Robust voting

The formal equivalence between social choice and statistical estimation means that criteria used to evaluate estimators can be interpreted as features of voting rules. The robustness of an estimator means, in the context of social choice, insensitivity to departures from majority opinion. In this paper we consider the implications of substituting the median, a robust, high breakdown estimator, for Borda's mean. The robustness of the median makes the ranking method insensitive to outliers and reflect majority opinion. Among all methods that satisfy a majority condition, median ranks is the unique one that is monotonic. It is an attractive voting method when the goal is the collective assessment of the merits of alternatives.     

Whose shortage of affordable housing?

Abstract

Shortfalls of low‐rent units are repeatedly cited as the rationale for programs to expand the supply of affordable housing. But the poverty‐level rents studied fall well below those of major supply programs. To reassess whether HOME and the low‐income housing tax credit (LIHTC) address actual shortfalls, this article compares numbers of units with renters by measuring both affordability and incomes with the median‐income‐based metric used for all federal rental programs.

During the 1980s, there were growing surpluses of units affordable to renters with incomes between 50 and 80 percent of their area's median income, a “low‐income” range that includes most HOME and LIHTC rents. By contrast, shortages were severe and growing only at rents affordable to households with incomes below 30 percent of area median. Examination of these shortfalls and the problems they create implies that programs to expand supply are not widely needed.     

Nationally poor,locally rich: Income and local context in the 2016 presidential election

When social scientists examine relationships between income and voting decisions, their measures implicitly compare people to others in the national economic distribution. Yet an absolute income level (e.g., $57,617 per year, the 2016 national median) does not have the same meaning in Clay County, Georgia, where the 2016 median income was $22,100, as it does in Old Greenwich, Connecticut, where the median income was $224,000. We address this limitation by incorporating a measure of one's place in her ZIP code's income distribution. We apply this approach to the question of the relationship between income and whites' voting decisions in the 2016 presidential election, and test for generalizability in elections since 2000. The results show that Trump's support was concentrated among nationally poor whites but also among locally affluent whites, complicating claims about the role of income in that election. This pattern suggests that social scientists would do well to conceive of income in relative terms: relative to one's neighbors.     

Money incomes of aged and nonaged family units, 1967-84

This article provides a detailed examination of changes in the income of the aged and of other age groups from 1967 to 1984. Levels of income, income inequality, the relative importance of selected types of income, and the poverty rates of various age groups are also analyzed. The data are from the Bureau of the Census Current Population Survey and annual money income before taxes is the measure of income. The relative income gains of the aged, compared with the nonaged, in 1967-84 reversed an earlier pattern in the post-World-War-II period: From 1947 to 1967, the incomes of the nonaged rose at a faster pace than those of the aged. Differences in their income growth were greater in 1979-84 than in 1967-79. Despite the substantial difference in the rates of income growth for the aged and nonaged units in 1967-84, the relationship between age and median income was altered only slightly. In 1984, aged family units continued to have relatively low median income, especially compared with the incomes of those in middle age.     

Ideological change and the economics of voting behavior in the US, 1920–2008

This paper tests the proposition that voters advance a more liberal agenda in prosperous times and turn more conservative in dire economic times. A reference-dependent utility model suggests that, with income growth, the relative demand for public goods increases and the median voter is more likely to vote Democrat. With slowing income growth, the median voter derives increased marginal utility from personal income—making taxation more painful—and is more likely to vote Republican. Ordinary and instrumented analyses of a new time series for the US median voter are encouraging of this income growth model. This work links voting behavior to economic business cycles and shows that ideological change is endogenous to income growth rates.     

Perceptional inequality and preferential judgements: An empirical examination of distributional axioms

There are two categories of income distribution evaluations: first, the more-or-less “value-free” perception of income inequality as a statistical dispersion; and second, the valuation of income distributions according to an explicit social welfare function which is meant to capture all of society's value judgements. These societal value judgements can be expressed in the form of preferences. Whereas the inequality perception of income distributions appeals to an observer's sober judgement, the revelation of preferences with respect to specific income distributions appeals to his or her sentiments. This paper is an empirical analysis which investigates the juxtaposition of preferences with respect to income distributions and corresponding perceptions of distributional inequality. We do this through a questionnaire in which attitudes towards various distributional axioms are tested. The source of our data is 1773 completed questionnaires collected from five German universities. Based on our data, we observe that individuals' preference orderings over the set of income distributionssubstantially deviate from their perceptions of distributional inequality. In fact, our test responses showed that even when some income distribution is judged to be more unequal than another, that distribution might be preferred, as it accords higher incomes to each individual. We hold that the preference for these greater incomes expresses a compensation for the increased degree of inequality. This explanation applies both to equiproportional and to equal fixed-sum increases in incomes, which implies a support of Paretian ethics.     

