Regional Implications of China’s Quest for Energy in Latin America

This paper analyses the Chinese quest for energy resources in Latin America, arguing that the strengthening of relations in this sector can only be explained by a conjunction of interests on both sides. Looking at the presence of Chinese national oil companies in the regional energy sector, we show that China’s incursion has allowed the region to shift its traditional energy partners, introducing a factor of change into economic and political relations with geopolitical implications for the regional arena.     

Undermining Western democracy promotion in Central Asia: China’s countervailing influences,powers and impact

This article examines whether and to what extent China’s involvement in Central Asian countries undermines the democracy promotion efforts of the European Union and the United States. Findings confirm that China does indeed challenge Western efforts, but in an indirect way. First, Chinese provision of substantial and unconditional financial assistance makes Western politically conditioned aid appear both ungenerous and an infringement of sovereignty. Second, the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, inclusive of China’s leadership role, creates an institutional means through which the (semi-)authoritarianism of member states is legitimized and challenges Western emphasis on democracy and human rights. Finally, by the power of its own example, China demonstrates that democracy is not a prerequisite for prosperity, the rule of law and social well-being.     

The Puzzle of India’s Relations with “Central Eurasia”

ABSTRACT

India’s relations with Afghanistan and the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia have contributed to the growing interest in the country’s rise. By treating them together as “Central Eurasia,” the discourses of Indian foreign policy invoke a contiguous geopolitical locale bound to India by a shared past. Yet, despite the strategic articulation of a manifest Central Eurasian region, the article uncovers a puzzle of bifurcation in India’s foreign policy reflecting distinct operationalizations of India’s cultural capital in its relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asia republics. The comparative analysis indicates that prior historical experience becomes a compelling strategic context for the continuous framing and reframing of the country’s foreign policy space, which reveals India’s shifting perceptions of international order, self-identity, and global roles. India’s interactions in Central Eurasia offer a good illustration of the crossroads that New Delhi’s foreign policy is facing – either keep on proliferating discourses that spin yarns of the international influence of its historical capital or develop proactive diplomatic strategies that deliver the international status that India desires.     

The More Assertive and Pragmatic New Energy Policy in Putin’s Russia: Security Implications for Northeast Asia

The article examines Russia’s New Energy Policy (NEP) and its impact on Northeast Asian security and the development of the Russian Far East. In contrast to analyses highlighting competition between China and Japan for Russian resources, to the contrary it is argued here that greater cooperation among consumer states in Northeast Asia would be beneficial for Russia. Although the NEP has resulted in changes in the composition of foreign investors in Russian energy projects, the author suggests that Moscow is interested in multinational cooperation in the energy sector because it would help diversify the regional energy market and contribute to the development of the Russian Far East and eastern Siberia.

Disciplined and undisciplined repression: illicit economies and state violence in Central Asia’s autocracies

What explains the use of disciplined repression in some autocratic regimes and undisciplined repression in others? Despite its relevance to these broader debates on authoritarianism, this question remains inadequately explained in conventional approaches to repression. This article proposes that autocrats’ discipline over the use of state repression is a consequence of their differential control over illicit commercial networks. Autocratic regimes that consolidate their control over rents become dependent on security apparatuses to deepen and maintain that control. These regimes invest in and support the development of coercive capabilities, which leads to more disciplined state repression. Where autocratic regimes do not control illicit networks and rents, their dependence on security offices is low. Consequently, their investment in coercive capacity suffers, giving rise to patterns of undisciplined repression. This article explores the empirical implications of these regime trajectories through a controlled comparison of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two drug transit states in post-Soviet Eurasia whose coercive institutions and patterns of state violence have developed in markedly different ways.     

Russia’s image of China and Russian-Chinese relations

Views of China in today's Russia are characterized by great diversity. There are those who stand for strengthening ties with China to counterbalance the West; those who prefer Russia balancing between various power centers; and those who fear China as a growing geopolitical rival with a potential of expanding at the expense of Russian territory. Russia's government for the foreseeable future can be expected to advocate closer ties with China. However, the real question now is not whether a future Russian leadership will advocate a more hostile or more friendly course toward China, but if it will be able to support its wishes (whatever they may be) with the real resources necessary to pursue any consistent policy. Alexander Lukin received his first degree from the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations and a doctorate from Oxford University. He worked at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Soviet Embassy to the PRC, and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. From 1990 to 1993 he was an elected deputy of the Moscow City Soviet (Council), where he chaired the Sub-Committee for Inter-Regional Relations. He is the author of Russian Democrats: A Study in Political Culture (to be published by Oxford University Press in 1999) and numerous articles on Russian and Chinese politics and Russian-Chinese relations which have been published in Russia, the PRC, the U.S., the UK, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. In 1997/1998 he was a visiting research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He is currently a research fellow at the Center for International Studies of the Moscow Institute of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Foreign Ministry (MGIMO-University) and an Associate in Research at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University.     

Russia’s ministry of ambivalence: the failure of civic nation-building in post-Soviet Russia

This article argues that the sources of official and societal ambivalence towards civic nationhood in today’s Russia are found in the institutional instability and personalist dynamics of hybrid regime politics in the 1990s. Successful civic nation-building should institutionalize inclusive criteria for citizenship as a basis for policymaking, which in turn should create incentives for dominant ethnicities to embrace civic nationhood. While the shifting views of Boris Yel’tsin on nationalities policy and the constant turmoil in the government’s nationalities ministry have received little scholarly attention, they illuminate the endogenous sources of regime instability in relation to civic nation-building. Russia’s experience thus challenges the traditional view of ethnic nationalism as fostering authoritarianism and civic nationalism as fostering democracy: rather, competitive authoritarianism in the 1990s confounded the regime’s own efforts toward civic nation-building and laid the groundwork for the “ethnic turn” in Russian politics under Vladimir Putin.     

