Incompatibility of the Digital Economy Act 2010 subscriber appeal process provisions with Article 6 of the ECHR

Through case-law research, this paper critically assesses the compatibility of the Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA) subscriber appeal process provisions (Section 13 of the DEA) with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Drawing on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law, Ofcom's Initial Obligations Code (the Code), and the DEA judicial review decision, namely, BT PLC and Talk Talk PLC v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and others, this paper focuses on the three Strasbourg Court principles of equality of arms, admissibility of evidence, and presumption of innocence, in an effort to determine whether Section 13 of the DEA infringes them, and whether this constitutes a breach of a subscriber's right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. The paper examines these three ECtHR principles. It contrasts such principles with the Code's provisions, and considers the compatibility of Section 13 of the DEA with Article 6 of the ECHR. It concludes that the DEA subscriber appeal process provisions do indeed infringe these principles, thus constituting a violation of subscribers' right to a fair trial. It also recommends that the UK government start taking seriously human rights in general, and Article 6 of the ECHR in particular.     

Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom: Sensible Dialogue or a Bad Case of Strasbourg Jitters?

In Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom a majority of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that the UK's statutory broadcasting ban on political advertisements under the Communications Act 2003 did not breach the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The judgment departs from the Court's established case law and, it is argued, raises several issues of concern both with regard to freedom of expression, and for human rights adjudication more generally. In particular, the Court's use of a doctrine of ‘general measures’ led it to place a great deal of reliance on the quality and quantity of legislative debate that preceded the UK ban, rather than its actual impact upon the applicant.     

A study of section 3 of the Maltese Official Secrets Act,its Canadian and British counterparts and its effects on freedom of expression

This article answers the question whether s 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act breaches freedom of expression as contained in art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights is briefly analysed in the light of obtaining case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Section 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act – which finds counterparts in several Commonwealth criminal law statutes – is subsequently studied by reference to United Kingdom and Canadian case law. A freedom of expression impact assessment of s 3(1) of the Official Secrets Act is carried out with the ensuing conclusion being that only s 3(1)(c) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act might, in certain circumstances, constitute a breach of art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta.     

Out of Many,One? Strasbourg's Ibrahim Decision on Article 6

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Ibrahim v United Kingdom on 13 September 2016. Relying on Salduz v Turkey, the applicants claimed, largely unsuccessfully, that denial of access to a lawyer during police questioning, and subsequent admission into evidence of statements made in the course of that questioning, violated fair trial rights protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The comment suggests that the decision's unusually emphatic statements about Article 6's ‘internal structure’ have consequences for assessing violations in future applications. Further, the decision creates greater room for public interest balancing in Article 6 cases. The decision may thus undermine the Article 6 guarantees.     

The University of Barchester,Coketown University,Ipswich Cathedral Choir School,Gas Street Comprehensive School and the European Convention on Human Rights: A link?

This article focuses on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and especially Article 6 entitled Right to a Fair and Public Hearing , all now fully incorporated into the UK via the Human Rights Act (HRA, 1997). This article discusses the implications for UK education institutions and the potential conflict with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Visitor in English chartered universities and colleges. Also discussed are UK schools, colleges and universities as 'public authorities' and 'emanations of the state', the creation of a Higher Education Ombudsman as a 'Super-Visitor' or 'HERO' (Higher Education Regulatory Office), the impact of HRA and ECHR less dramatic for schools than for universities (or at least for the Visitor function within them), and finally the coming three decades of legal uncertainty and fees for lawyers.     

Inhuman and Degrading Punishment,Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber's judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment's profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.     

The Enjoyment of Rights and Freedoms: A New Conception of the 'Ambit' under Article 14 ECHR

Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as applied by the UK judiciary under the Human Rights Act 1998, is in danger of becoming as 'parasitic' as it is often described. Judges have inappropriately narrowed the scope of the 'ambit' of other Convention articles, and thus limited the number of claims to which Article 14 can apply, by defining it according to considerations more properly weighed in a justification analysis incorporating proportionality. The emerging approach departs from Strasbourg jurisprudence, and fails to give full effect to the language and intent of Article 14. This trend need not continue. This article begins the process of fashioning a new conception of the ambit of Convention articles: one that could change the fortunes of Article 14 cases in the UK, but that flows naturally from the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights, and gives effect to the spirit of the HRA.     

Data retention and the future of large-scale surveillance: The evolution and contestation of judicial benchmarks

Recent and upcoming judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have resurfaced a much-debated topic on the legal limitations of law enforcement authorities and intelligence services under EU law in implementing surveillance operations. In its decisions, the CJEU has reinstated and at times remoulded its case-law on data retention, unearthing a variety of legal issues. This article aims to critically analyse the legal limitations of (indiscriminate) surveillance measures, the role of the private sector in the scheme, and the line between the competence of the Member States and that of the EU on national security matters. It also aims to remark on the latest developments on the reception of the decisions by the Member States and the EU legislator, as well as on the ongoing dialogue between the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).     

