THE IMPACT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ON WHITEHALL

This article examines whether the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 has changed Whitehall. Based on a two‐year, ESRC‐funded study, it evaluates the impact of FOI on five characteristics of the Whitehall model: the culture of secrecy, ministerial accountability to Parliament, civil service neutrality, the Cabinet system, and effective government. Proponents of FOI hoped that government would be less secretive, more accountable and more effective; critics feared that civil servants would lose their anonymity, and collective Cabinet responsibility would be undermined. Drawing on interviews, media analysis, case law and official documents, the article finds that the impact of FOI is modest at most. It is not powerful enough to do much good or much ill, and the feared ‘chilling effect' on candour and record‐keeping has not materialized. Leaks do more damage than FOI disclosures. But ministers remain apprehensive about the effect of FOI on Cabinet records and discussions.     

Transparency Pays? Evaluating the Effects of the Freedom of Information Laws on Perceived Government Corruption

About 90 countries have adopted Freedom of Information (FOI) laws with the objective of facilitating citizens’ right to access information on government activities expeditiously. It is argued that FOI laws increase transparency and fix accountability of the government. We provide quantitative evidence on the impact of FOI laws on perceived government corruption. Using panel data for 132 countries over the 1990–2011 period, we find that adopting FOI laws after controlling for self-section bias, is associated with an increase in perceived government corruption driven by an increase in detection of corrupt acts. In fact, FOI laws appear to increase the perception of government corruption if combined with a higher degree of media freedom, presence of NGO activism and political competition. However, the perception of government corruption tends to decline with the duration of FOI law adoption. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity using instrumental variables, alternative samples and estimation methods.     

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OMBUDSMAN

In an article in Public Administration five years ago I reported on the operation of the new freedom of information laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Hazell 1989). Despite these Commonwealth precedents, under Mrs Thatcher's premiership the British government maintained that freedom of information was incompatible with the Westminster system of ministerial accountability to Parliament. Under John Major that line has softened a bit, and last year the British government took an important step towards freedom of information, with the introduction of its new code of practice on open government. The code of practice will be policed by the Ombudsman; and this article considers the implications of this novel extension to his jurisdiction.     

THE SCOTT REPORT

The Scott report shows that the two most serious allegations made against ministers - that they conspired to sell lethal arms to Iraq in violation of government guidelines, and that they conspired to send innocent men to prison - are unfounded.
The inquiry violated the Salmon guidelines for the conduct of tribunals and is further evidence that an informal tribunal of this type is less well-equipped to examine a matter causing nation-wide public concern and to secure justice to individuals, than a statutory tribunal appointed under the Act of 1921.
Nevertheless, the Scott report raises three issues of fundamental constitutional importance - ministerial accountability to which the final section of the report is devoted, freedom of information which Sir Richard regards as a corollary of ministerial accountability, and the proper relationships between ministers and civil servants.
Sir Richard believes that constitutionally improper things occurred during the period which his inquiry covers. The fact that no minister or civil servant paid any penalty casts doubt as to whether ministerial accountability is a genuine convention of the constitution or a convenient fiction enabling both ministers and officials to evade responsibility.     

REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCOTT REPORT FOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

The immediate impact of the Scott report was slight because it had no conclusion and led to no ministerial or other resignations. Reasons for this inconclusiveness were examined, including conventions of the judicial process, the difficulty Scott had in defining the offences he was examining, the slipperiness of those offences as constitutional conventions and Scott's lack of grasp of administrative processes.
Yet his report is a mine of information on problems of accountability in the area of government defence sales. It was atypical in that three departments pursuing four policies between them and with another department as policeman had a locus in the process. Given the nearly 100,000 licences being processed at one time, it was a large, complex and fragmented administrative activity which might easily have resulted in more mishaps than it did.
Despite its special features the author argues that it does provide evidence of six areas of difficulty in government accountability which are also of (growing) relevance outside the area Scott surveyed: how one finds who is responsible for policy and policy change; how accountability is secured where confidentiality is justified for national security or other reasons; how one gets operational accountability for executive operations within departments; the accountability of junior to departmental ministers; of junior to more senior civil servants; and of civil servants to ministers.     

