Growing up Sexist: Challenges to Rawlsian Stability

John Rawls pinpoints stability as the driving force behind many of the changes to justice as fairness from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism. Current debates about Rawlsian stability have centered on the possibility of maintaining one’s allegiance to the principles of justice while largely ignoring how citizens acquire a sense of justice. However, evaluating the account of stability in political liberalism requires attention to the impact of reasonable pluralism on both of these issues. I will argue that the first question of Rawlsian stability – how a child acquires a sense of justice – remains unanswered in Political Liberalism. This fact has been overlooked by Rawls, his defenders, and his critics. The failure to attend to the ways reasonable pluralism undermines Rawls’s own story about a child’s moral development ultimately threatens Rawls’s account of stability in political liberalism – or so I will argue. Despite all of the changes Rawls makes to justice as fairness in order to resolve the stability challenge, Political Liberalism fails to deliver the robust stability Rawls seeks.     

Rising crime rates amidst transformations in Eastern Europe: Socio‐political transition and societal response

Unprecedented and dramatic increases in crime rates in countries of Eastern Europe (data are available to document the increases for Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and many of the former Soviet Republics) raise the issue of whether the political and social transformations that have been taking place in Eastern Europe must inevitably lead to social disruption and resulting crime increases. Since the nature of the phenomenon is historically unique (there has never been a similar revolutionary transition from socialism to capitalism), a new, unconventional, and innovative theoretical approach is needed to account for the phenomena being discussed here. Assuming that the transformations can be legitimately subsumed under the concept of ‘‘socio‐political process,’’ the purpose of the paper is to identify some basic and inherent characteristic features of the causal mechanism at work, specifically —?''How do the dynamics of the Eastern European socio‐political process explain the rising crime rates?'’ (''What causal factors inherent in the dynamics are responsible for the crime rises?'') Another issue to be examined is that because of the unprecedented nature of the process being talked about here, a different dimension of the socio‐political process theory must be realized and examined. The paper will be based on three hypotheses: 1. The Eastern European transformations imply a need for a new component of the socio‐political process theory (transition from socialism to capitalism, not vice versa as has historically been the case).

2. To the extent that crime is a product of socio‐political change, crime rates are bound to increase much more during a socialism‐to‐capitalism transition rather than during a capitalism‐to‐socialism transition.

3. Some inherent traits of socialism‐to‐capitalism transitions explain why crime rates increase much more during those transitions than during capitalism‐to‐socialism ones.

     

Laws of Inclusion and Exclusion: Nomos,Nationalism and the Other

This article explores how and why contemporary nationalist ‘defence leagues’ in Australia and the UK invoke fantasies of law. I argue these fantasies articulate with Carl Schmitt’s theory of ‘nomos’, which holds that law functions as a spatial order of reason that both produces and is produced by land qua the territory of the nation. To elucidate the ideological function of law for defence leagues, I outline a theory of law as it relates to (political) subjectivity. Drawing on the work of Foucault, Agamben and Brown, I demonstrate how subjects form and are formed by historically contingent relationships to law in the contemporary neo-liberal moment. Turning to Lacan, I show how nationalistic invocations of law provide nationalists with a fantasy that the nation’s law represents them and holds them together (as the nation itself). Similarly, I argue that nationalists imagine that the other has their own law as well, which not only corresponds to the other, but functions as a legible index of the other’s otherness—a metonym for the threatening uncertainty and radical difference that the other represents. Drawing on Lacan’s concept of the big Other, I ultimately argue that nationalists aggressively (re)assert law not only to defend the nation, but to ensure their own symbolic and ontological security therein.

     

Property Offences as Crimes of Injustice

The article provides an outline of the basic principles and conditions of criminalisation of interferences with others’ property rights in the context of a specific context: a liberal, social democratic state, the legitimacy of which depends primarily on its impartiality between moral doctrines and the fair distribution of liberties and resources. I begin by giving a brief outline of the conditions of political legitimacy, the place of property and the conditions of criminalisation in such a state. With that framework in place, I argue that interferences with others’ property rights should be viewed as violations of political duties stemming from institutions of distribution. I then discuss three implications of this view: the bearing of social injustice on the criminal law treatment of acts of distributive injustice; the expansion of criminalisation over the violation of distribution-related duties, which are considered criminally irrelevant under moral conceptions of criminalisation; and, finally, the normative significance of the modus operandi.     