How to control interception-does the UK strike the right balance?

This Article critically analyses the regime for intercepting the content of communications under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in the light of the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in Kennedy v the UK. It looks at the safeguards for privacy protection provided such as the requirement for a warrant and the roles of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the Interception of Communications Commissioner and whether these safeguards are compliant with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.     

Delfi AS v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights

In October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights in Delfi AS v Estonia upheld a decision of the Estonian Supreme Court to impose liability on the owners of an internet news portal for defamatory comments which had been posted on their website by anonymous third parties. This note suggests that the decision is important in the context of publications with a ‘public interest’ element to them, because it appears to afford more protection to the right to reputation (deriving from the Article 8 right to privacy) and less to freedom of expression than was formerly the case. It is further argued that the Court's emphasis on the positive obligation of states to protect this right to reputation may mean that the existing English law in this area, including, potentially section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, is inconsistent with the ECHR jurisprudence.     

The Digital Economy Act 2010: subscriber monitoring and the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR

This paper critically assesses the compatibility of s3 Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA) with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR). The analysis draws on Ofcom’s Initial Obligations and two UK cases, namely: British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills,¹1 British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin).View all notes and R (British Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others.²2 R (British Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others [2012] EWCA Civ 232.View all notes It argues that the implementation of this obligation allows directed surveillance of subscribers’ activities without legal authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). It also analyses compliance with the Strasbourg Court’s three-part, non-cumulative test, to determine whether s3 of the DEA is, firstly, ‘in accordance with the law’; secondly, pursues one or more legitimate aims contained within Article 8(2) of the Convention; and thirdly, is ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’. It concludes that unless the implementation of s3 of the DEA required the involvement of State authorities and was specifically targeted at serious, commercial scale online copyright infringement cases it could infringe part one and part three of the ECtHR’s test, thereby violating subscribers’ Article 8 ECHR rights.     

O'Keeffe v Ireland: The Liability of States for Failure to Provide an Effective System for the Detection and Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse in Education

In O'Keeffe v Ireland, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that Ireland failed to protect the applicant from sexual abuse suffered as a child in an Irish National School in 1973 and violated her rights under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This note argues that the decision is important in expanding the Court's jurisprudence regarding positive obligations under Article 3 to child sexual abuse in a non‐state setting where there was no knowledge of a ‘real and immediate’ risk to the applicant. It also argues that the case raises concerns about the Court's methodology for the historical application of the Convention and about the interaction of Article 3 positive obligations with vicarious liability in common law tort regimes.     

Case Comment: The Legality of ‘Kettling’ after Austin

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14. Austin claimed, unsuccessfully, that police kettling at a public protest in London amounted to a violation of her right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This case comment suggests that the court took an unexpected and unorthodox approach to the issue of ‘deprivation’ within Article 5. This decision may come to undermine the protections afforded by Article 5 and extend the current exceptions to Article 5 to an indefinite range of situations.     

The rule of law as the lodestar of the European Convention on Human Rights: The Strasbourg Court and the independence of the judiciary

The rule of law is a constitutional principle under the European Convention on Human Rights. Throughout its history, the rule of law has been the lodestar guiding the development of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In recent years, the normative impact of this principle has been increasing in the case-law of the Court, in particular in cases dealing with the independence of the judiciary. The article discusses the conceptual core of the rule of law under the Convention system as a fundamental component of “European public order”. Subsequently, the three-dimensional normative status of the rule of law is explored as well as the Court's statement that the principle is “inherent in all the Articles of the Convention”. On this basis, an in-depth analysis is undertaken of the application in recent Strasbourg case-law of the independence of the judiciary as a fundamental organic component of the rule of law. Finally, the author reflects on the “symbiotic” relationship in the field of judicial independence between the Strasbourg Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union.     

Has the Right to Education a Future Within the United Nations? A Behind-the-Scenes Account by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998-2004

This article ponders over the future of human rights work withinthe United Nations on the basis of the author's six years ofexperience as the Special Rapporteur on the right to educationof the Commission on Human Rights. This broadens the analysisto the factors shaping the work of the Commission on Human Rightsthat are not formally documented, and generates a series ofquestions concerning the Commission's recent past and uncertainfuture.     