OPEN HOUSE? FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE UK PARLIAMENT

Not all parliaments are subject to Freedom of Information (FOI), and no one has studied what difference it makes to the working of a parliament. This article evaluates the impact of FOI on the UK Parliament by reference to its main objectives. It finds that FOI has made Westminster slightly more open and accountable; but it has not increased public understanding, participation, or trust. Westminster was already very open and other initiatives have helped increase participation. Trust was badly damaged by the MPs' expenses scandal, triggered by FOI requests. The House of Commons' hesitant response to those requests revealed problems of corporate governance.     

Financial Discrepancies in Political Party Funding by Indonesian Local Government Authorities

Through different forms of decentralization variables, this study investigates Indonesian local government authorities' 2006 financial accountability reports in terms of local government authorities' contributing funds to political parties. Audit results by the Supreme Audit Body reveal that many articles were violated by these authorities in regard to the distributing, administrating, and reporting of assistance funds from them to political parties. Each rupiah committed by the 221 local government authorities involved in this study violated, on average, 1.8 articles, indicating a low level of compliance.

Critically, the study finds that administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization decreases discrepancies. The less administratively decentralized provincial authorities, where decision making is a level of government farther from the people, are more likely than non-provincial local government authorities to make discrepancies with political party legislation and regulations. Fiscally decentralized local government authorities, who earn a higher fraction of their revenue from local sources, also tend to have fewer discrepanciesFinally, politically decentralized authorities with a higher percentage of elected officials from the decentralized supporting ruling coalition, also have fewer discrepancies.     

The Civil Servant as Legislator: Law Making in British Administration

How are government policy commitments converted into legislation and what happens in the conversion? The role of civil servants in preparing legislation is far more important than is generally assumed. By looking at the work of four recent bill  teams in Britain – teams of civil servants given the task of developing Acts of Parliament – their crucial roles in initiating policies, placing them on the political agenda (even helping secure their place in a party manifesto), developing them, making sure they pass through parliament and enacting them once they have reached the statute books are assessed. The article explores the composition and working methods of bill teams. These teams work with considerable autonomy in developing legislation, but it cannot be assumed that they operate outside ministerial control. Teams see themselves as reflecting the priorities of the government in general and their ministers in particular. Yet ministers typically know relatively little about the law they are bringing in until they receive the submissions and briefings from their officials. Perhaps the biggest danger for democracy is not a civil service putting forward proposals which a minister feels forced to accept, but rather that ministers do not notice or fully appreciate what is being proposed in their name despite having the political authority to change it and a civil service which bends over backwards to consult and accommodate them.     

Changing Forms of Accountability in Education? A Case Study of LEAs in Wales

Political mechanisms of accountability were marginalized by Conservative government reforms during the 1980s and 1990s which sought a more market-oriented approach within the public sector in order to enhance ‘consumerism’. In education, parents were given more choice between schools and were provided with more information on school performance. The promotion of market accountability has involved a reduction in the powers of local education authorities (LEAs) which had been central to the operation of political accountability. However, whilst market-based forms of accountability were firmly enhanced in principle by the legislation, to what extent have the forms of accountability operating within LEAs changed in practice? Interviews with Chief Officers and the Chair of the Education Committee are used to identify changing perceptions and practices of accountability in LEAs in Wales. The findings indicate that although local politicians and officials have been forced to operate within the legislative framework of market accountability, they have sought to impede its successful implementation. The policy community in Wales facilitated the LEAs’ capacity to respond in this way. The market-based reforms conflicted with fundamental values held in Wales, which remain those of professional accountability.     

