Lifetime distributional effects of Social Security retirement benefits

This article presents three measures of the distribution of actual and projected net benefits (benefits minus payroll taxes) from Social Security's Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) for people born between 1931 and 1960. The results are based on simulations with the Social Security Administration's Model of Income in the Near Term (MINT), which projects retirement income through 2020. The base sample for MINT is the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation panels for 1990 to 1993, matched with Social Security administrative records. The study population is grouped into 5-year birth cohorts and then ranked by economic status in three ways. First, the population is divided into five groups on the basis of individual lifetime covered earnings, and their lifetime present values of OASI benefits received and payroll taxes paid are calculated. By this measure, OASI provides much higher benefits to the lowest quintile of earners than to other groups, but it becomes less redistributive toward lower earners in more recent birth cohorts. Second, people are ranked by shared lifetime covered earnings, and the values of shared benefits received and payroll taxes paid are computed. Individuals are assumed to split covered earnings, benefits, and payroll taxes with their spouses in the years they are married. By the shared covered earnings measure, OASI is still much more favorable to persons in the lower income quintiles, although to a lesser degree than when people are ranked by individual covered earnings. OASI becomes more progressive among recent cohorts, even as net lifetime benefits decline for the entire population. Finally, individuals are ranked on the basis of their shared permanent income from age 62, when they become eligible for early retirement benefits, until death. Their annual Social Security benefits are compared with the benefits they would have received if they had saved their payroll taxes in individual accounts and used the proceeds to buy either of two annuities that provide level payments from age 62 until death: a unisex annuity that is based on the average life expectancy of the birth cohort or an age-adjusted annuity that is based on the worker's own life expectancy. On the permanent income measure, OASI is generally more favorable to people in higher income quintiles. Moreover, it is particularly unfavorable to those in the lowest quintile. Because people in the lowest quintile have a shorter life expectancy, they receive OASI benefits for a shorter period. This group would receive greater benefits in retirement if they invested their payroll taxes in the age-adjusted annuity. OASI is more favorable to them than the unisex annuity, however, OASI is becoming more progressive in that the net benefits it provides drop more rapidly among higher income quintiles than lower ones. This article also examines how OASI affects individuals by educational attainment, race, and sex. On both the lifetime covered earnings and the permanent income measures, OASI is more favorable to workers with less education and more favorable to women. The results by race and ethnicity are mixed. When people are ranked by the present value of their shared lifetime covered earnings, OASI appears more favorable to non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics than to non-Hispanic whites. When people are ranked by shared permanent income in retirement, however, OASI produces negative returns for both non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites in the most recent birth cohorts, with non-Hispanic blacks faring relatively worse. The changes across cohorts occur partly because of changes in tax rates and benefits, but more importantly because of changing demographics and earnings patterns of the workforce. Of particular importance is the increasing share of beneficiaries who receive worker benefits instead of auxiliary benefits as wives or widows. OASI benefits are based on the lifetime covered earnings of current or former married couples, as well as on earned retirement benefits of individuals. The reduced importance of auxiliary benefits (due to the higher lifetime covered earnings of women) and the increased proportion of divorced retirees make OASI more progressive--even as net benefits decline--for current and future cohorts than for cohorts who retired in the 1990s. Analysis of these findings suggests that simulations of policy changes in Social Security must take into account the decreasing importance of auxiliary benefits across birth cohorts and the complex changes in individuals' marital histories.     