Taiwan’s Sub-national Government Relations with Japan: Post-1979 Developments

In 1972 the Japanese government ended its diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China. And yet it did not. In the aftermath of that decision, colonial legacy ties between Taiwan and Japan were drawn upon to create a new form of relationship, with ties that were official in all but name. Taiwanese cities and counties were also encouraged to develop formal ties with their Japanese counterparts. These sub-national ties are a critical – but little researched – component of the enduring bilateral relationship between these two countries. This article – based on extensive fieldwork in both countries – is an initial effort in understanding how these ties have developed and function, and how they support bilateral relations between Taiwan and Japan. Drawing on additional fieldwork in China, this article also considers what formal limitations exist on the para-diplomatic relations between these countries.     

Japan’s Quest for “Soft Power”: Attraction and Limitation

Japan is seeking to project its “soft power” through the allure of manga and anime in its public diplomacy. The production, diffusion and global consumption of manga and anime are driven by market forces and consumer tastes and not by the Japanese state. However, the latter is seeking to harness this popular culture to burnish Tokyo’s international image. Despite the attractiveness of Japanese pop culture and other more traditional forms of public diplomacy, Tokyo’s pursuit of “soft power” and a good international image is undermined by its failure to overcome its burden of history.

Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific

Since the early years of the twenty-first century, a number of key regional governments have consciously chosen to alter the way they talk about the region, and have now largely shifted from using the ‘Asia-Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct. But after three decades of utilising the ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept, why has this been the case and how might this shift in geographical conceptualisation alter the strategic framework of the region? This paper argues that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a regional reconceptualisation utilised by Japan, Australia, India and the USA to address deficiencies in Asia’s maritime security and institutional architecture, which are being simultaneously influenced by a more assertive Chinese posture and waning U.S. influence. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific concept has developed in tandem with a transformation in the regional security architecture. The utilisation of maritime minilateralism between Japan, India, Australia and the USA supplements Asia’s bilateral American alliances, with an array of trilateral security dialogues or ‘security triangles’. The Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific shift is really an instance of an emerging minilateral security regionalism, rather than the predominant forms of bilateral and multilateral security and economic regionalism that have dominated Asia in recent decades.     

China-Taiwan Relations Through the Lens of the Interaction Between China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation

China-Taiwan Relations have become significantly less confrontational since 2008. One of the indicators demonstrating the improvement of their relations is the resumption of the contact between China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in 2008 after 9 years of no formal interaction. The purpose of this paper is to explore China-Taiwan relations in the period from 1990 to 2008 by examining the interaction between the aforementioned two organizations which were founded in 1991. By analyzing the relevant official announcements and statements made by China and Taiwan in the period from 1990 to 2008, this paper finds that China became more hostile toward Taiwan and therefore its ARATS in turn was unwilling to negotiate with Taiwan’s SEF when it perceived that the Taiwanese government was pushing for Taiwan’s independence. By contrast, when it perceived that the Taiwanese government was more compromising on the issue of Taiwan’s independence, it became relatively conciliatory and its ARATS in turn was more willing to interact with Taiwan’s SEF.     

China’s Surging Energy Demand: Trigger for Conflict or Cooperation with Japan?

This article revisits a conventional interpretation of Sino-Japanese energy relations from geopolitical and zero-sum viewpoints. Contemporary Sino-Japanese disputes over the East China Sea and their scramble over a crude-oil pipeline from Russia have drawn global attention to the intensification of the rivalry between the two giant energy consumers. Beijing and Tokyo, however, have gradually found common interests resulting from business opportunities, environmental countermeasures, etc. Russia’s failure in driving a wedge between China and Japan, and the United States’ proactive engagement in Asia-Pacific energy issues, appear to provide new opportunities in which the East Asian powers’ energy rivalry can be reduced.

Diminishing returns: Russia’s participation in the World Trade Organization

Russia’s 2012 accession to the World Trade Organization was widely expected to spur economic growth and modernization, by helping the country abandon its import-substitution model and fully integrate into the global economy. However, thus far, Russia’s compliance record with its WTO commitments has been mixed, and WTO membership has given Russia limited economic benefits and few political gains. In analyzing why, this article uses neoclassical realism as a framework for assessing Russia’s behavior in WTO trade disputes and negotiations. During Russia’s economic recession, the regime of President Vladimir Putin advanced protectionist policies and maintained statist control over the heights of the economy, while using rhetorical strategies to counter accusations from Western powers that Russia had violated WTO norms. Russia’s struggling economy weakened its status as a global economic power, and it was viewed as unqualified to sit among the core group of negotiators in the WTO.     

Understanding Russia’s energy turn to China: domestic narratives and national identity priorities

This study investigates whether, as part of a broader “Asian Energy Pivot,” Russia’s energy giant Gazprom refashioned its export strategy away from Europe, and what impact such a reorientation might have on the EU–Russia gas relationship. It uses four empirical cases to emphasize the domestic movers underlying Russia’s eastward shift in energy trade, developing a constructivist theory rooted in the dynamics of Russia’s dominant public narrative and the contours of domestic politics. It argues that Russia’s national interests changed as a result of how Russian policy-makers interpreted and reacted to the stand-off with Europe, in response to what they perceived as Europe’s attempt to isolate it economically and geopolitically. Russia’s Eurasianists, who had advocated the notion of a necessary turn to the East for a long time, positioned themselves as norm entrepreneurs and their new interpretation of the preexisting material incentives shaped the future course of action.