从自由到平等:美国言论自由的现代转型

自1960年代开始,美国言论自由开启了从经典时期向现代的转型。在色情作品、仇恨言论和竞选经费三个领域,言论自由分别与性别平等、种族平等和财富平等正面相遇。通过把"平等"价值引入言论自由这一转型,使色情作品、仇恨言论和竞选经费从单纯的自由问题变为平等与自由间的平衡;同时,为了促进平等,它还强调法律和政策应告别形式中立,必须向弱势群体有所倾斜。这一转型相当于一场言论自由的"新政",终结了言论自由的洛克纳时代,重塑了言论自由的范式和议程,并对当代言论自由的发展产生持续和深远的影响。     

论程序优先的哲学基础

程序优先是程序内涵的应有之义.从辩证法、认识论和价值论的视角,都能发现程序正义对实体正义的超越.因此,程序优先的理念具有坚实的哲学基础.     

Liberty without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a "Negative Citizenship" Regime

Why, in comparison with other liberal capitalist democracies, is the social welfare state so poorly anchored in American law and public discourse? Surely American political and social history have contributed much to the weakness of our “social state.” But law, too, has played a significant material, as well as ideological, role and has provided the terrain for much of our social development. This essay explores the particular contribution of the property-liberty nexus to the stunted development of positive liberty and social citizenship in the United States. It traces this connection from the natural rights and bourgeois Founders through several key conjunctures in American history, including Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the civil rights periods and compares some of the results with developments in Germany and the aspirations of American progressives. The essay contends that left and right alike have operated within a highly resilient and constricting framework that has made progress in the area of social citizenship both awkward and fragile. Although some possibilities for forward movement have always existed and still remain, the prospects for positive-liberty social-state law are not abundant: The master's house is not about to be taken down with his own tools.     

Managing Equality in Social Dilemmas: Emotional and Retributive Implications

The equality rule is an important coordination rule in symmetric public good dilemmas. Although prior research emphasized that people use the equality rule out of efficiency concerns (as it helps to obtain the public good in the most efficient manner among group members), it may also reflect a true preference for fairness. More precisely, research examining emotional and retributive reactions as a result of a violation of the equality rule by a fellow group member showed that equality indeed is related to people’s personal values and what they consider to be fair. The present paper suggests that a violation of the equality rule results in emotional reactions, and these emotional experiences encourage further retributive actions. The different reactions following an equality violation are described as a function of three features: (1) the motives to use equality, (2) attributions for explaining the violation, and (3) the honesty of the given explanation. The write-up of this paper was partly supported by GOA/05/04 from the Research Fund of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The research and write-up was supported by a fellowship of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, Grant No. 016.005.019), awarded to the second author.     

The Argument from Transnational Effects II: Establishing Transnational Democracy

This article continues with a discussion of what the author calls the argument from transnational effects. It says that supranational or transnational forms of integration, in particular market integration, are desirable on account of democracy itself. National democracies find themselves thereby forced to confront and to internalise the externalities that they cause for each other. A fortiori, democracy becomes supposedly emancipated from the confines of the nation state. This article examines the argument critically at a general level. The situation under consideration concerns all cases in which, regardless of whether there is movement or not, the acts of one democracy adversely impact on the interests of others. The article tries to identify instances where the harm is tied to a failure of representation in a transnational context and not caught by the harm principle, broadly understood. In order to calibrate the argument's scope the article resorts to the principle of universalisation. The guiding intuition is that so long as the act of one democracy is morally justified on the basis of this principle, the argument from transnational effects does not apply. Hence the argument is of no avail where the impact of one democracy on another is perfectly legitimate. This would be the case, for example, when the effects are too insignificant to require any debate. Determining the range of legitimate impact is a core question of transnational constitutional law. Any such determination presupposes mutually shared interest definitions. More often than not, however, the relevant interest definitions underlying universalisation are debatable. Therefore, it appears to be inevitable, at first glance, to have relations of transnational interdependency matched by transnational democratic processes. The article then goes on to identify three different types of universalitation with reference to what can be regarded as their respective anchor. Simple universalisation is based upon shared interest definitions. Reflexive universalisation involves common views of oneself (and others). Self‐transcending universalisation is grounded in the desire to live in a free society. Reflexive universalisation requires to extend mutual sympathy. From this perspective, transnational democratic processes are tantamount to nation‐building. However, one would commit a sentimentalist fallacy if one were to conclude that mutual sympathy in and of itself engenders an expansion of mutual responsibility. The article argues that with regard to the third type of universalisation the institutionalisation of transnational democratic procedures cannot be justified. It would threaten to undermine various conceptions of a free society. It is argued that for the sake of the realisation of equal citizenship the argument from transnational effects actually needs to endorse the existence of bounded democratic communities. Unbounded transnational democracy would exercise an adverse effect on citizenship. It also turns out that the argument from transnational effects, in its uncorrected form, remains haunted by the dilemma that the type of democracy that is envisaged by it becomes easily absorbed by administrative processes. The article concludes that the argument from transnational effects, correctly understood, has a more modest import than its proponents would have us believe. Rather than supporting the release of democracy from its national bounds, it helps to explain why the co‐existence of bounded democratic polities remains essential to equal citizenship. More forceful versions of transnational integration graft onto political societies elements that are not genuinely democratic and strangely reminiscent of different forms of rule. These are forms of rule that Aristotle would not have called ‘political’, for they do not involve the exercise of power by equals over equals.     