A DEFENCE OF FREQUENT MINISTERIAL TURNOVER

The frequency with which British ministers are transferred between departments incurs considerable adverse comment. It is generally held to have a prejudicial effect upon government. However, much of the criticism is misdirected and predicated upon questionable assumptions. There are cogent (if rarely voiced) arguments in favour of relatively rapid ministerial turnover. Within departments short-stay ministers are in a stronger position than conventional wisdom allows. At the cabinet level they are less likely to adopt a narrow, departmentally oriented approach at the expense of wider considerations. The party management function of ministerial reshuffles, though much disparaged, plays an essential part in effective government, promoting ministerial vitality and assisting in the achievement of the legislative programme. The preponderance of career politicians in the House of Commons accentuates the pressures for rapid ministerial turnover, the need for which is, paradoxically, further increased by the same party being in office for a prolonged period.     

Hegemony,Politics and Ideology: the Role of Legislation in NGO–Government Relations in Asia

In the wake of debate on the ‘New Policy Agenda’ of good governance and the increasing prominence of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) in public service delivery, serious questions are being asked about the role of NGOs in development, their accountability, their relationships with donors, with the state and with their beneficiaries. As southern NGOs receive increasing amounts of funding from donors and northern NGOs, their profile is being raised, prompting government response. The nature of legislative responses of governments to increasingly high profile NGO communities range from open hostility and suspicion, to indifference. National legislative frameworks are neglected in the literature, yet they may profoundly influence the accountability, legitimacy, organisation and vision of local NGOs as well as the way northern NGOs can operate in a country. The article illustrates the potential for conflict over legislation on NGOs but also important opportunities and benefits, maintaining that legislation is necessary, because it can act as a catalyst to spark and focus debate on the role of NGOs, the extent to which they legitimately represent civil society, to whom they are accountable and how they can be protected. Open, balanced negotiation between stakeholders is necessary to avoid conflict and focus discourse on NGO and government roles and accountability. Governments, donors and NGOs each have a role to play in shaping NGO legitimacy, ensuring their upwards and downwards accountability.     

Size and Local Democracy: the Case of Czech Municipal Representatives

The municipal structure of the Czech Republic experienced a wave of fragmentation after the fall of the communist regime. As a result, most Czech municipalities today have populations of only a few hundred inhabitants. This situation creates specific conditions for the democratic functioning of local representative bodies. In this paper we focus on two features of Czech local government. First, we deal with electoral competitiveness in Czech municipalities; second, we analyse councillors' accountability to voters, their readiness to stand for re-election and their electoral success in successive elections. Based on an analysis of data on individual candidates and elected councillors in four successive terms, we demonstrate that the willingness to stand for election and re-election does not decrease over time; however, the choice among different candidates is limited in the smallest municipalities. Thus, the data show a reduced willingness to stand for re-election and an extraordinarily high chance of re-election in smaller municipalities. This finding weakens the general assumption about higher accountability of elected officials in small municipalities. On a more general level, we conclude that Czech local government has some features of small political systems with infrequent occurrence of major election conflicts.     

LEGAL EUROPEANIZATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

By mid-2003, the legal orders (the entire bodies of legislation in force) of three EU member states – Austria , Denmark, and The Netherlands – contained between 10.5 and 14.2 per cent of rules devoted to the transposition of EU directives. Only a few ministerial jurisdictions contain more than 20 per cent of Europeanized rules. The member states show remarkable differences in the use of parliamentary versus delegated legislation as a means of transposition. The comparison of the three cases tentatively suggests that different legal traditions and the parliamentary involvement in EU affairs are important factors that account for cross-national differences.     

Accountability by Professionalism or Managerialism? Exploring Attitudes Among Swedish and Norwegian Local Government Leaders

Most developed countries continue to experience problems with malfeasance and corruption, making accountability a fundamental concern of the public government. Still, the mechanisms which ensure accountability are not given. This article explores two different and apparently conflicting principles of accountability in public organizations: “Professionalism” based on values and internalized incentive structures and “Managerialism” based on externalized incentives and hierarchy. The empirical analysis is based on a comparative survey among local government leaders in Sweden and Norway. The analysis shows that both professionalism and managerialism are regarded as important means for accountability and tend to be understood as complementary more than competing principles.     

