Can feminist judges make a difference?

Many of the expectations and aspirations about the ‘difference’ that women judges would make have proved unrealistic, given the inevitable diversity and often conservatism of women appointed as judges. On the other hand, we might reasonably expect feminist judges to ‘make a difference’. This essay focuses on feminist judges, and seeks to identify what it is that we might reasonably expect of them. This in turn requires consideration of who counts as a feminist judge, what might be included in a feminist approach to judging, and what institutional norms inherent within the judicial role might constrain the adoption of a feminist approach. The essay concludes that feminist judges both can and ought to make a difference across a wide range of judicial activities.     

侵权责任法与社会法关系研究

侵权责任法如果不与其他法律领域联动就很难解决损害与赔偿的问题,社会法正是由侵权责任法的边界区域进入传统的私法秩序中而发展起来的。一些广泛的政策性考量催生了与侵权责任法的私法性相异质的规范体,公法因素渗透进来并使其呈现出社会化的发展趋向。侵权责任法一直扮演着社会冲突的"雷达"角色,成为了正在显现的危险得以早期发现和预警的一种探测机制,进而成为更能有效解除社会冲突和社会危机的社会法的低级伙伴。社会法说服了侵权责任法朝向集体责任的发展方向,培植了侵权责任法认同社会团结与合作的文化基因。侵权责任法与社会法之间更为深刻的关系还在于权利与权力、义务与责任蕴含着政治性、经济性和文化性的制度基因。     

The Paradox of American Critical Legalism

Duncan Kennedy's essay is a reprint from his recently published book. We hope to draw attention to Kennedy's work among students of European integration since we believe his analysis to be relevant both to the specific debate on the impact of European integration upon private law and to comparative legal study in general. European legal scholarship has only recently begun to examine the problems of private legal integration. The late appearance of private law in the integration arena is due to a primarily instrumental understanding and strategic use of law in the European market-building project: only once legal ‘barriers to trade’ were eliminated and national regulatory law replaced by Europeanised norms, did the degree to which the core institutions of ’private‘ law had been (indirectly) affected by the integrationist logic become apparent. Comparative legal research, however, has benefited from this awakening of interest. European Commission projects have widened the scope of and intensified comparative studies in Europe. Equally, experience gained from the ‘Integration Through (Public) Law’ project has led to a new private legal debate on the impact of national traditions, the concept of legal cultures and the social functions of private law. Accordingly, whilst Duncan Kennedy's deliberations on the history of American legal thought and the differences between American and European legal cultures are generally to be commended for their sensitive treatment of the specificities of the civil law system and the common law heritage, they are equally of particular topical concern since in addition to highlighting America's ‘utter faith and utter distrust in law,’ they also investigate the fundamentally different approaches adopted towards ‘the project law’ within each of the member states of the EU. If European private lawyers are to come to terms with the problems of integration and convergence, they must first tackle these deep-seated divergences between their own national legal cultures.     

We All Make Mistakes: A ‘Duty of Virtue’ Theory of Restitutionary Liability for Mistaken Payments

In contrast to the moral foundations of contract, tort, and the law of property, which are generally regarded as elements of Kantian ‘right’, the liability to return the value of mistaken payments is, it is argued, an example of the law's enforcing a duty of virtue, the legalisation of the duty of beneficence in a way similar (though not identical) to how the law might instantiate a duty of easy rescue. Accordingly, one of Birks's most cherished theses – that the law of unjust enrichment represents a distinctive element of private law – can be made out: it is distinctive in having an entirely different normative source: in virtue, not in right. But this result comes at a cost: (1) a legal system could function more or less justly without such a liability; (2) Birks's thesis that liability for mistaken payment is the archetype or paradigmatic case of liability for unjust enrichment would have to be abandoned; and (3) we would have to recognise that the ground of this liability is policy‐motivated.     

