Robert E. Lang proposes an explanation of why improvements to a home may either add to or detract from its value. He suggests a dual housing market: “one for conventional low‐density suburbs, and one for cities and denser suburbs” (8). The former values features implying a natural or less intense use, and the latter values features adding “intensity or utility to a property” (8).

This article reinterprets Lang's explanation as an example of interaction (something having a different effect under one condition than it does under another) arising via summation followed by a nonlinear function of the result. An alternative explanation in terms of the fit between characteristics of a home and its location is also noted.     

Taxation and presidential approval: separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence?

Previous research has established that taxation may impose significant electoral costs on politicians. This literature, however, focuses exclusively on the effect of the tax burden. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that both the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the US president’s approval ratings (over the 1959–2006 period). Our results support this proposition. Specifically, we find a negative impact from the magnitudes of the tax burden and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential approval ratings.     

The effects of rules on local political decision-making processes: How can rules facilitate participation?

It is often claimed that participation empowers local actors and that an inclusive decision-making process is crucial for rural development. We aim to investigate how formal and informal rules are set in local decision-making processes and how those rules may impact the actual level of participation by local actors. In a comparative case study, the rules-in-use for the planning of community projects in Thailand are examined. For our analysis, we use the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, which allows for more precise analysis of the impact of the rules. Fifty-three villages are served by four selected Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAO) which are either known for success in achieving participation or ranked as problematic in implementing the decentralization and local participation goals of the Thai government. The study is based on 60 semi-structured interviews with TAO staff, a survey of village leaders in 50 villages and a household survey of 104 villagers. We scrutinize seven types of rules and show some particular differences in terms of the impact from the rules-in-use. In the TAOs ranked as less participatory, the attendance rate in the meetings is found to be lower (boundary rule), villagers are informed about a meeting with a shorter notice (information rule) and more villagers mention that elites interfere in the project selection process (aggregation rule). A high level of fuzziness appeared in the position and authority rules. Further, we obtained information on the particular deontic logic, showing generally a high share of de facto may-statements in the implementation of the rules. We conclude that if the policy goal is enhancing participation, rule-setting offers good scope for intervention. From a practical perspective, information on administrative procedures has to be made more accessible and public administrators should receive procedural training.