Taking Care of Strasbourg: The Status of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights in Kosovo’s Domestic Legal System

This paper addresses the position of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law in Kosovo’s domestic legal order. To begin with, it reviews the background of the issue of human rights in Kosovo highlighting its distinct position and perspective. This article then analyses the position held by the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols in Kosovo’s legal order while also addressing the ECHR’s constitutionalization, its direct effect and the constitutional review on basis of it. The paper then examines whether the case-law of the ECtHR is binding in Kosovo, whether it is directly effective, and whether Kosovo’s Constitutional Court can use it as a ground in the conduct of constitutional reviews. This paper argues that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR both hold a privileged status under Kosovo’s constitutional law, despite Kosovo not being a party to the ECHR and, therefore, having no international liability to implement the ECHR. In addition, the paper offers certain arguments regarding the relative positions of the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR within the current practice of Kosovo’s judicial system. This paper concludes with the argument that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR hold a privileged status in the context of Kosovo’s domestic legal order—one which could serve as a precedent in respecting human rights and freedoms.     

Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Victim Status,Extraterritoriality and the Search for Principled Reasoning

In Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the relevant standard of ‘victim status’ that applies in secret surveillance cases consists in a potential risk of being subjected to surveillance and that the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to the surveillance of individuals who reside outside of the UK. This note argues that the Tribunal's finding regarding the victim status of the applicants was sound but that the underlying reasoning was not. It concludes that the Tribunal's finding on extraterritoriality is unsatisfactory and that its engagement with the European Court of Human Rights case law on the matter lacked depth. Finally, the note considers the defects of the Human Rights Watch case, and the case law on extraterritoriality more generally, against the backdrop of the place of principled reasoning in human rights adjudication.     

The Place of Wishes and Feelings in Best Interests Decisions: Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B

In Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B the Court of Protection decided that it was not in the best interests of Mr B to receive amputation surgery against his will, notwithstanding that he would die without the treatment. The judge met with Mr B in person and his best interests decision placed significant weight on Mr B's wishes and feelings. This case note considers this influential case in the context of ongoing debate about the place of wishes and feelings in best interests decisions under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It considers the history of the best interests principle, its interpretation by the Supreme Court in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James, ongoing debates about its compatibility with Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and recent proposals by the Law Commission for statutory amendments to the Mental Capacity Act.     

An academic perspective on the copyright reform

The recently proposed new Copyright Directive was released on 14 September 2016. It has been described by EU law-makers as the pillar of the copyright package promised by the European Commission (EC), to be delivered before the end of Mr. Juncker's mandate. In its Communication of 6 May 2015, the EC had stressed “the importance to enhance cross-border access to copyright-protected content services, facilitate new uses in the fields of research and education, and clarify the role of online services in the distribution of works and other subject-matter.” The proposed Copyright Directive is thus a key measure aiming to address two of these three issues. However it is not without shortfalls.We have therefore decided to publicly express our concerns and send an open letter to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to urge them to re-assess the new provisions dealing with mandatory filtering of user-generated content in the light of the CJEU case law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.In a more extended statement, we examine in details the text of both the explanatory memorandum and the Directive itself.Our conclusions are:1. A comprehensive re-assessment of Article 13 and Recital 39 in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the E-commerce Directive (in particular Article 15) including CJEU case law is needed, as the proposed Copyright Directive does not expressly address the issue of its compatibility with both of these texts.2. Recital 38 does not clarify the domain and effect of Article 13. Rather, it creates confusion as it goes against settled CJEU case law (relating to Articles 14 and 15 of the E-commerce Directive and Article 3 of the Infosoc Directive). Recital 38 should therefore be deleted or substantially re-drafted/re-phrased. If the EU wants to introduce a change in this regard it should clearly justify its choice. In any case, a recital in the preamble to a directive is not an appropriate tool to achieve this effect.We hope that this exercise will prove useful for the debate that has now begun both in the European Parliament and in the Council.     

‘Notice and staydown’ and social media: amending Article 13 of the Proposed Directive on Copyright

ABSTRACT

This paper critically assesses the compatibility of content recognition and filtering technology or so-called notice and staydown approach with the right of social network platforms and users to a fair trial, privacy and freedom of expression under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR). The analysis draws on Article 13 of the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Copyright, the case-law of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Court and academic literature. It argues that the adoption of content recognition and filtering technology could pose a threat to social network platforms and user human rights. It considers the compliance of ‘notice and staydown’ with the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) three-part, non-cumulative test, to determine whether a ‘notice and staydown’ approach is, firstly, ‘in accordance with the law’, secondly, pursues one or more legitimate aims included in Article 8(2) and 10(2) ECHR and thirdly, is ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’. It concludes that ‘notice and staydown’ could infringe part one and part three of the ECtHR test as well as the ECtHR principle of equality of arms, thereby violating the rights of social network platforms and users under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention.