Austen Chamberlain and the continental balance of power: strategy, stability, and the league of nations, 1924-29

As foreign secretary from November 1924 to June 1929, Austen Chamberlain dominated British foreign policy. Central to his diplomatic strategy was the maintenance of the European balance of power and, in this circumstance, pursuit of a leadership role for Britain within the League of Nations. The foundation upon which Chamberlain based his European strategy lay with his determination to have Britain play the vital role of stabilizing relations between France and Germany, whose mutual antipathy after the Great War, compounded by the severity of the Treaty of Versailles, threatened continental security. By October 1925, his work bore fruit with the conclusion of the Locarno agreements. For the remainder of his tenure at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain used Locarno - and Germany's membership in the League that was part of that settlement - as the diplomatic mechanism to underwrite his strategic conception of the balance of power. This article addresses the neglected issue of the strategic base of Chamberlain's European policy and addresses three criticisms of his record as foreign secretary.     

Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924–1929

Several historians have suggested that Austen Chamberlain's Francophile tendencies during his period as foreign secretary between 1924 and 1929 were the defining features of his European diplomatic strategy. By examining four key events: the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, the Anglo–French Compromise on disarmament and the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this article argues that Chamberlain's relationship with the French was not entirely harmonious. After the high point of Locarno, Britain's relations with France became increasingly tense because of Chamberlain's growing disillusionment with Briand's willingness to pursue a diplomatic agenda that did not have at its heart a reinvigorated Entente Cordiale.     

Neville Chamberlain and Strategic Relations with the US During his Chancellorship

The standard appreciation of Neville Chamberlain's attitude towards the United States and its relationship to Britain's strategic position in the interwar most often begins its analysis with his becoming Prime Minister in 1937. Those works make it appear as if the man never considered what the strategic worth of the United States was until that moment. This article argues that to do so misses the vital influences and the legacy of Chamberlain's important formative years as Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was in that role, and in particular during the confrontational era of negotiations concerning war debts in the period between 1932 and 1934, that his perceptions of the worth of the United States were influenced greatly. This article hopes to redirect future studies of Chamberlain's strategic thinking toward the idea of looking at the formulation of that strategic thinking in a more comprehensive fashion.     

Sir Austen Chamberlain and British Foreign Policy 1931-37

This article seeks to analyze Sir Austen Chamberlain's critique of British foreign policy in the six years before his death in 1937. It presents Chamberlain as one of the most perceptive contemporary observers of the international scene, and in particular of Hitler's Germany. Unusually among British politicians, Chamberlain drew a direct causal connection between the domestic policy of the Nazi regime and its likely behaviour in the international arena. However, it is suggested that the basis for his understanding was an innate anti-Germanism, which can be dated back to his experiences as a young man in the 1880s.     

试析安倍“有主见的外交”及面临的挑战

"有主见的外交"的新理念是安倍首相面对小泉内阁外交的困境和僵局寻求突破的产物,既是对小泉内阁外交路线的一种修正,也是安倍首相个人风格特点的一种彰显。其基本内涵包括:加强亚洲外交改善睦邻关系,提升欧洲外交拓宽战略空间,维持日美同盟提高自身地位,扩大国际影响加大"争常"力度。这一理念对新内阁以来的日本外交已经产生了一定的积极影响,但受制于国内国际诸多因素,也面临着严峻的挑战。     

Summit diplomacy of the seventeenth century: William III and Peter I in Utrecht and London, 1697-98

This article evaluates the meetings of the Russian Tsar Peter I and the English King William III in 1697-98 as the high point of Russia's 18-month Great Embassy to western Europe. The emphasis is on the diplomatic aspects of Anglo-Russian summits as well as on their results for international relations and diplomacy in Europe with particular focus on dramatic changes in Russia's attitude to international cooperation. Reform of Russian diplomatic machinery, enacted by Peter I as a follow-up of his European journey, were as well to a great degree motivated by his personal contacts with William III and his English and Dutch diplomatic advisors. Based on British and Russian archival sources, the article attempts to prove that Anglo-Russian summitry, and, in the first place, the rendezvous in Utrecht (1 September 1697, old style), signified Russia's intention to acquiesce to the raison d'etat principle in international relations and in practical diplomatic behaviour, thus abandoning religious and political prejudices that had kept Russians on the periphery of European diplomacy.     

