Law and Coercion: Some Clarification

The relationship between law and coercion has been, and still is, a central topic in legal philosophy. Despite this, discussion about it is immersed in confusion. Some philosophers have noticed this, but hardly any work has been done to attempt to solve or even identify the confusions. This paper aims to fill this gap. Here I propose distinctions and qualifications that help us clarify the relationship between law and coercion and avoid confusion. Building on the clarificatory work, I then argue that despite there being several distinct philosophical discussions about the relationship between law and coercion, one of them should be prioritised.     

The Forces of Law: Duty,Coercion, and Power

This paper addresses the relationship between law and coercive force. It defends, against Frederick Schauer's contrary claims, the following propositions: (a) The force of law consists in three things, not one: the imposition of duties, the use of coercion, and the exercise of social power. These are different and distinct. (b) Even if coercion is not part of the concept of law, coercion is connected to law many important ways, and these are amply recognized in contemporary analytic jurisprudence. (c) We cannot determine how important coercion is to the efficacy of law until we know what counts as coercive force. The question of what counts as coercion is not a matter for generalization or stipulation. It requires an explanation of the concept of coercion.     

From Public Sociology to Public Philosophy: Lessons for Law and Society

The late Philip Selznick's final book, A Humanist Science, examines the role of values and ideals in the social sciences, including the study of law and society. Throughout his academic career, Selznick was committed to what he called “legal naturalism,” a sociological version of the natural-law perspective, while his critics continue to adhere to various forms of positivism. But the age-old opposition between natural law and legal positivism today may be giving way to the quest for public sociology—a sociology that promotes public reflection on significant social issues and thus functions as a moral and political force. A Humanist Science ends with a strong plea for public philosophy. Public philosophy overlaps with public sociology but is a much stronger concept. Selznick's message of public philosophy may be another of his enduring contributions to the field of law and society.     

The Nature of Law and Potential Coercion

This paper argues for a novel understanding of the relationship between law and coercion. It firstly refutes Kenneth Himma’s claim that the authorisation of coercive enforcement mechanisms is a conceptually necessary feature of law. It then claims that the best way to understand the law is as coercion‐apt. The “coercion‐aptness” of law is clarified, in part, by appealing to an essential distinction between law and morality: Whereas it can be reasonable for the law to appeal to coercive means in order to motivate compliance, it seems decidedly unreasonable for morality to do so.     

民主与法制：邓小平的依法执政思想探微

邓小平法制思想是邓小平理论宏大科学体系的重要组成部分。在建设有中国特色社会主义理论的创造中，邓小平坚持解放思想、实事求是的思想路线，不断地从实际出发，提出了一系列充满时代特征的法制思想，鲜明地提出了加强法制建设的一系列基本问题，提出了新时期法制建设的主要任务，深刻地论述了民主与法制的统一对提高党的执政能力、依法治国的重大意义。邓小平的法制思想，内容丰富，博大精深，是当代中国民主法制建设的指导思想，是中国建设社会主义法治国家的根本方针。     

From Movement to Mentality,from Paradigm to Perspective,from Action to Performance: Law and Society at Mid‐Life

Kitty Calavita's Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law (2010) offers a broad and useful overview of the intellectual accomplishments of law and society scholars and a self‐confident assertion that they perform an invaluable service by focusing on “real law,” that is, law in action rather than law on the books. This essay argues that the field is more fragmented than Calavita notes and that law and society research is neither engaged with a common set of questions nor organized around a single central insight or an agreed‐upon paradigm. Moreover, this essay raises questions about Calavita's claims about “real” law and suggests that we complement law and society's traditional focus by examining the varied performances of law, whether in texts or in the world beyond those texts.     

论经济法的社会本位理念及其实现

社会本位是以社会整体为中心和起点,要求在个人与社会之间重新分配权利的一种法律思想。它将社会视为目的而非手段,坚持权利本位,但主要关注社会公共权利而非个人权利。私法因其奉行个人本位理念而难以容纳这一权利。社会公共权利的栖息地主要是经济法和其他社会立法。在社会本位实现过程中,国家的作用至为关键,除立法机关应以社会整体为中心配置权利和义务外,司法机关和行政机关应当成为实现社会本位的重要力量。     