社会本位——民法典的最佳选择

从法的本位出发，分析了几种本位的区别与联系，并结合了现代民法的发展趋势和我国传统法律文化及社会主义市场经济的客观要求，闸述了坚持社会本位在构建我国民法典中的科学性。     

Abolishing the Death Penalty: An Untested Legal Argument

This paper supplies the logical and substantive framework for an untested challenge to the legality of the death penalty in the United States. As such, it yields a novel strategy for appellants and supporting amici seeking review of capital cases in the United States Supreme Court. With twin reliance on the right of the people to reparation for harm wrongly inflicted by others and their constitutional right to Due Process of Law under the Fourteenth Amendment, this paper advances the argument that the mere possibility of a wrongful execution yields an imperative for abolishment of capital punishment by the Court.     

论伯林的自由观——从两种自由概念谈起

伯林提出了“积极自由”与“消极自由”的著名区分。在深刻剖析了三种不同类型的积极自由观和二十世纪极权主义的逻辑联系的基础上,伯林认为消极自由观是“机会”、“能够”、“可能性”取向的自由观,以区别于“必须”、“应该”取向的积极自由观。但伯林的剔除了自主概念的消极自由观也蕴含了内在的危机。     

自由与民主:宪法诉讼的价值理念探幽

自由是宪法诉讼的核心价值 ,自由价值之中镌刻着深刻的民主价值思想。宪法诉讼的自由价值表现在 :1 矫正和修饰多数形成机制本身所存在的瑕疵 ,弥合宪法既定约束和现实多数之间的冲突 ,拓展宪法中关于自由范围和内容的规定 ;2 维护公民的“反向自由” ,防御政府的“正向侵犯” ;确认公民的“正向自由” ,救济立法缺位而引起的权利虚置 ,最终实现公民“反向自由”和“正向自由”的结合。宪法诉讼自由价值的民主性表现在如下层面 :1 宪法诉讼机制对自由价值的诉求和保障实现了民主的现代转型 ,即由古代的纯粹民主向现代的自由民主之转变 ;2 反向自由的宪法定位和正向自由的个案满足使民主和自由之间保持了持久的张力和不断的平衡 ,从而使自由主义民主具备了得以实现的现实基础。     

公共经济学视野中的高等教育公平

高等教育公平的特殊重要性是其在构建和谐社会中所具有的不可替代的基础性推动作用.从公共经济学视角阐述高等教育的公平性问题,收入分层是导致高等教育不公平的一个重要因素.因此,我们的政策思路应是:尽力避免市场经济体制下的一个基本规律,即社会分层体系会通过教育体系去有效地实现自身的阶层封闭与自我循环,导致"富者愈富,穷者愈穷"的"马太效应."     