Summit diplomacy of the seventeenth century: William III and Peter I in Utrecht and London, 1697–98

This article evaluates the meetings of the Russian Tsar Peter I and the English King William III in 1697–98 as the high point of Russia's 18‐month Great Embassy to western Europe. The emphasis is on the diplomatic aspects of Anglo‐Russian summits as well as on their results for international relations and diplomacy in Europe with particular focus on dramatic changes in Russia's attitude to international cooperation. Reform of Russian diplomatic machinery, enacted by Peter I as a follow‐up of his European journey, were as well to a great degree motivated by his personal contacts with William III and his English and Dutch diplomatic advisors. Based on British and Russian archival sources, the article attempts to prove that Anglo‐Russian summitry, and, in the first place, the rendezvous in Utrecht (1 September 1697, old style), signified Russia's intention to acquiesce to the raison d'etat principle in international relations and in practical diplomatic behaviour, thus abandoning religious and political prejudices that had kept Russians on the periphery of European diplomacy.     

胡志明的外交风格

2004年越共中央发布第23号文件,号召越南全党全国“在新时期加强胡志明思想的宣传、教育、研究和贯彻”。为了落实这一指示,2004年3、4月间,越南各地广泛开展了“胡志明思想优秀报告员”竞赛。主要内容包括:胡志明关于培养革命接班人的思想,关于勤俭廉政、大公无私的思想,关于发展经济和文化的思想,关于人民当家作主、建设一个民有、民享、民治国家的思想等。胡志明的思想涵盖了各个领域的方方面面,本文仅就其外交风格作些论述。胡志明(1890～1969),越南共产党和越南民主共和国的缔造者,越南人民的伟大领袖和民族解放的英雄,是国际共产主义…     

Machiavelli’s Science of Statecraft: The Diplomacy and Politics of Disorder

This paper calls into question the extent to which ethical dualism, broadly conceived as raison d’ état, does justice to Machiavelli’s understanding and practice of the diplomatic arts. Arguments are advanced herein that Machiavelli did not so much abandon morality as he sought, through the examples of Rome and antiquity, to find a different remedy for the disorder and violence rampant in the Italy of his day. Machiavelli’s reports in the diplomatic service of Florence illustrate qualities and skills of the diplomat often at odds with the caricature of the immoral statesman.     

My Experiences of the Region during the Last Century – with Particular Reference to Sino-British Relations

The author describes his early diplomatic experiences as a Chinese language student during the Cultural Revolution, followed by his first posting to Peking. Hong Kong was then a major issue between China and Britain. He examines the tensions and difficulties of those years and the first signs of better days ahead. He details his involvement in the upgrading of diplomatic relations, and the first ministerial exchanges. His final overseas posting was to Hong Kong, first to head the Trade Commission, and then, importantly, to manage the final four years of detailed negotiations with China over the handover.     

My Experiences of the Region during the Last Century - with Particular Reference to Sino-British Relations

The author describes his early diplomatic experiences as a Chinese language student during the Cultural Revolution, followed by his first posting to Peking. Hong Kong was then a major issue between China and Britain. He examines the tensions and difficulties of those years and the first signs of better days ahead. He details his involvement in the upgrading of diplomatic relations, and the first ministerial exchanges. His final overseas posting was to Hong Kong, first to head the Trade Commission, and then, importantly, to manage the final four years of detailed negotiations with China over the handover.     

布什政府的外交遗产

布什总统任期即将结束，盘点布什政府的外交政策，留给继任者的负面遗产不少：阿富汗战争和反恐依然任重道远；伊拉克战争善后并不容易；美俄关系需要重建；伊核、朝核问题依然艰难；中东和平进程需要有所突破。但布什政府8年的亚洲政策是其外交中的亮点。     

Sir Ernest Satow in Tokyo, 1895-1900: From Triple Intervention to Boxer Rebellion

Satow's term as minister plenipotentiary at Tokyo has not been studied much in detail, though it is arguably the highpoint of his career as a diplomat. Satow was the first British envoy to Japan to have a profound, scholarly understanding of Japanese culture and politics gained over many years of residence in the country. This article offers a survey of Satow's diplomatic activities, and focuses especially on the revision of the so-called unequal treaties in 1899 and the marked improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations during this period.     