Evaluating the initial impact of eliminating the retirement earnings test

Under the retirement earnings test, Social Security benefits are reduced if earnings exceed specified amounts, although the benefit reduction is partly offset by future benefit increases. By imposing a tax on the earnings of beneficiaries, the earnings test provided a disincentive for them to supplement retirement income by working. The Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 eliminated the earnings test for Social Security beneficiaries who have reached the full retirement age. This article presents the first study of labor force activity (earnings and employment) among individuals aged 65-69 before and immediately after this sudden rule change. Drawing on Social Security administrative data, the author examines three widely expected reactions: increased return to work, increased hours worked, and accelerated applications for old-age benefits. The analysis finds that removing the retirement earnings test: Encouraged some workers to increase their earnings. The increases in earnings are large and significant among higher earners but are not statistically significant among lower earners. Had little effect on employment. Removing the earnings test appears to have had no immediate, significant effect on the employment rate of older workers. Employment of older people may be affected in the longer run, however. Slightly increased the pace of applications for benefits. Applications rose about 2 percent in the 65-69 age group in 2000. The overall acceleration will probably be small, however, because most individuals in this age group apply for benefits before reaching the full retirement age. Although the current analysis captures the effects of retaining older workers in the labor force, these initial results may not capture all the effects of eliminating the retirement earnings test, however, for two reasons. First, the analysis covers only a single year--the year the earnings test was eliminated. Since eliminating the earnings test may have had little effect on people who had already retired, its full effect may not be apparent for several years. Second, the analysis applies only to workers aged 65-69. Eliminating the earnings test for people above the full retirement age may also encourage younger workers to delay retirement and therefore increase their labor supply. Further analysis will therefore be required to determine the longer-run impact of eliminating the retirement earnings test.     

Early retirees under Social Security: health status and economic resources

Some proposals to change the Social Security program to ensure long-run solvency would reduce or eliminate benefits for early retirees. This article documents the health and financial resources of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) beneficiaries aged 62-64. It identifies a substantial minority of early retirees who might be economically vulnerable if either the early eligibility age or normal retirement age was raised. Attention is directed at the extent to which poor health limits work in this age group and the extent to which curtailment of early OASI benefits might lead to increases in the Disability Insurance (DI) program rolls. Using a set of comprehensive health measures, we estimate that over 20 percent of OASI beneficiaries aged 62-64 have health problems that substantially impair their ability to work. This finding implies that in this age range, as many severely disabled persons receive OASI benefits as disability benefits. In fact, 12 percent of early beneficiaries would meet a more stringent criterion for being classified "disabled"--SSA's medical standard for disability benefits. The evidence therefore indicates that OASI functions as a substantial, albeit unofficial, disability program for early retirees. Compared with those who have no health problems or are less severely impaired, early OASI beneficiaries who meet the medical criteria for disability benefits are more likely to be living alone and more likely to be poor or "near poor." The great majority of the group--almost 80 percent--are women. Analysis of their earnings histories suggests that most of these beneficiaries do not satisfy the insured-status requirements for Disability Insurance benefits. The article considers the different roles of the OASI program and the DI program for health-impaired individuals aged 62-64. Disability modelers sometimes overlook an important aspect of program administration. Under customary screening procedures implemented in Social Security field offices, applicants for early OASI benefits who appear to be severely impaired simultaneously apply for DI benefits if they are disability insured. If they are found eligible for DI benefits, those applicants become DI beneficiaries. The implication is that raising the earliest entitlement age would have little impact on the DI rolls. Unless there are changes in eligibility criteria, the DI program would not serve as a safety net for many of the most severely disabled early retirees.     

Social Security Privatization and Market Risk

Under Social Security privatization, workers would be allowed to divert some of the money that currently goes to Social Security into private accounts. This would expose them to market risk, that is, the risk of a substantial drop in equity prices or of a prolonged bear market. This could result in generations of workers with less money than they thought they would have for retirement. Depending on a worker's birth date, if the privatization approach proposed by President Bush's Commission to Strengthen Social Security had been enacted at the start of the Social Security program, the retirement benefits generated from putting 10% of earnings in a private account for 35 years would have ranged from 100% to less than 20% relative to pre‐retirement earnings. The extraordinarily high retirement income generated from the booming 1990s stock market was the equivalent of winning the generational lottery—unlikely to be repeated regularly. Even under these beneficial circumstances, a privatized system could have cost the government more than $1 trillion in today's dollars over the past 3 decades if the government decided to help out those who accumulated too little for retirement. The primary alternative to a government bailout of the Social Security system, older workers working longer, would likely not generate the desired results. Workers wanting to work longer would create labor market pressures typically at times when unemployment is already high.     

The earnings test and the short-run work response to its elimination

Eliminating the earnings test will have different effects on the work effort of persons aged 65-69, depending on whether or not they are currently working or currently receiving Social Security benefits. This article reviews the development of the earnings test and examines the theoretical implications on work effort of removing the test for members of this age group. It looks at the Current Population Survey (CPS) data to determine how many persons aged 65-69 have characteristics that can be identified with groups that would theoretically increase, decrease, or not change their work effort should they no longer be subject to the earnings test. This analysis suggests that at least 80 percent, and perhaps more than 90 percent, of the 9.7 million persons aged 65-69 will not change their level of work effort if the earnings test is eliminated. Individuals who would modify their hours worked and earnings are fairly evenly split among those who would increase, decrease, or have an undetermined direction of change in their work effort.     

How have people responded to changes in the retirement earnings test in 2000?

This article describes responses to removing the retirement earnings test in 2000 for persons at the full retirement age or older. We examine annual earnings and retirement benefit claims from Social Security administrative data that cover the 4 years before and after the change. Three findings emerge from the study. First, the effect on earnings of removing the earnings test is uneven across people with different earnings levels. We find little effect on earnings at lower levels, but the effect on earnings in the mid to upper levels (50th to 80th percentiles) is large and significant. Such a finding indicates that the removal most affects people with earnings levels above the earnings test threshold. The largest increases in earnings are found at the 70th percentile for persons who have attained ages 65-69 and at the 60th percentile for those turning 65. Second, there is no clear evidence of the effect of the test's removal on the overall rate of labor force participation. A small rise in work participation among individuals aged 65-69 may be at least partially attributable to the trend already under way. Increases in work participation that do occur are mostly attributable to retaining older workers rather than inducing older workers back into the workforce. The effect appears to increase over time, suggesting that the removal has long-lasting effects on work participation. Third, the removal of the earnings test accelerated applications for benefits by 2 to 5 percentage points among individuals aged 65-69 and by 3 to 7 percentage points among those reaching age 65.     

Effect on benefits of earnings at ages 65 or older, 1995.

A major policy issue for the Social Security program is the treatment of earnings of persons who have attained retirement age. This article discusses the retirement test and recomputation of benefit provisions, and provides statistical data for 1995. In 1995, about 806,000 persons aged 65-70 had significant earnings resulting in the withholding of benefits by the retirement test. About 1,659,000 persons aged 65 or older realized an increase in their benefit amount because of their earnings.     

Changing the method for calculating quarters of coverage: the impact on workers' insured status

The 1977 Social Security Amendments specified that, beginning in 1978, a worker would be credited with one quarter of coverage for a designated amount of annual earnings. For 1978, a worker received one quarter of coverage (up to a total of four) for each $250 in annual earnings from employment or self-employment. Before 1978, a worker who was paid $50 in wages in a calendar quarter was credited with a quarter of coverage. A person who had $400 or more in self-employment income in a year was credited with four quarters of coverage. Some workers received more quarters of coverage under the new provisions than they would have under the old, and other workers received less. Since a worker's receipt of benefits depends on his or her insured status, which is based on quarters of coverage, this change can affect a worker's eligibility for benefits. This study indicates that if $250 in annual earnings had been required for one quarter of coverage in 1977, more than 2.1 million workers would have had a change in their insured status for disabled worker benefits, and about 700,000 workers would have had a change in their insured status for survivor benefits. Those whose insured status was affected were most likely to have had marginal earnings records--for example, they had four to seven quarters of coverage when six were needed. (This effect was expected when the legislation was passed.) This article examines those whose eligibility for benefits was most likely to have been affected.     

Social Security's special minimum benefit

Social Security's special minimum primary insurance amount (PIA) provision was enacted in 1972 to increase the adequacy of benefits for regular long-term, low-earning covered workers and their dependents or survivors. At the time, Social Security also had a regular minimum benefit provision for persons with low lifetime average earnings and their families. Concerns were rising that the low lifetime average earnings of many regular minimum beneficiaries resulted from sporadic attachment to the covered workforce rather than from low wages. The special minimum benefit was seen as a way to reward regular, low-earning workers without providing the windfalls that would have resulted from raising the regular minimum benefit to a much higher level. The regular minimum benefit was subsequently eliminated for workers reaching age 62, becoming disabled, or dying after 1981. Under current law, the special minimum benefit will phase out over time, although it is not clear from the legislative history that this was Congress's explicit intent. The phaseout results from two factors: (1) special minimum benefits are paid only if they are higher than benefits payable under the regular PIA formula, and (2) the value of the regular PIA formula, which is indexed to wages before benefit eligibility, has increased faster than that of the special minimum PIA, which is indexed to inflation. Under the Social Security Trustees' 2000 intermediate assumptions, the special minimum benefit will cease to be payable to retired workers attaining eligibility in 2013 and later. Their benefits will always be larger under the regular benefit formula. As policymakers consider Social Security solvency initiatives--particularly proposals that would reduce benefits or introduce investment risk--interest may increase in restoring some type of special minimum benefit as a targeted protection for long-term low earners. Two of the three reform proposals offered by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security would modify and strengthen the current-law special minimum benefit. Interest in the special minimum benefit may also increase because of labor force participation and marital trends that suggest that enhancing workers' benefits may be a more effective means of reducing older women's poverty rates than enhancing spousal or widow's benefits. By understanding the Social Security program's experience with the special minimum benefit, policymakers will be able to better anticipate the effectiveness of other initiatives to enhance benefits for long-term low earners. This article presents the most recent and comprehensive information available about the special minimum benefit in order to help policymakers make informed decisions about the provision's future. Highlights of the current special minimum benefit include the following: Very few persons receive the special minimum benefit. As of December 2001, about 134,000 workers and their dependents and survivors were entitled to a benefit based on the special minimum. Of those, only about 79,000 received a higher total benefit because of the special minimum; the other 55,000 were dually entitled. (In effect, when persons are eligible for more than one type of benefit--that is, they are dually eligible--the highest benefit payable determines total benefits. If the special minimum benefit is not the highest benefit payable, it does not increase total benefits paid.) As of February 2000, retired workers who were special minimum beneficiaries with unreduced benefits and were not dually entitled were receiving, on average, a monthly benefit of $510 per month. That amount is approximately $2,000 less than the annual poverty threshold for an aged individual. Special minimum benefits provide small increases in total benefits. For special minimum beneficiaries who were not dually entitled as of December 2001, the average special minimum monthly PIA was just $39 higher than the regular PIA. Most special minimum beneficiaries are female retired workers. About 90 percent of special minimum beneficiaries are retired workers, and 77 percent of those retired workers are women. The special minimum benefit has never provided poverty-level benefits. Maximum payable special minimum benefits (unreduced for early retirement) equal 85 percent of the poverty level for aged persons, down from 96 percent at the provision's inception. Major public policy considerations raised by this analysis include the following: Social Security benefits alone do not protect all long-term low earners from poverty. Low earners with 30 years of earnings equal to the annual full-time minimum wage who retired in selected years from 1982 to 2000 received benefits that were 3.9 percent to 20.1 percent below the poverty threshold, depending on the year they retired. For 40-year earners, the range was 3.9 percent to 15.3 percent below poverty. Furthermore, in 1993, 29.2 percent of retired-worker beneficiaries who were poor had 30 or more years of coverage. The size of the universe of persistently low earners with significant attachment to the covered workforce is unknown. Available research that examines two 28-month periods suggests that only 4 percent to 6 percent of full-time, full-period earners had below-minimum wages for more than 12 consecutive months. Targeting enhanced benefits only toward long-term, regular workers who are low earners is difficult under the current Social Security program. All else being equal, if total wage-indexed lifetime covered earnings are the same for both a full-career low earner and for a high earner who has worked only occasionally, then their Social Security benefits will be identical. Social Security has no information on number of hours worked, hourly wages, or other information that could distinguish between two such persons.     

Projections of economic well-being for Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and 2062

