What does Brexit Tell Us about Our Understanding of European Identity?

This paper reports on a number of Eurobarometer surveys undertaken by the European Commission as a way of reflecting on Brexit and the challenges it poses to European identity. Our work with the surveys has been undertaken in the context of developing an educational game (RU EU?) which will explore European identity. European citizenship and identity have been strongly promoted by the EU but, while they appear to have been accepted at an elite level, the EU—and the UK in particular—have so far not constructed a narrative which has been supported by ‘ordinary’ citizens. Brexit has therefore exposed the failings of European elites in this regard. That said, there is some evidence that the complexities of Brexit have led to a strengthening of European identity in the other EU 27 countries.     

Food Brexit and Chlorinated Chicken: A Microcosm of Wider Food Problems

This paper situates food safety concerns raised in the Brexit debate since the referendum and suggests that, although the issue of chlorinated chicken entered public discourse, it represents wider concerns about food safety standards. Food safety has had high resonance in the UK since the 1980s, but Brexit shows how it connects to wider concerns also raised about Brexit, such as impacts on healthcare, the effects of austerity on food poverty, the limitations of low waged employment, concerns about migration and labour markets, and regional economic disparities. Brexit’s impact on the UK food system is immense because food has been highly integrated into EU governance. While food standards can be portrayed as a single narrow issue, the paper suggests it provides a useful lens with which to examine, interrogate and comprehend these wider Brexit politics. The complex realities of food politics and wider food system dynamics undermine any simplistic political narrative of ‘taking back control’.     

What has the Brexit Process done to Scotch Whisky?

The United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union does not have any impact on Scotch whisky itself: Brexit or not, Scotch whisky is Scotch whisky. However, it features more prominently in the Brexit negotiations than, for example, beer. This is because Scotch whisky is a highly export‐oriented product which brings large economic benefits to the UK—particularly Scotland—and its brand is protected by the international regime of intellectual property rights protection, especially, by the geographical indications regime championed by the EU. Moreover, the Brexit negotiations have led to the resurfacing of another political issue which affects Scotch whisky: Scottish independence. As a strong territorial brand, the constitutional status of Scotland is highly relevant to Scotch whisky and the investigation into the impact of the Brexit process on Scotch whisky has highlighted the inter‐connectedness of various political issues.     

Brexit: A Cliff Edge or a Small Bump in the Road?

It is becoming increasingly accepted, not least by the Prime Minister and opposition leadership, that the negotiation of a comprehensive trade relationship with the EU is necessary to prevent the UK economy falling off a ‘cliff edge’. This concern is shaping the UK's strategy towards negotiations with the EU and has provided at least part of the motivation for the UK to consider requesting a transition period to facilitate the Brexit process. But how accurate are these fears? What evidence is there for the existence of a ‘cliff edge’? How disastrous would it be for the UK to revert to trading with the EU on the same basis as most other countries in the world, namely according to World Trade Organisation rules? This article seeks to address these issues and it highlights a number of implications for policy makers which flow from understanding the available evidence a little more clearly.     

The Impact of EU Membership on UK Economic Performance

The relatively deep level of economic integration achieved by the European Union (EU) has been highly successful in increasing trade for its members. Larger trade volumes have had positive effects on productivity levels. In the case of the United Kingdom the gain from joining the EU was probably around 10 per cent of GDP and this far exceeded any costs of membership, possibly by a ratio of seven to one. A major reason for this outcome was a significant increase in competition as protectionism was abandoned. The economic implications of Brexit are much less clear because there are many permutations of what it would entail. Future trade barriers rather than budgetary transfers are the main issue. Brexit could be quite costly if the UK left the single market and used its new policy space badly. Ironically, while Brexit clearly appeals to free traders, it could end up empowering protectionists.     

Brexit and UK International Development Policy

In this article we explore the implications of Brexit for the UK and the EU's development policies and strategic directions, focusing on the former. While it is likely that the operational process of disentangling the UK from the various development institutions of the EU will be relatively straightforward, the choices that lie ahead about whether and how to cooperate thereafter are more complex. Aid and development policy touches on a wide range of interests—security, trade, climate change, migration, gender rights, and so on. We argue that Brexit will accelerate existing trends within UK development policy, notably towards the growing priority of private sector‐led economic growth strategies and blended finance tools. There are strong signals that UK aid will be cut, as successive secretaries of state appear unable to persuade a substantial section of the public and media that UK aid and development policy serves UK interests in a variety of ways.     

What does Brexit Mean for the UK's Climate Change Act?

This article examines the potential implications of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (so‐called ‘Brexit’) for the success and survival of the country's flagship climate policy, the Climate Change Act 2008. The impact of a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ Brexit for the main features of the Climate Change Act are assessed, building on documentary evidence and elite interviews with key policy‐makers and policy‐shapers. The article argues that the long‐term viability of the Climate Change Act was being threatened even before the EU referendum, and that Brexit will do little to improve this situation. Even though the existence of the Climate Change Act is not under immediate threat, a range of issues presented by Brexit risk undermining its successful implementation.     