The Value of Diplomatic History: A Case Study in the Historical Thought of Herbert Butterfield

This article, substantially based on archival sources, aims to rehabilitate diplomatic history as a mode of enquiry and education using the insights and reflections of Sir Herbert Butterfield, one of the leading historians of the twentieth century. Integrated with developments in theory, methodology and new areas of inquiry over the past generation, his thoughts, it will be argued, can inform the tenets of a revitalized diplomatic history—one that fulfills the promise of its founding scholars and one that reclaims its place at the forefront of historical scholarship: a corrective to some of our present academic priorities.     

The Value of Diplomatic History: A Case Study in the Historical Thought of Herbert Butterfield

This article, substantially based on archival sources, aims to rehabilitate diplomatic history as a mode of enquiry and education using the insights and reflections of Sir Herbert Butterfield, one of the leading historians of the twentieth century. Integrated with developments in theory, methodology and new areas of inquiry over the past generation, his thoughts, it will be argued, can inform the tenets of a revitalized diplomatic history—one that fulfills the promise of its founding scholars and one that reclaims its place at the forefront of historical scholarship: a corrective to some of our present academic priorities.     

A 'missed opportunity' for peace? Harold Wilson, British diplomacy, and the sun flower initiative to end the Vietnam war, February 1967

This article examines Harold Wilson's attempts to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war during his first term in office as Britain's Prime Minister, with particular reference to his discussions with the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, in London in February 1967. Wilson's diplomatic efforts were influenced by his intention to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, and by his belief that the United Kingdom could help develop East-West contacts and facilitate the process of detente. In conclusion, this article argues that the failure of the Sunflower initiative in February 1967 was due not to the intervention of American 'hawks', as Wilson supposed, but to the convoluted clash of interests of the powers involved either directly or indirectly in the Vietnam war - the USA, USSR, China, and North Vietnam - which handicapped third-parry peace initiatives.     

The Revitalization of Diplomatic History: Renewed Reflections

Diplomacy is one of the oldest human institutions, with diplomatic records dating back to some of the earliest civilizations. At present, the methods and content of diplomatic history have much to offer modern scholars, but the field as a whole suffers from being out of step, philosophically, with the mainstream of historical and political-scientific study. The departure of diplomatic history from the philosophical mainstream both of political science and of history in general has left the field in dire straits. Fallen from its former grace, diplomatic history requires a new vision: not a groundbreaking, original vision, but a vision informed by previous generations, adapting their foundational principles to the ideals and demands of the twenty-first century academy. It is thus not only the Grand Tradition itself, but its ethos that must be preserved, in order to retain the distinguishing character and methods of diplomatic and military history as independent, politically moderate academic disciplines, regardless of their reputation among neighboring fields.     

A ‘missed opportunity’ for peace? Harold Wilson,British diplomacy,and the sun flower initiative to end the Vietnam war,February 1967

This article examines Harold Wilson's attempts to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war during his first term in office as Britain's Prime Minister, with particular reference to his discussions with the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, in London in February 1967. Wilson's diplomatic efforts were influenced by his intention to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, and by his belief that the United Kingdom could help develop East-West contacts and facilitate the process of detente. In conclusion, this article argues that the failure of the Sunflower initiative in February 1967 was due not to the intervention of American ‘hawks’, as Wilson supposed, but to the convoluted clash of interests of the powers involved either directly or indirectly in the Vietnam war – the USA, USSR, China, and North Vietnam – which handicapped third-parry peace initiatives.     

Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt: From New York to Prague

The present article first traces Ambassador Steinhardt's career from his days at Columbia University (1909-1915) to his successful legal career as a partner at Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall in New York City. It then studies Steinhardt's diplomatic career that commenced in 1933, when President Roosevelt sent him as U.S. minister in Sweden. This was followed by appointments—as U.S. ambassador—in Peru and the Soviet Union. His wartime service as U.S. ambassador to Turkey is examined closely since the lessons learned there would have been applicable at his next post, Prague, Czechoslovakia.     

Sir Ernest Satow in Tokyo, 1895-1900: From Triple Intervention to Boxer Rebellion

Satow's term as minister plenipotentiary at Tokyo has not been studied much in detail, though it is arguably the highpoint of his career as a diplomat. Satow was the first British envoy to Japan to have a profound, scholarly understanding of Japanese culture and politics gained over many years of residence in the country. This article offers a survey of Satow's diplomatic activities, and focuses especially on the revision of the so-called unequal treaties in 1899 and the marked improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations during this period.