Policymakers considering potential changes to the Social Security program need to be able to assess how such changes would affect the economic well-being of future retirees. The first step to understanding these effects is to determine the well-being of future retirees under the current Social Security system. To this end, this article projects the retiree populations aged 62 or older in 2022 and 2062 using the Social Security Administration's MINT (Modeling Income in the Near Term) model and assesses their well-being. Because no one measure can fully capture whether future retirees will have adequate resources to meet their needs, we employ several indicators to assess retirement prospects. In addition, because current-law Social Security promises cannot be financed from current-law taxes, we project an alternative 2062 baseline that adjusts Social Security benefits downward to reflect the amounts that current-law taxes can support. Our results illustrate the importance of using several measures when assessing the well-being of future Social Security beneficiaries. When using absolute measures, retirement well-being will improve for Social Security beneficiaries in 2062 compared with those in 2022. Median per capita income of Social Security beneficiaries is projected to increase by a third (in real terms) between 2022 and 2062, with a corresponding decline in projected poverty rates. In addition, median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062. Relative measures of well-being, however, suggest a decline in well-being between Social Security beneficiaries in 2022 and those in 2062. The share of beneficiaries who have low income relative to their peers, measured as the share whose income-to-needs ratio is less than half of the median ratio, will increase over time. In addition, income replacement rates are projected to fall between 2022 and 2062, indicating a decline in how well-being during retirement compares with that during the working years. And although median financial wealth will increase between 2022 and 2062, it will actually fall relative to economy-wide average wages. Projected improvements over time would lessen, and declines would be exacerbated, if instead of assuming the payment of currently scheduled Social Security benefits we assumed that benefits would be reduced according to what is payable under current-law taxes. Regardless of which measure of well-being is used, certain groups fare worse than others, including beneficiaries who never married, nonwhites, beneficiaries without a high school degree, and those with fewer years of labor force experience and low lifetime earnings. These vulnerable groups are likely to be more dependent on Social Security benefits for their retirement income. As a result, they fare particularly poorly under the assumption that Social Security benefits are reduced to reflect what is payable under current-law taxes.     

Projecting retirement income of future retirees with panel data: results from the modeling income in the near-term (MINT) project

Cross-sectional data capture only a point in time and miss individual changes in earnings, labor force participation, marriage, fertility, and health. Because panel data follow individuals over time, they do not have this problem. The problems or concerns with cross-sectional data may be compounded when these data are used to make projections. Iams and Sandell (1997) found that using panel data on earnings explained much more variation in future earnings than using cross-sectional survey data. Panel data are also needed to estimate Social Security benefits, especially for women. Because of auxiliary benefits paid to spouses, ex-spouses, and widow(er)s of entitled workers, an individual's Social Security retirement benefit depends not only on his or her earnings history, but also on his or her marital history and the earnings histories of current and previous spouses. When we compare projected unreduced Social Security benefits with what they would be if we didn't have marital history or earnings history data for men, we find that: Benefits computed using only earnings histories are not very different from benefits computed using both earnings and marital histories. Benefits computed using only current earnings and marital histories underestimate benefits for those in earlier birth cohorts and overestimate benefits for those in the most recent birth cohort. Benefits computed without either marital or earnings histories underestimate benefits for all birth cohorts, but by much more for earlier cohorts than for more recent cohorts. For women we find that benefits computed without marital or earnings histories underestimate benefits in all birth cohorts. The largest differences are for women in earlier birth cohorts. Using both marital and earnings histories to estimate unreduced Social Security benefits, we find that men are projected to continue receiving higher benefits than women, although the gap is expected to narrow as the baby boomers near retirement age. We also look at the composition of projected total income available at retirement for those with incomes in the 45th-55th percentiles of the income distribution and find that: Total income at retirement is projected to be larger for men than for women in every birth cohort. Women are projected to receive the largest share of their total income from Social Security benefits. Men are projected to receive the largest share of their total income from other income sources, although this share declines as the baby boomers near retirement age.     

Using data for couples to project the distributional effects of changes in Social Security policy

Under Social Security program rules, the aged receive Social Security benefits either as retired workers, spouses, divorced spouses, or widow(er)s. Retired-worker benefits are paid to workers who have 40 quarters of coverage over their lives. Auxiliary benefits are paid to spouses, divorced spouses, and widow(er)s of retired workers. Spouse benefits are computed using the earnings history of the current spouse for individuals who are married when they apply for benefits. Divorced spouse and widow(er) benefits are computed using the earnings history of the ex-spouse or deceased spouse with the highest PIA. A large number of retired women are entitled to auxiliary benefits. Some women receive only auxiliary benefits, while the majority of women have their retired-worker benefit supplemented by auxiliary benefits. Because the level of Social Security benefits can reflect the relative lifetime earnings of both spouses, as a couple, using individual data to estimate Social Security benefits will tend to underestimate actual benefits, particularly for women. However, detailed data for couples are often difficult to obtain. There is currently no known single data source that includes both marital and earnings history information. As a result, many researchers resort to estimating Social Security benefits using individual data or aggregate data, such as the average earnings of men and women. The Social Security Administration's Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, with substantial assistance from the Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, and the RAND Corporation, is developing a model that overcomes this problem by using the marital and earnings histories of both marital partners to estimate Social Security benefits. The Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) model projects retirement income (Social Security benefits, pension income, asset income, and earnings of working beneficiaries) from 1997 through 2031 for current and future Social Security beneficiaries using a unique data source--the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)--matched to Social Security Administration records. Using MINT data, this article establishes the importance of using data for couples rather than individuals by examining the impact of changing Social Security benefits to reflect 40 years of lifetime earnings rather than the 35 years required under current law. We compare the effect of this policy change on married women by estimating their benefits with data for couples and with individual data. Results indicate that: Using individual data overestimates the projected reduction in retirement benefits brought about by the policy change and makes the effects on women look more severe than they actually are. Because older birth cohorts are more likely than younger cohorts to receive auxiliary benefits based on their husbands' average lifetime earnings, the bias created by using individual data is projected to be much larger for older cohorts than for younger cohorts. This article emphasizes the importance of using data for couples to estimate Social Security benefits, particularly for women. Although our focus is on married women, using data for couples is just as important for calculating the retirement benefits of divorced and widowed individuals. For individuals who are divorced or widowed at retirement, their Social Security benefits are based on their own earnings history, as well as the earnings histories of each of their previous spouses.     

Self-employment income at low earnings levels.

If self-employment were much more prevalent at moderate and high earnings levels than at low levels and if the incidence of both the employee and employer taxes on wages is on the employee, then the social security tax structure would be regressive relative to taxable earnings. Analysis shows, however, that this is the case only in a very limited sense. For 1970, 6.5 percent of taxable earnings derives from self-employment. At least 6.3 percent of taxable earnings consists of self-employment income in each observed interval from $400 to $3,600. The proportion declines slightly with rising earnings until near the taxable maximum, when it begins to rise. If the average tax rate on earnings up to the maximum were tabulated by earnings both below and above the maximum, it appears very likely that mild regressivity would be shown beyond the taxable maximum, but of not more than a few tenths of a percent.     

Income of new disabled-worker beneficiaries and their families: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

In 1982, disabled workers who came on the social security disability insurance rolls from mid-1980 to mid-1981 had median monthly incomes of less than $500 if they were unmarried and less than $1,300 if they were married. These median monthly income levels, which include the income of a spouse and minor children if present, are roughly half those of the noninstitutionalized population aged 25-64. Social security benefits are the most important source of income for disabled workers and their families: They account for 40 percent of the total family income of married disabled workers and 65 percent of the total income of unmarried disabled workers. Social security benefits provide at least half of all income for more than 80 percent of unmarried disabled-worker beneficiaries and for 50 percent of the married beneficiaries. For married disabled-worker beneficiaries, earnings of the spouse are the second most important income source. Spousal earnings account for 28 percent of total income. Pensions and asset income each account for about 10 percent of total income for these married beneficiaries. Earnings are not an important source of income for unmarried disabled-worker beneficiaries for whom they amount to only about 3 percent of total income. Pensions, asset income, and public transfers each account for about 10 percent of total income of the unmarried beneficiaries.     

Divorced women at retirement: projections of economic well-being in the near future.

The Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) data system projects retirement income for persons retiring in the 1990s through 2020. Using those data, we examine the economic well-being of divorced women at retirement. The MINT data system improves upon previous estimates of Social Security benefits by: Measuring and projecting years of marriage to determine if the 10-year requirement has been met, Projecting lifetime earnings until retirement and eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits, and Estimating lifetime earnings of former spouses. MINT also makes independent projections of each retiree's income from pensions, assets, and earnings (for working beneficiaries). As a result of changes in marital patterns, MINT projects that the proportion of women who are divorced will increase. At the same time, the proportion of those women who are eligible for auxiliary benefits is projected to decrease, for two main reasons. First, changes in women's earnings and work patterns result in more women receiving retired-worker benefits based on their own earnings. Second, an increased number of divorced women will not meet the 10-year marriage requirement for auxiliary benefits. Despite the projected decrease over time in eligibility rates for auxiliary benefits, the level of Social Security benefits is projected to change little between the older and younger birth cohorts of divorced women entering retirement. According to the MINT data, the most vulnerable of divorced women will be those who have not met the 10-year marriage requirement. Poverty rates will be higher for them than for all other divorced women. This group of divorced women is projected to grow as more and more women divorce from shorter marriages. With more women divorcing and with fewer divorced women meeting the 10-year marriage requirement, the proportion of economically vulnerable aged women will increase when the baby boom retires. Further research is warranted on this long neglected subject. Analyses of divorced women's economic well-being by major socioeconomic characteristics such as race and ethnicity and education are of particular interest. Such analyses can be supported by the MINT data system.     

Income of retirement-aged persons in the United States

This article reviews the composition and level of retirement income in the United States and how this has changed over time, focusing on two overlapping but distinct groups--the entire population aged 65 or older, and recent retirees. Changes in the composition of income of the aged over the past 20-30 years, including greatly expanded Social Security and pension coverage and an increasing number of persons with retirement savings, have improved the economic status of the aged not only in comparison with the aged in earlier years, but also in comparison with younger adults who derive most of their income from earnings. New retired workers are better off than the total aged population in several respects. The younger cohorts now in the labor force will spend more of their working lives in the more favorable conditions now present than was true of past new beneficiaries or the aged as a whole. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to expect that today's workers will enjoy more and larger pensions and increased income from savings to supplement their Social Security benefits when they retire.     

The effect of health on retirement

Results from retirement research suggest the following conclusions about health, retirement, and the likely effects of the changes in retirement age made by the 1983 Social Security Amendments. First, after controlling for non-health-related factors, it is clear that older workers who are in poor health retire earlier than workers with similar economic circumstances who are in good health. Second, the research reviewed here tends to indicate that the response of the average worker to the changes made in the social security full retirement age by the 1983 amendments will be small. Estimates suggest than the average increase in the retirement age will be between zero and 3 months. Finally, while the evidence is much less certain, research results suggest that older workers in poor health may respond even less than the average worker. It is not possible to say precisely what will happen to lifetime incomes as a result of these changes. A small labor supply response suggests that not much of the lost social security benefits will be made up by additional earnings, either for workers on average or for workers in poor health. However, earnings are only part of the total income picture. Other than a brief mention, this article has not addressed how workers may adjust their savings behavior, or how private pensions may adjust, and particularly whether the potential for adjustment through these avenues is the same for workers in poor health as for the average worker.     

The impact of changing financial work incentives on the earnings of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries

SSDI beneficiaries lose their entire cash benefit if they perform work that is substantial gainful activity (SGA) after using Social Security work incentive programs. The complete loss of benefits might be a work disincentive for beneficiaries. We report results from a pilot project that replaces the complete loss of benefits with a gradual reduction in benefits of $1 for every $2 earned above an earnings disregard level. Beneficiaries who volunteered to participate in the project were randomly assigned to a group receiving the new program or to a control group. The policy led to a 25 percent increase in the percentage of beneficiaries with earnings above the annualized SGA amount, or $11,760 in 2009 dollars. It did not result in a reduction in benefit payments. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Workers' compensation: 1984-88 benchmark revisions.

About 93.1 million workers were covered under workers' compensation laws in 1988--an increase of 11 percent from the 1984 total. Benefit amounts totaled $30.7 billion--an increase of about 56 percent since 1984. Of the total payments made under the workers' compensation program, $17.6 billion went to disabled workers, $1.6 billion to their survivors, and $11.5 billion for medical care. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is interested in measuring economic security in the United States, and workers' compensation plays a large role in that measurement. This article represents one part of our overall effort to determine the roles the various income-maintenance programs play in helping citizens of the United States achieve economic security. The figures presented here provide readers with an opportunity to review workers' compensation program operations during much of the 1980's. Workers' compensation is also important to SSA because that program is directly related to the Social Security Disability Insurance program. Since 1965, Social Security disability benefits have been subject to reduction if the beneficiary also receives workers' compensation and the combined benefits exceed 80 percent of previous earnings. In addition, SSA has been directly involved in providing income maintenance for disability from work-related diseases since 1969 when the Federal Black Lung benefits program was established.