Social Security: a financial appraisal for the median voter

Several explanations have been proposed for why voters continue to support unfunded social security systems. Browning (1975) suggests that the extremely large unfunded pension systems of most democracies depend on the existence of a voting majority composed of middle-aged and older people who fail to fully internalize the cost of financing the system. In fact, when voting, economically rational workers consider only their current and future contributions to the system and their expected pension benefits--not their past contributions, which they regard as sunk costs. If, for a majority of voters, the expected continuation return from social security exceeds the return from alternative assets, an unfunded social security system is politically sustainable. This article explores the validity of Browning's proposition by quantifying the returns that U.S. voters in presidential elections from 1964 to 1996 have obtained, or expect to obtain, from Social Security. Did "investments" in Social Security outperform alternative forms of investment, such as mutual funds or pension funds, for a majority of the voters? What can be expected for the future? The U.S. Social Security system redistributes income within age cohorts on the basis of sex, income, and marital status. To account for some of these features, the median voter is represented by a family unit whose members--a husband who accounts for 70 percent of household earnings and a wife who accounts for 30 percent--make joint economic and voting decisions. Thus, retirement and survival benefits paid out to the spouse of an insured worker can be included in the calculation of Social Security returns. Interval estimates of voters' family incomes from the U.S. Census Bureau were used to obtain the median voter's household earnings. The median voter's age is derived from the ages of those who voted in presidential elections, not from the ages of the entire electorate. The median voter's contributions to Social Security are the product of the joint employer/employee Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) tax rate and employee earnings. Data on actual contributions are available for median voters in the 1964 to 1976 elections; Social Security Administration (SSA) estimates are used for future tax rates and average wage growth rates. Data on actual old-age, retirement, and survivor benefits, as well as estimates of future benefits, are also available from SSA. Analysis of ex-post returns from "investing" in Social Security and from a buy-and-hold strategy applied to three alternative assets--the Standard & Poor's Composite Index (S&P), the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), and U.S. government bonds--shows surprising results. In 1964 and 1968, Social Security largely outperformed the other three assets. In 1972, Social Security and the stock market performed almost equally. In 1976, however, the median voter would have been better off in the stock market. The expected returns for median voters in later elections cannot be directly compared with realized returns from alternative assets. However, estimates range from 5.7 percent in 1984 to 7.0 percent in 1996 and thus compare favorably with average returns of 5.6 percent for S&P, 5.3 percent for DJIA, and 2.1 percent for government bonds over the 1964-1996 period. Although these findings must be taken with caution since they compare ex-post returns, they show that, despite a continuous reduction in profitability, Social Security still represents a safe, high-return asset for a majority of families.     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in a Median Voter Model

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income. It turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of i) economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii) political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions. A negative welfare effect is more likely, the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter's labor income to average labor income. We also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination; it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters.     

Changes in the incomes of age groups, 1984-89.

In terms of changes in the incomes of age groups, the 1984-89 period was very different from the periods that immediately preceded it. This summary focuses on changes for aged family units. During the 1984-89 period, the rate of growth of real median income of aged units was substantially lower than in other subperiods since 1967, the first year for which comparable detailed estimates are available. During the 1984-89 period, the ratio of aged to nonaged median incomes fell for 4 consecutive years, after generally rising since about 1970. The relative medians of almost all detailed aged age groups fell at least slightly from 1984 to 1989, after a period of substantial rises. The increases in income for aged units during 1984-89 were higher for high-income units than for low-income units, producing an increase in inequality. The percentage of aged persons who were poor fell slightly from 1984 to 1989, but that percentage remained above the rates for other adult age groups. A relatively high percentage of aged persons had income that was less than 50 percent above the poverty threshold. The increase in the real mean total income of aged units from 1984 to 1989 was the net result of substantial increases in earnings and pension income and a substantial decrease in property income. In contrast, the much larger increase in real mean total income for aged units from 1979 to 1984 was characterized by a large increase in property income, substantial increases in Social Security benefits and pension income, and a small decrease in earnings.     

