Promotion of the right of establishment in EU: focusing on the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Imperative Requirement Doctrine</Emphasis>

Consolidation of the “Common European Market” is a key feature of the European Union, which is made possible by the freedom in movement of goods, capital, services, and people. The freedom of movement for businesses manifests itself as the right of establishment. The aim of this paper is to examine various issues surrounding the right of establishment and to analyze the position of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in each case. The analysis of cases illustrates a consistent opinion of the ECJ: The right of establishment is highly protected, but it must be exercised in the context of national legislation. Government regulation in market access, on the other hand, must meet the imperative requirement doctrine: it must be non-discriminatory, there must be general public interest at stake, the regulation must be an effective means of promoting public interest, and the regulation must be necessary and proportional to the general interest at stake. In sum, the ECJ upholds the right of establishment but nonetheless respects the states’ specific regulatory authority as long as they conform to the imperative requirement doctrine.     

Congressional Communication: Content & Consequences,by Daniel Lipinski. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 143 pp. $29.95 paper.

Television interviews with political candidates are pivotal moments in election campaigns. Previous studies in Anglo-American contexts have shown that adversarialism in television interviews can be predicted by the power of the politician and by the status of the interviewer. However, worldwide the structural conditions of the liberal media system are unique. This article studies how the Anglo-American watchdog model of interviews should be adapted to polarized television markets such as Italy, where broadcast organizations are politically, financially, and historically linked to different political blocks. A content analysis of the level of toughness in questions posed to politicians from different parties during the 2006 and 2008 Italian general elections showed that, in line with the watchdog model, journalists are more adversarial toward politicians who are likely to win the elections. Apart from this, interviews in polarized television markets follow a different model: Interviewers with high status are less adversarial, politicians from minor parties face more threatening questions, and partisan bias is more important than role bias. The generalizability of this model is discussed in the light of the polarization of television markets, partisan segregation, and the potential consequences for vote choice and election outcomes.