Street politics in Damascus: Kinship and other social categories as bases of political action, 1830–1841

The study examines popular politics in Damascus during the 1830s with a focus on kinship and other social categories that served as bases for political action. It is based on a close reading of one text, an anonymous Arabic chronicle known as ‘Historical Memoirs’ (Mudhakkirāt tārīkhiyya), which is analysed as a repertoire of contemporary social and political concepts. This analysis reveals an ideology of ‘localist’ resistance against the centralising state and its ‘loyalist’ allies in Damascus. Kinship played an important role in this struggle on the social plane (e.g. by using family networks for political ends) as well as on the cultural plane (e.g. through the use of kinship metaphors or through criticism of kinship ties in politics). It is concluded that the function of kinship in Damascene politics can only be understood in the context of other social categories such as factionalism, religious affiliation, class and ethnicity.     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.     

Law of Denial

Law’s claim of mastery over past political violence is frequently undermined by reversals of that relationship of mastery, so that the violence of the law, and especially its symbolic violence, becomes easily incorporated into longues durées of political violence, rather than mastering them, settling them, or providing closure. Doing justice to the past, therefore, requires a political and theoretical attunement to the ways in which law, in purportedly attempting to address past political violence, inscribes itself into contemporary contexts of violence. While this may be limited to an analysis of how law is an effect of and affects the political, theoretically this attunement can be further refined by means of a critique of dynamics that are internal to law itself and that have to do with how law understands its own historicity, as well as its relationship to history and historiography. This article aims to pursue such a critique, taking as its immediate focus the ECHR case of Perinçek v Switzerland, with occasional forays into debates around the criminalisation of Armenian genocide denialism in France. The Perinçek case concerned Switzerland’s criminalisation of the denial of the Armenian genocide, and concluded in 2015 after producing two judgments, first by the Second Chamber, and then by the Grand Chamber of the ECHR. However, although they both found for the applicant, the two benches had very different lines of reasoning, and notably different conceptions regarding the relationship between law and history. I proceed by tracing the shifting status of ‘history’ and ‘historians’ in these two judgments, and paying attention to the deferrals, disclaimers and ellipses that structure law’s relation to history. This close reading offers the opportunity for a critical reappraisal of the relationship between law, denial and violence: I propose that the symbolic violence of the law operative in memory laws is a product of that which remains unresolved in law’s understanding of historicity (including its own), its self-understanding vis-à-vis the task of historiography, and its inability to respond to historical violence without inscribing itself into a history of violence, a process regarding which it remains in denial.

     

A coup d'état in law's empire: Dworkin's Hercules meets Atlas

In Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin advances two incompatible versions of law as integrity. On the strong thesis, political integrity understood as coherence in fundamental moral principles constitutes an overriding constraint on justice, fairness and due process. On the weak thesis, political integrity, while a value, is not to be privileged over justice, fairness, and due process, but to be weighed along with them. I argue that the weak thesis is superior on both of Dworkin's criteria: fit and justifiability. However, the weak thesis must be amended to allow for coherence in policies as well as in principles: the social consequences of legal decisions must be taken into account.I would like to thank Kenneth Kiprnis for his helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law,Convention, Soft Law

The Governance of Britain Green Paper continues the programme of constitutional reform begun in 1997, and appears to reinforce the juridification of the UK's constitution. Nevertheless, several key reforms will be implemented not by legislation, but by creating new conventions. This article argues that such ‘declared’ conventions are best understood as a form of constitutional ‘soft law’, which attempt to influence constitutional behaviour rather than generating binding norms. Applying a regulatory analysis, it then argues that the case for a soft, rather than hard law approach to constitutional reform is weaker than its widespread use in the UK suggests. Finally, the article challenges the thesis that the political constitution is being replaced by a legal constitution, arguing that the government's attitude to constitutional reform still exhibits basic characteristics of political constitutionalism. Moreover, there is more to contemporary constitutional developments than a bipolar contest between political and legal constitutionalism.     

Non-State Actors in International Law: A Rejoinder to Professor Thirlway

That we consider the state-based system as best representing the individual is the product of a particular world view. A ‘naturalized myth’ renders inevitable the link between the physicality of the observable landscape and the state as a means of organizing a polity. This myth lingers on in international legal scholarship, although it has been debunked in other disciplines, notably in critical political geography. (Public) international lawyers can learn from their brethren in other disciplines and problematize the territorial state as a contingent political concept. Awareness of the social production of space may allow lawyers to imagine practices of resistance to the spatial status quo, in particular rights of non-state actors in the production of international law, alongside states, and obligations and responsibilities of non-state actors, especially where states have proved unable to properly assume roles of protection vis-à-vis individuals under their formal jurisdiction.