The Argument from Transnational Effects I: Representing Outsiders through Freedom of Movement

This article and its sequel examine an argument that has become a shibboleth for the European pro‐attitude towards international and supranational legal arrangements. I call it the argument from transnational effects. The argument says that supranational or transnational forms of integration, in particular market integration, are desirable on account of democracy itself. National democracies find themselves thereby forced to confront and to internalise the externalities that they cause for one another. A fortiori, democracy becomes supposedly emancipated from the confines of the nation state. Since the argument favours normative limitations on national political processes it seems to lend strong support to the introduction of transnational constitutional discipline. In this article and its sequel it is claimed that the argument, correctly understood, cannot support the creation of transnational democracy. Rather, in a critically recalibrated form, the argument, paradoxically, provides strong backing for the existence of bounded political communities without, for that reason, succumbing to ontologically questionable beliefs about the essence of national communities. Hence, the argument is really as much about the limits set to transnational integration as it is about their legitimacy. This explains why it is of central relevance to constitutionalism in a global age. The opening sections of this article offer an interpretation of John Hart Ely's constitutional theory. Examining the latter helps to articulate adequately the democratic sensibility expressed in the argument. It is argued that Ely's theory exceeds the scope of a mere theory of judicial review. It presents, indeed, a theory of constitutional authority, which is highly relevant to an analysis of the argument from transnational effects. The article then distinguishes and discusses two different readings of the representation‐reinforcing task that Ely attributes to constitutional legality. According to one reading, representation is secondary and only ancillary to the realisation of equality. According to another reading, equal participation is prerequisite to the success of representative democracy whose aim is to discover common ground. It is concluded that the first reading is easier to accommodate in a transnational setting. It will be seen that Ely's theory—at any rate, the first reading of it—is basically concerned with the problem addressed by the argument from transnational effects. This article's discussion of the argument distinguishes two different types of situation. A third, more general type will be dealt with in a subsequent article. The first situation affects people who realise that they would be better off if they were to benefit from the laws of a different democracy. Hence, they would like to have these laws imported. It is argued that their interests do not find support in the argument from transnational effects. The second situation concerns someone who encounters obstacles when moving from one democracy to another. Such obstacles can emerge either as a result of discrimination against non‐nationals or from the sheer fact that laws between and among bounded societies are different. The antidote against the latter is to submit national legislation to a proportionality test. Even though reinforcing representation prima facie seems to support this conclusion, the article claims that virtual representation, correctly understood, actually restricts the sweep of constitutional control to cases of behavioural discrimination. Extending the scope of control would actually violate the respect that it is owed to national democratic autonomy pursuant to the principle of virtual representation. It is also shown that only by limiting its sweep the argument from transnational effects can be prevented from endorsing neoliberal political goals.     

Sex Equality in Social Protection: New Institutionalist Perspectives on Allocation of Competence

This article examines the development of regulation in the European Union (EU) of sex equality in social protection. It applies research methodologies suggested by 'new institutionalist' and 'historical institutionalist' perspectives on European integration. It does not aim to replace existing accounts, but simply to add an additional perspective to the analysis. The article suggests that new insights can be gained by observing the impact of the question of 'division of competence' on the issue of regulation of sex equality in social protection by the EU. The focus on division of competence illuminates relationships between institutions involved in the process of policy formation and implementation, especially the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. It may also illuminate policy outcomes and the directions in which the EU's sex equality law (and possibly social law more generally) has developed and may develop in the future.     

Double Nationality in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance

Currently the Member States' nationalities, short of being abolished in the legal sense, mostly serve as access points to the status of EU citizenship. Besides, they provide their owners with a limited number of specific rights in deviation from the general principle of non‐discrimination on the basis of nationality, and—what is probably more important for the majority of their owners—trigger legalised discrimination in the wholly internal situations. Viewed in this light, the requirement to have only one Member State's nationality enforced in national law by 10 Member States seems totally outdated and misplaced. This paper focuses on the legal analysis of this controversial requirement.     

引领人民向自由前进的航标——浅评卢梭的《社会契约论》

卢梭的《社会契约论》既是一部政治学著作,又是一部法学著作,是世界思想史上的重要古典文献之一。本文即从它的历史背景出发,对其"自由与平等"的目标、性质以及"主权在民"的重要思想进行了浅显的评析。     

Means Discrimination: An Investigation into the Ideology of Constitutional Equality

Constitutional "equal protection" has a technical meaning that orients legal thinking. Its roots are in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and the relationship between separation of the races in schools, theaters, and other public places and the guarantee of material or physical equality. Brown v. The Board of Education (1954), in eliminating separation from constitutional protection also eliminated the constitutional promise of material equality.
The approach to this ideology turns away from outcomes in order to get to the meanings, standards and conceptual parameters that influence the application of constitutional discourse to discrimination against those with inadequate means.