'Arm's Length but Hands On'. Mapping the New Governance: The Department of National Heritage and Cultural Politics in Britain

This article uses the Department of National Heritage (DNH) founded in 1992 to illustrate the current debate over changing governance in Britain (such as the hollow core and self-steering networks) given the development of small, central policy-oriented ministries supervising a penumbra of policy networks. The article argues that the DNH has at its disposal a number of power resources – ministerial activism, policy review and guidance, systematic review, and finance – which enable it to give a determined steer to its autonomous networks. The implication of this is that real structural change should not obscure the resources at the disposal of the centre in their relationship with their policy networks: government is not just another organization.     

Evaluating Freedom of Information Laws: Objectives,Approaches, and Practical Considerations

Freedom of information (FOI) laws aim to improve the public’s opportunities to access official information from public authorities and hence to increase the level of transparency. Thus, it is important to know whether and to what degree the effects intended by establishing FOI laws are achieved and how their implementation could be improved. In order to answer these questions, FOI laws have to be evaluated. Unfortunately, attempts to evaluate FOI laws are still in their infancy. To promote sound evaluation, this article aims to provide guidance on how comprehensive FOI law evaluations might be designed and conducted.     

Financing Local Government

There has been much debate in the UK over the implications for local government accountability of the high proportion of central funding of local government. The question has received particular attention recently as a key issue in the government's 'Balance of Funding' review. Two forms of accountability can be distinguished: average accountability and marginal accountability. This paper provides an analysis of the relationship between the balance of funding and these two concepts of accountability and concludes that increasing the proportion of local funding would be beneficial. One method of addressing problems caused by high central funding would be to introduce a local income tax alongside council tax, enabling the central grant to be reduced. The paper examines practical issues involved in the introduction of such a tax.     

Local Government Public Servants Performance and Citizens Participation in Governance in Nigeria

Abstract

This paper examines the performance of public administrators at the local government level in Nigeria. It traces the development of local governments in Nigeria from 1945 to present times. It argues that the shift in the critical decision‐making powers and functions of local government requires its public administrators to be better‐trained professionals. However, without citizens' participation in governance, public servants' accountability will be low. The study addresses the following questions: How do public sector performance and development of actions by citizens affect accountability in the local governments? How much training do public administrators in Nigeria's local governments have in public management? What is the relationship between performance and citizenship participation in local governments' development process? The question of interests in this study is how public administration at the local government level can better serve Nigeria's communities and in so doing develop authentic relationship with citizen groups, and equitably enhance public trust, legitimacy, and performance of the public sector in the nation.     

NATIONAL AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE: GOVERNMENT DRIVEN,COMMISSION DRIVEN OR NETWORKED?

In terms of national agencies in the European administrative space, case studies indicate that national governments may be partly split so that national (regulatory) agencies operate in a ‘double‐hatted’ manner when practising EU legislation, serving both ministerial departments and the European Commission. Applying large‐N questionnaire data, this article follows up these studies by investigating how important various institutions are with respect to influencing national agencies when they are practising EU legislation. How discretion is exercised at this stage of the policy process is not trivial; we demonstrate that, in addition, this activity is highly contested. Our main conclusion is that implementation of EU policies at the national level is neither solely indirect via national governments (as the standard portrayal says), nor solely direct (through Commission‐driven national agencies), nor solely networked (through transnational agency clusters). Implementation is instead compound with several sources of power represented more or less simultaneously.     

KEEPING IN CONTROL: THE MODEST IMPACT OF THE EU ON DANISH LEGISLATION

Membership of the EU and the scope of European integration are still contested issues in Danish politics. However, the impact of EU legislation on Danish legislation is relatively modest and highly concentrated within the field generally related to the regulation of the internal market. Strong upstream procedures at both the interdepartmental and the parliamentary level have been installed that effectively protect Danish policy-makers against political surprises in EU legislative politics. Upstream procedures are much stronger than the downstream ones for overseeing the implementation of EU policies and they ensure a high degree of consensus on specific EU legislation, both among the political parties in the Danish Parliament and among affected interests. As a result the transposition of directives is mainly a ministerial responsibility, and within the well-established fields of cooperation, the decree is the preferred legal instrument.