Incomplete information,income redistribution and risk averse median voter behavior

This paper extends the median voter model to include risk aversion. An expected utility maximizing median voter with an aversion to risk may behave differently than a median voter who is certain. A referendum on income redistribution from the top of the distribution to the bottom which fails when the median voter is certain may pass in the extended median voter model. Economic inefficiencies and the net losses accompanying redistribution are shown to play a pivotal role in determining the behavior of the risk averse median voter. The model is illustrated using a one percent Demogrant redistribution. The major motive for government income transfers in the modern world, and in fact throughout history, is simply that the recipients of the money would like to get it and they have the political power ... to implement their desires. Gordon Tullock (1983: 2) Because political transfers seem to violate the standard Pareto norms, we have tended to opt out of any discussion and to say that nothing further can be constructed on the basis of individual evaluations. Once the franchise has been extended to all adults, and once the constitution has allowed income transfers to take place collectively, the formal act of transfer becomes fully predictable from positive economic analysis. The basic property right inheres in the voting franchise ... James M. Buchanan (1984: 187)     

How husbands and wives vote

This article uses economic theories of voting behavior and household decision making to analyze the role of own and spouse earnings in determining political voting behavior. The main predictions from these models is that earnings is one of the factors that has an impact on political preferences and in households who share resources, voting behavior will be influenced more by the most representative labor income in the family. I investigate empirically the importance of individual vs household income, and find that the importance of individual income on voting behavior is contingent on employment. On average women earn less than their husband and vote according to their husbands income. If the wife is the maximum earner of the household or works fulltime, she votes more according to her own earnings.     

Response to Steven Plaut

The standard requirement of monotonicity of a voting procedurestates that an improvement in the ranking of the winningalternative, ceteris paribus, should not make itnon-winning. A concept apparently closely linked tomonotonicity is known as the participation axiom whichrequires that it should never be advantageous for a voter toabstain rather than to vote according to his/her preferences.Situations in which a group of voters may end up with a betteroutcome by not voting at all than by voting according to theirpreferences are called instances of the no-show paradox. Astrong version of the paradox occurs when the abstainers endup with their most preferred outcome by abstaining. A thirdrelated concept is invulnerability to preference truncation.This is satisfied by such procedures that make itadvantageous for voters to always reveal their entirepreference rankings. The fourth concept, Maskin monotonicity,plays an important role in mechanism design literature. Wediscuss these requirements in the context of votingprocedures. Particular attention is paid to the plausibilityof conditions guaranteeing various forms of monotonicity.     

Income of new disabled-worker beneficiaries and their families: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

In 1982, disabled workers who came on the social security disability insurance rolls from mid-1980 to mid-1981 had median monthly incomes of less than $500 if they were unmarried and less than $1,300 if they were married. These median monthly income levels, which include the income of a spouse and minor children if present, are roughly half those of the noninstitutionalized population aged 25-64. Social security benefits are the most important source of income for disabled workers and their families: They account for 40 percent of the total family income of married disabled workers and 65 percent of the total income of unmarried disabled workers. Social security benefits provide at least half of all income for more than 80 percent of unmarried disabled-worker beneficiaries and for 50 percent of the married beneficiaries. For married disabled-worker beneficiaries, earnings of the spouse are the second most important income source. Spousal earnings account for 28 percent of total income. Pensions and asset income each account for about 10 percent of total income for these married beneficiaries. Earnings are not an important source of income for unmarried disabled-worker beneficiaries for whom they amount to only about 3 percent of total income. Pensions, asset income, and public transfers each account for about 10 percent of total income of the unmarried beneficiaries.     

The Primacy of Race in the Geography of Income‐Based Voting: New Evidence from Public Voting Records

Why does the relationship between income and partisanship vary across U.S. regions? Some answers to this question have focused on economic context (in poorer environments, economics is more salient), whereas others have focused on racial context (in racially diverse areas, richer voters oppose the party favoring redistribution). Using 73 million geocoded registration records and 185,000 geocoded precinct returns, we examine income‐based voting across local areas. We show that the political geography of income‐based voting is inextricably tied to racial context, and only marginally explained by economic context. Within homogeneously nonblack localities, contextual income has minimal bearing on the income‐party relationship. The correlation between income and partisanship is strong in heavily black areas of the Old South and other areas with a history of racialized poverty, but weaker elsewhere, including in urbanized areas of the South. The results demonstrate that the geography of income‐based voting is inseparable from racial context.     

Setting the record straight: A note on sophisticated voting under Borda's method

The purpose of this note is to correct some inaccuracies in the literature regarding sophisticated voting under Borda's method. It is shown that if a single candidate must be elected and voters vote sophisticatedly under Borda's method, then: (1) Contrary to both Black's (1976) and Ludwin's (1978) claims, a voter's undominated voting strategy may require him not to give top ranking to his most preferred candidate; (2) Contrary to Black's (1976) claim, an undominated strategy may be such that all candidates except the most preferred one are ranked last; (3) Whereas a candidate who constitutes the true bottom preference of an absolute majority of the voters will never be elected if voters vote sincerely, this candidate may be elected if voters vote strategically; (4) The election of a candidate who constitutes the true top preference of an absolute majority of the voters is not systematic: ceteris paribus this candidate may be definitely elected when voters vote sincerely but not when they vote strategically, as well as vice versa.     

Economic growth and income equality since the 1982 recession

This paper tests the “rising tide” and “trickle down” hypotheses of income growth by examining several measures of income inequality between 1983 and 1987. A close look at household incomes between those years shows that post-tax income growth has been concentrated among the 20 percent of American households with the highest incomes. The middle income classes have experienced only modest income growth over this period, and the 20 percent of American households with the lowest incomes have experienced a decline in income. These results hold whether the analysis is based on a summary measure of income equality such as the Gini coefficient, or on a less technical measure such as average income. Furthermore, income growth seems to be decreasing most rapidly for groups of households that historically have had the lowest incomes: female-headed households, blacks, and Hispanics. Finally, two standard explanations of the inequality trend—that the distributional changes are the result of either cohort effects or the movement of jobs to the lower wage areas of South—are tested by disaggregating the data. Neither hypothesis is confirmed by our research.     

All voting is strategic

All voting is strategic because the shared outcomes are note within the choice set of any voter, the elements of which can only be strategies. Voting behavior need not re- flect the individual's ordering of outcomes, and the conventional distinction between sincere and sophisticated voting is misguided. In voting choice, the ordinal ranking of outcomes must be supplemented by intrapersonal evaluation of utility differences among these outcomes and also by predictions concerning the behavior of other participants in the nexus of interdependence.     

Making wasted votes count: Turnout,transfers, and preferential voting in practice

Proponents of electoral reform champion the single transferable vote (STV) or aligned forms of preferential voting (AV, IRV, RCV) as a method to improve participation among and representation of the general public. Voters provide an ordinal ranking among alternatives on the ballot, and ballots not used to elect a candidate are transferred to another favored alternative. Preferential voting is intended to encourage both citizen participation in an election and sincere voting. Yet the empirical evidence about the effects of preferential voting in the scholarly literature is scant. Elections of members to the Dáil Éireann, the lower house of national parliament in Ireland, provide a wealth of data on preferential voting. Data from four recent Irish elections (1997, 2002, 2007, and 2011) are analyzed to assess the effectiveness of STV on reducing wasted votes. The number of nontransferable ballots, votes not used for any candidate, is large and increases as the need for lower level preferences (that is, later counts or rounds) grows. Voter turnout does not correspond to preferential voting in predictable ways; turnout declines as the number of candidates elected increases. Although preferential voting systems have much to offer, their effects need to be evaluated.     

England's New Scheme for Funding Higher Education through Student Fees: ‘Fair and Progressive’?

From September 2012 most home undergraduates at English universities are being charged fees of £9,000 per annum. These are funded by a government loan, which attracts interest from the moment they start their course; after three years their accumulated debt exceeds £30,000. They can also borrow to cover their living costs, on the same terms, so that those studying in London can graduate with a debt of more than £50,000—although those from low‐income families can obtain grants and universities are encouraged to provide bursaries and other support to students from underrepresented groups. Graduates start repaying their debts once their annual income exceeds £21,000—at a rate of 9% of the difference between their income and that figure: until the debt is fully repaid it continues to attract interest, by as much as three percentage points above the current inflation rate. Using data from a calculator on a government website, this paper shows that the highest‐paid graduates pay back less than those on middle incomes: the ‘squeezed middle’ pays back more not only than those on low incomes but also the better‐paid and those whose incomes increase more rapidly. This has differential effects according to occupation—and sex; and middle‐income groups also contribute more to the costs of widening participation programmes, which all universities charging more than £6,000 per annum are required to fund.     

A Neo-Downsian Model of the Alternative Vote as a Mechanism for Mitigating Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies

Among those advocating the use of particular electoralmechanisms to reduce the prospects for conflict and strengthendemocracy in societies that are deeply divided in ethnic orreligious terms, there are two main approaches, one associatedwith Arend Lijphart, one with Donald Horowitz. Lijphartadvocates using electoral rules such as list PR thatstrengthen the power of ethnically or religiously definedpolitical elites in the context of implementing power-sharingmechanisms at the elite level that institutionalize norms suchas proportional allocation and mutual veto across ethnies.Horowitz advocates using a preferential voting method, thealternative vote (AV), within constituencies thatare multi-ethnic in character, to allow for voting acrossethnic lines and to increase the likelihood of electingcandidates whose perceived obligations are wider than theirown ethnic group and/or to foster the creation of coalitionsthat are multi-ethnic in character. The main focus of thisessay is the reformulation of Horowitz’s approach in terms ofideas adapted from the neo-Downsian literature on median votermodels. We illustrate Horowitz’s approach with illustrationsinspired by the predominantly biracial political competitionin Fiji between native Fijians and those of Indian descent.