     

Reflective Judgement and Prudential Rationality: A Contribution to an Inclusive Practical Application of Law

Hannah Arendt has developed a theory of the importance of judgment of taste for political manners, founded on the Kantian aesthetic theory. Nowadays this theory is considered a current theoretical reference for establishing a political way to reconcile the demands of the radicalization of deliberative democracy with the need for political inclusion (Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib). Albena Azmanova in her The Scandal of Reason: A Critical Theory of Political Judgment proposes an inclusive political rhetoric. The political theory founded on judgment is based on Kant’s philosophy; it was developed by Arendt and has greatly influenced the current debate, as an alternative theory in which the moral basis of law can be more sensitive to human contexts; a universalist theory more adequate for dealing with the tragic dimension of human life. The theory of political judgment uses the concepts of reflective judgment and ‘enlarged thought’ as its main concepts. As a starting point, a theory like this considers the singular judgments of justice that each person makes. The background, therefore, is not a rational foundation of principles, but the capacity of rational beings to make judgments. This post-metaphysical theory of law, based on a theory of judgment, is a critique of legal positivism, but presents itself as an alternative to the idealistic theory of law. But this theoretical project has received some criticism related to the adequacy of Arendt’s rereading of Kantian philosophy and her attempt to approximate Kant’s reflective judgment to the Aristotelian concept of phronêsis. Some critics, such as Bryan Garsten, believe that Kant’s rhetoric of public reason diminished and displaced the prudential faculty of judgment that Arendt is to be interested in reviving. Arendt’s attempt to find a theory of judgment in Kant’s aesthetic theory is not successful, in Garsten’s view. Our purpose is to show that a critical theory of judicial judgment is not only possible, but necessary; Arendt’s theory of judgment offers an important contribution to a critical theory of judicial judgment, particularly one devoted to the construction of a legal theory that prioritizes a politics of social inclusion. This theory proposes a critical approach to the project of the procedural conception of democracy, since it can mask social exclusion. An adequate understanding of judicial argumentation cannot forget that it happens in a rhetorical context: it is not only important what a discourse says, but how it says it. The radicalization of deliberative democracy supposes a revision of the ways judicial deliberation is thought: not by reference to universal or at least general principles, but taking into consideration what is ‘critically relevant’, with a view to remedying social injustice (following Azmanova).

     

Women and the Rawlsian Social Contract

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls considers neither the position of women nor the organization of the family in the just society. My paper discusses the extent to which his social contract can be extended to include justice to women in spite of this omission. Feminists have accused Rawls of creating a theory of justice for white middle class males. I argue that this is not a logical consequence of the basic elements of his theory, namely his definition of the original situation and of the veil of ignorance. The limitations of Rawls's theory arise because he deliberately constrains the social contract to the rights and duties of citizens in relation to the government while he also defines the family as being outside the sphere of citizenship and government. If this constraint is removed, the social contract must of necessity be extended to the family. I also argue that unless organization of the care and nurture of children are included in the social contract, the position of women in society is not resolved.     

Political Liberalism, Ethos Justice, and Gender Equality

Susan Okin criticizes John Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ because it does not apply principles of justice directly to gender relations within households. We explain how one can be a ‘political liberal feminist’ by distinguishing between two kinds of justice: the first we call ‘legitimacy justice’, conceptions of which apply to the ‘legally coercive structure’ of society; the second we call ‘ethos justice’, conceptions of which apply to citizens’ ‘non-coercive’ relations. We agree with Okin that a society in which most persons act in accordance with ‘gender equal’ ethos justice is morally superior to one in which most persons do not. A shared commitment to a particular conception of ethos justice, however, cannot be required by a conception of legitimacy justice. A political liberal feminist is committed to promoting gender equality with respect to both legitimacy justice and ethos justice, but recognizes that different means are necessary to do so.     

Discourse of decency: white nationalists,white antiracists,and the criminality of color

Contemporary research on white racial attitudes on race and crime reflect a grouping of opinions on a traditional liberal-conservative scale. These two groupings reflect what sociologists and political scientists call ‘issue constraint’ or a ‘clustering’ of ideas into a specific ideological worldview. Many now argue this gulf is growing; a white ‘culture war’ that many interpret as evidence of the increasing fracturing and political bifurcation of white racial identities over ‘hot button’ topics like race and crime. While a substantial literature on race and crime finds white racial attitudes to vary by educational level and political orientation, we know less about shared understandings of crime and race in relation to the processes of white racial identity formation. Rather than view attitudinal statements on race and crime as accurate reflections of essential different and static white racial political positions or ideological orientations, additional scholarship can examine discourse on crime and race as constitutive of the white identities that wield them. Drawing from an ethnographic study with conservative white nationalists and liberal white antiracists, this paper addresses the following question: what is the relationship between discourse on crime and race and the ongoing process of white racial identity formation?     

Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Desperately Seeking ‘Justice’ in Classical Chinese: On the Meanings of Yi

This essay sets out to search for an equivalent Chinese word to the English word ‘justice’ in classical Chinese language, through ancient Chinese philosophical texts, imperial codes and idioms. The study found that there does not seem to be a linguistic sign for ‘justice’ in classical Chinese, and further, yi resembles ‘justice’ in some ways and has been used sometimes to translate  ‘justice’, but yi is a complex concept in traditional Chinese philosophy with multiple meanings and it is dissimilar to ‘justice’ in their semantic and pragmatic meanings in Chinese and English legal culture. While ‘justice’ is a keyword and fundamental to Western law, yi is not a legal word or concept in classical Chinese in traditional China. Given its complexity, yi does not have a one-to-one equivalent in English. It sometimes carries a sense of ‘righteousness’ and occasionally ‘justice’, but yi and ‘justice’ are not equivalent. In view of these, it becomes understandable that the translations of yi in contemporary Chinese usage vary ranging from ‘friendship and justice’ to ‘greater good’, among others. The meaning of yi is still uncertain and context sensitive as it was two thousand years ago.

     

The reasonable citizen: A model for bridging ethics and politics in the EU

The ethical-political model of the EU needs normative rethinking after the pandemic. Using Dworkin's ‘thesis of continuity’ between ethics and politics, I argue that a strong model of the citizen, called on to exercise duties and civic virtues, is badly needed by the EU. The legitimacy of EU political institutions is not enough, if we want to promote the participation of citizens to their functioning. The basic point is that of arguing in favour of the model of ‘the reasonable citizen’, aimed to overcome the dominant liberal model of ‘citizenship as rights’. This is shown by the ‘European Social Model’, but its weaknesses need to be supplemented by a republican conception. In order for the reasonable citizen not to be just an abstract ideal, some measure of operationalisation is proposed through ‘progressively increasing constellations of common identities’; these rely on and respect the multiple demoi of the EU.     

The Politics of Rule of Law Reform: From Delegation to Autonomy

How can we understand the delegation of power and authority – for example, from a polity to an administrator - in a world of fragmented governance? In this paper, I introduce the practices of contemporary ‘rule of law’ and ‘governance’ reform, which reframe this question in politically powerful ways. These practices are increasingly important in development contexts, and beyond. Practitioners begin with the assumption that some sort of administration occurs in the development contexts in which they work. They then focus on how to convene a political community in which to embed – and potentially legitimate - that administration. They thereby reconfigure the question of delegation into one of autonomy – or managing the extent to and ways in which the administrative legal system self-produces. In doing so, I argue that contemporary rule of law practitioners wield constitutional power under the rubric of workaday administrative reform. At the same time, they efface their political accountability.     

The Sheffield School and Discourse Theory: Divergences and Similarities in Legal Idealism/Anti‐Positivism*

Abstract. When first I began this paper, I envisaged it as a fairly straightforward exercise in comparison between the Sheffield School’s and Discourse Theory’s varieties of legal idealism or anti‐positivism (these terms being synonymous for the types of theory that contest positivism’s separation thesis, that is, the contention that there is no necessary conceptual connection between law and morality). One obvious distinction, for example, is between the moral substance at the heart of these respective theories: the Sheffield School’s legal theory being founded on Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency, and Alexy’s theory focusing on Radbruch’s intolerable degree of injustice. However, the more I thought about the two respective theories, the more interested I became in one particular issue: the denial of the separation thesis that constitutes legal idealism. Here, I present a paper which is not so much concerned with the substance of two different types of legal idealism or anti‐positivism, but which focuses on the question of whether and in what way either or both of the theories can correctly be characterised as legal idealist or anti‐positivist. I focus in this paper on two works in particular: Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s Law as a Moral Judgment (1994), and Robert Alexy’s The Argument from Injustice (2002).     

The devolution era in Northern Ireland

By creating ‘outsiders’ … labelling invariably gives rise to repeat interventions of increasing intensity that … ultimately establish, consolidate, and/or confirm offender ‘identities’. Such ‘identities’ attract further intervention and/or negative reaction and so the process continues.

(Goldson, 2010)

As the above quote attests, labelling theorists recognise the harmful impact of formal system contact on the individual and contend that problems occur when members of society become intolerant towards the individual's offending, forming a ‘negative social reaction’, invoking damaging consequences for the ‘offender’ (ibid).