Reading between the lines: party cues and SNP support for Scottish independence and Brexit

Scotland’s future within the European Union (EU) played a prominent role in the 2014 independence referendum. The story goes that latent supporters of independence voted to stay within the UK to maintain EU access. Defeated, Scottish leaders declared the referendum a once-in-a-life-time event only repeated if conditions substantially changed. With the UK now facing a chaotic exit from the EU, proponents of Scottish independence have suggested that a second referendum may occur after Brexit negotiations are completed. Faced with a consensus among Scottish party leaders in supporting EU membership, those hoping for a second independence referendum, we argue, looked to alternate sources of information that saw Brexit as an opportunity to create the conditions that would spur a second referendum. Using panel data from the British Election Study, we examine whether Scottish voters voted tactically to leave the EU. We argue that Scottish National Party voters were likely to interpret statements on the conditions for a second independence referendum as an implicit signal to vote “Leave.” The results have important implications for the role of referendums in representative democracy, strategic voting, and the importance of intra-party division on individual vote choices.     

Questions of Sovereignty: Redefining Politics in Scotland?

The issue of sovereignty has never been resolved in Scotland. The 1998 Scotland Act, creating the Scottish Parliament affirmed that the Westminster Parliament is sovereign, but this is disputed. In practice, the issue was left largely in abeyance as sovereignty was seen as an outdated concept. The Scottish independence referendum of 2014 and the UK Brexit referendum of 2016 both brought back the question of sovereignty in stark terms. Analysis of data from the British Election Study of 2019 with regard to (a) the right of Scottish self‐determination, and (b) the right of a UK‐wide majority to take Scotland out of the EU, allows us to identify ‘sovereigntists’ and ‘unionists’. Sovereigntists, on both dimensions, now constitute a majority. A smaller group of unionists reject both positions. There remains a group of ‘semi‐sovereigntists’ who accept Scottish self‐determination, but also that the UK as a whole should decide on Brexit. Controlling for the social and political factors, Scots are increasingly polarised around issues of sovereignty, which have become central to contemporary Scottish politics.     

Internationalism Under Platform Capitalism: Brexit and the Organisation of UK Fast Food Workers

In October 2018, a coalition of UK trade unions and civil society organisations called a strike across the UK’s fast food sector in support of a living wage, union recognition and the end to zero‐hour contracts in the sector. This paper takes the day of action—labelled the McStrike—as a starting point for an account of the place of the EU and Brexit in the campaign for fast food rights, as well as the contrasting political standpoints adopted by the different trade unions involved in the action. Brexit is used as a prism through which to analyse aspects of Britain’s contemporary food politics, especially those pertaining to freedom of movement, workplace organisation, and the role of EU legislation in protecting workers’ rights. In exploring the international dimensions of union organisation among the UK’s fast food workers, other, more conceptual considerations regarding the changing nature of public and private food consumption and the incorporation of food‐to‐go into the gig economy are also broached.     

The UK and EU Foreign and Security Policy: An Optional Extra

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.     

Towards a New Ireland

Despite all the contemporary difficulties that we face on the island of Ireland, twenty-four years on from the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, there is a clear sense of hope for a better future. We should be optimistic for our shared future, even if we do not agree on what form that should take. We cannot discuss Northern Ireland or its future without acknowledging that Brexit has significantly shifted the conversation. Not only has it brought Anglo-Irish relations to a low not seen in the past twenty-five years, but it has also damaged the reputation of the UK internationally and brought the topic of Irish unity back to the fore of our political discourse.     

Brexit and Fisheries: Fish and Chips Aplenty?

When discussing Brexit and food, fisheries take a special place: first, because the fisheries sector punched far above its (economic) weight in the campaign leading up to the Brexit referendum; second, because of the promise of a bright future for the fishing industry—both by politicians promising to ‘take back control of our waters’ as well as by industry representatives auguring a ‘sea of opportunities’ for fishermen. As it is still far too soon to assess fully the effects of Brexit for the fishing industry and the market for fisheries products, this paper takes a step back and analyses the context within which the changes brought about by Brexit will be taking place. It analyses the complexity of the post‐Brexit fisheries context and its possible repercussions for food policy and the seafood sector. One of the central questions is whether Brexit could contribute to reviving the fisheries industry and enhancing food security in the UK. To explore this further, two other questions present themselves: when is fish UK fish? And what do UK consumers want? Finally, the paper looks at the structure of employment in the seafood industry and how that may present policy makers with difficult decisions. The paper concludes that the picture when it comes to the effect of Brexit on fisheries policy is expected to be mixed, and that both the potential benefits and costs of Brexit are likely to be unevenly distributed within the fisheries sector.     

Brexit Means Brexit—or Does It? The Legacy of Theresa May's Discursive Treatment of Brexit

With the looming reality of Brexit drawing closer, it is the intention of this article to explore Theresa May's post‐referendum communicative behaviour on Brexit—the very issue that came to define her premiership agenda—and uncover what legacy it has left behind. Building upon, extending and updating the emerging literature on May's discourse, the inquiry helps us understand how May acted through language in order to influence and change other people's attitudes towards and ways of looking at Brexit. The article argues that there are at least seven ways, closely interrelated and feeding into each other, in which her discursive construction of Brexit has left a somewhat bitter legacy, contributing to the Brexit political paralysis and inspiring substantial levels of confusion and exasperation, both within the UK and abroad.     

The Democratic Duty to Oppose Brexit

What should be the position of democrats in response to the Brexit referendum? Many urge a duty to accept the result. This article argues the contrary. If someone is a UK citizen, has a belief that leaving the European Union will be damaging to the common good of the UK and is a convinced democrat, then that person has a duty to oppose Brexit. Neither of the two principal reasons for accepting the result—a claim of popular sovereignty or of parliamentary sovereignty—imply a duty not to continue to oppose. Arguments from political equality for simple majority rule do not apply when the alternatives are ill defined. More generally, popular sovereignty presupposes and does not replace constitutional democracy, and in a parliamentary democracy there is always a continuing right to oppose.     

Brexit and Strand Three of the 1998 Agreement: The Three Faces of East-West

Under Strand Three of the 1998 Belfast ‘Good Friday’ Agreement, institutions were set up to promote the ‘harmonious and mutually beneficial development’ of the ‘totality of relationships’ between the peoples and governments of Ireland and the UK, including its devolved administrations and Crown Dependencies. According to the text of the 1998 Agreement this ‘east-west’ dimension was to have two elements with corresponding institutions: an intergovernmental one reflected in the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) and an interjurisdictional one reflected in the British-Irish Council (BIC). These Strand Three institutions were designed to provide fora for, respectively, intergovernmental cooperation on ‘non-devolved Northern Ireland matters’ in the case of the BIIC and information exchange and cooperation ‘on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations’ in the case of the BIC. Nowhere in the 1998 Agreement text is the concept of ‘east-west’ used to refer to relations between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Yet, in the wake of Brexit, and in the midst of controversy over the implications of the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland, relations between Great Britain and Northern Ireland (GB–NI) have been newly framed as ‘east-west’. The creation of this new discursive face of ‘east-west’ relations marks an important, but little discussed, impact of Brexit on the political and constitutional landscape of the UK and Ireland. Against this backdrop, this article considers the impacts of Brexit, and the Protocol, on three faces of ‘east-west’ relations—the BIIC, the BIC and, newly, GB–NI—and discusses their implications for the future of Strand 3 institutions and the ‘totality of relationships’ they represent.     

A Changing UK in a Changing Europe: The UK State between European Union and Devolution

Two issues currently dominate the UK's constitutional landscape: the UK's membership of the European Union (EU) on the one hand; and the unsettled constitutional settlements between the UK and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on the other. This article considers these two issues in concert. It stresses the distinct relationships between the EU and the devolved territories within the UK—concerning both devolved and non‐devolved policy areas—highlighting the salience of a devolved perspective in any consideration of UK–EU relations. Despite its importance, sensitivity to this has been lacking. The article explores the implications of a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome on the future of the internal territorial dynamics within the UK. While there are too many unknowns to be certain of anything, that there will be knock‐on effects is, however, beyond doubt.     

Dissonance on the Brexit Menu: What does Britain Want to Eat?

This article focusses on the future of food in the UK in the context of Brexit. It examines the claims and promises made by Brexiteers before the referendum and juxtaposes these with the approach pursued by the Conservative‐led government since. The article argues that there is a clear dissonance between the two. This dissonance is the result of two important factors. First, the government is stuck in a non‐decision‐making mode, making it unable to pursue clear policies. Second, the food claims and promises made by Brexiteers are in opposition to what the vast majority of the public, food experts, farmers and food businesses want. Through exploring these two factors, and the Brexiteers’ claims and promises, the article explains what leaving the EU might mean for the future of food in the UK.     

Constitutional Illegitimacy over Brexit

Members and supporters of the British government say that the only constitutionally legitimate course of action over Brexit after the referendum is to press ahead with withdrawal from the European Union, even if that would entail the complete severance of all ties (which we normally call ‘hard Brexit’). A more sophisticated view of the constitution, however, shows that these more or less populist arguments are false. As the Supreme Court confirmed in the recent Gina Miller judgment, the constitution did not change with the June referendum. Parliament is still supreme and determines both ordinary legislation and constitutional change. In fact, if one examines closely the claim that the referendum entails hard Brexit, it becomes obvious that this claim is false as well. The referendum opened the door for one among four different possibilities. Which Brexit option—if any—the United Kingdom should take is a matter for Parliament now to decide, following the normal processes of democratic deliberation and representation.     

The UK Brexit vote and its potential strategic impact

The United Kingdom's 'Leave' camp is mounting a strident and emotive campaign for the UK's departure from the European Union, and has gained significant popular traction. 'Brexit' would pose serious economic and political risks to the UK and significantly diminish the EU's size and clout. The 'Remain' camp will need to work hard to mobilise voters and put across the EU's benefits more effectively to prevent Brexit.