从比较法、法社会学到比较法社会学

摆在读者面前的这本书 ,是多个研究项目的共同成果 ,也是近年来我的学术思想转变过程的记录。一1 996年当我向国家社会科学基金申请《比较法社会学 :框架和方法》这一项目时 ,我的基本思路是 :“是否能通过某些法律指标来衡量不同国家法律制度的发达程度。如果能 ,通过哪些法律指标 ,这些指标之间的关系如何。”大家知道 ,在经济学中经常使用一系列的经济指标 ,如人均国民经济产值 ,人均消耗石油的数量 ,居住在城市的人口占总人口的百分比等来衡量和比较不同国家的经济发达程度、工业化水平和都市化程度。在法学研究中 ,比如我们在衡量和比…     

From Cairo to Jerusalem: Law,Labour, Time and Catastrophe

Following the eclectic itineraries of ‘Near East’ expert, R. M. Graves, this article tells a story of an ongoing Nakba (catastrophe) of small and large legal decisions. Without reducing the human catastrophe of the event of the Nakba (the 1948 Palestinian forced exodus), it engages with it as a legal event that crosses (in this story at least) from Cairo to Jerusalem, from the League of Nations’ era (1920–1946) to the United Nations’ era (1945–), from the governance of labour and gender, to labour partition, and finally to the governance of municipalities through law and expertise. Graves’ relationship to both Cairo and Jerusalem was materialized through different forms of affective legal governance. Graves, who in his own dichotomous words was ‘neither a Zionist nor an anti-Semite’, managed Jerusalem across national lines in the wake of the UN Partition Plan (1947), and as the old empire was withdrawing right before Jerusalem itself became a site of the catastrophe—right before the Nakba.

     

宪法：从政治法到治政法

将宪法称为政治法,虽然由来久、流传广,但弊病多、危害深,不宜继续提倡。政治事务虽然由宪法集中规范,但宪法不只是规范政治事务。单纯从宪法与政治的关系上讲,宪法不是政治统治法、被政治控制之法,而是控制政治之法、治理政权之法。人民是政治与治政的主体,宪法是人民治政的依据与准则。将宪法作为治政法,体现了民主与民治的要求,有利于增强宪法的法律属性与价值理性,有利于实现宪治、实现民主、实现自由。     

我国《行政强制法》的法律地位、价值取向和制度逻辑

《行政强制法》是规范政府共同行为的一部重要法律,是中国特色社会主义法律体系的支架性法律,其出台是我国行政法治建设历程中的又一个里程碑。本文从法律地位、价值取向和制度逻辑三方面结合的视角,依次探讨了《行政强制法》的地位、所涉重要关系、行政强制的界定、原则、设定、种类、程序、执行体制和法律责任等九个基本问题,以期对准确把握该法的立法精神,正确理解和实施该法有所裨益。     

英美刑法辩护理由中的“胁迫”及其启示

胁迫是英美法系各国刑法普遍承认的一种犯罪辩护理由。传统意义的胁迫是指胁迫者以紧迫的死亡或严重伤害身体相威胁,迫使行为人实施某种被刑法禁止的行为。胁迫是一种犯罪的可宽恕事由,其根据在于,当一个人面临一般人都无法抗拒的严重威胁,主观上难以作出合法的选择时,缺乏刑事归责的可能性。我国刑法中没有胁迫的概念,司法中按照紧急避险处理被胁迫犯罪案件,这既不符合被胁迫犯罪的本质,也限制了胁迫的适用范围。我国刑法应当引入胁迫的概念,将其视为一种独立的阻却责任事由。我国刑法对胁迫的适用,应当采取形式与实质相结合的标准。胁迫不能适用于故意杀人犯罪。     

Privatization in Poland: Politics,Society, and the Law*

The paper presents the beginning and the initial results of the process of privatization in Poland. Starting from the summer of 1990 it examines the political debate on the Privatization Act and corresponding social reaction. It shows how the society answers such important questions as: who, and on what principles, is to take over the hitherto state-owned property? The next question is on the content of the “social contract on privatization”: the legal starting point and the first empirical results. It appears that the most visible social effect was the growth in the inequalities between workers and the elites of the society. The role of workers in the process of transformation is also of special interest. Finally, the paper examines the role of privatization law, which on the one hand presents a compromise between the ruling class and the society and on the other hand has been replaced by current privatization policy.     

从威权型法到自由民主型法——法治发展的全球趋势

法治社会的生成是一个不断削弱政治专权、捍卫个体尊严的过程。威权型法作为政治权力的孳息物 ,具有人格贬损、话语霸权、政法合一、严刑峻法等特征 ,从而使人不成其为人 ,使法不成其为法。从威权型法转向自由民主型法是全球化时代的法治发展趋势。自由民主型法的价值取向是权利至上 ;制度支撑是宪政体制 ,具体内容包括人民主权、权力分割、违宪审查、司法独立和政党守法等内容。