A Shift in Focus: Systematisation in European Private Law through EU Law

The discourse on the Europeanisation of private law appears gradually to be moving into new territory in which the central debate on convergence of private laws in Europe makes place for structural questions on private law development in a multi‐level European legal order. With the realisation that private law is and will remain complementary regulated at EU level and in national laws, a re‐orientation is called for that, in the words of Micklitz, ‘allows one to determine which norms shall be elaborated and enforced at what level and by whom’. This article accepts that such a re‐orientation is needed in relation to substance, process, instruments and enforcement; a more fundamental question needs to be addressed, however, in order to ensure coherence in the development of private law in Europe. As can be gleaned from existing practice in EU consumer law, competition law, and financial market regulation, a deeply engrained tension between market integration and protectionist policies in Community law has resulted in incoherent regulation at EU level, which filters through into national legal systems. This puts at risk fundamental values of private law, such as certainty and fairness. A solution for this is proposed by shifting the focus from national private laws to the political and doctrinal structure of EU private law, and the normative framework it provides. General principles of EU private law, it is argued, could and should provide a counterweight to the problem of conflicting policies and set out a guideline for the future development of European private law.     

The Negligence Standard: Political Not Metaphysical

This contribution distinguishes two kinds of responsibility: the basic (or ‘metaphysical’) kind that we all inescapably have as functioning human beings; and the assignable (or ‘political’) kind that connects each of us with some particular tasks, and not with others. Having explored some differences between the two, and in particular the role of law's authority in connection with each, the discussion turns to the negligence standard, especially but not only as it figures in tort law. Recently, several philosophers have attempted to find a role for the negligence standard in the metaphysics of basic responsibility. This contribution resists that development and stands up for the traditional lawyer's view that the negligence standard belongs to the pliable politics of assignable responsibility. Basic responsibility, it is argued, is fundamentally strict.     

民事权益受损者行政诉讼原告资格考辨

民事权益受损者本应通过民事诉讼获得救济,一旦其请求行政机关介入查处违法行为或解决民事纠纷时往往会引发行政诉讼原告资格问题.本文采实质诉权说认为,民事权益受损者起诉权的认定应以公法请求权为基础,故需以保护规范理论为工具探寻公法规范中是否包含保护私人利益的指向,而非简单以侵权行为影响论或行政行为影响论判断受害者的行政诉讼原...     

Labour Constitutions and Occupational Communities: Social Norms and Legal Norms at Work

This paper considers the interaction of legal norms and social norms in the regulation of work and working relations, observing that, with the contraction of collective bargaining, this is a matter that no longer attracts the attention that it deserves. Drawing upon two concepts from sociology – Max Weber's ‘labour constitution’ and Seymour Martin Lipset's ‘occupational community’ – it focuses on possibilities for the emergence, within groups of workers, of shared normative beliefs concerning ‘industrial justice’ (Selznick); for collective solidarity and agency; for the transformation of shared beliefs into legally binding norms; and for the enforcement of those norms. If labour law is currently in ‘crisis’, then a promising route out of the crisis, we argue, is for the law to recover its procedural focus, facilitating and encouraging these processes.     

Bentham on the Interpretation of Laws

A widely accepted view is that, for Bentham, legal interpretation was a mechanical or technical matter. This paper reconstructs Bentham’s complex theory of legal interpretation and challenges the above view. It demonstrates that Bentham’s theory of legal interpretation consists of three major theses. First, when there are different interpretations of a law, the authoritative interpreter ought to be the sovereign legislature. Second, strict interpretation attributes to the legislature the will it actually has when making the law. The strict interpretation of a law ought to take the text of the law itself as the standard, and then be guided by its purpose. Third, liberal interpretation attributes to the legislature a will that it would have had if it had been aware of the case before the court, but which it in fact failed to have through inadvertency. Liberal interpretation is a necessary evil, and must be checked: liberal interpretation ought to be made according to the pattern and materials of the old laws, and be subject to the authority of the sovereign legislature.     

Lies and Free Speech Values

In the short time since Seana Shiffrin published Speech Matters, ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’ have become full-blown phenomena, and various forces have destabilized the line between truth and falsity. Now more than ever, Shiffrin’s project is one of urgent importance. This essay examines Chapter Four of Speech Matters, which asks the crucial question: when and how may the law regulate lies? Shiffrin concludes that the law could regulate lies much more often than it does, though sometimes it ought not to for pragmatic reasons. For all of Shiffrin’s masterful explication, there is perhaps more to say in the space between Chapter Three’s moral account of free speech and Chapter Four’s legal one. Setting existing doctrine aside, how would a society translate the moral principles of Chapter Three into a system of law? Which worries are intrinsic to free speech, and which are purely pragmatic? In other words, what does a thinker-based account of law look like?

     

Casting Aside Clanking Medieval Chains: Prerogative,Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum

This article confronts the controversies surrounding Article 50 by analysing the relationship between statute and prerogative in the UK. The piece focuses on domestic constitutional issues and suggests a new way of classifying the relationship between statute and prerogative into two types falling under ‘the abeyance principle’ or ‘the frustration principle’. The abeyance principle means that where statute and prerogative overlap, the prerogative goes into abeyance. The frustration principle means that where statute and prerogative give rise to potential inconsistencies, but do not overlap, the prerogative cannot be used inconsistently with the intention of parliament as expressed in the relevant legislation. It then argues that Article 50 has the status of primary or ‘primary‐equivalent’ legislation which could justify applying the abeyance principle. This would mean that the trigger power would be exercised on statutory authority rather than through prerogative powers. If the courts are unable thus to construe the relevant legislation it argues EU law requires the courts to bridge the gap. Alternatively, if the abeyance principle is not applicable, it argues the frustration principle could apply but the circumstances in this litigation fall outside it. In the further alternative, EU law could require the frustration principle itself to be set aside in this case.     

公司法律规范分类研究

公司法律规范的种类应当包括强制适用规范、授权适用规范和推定适用规范。强制适用规范是强行界定当事人权利义务关系的一种公法和私法相融合的法律规范,授权适用规范和推定适用规范有助于私法自治原则的推行。解析公司法律规范的研究目的在于,重构公司法律规范体系,即内在的规范体系和外在的规范体系。内在的规范体系由公司法、民法、合同法等私法规范构成,外在的规范体系由宪法、刑法、行政法等公法规范和内在规范体系共同形成一个统一的整体。     

The Question Concerning the Common Frame of Reference

The many directives on private consumer law enacted in the last three decades have met with considerable neglect and resistance amongst domestic judges, legislatures and scholars, bringing about less legal unity and more ‘legal fragmentation'—to say it in the words of the Commission. The Draft Common Frame of Reference is one more attempt, on the part of certain strands of European private law scholarship, at imposing a formal break on, and at overcoming, such fragmentation. Presented as a ‘comprehensive and self‐standing’ document, its ambition is to definitively implement the Commission‐generated, market‐orientated agenda of private law reform, so much resisted at the national level. The article argues that the EU legislative institutions should not go ahead with the plan of incorporating the Draft's content in EU law, by adopting a CFR. A CFR would confer an unprecedented degree of authority on a range of contested directive‐generated rules, from the test of fairness to the risk development defence in product liability. In creating a climate in which CFR‐based legalistic arguments promote unity over fragmentation, a CFR would emasculate public debate by implementing, under the spell of legal necessity, exactly those partisan, Commission‐initiated policies that have been, and still are, openly opposed in domestic legal circles. The Draft embodies a grammar of imposition that should be questioned.     

Derrida and the Philosophy of Law and Justice

Readings of Derrida’s work on law and justice have tended to stress the distinction between them. This stress is complicated by Derrida’s own claim that it is not ‘a true distinction’. In this essay I argue that ordinary experiences of the inadequacy of existing laws do indeed imply a claim about what would be more just, but that this claim only makes sense insofar as one can appeal to another more adequate law (whether the projection of a new law or an existing ‘higher’ law). Exploring how Derrida negotiates a subtle path between classical Platonism and classical conventionalism about justice, the attempt is made to take seriously Derrida’s aim to affirm the idea of a ‘mystical’ foundation of the authority of laws by taking ‘the use of the word “mystical” in what I venture to call a rather Wittgensteinian direction’.     

公私法协动视野下生态环境损害赔偿的理论构成

生态环境损害赔偿涉及私法与公法的协动。从比较法来看,私法在生态环境损害赔偿中的作用有两种解释路径:一是依托既有权利(如所有权、健康权等)受侵害,扩张损害概念,从责任范围层面涵盖生态利益;二是创设环境权或环境秩序权,从责任成立层面涵盖生态利益。两种进路的背后反映了对于公私法关系的不同认识,前者认为公法、私法并行救济,后者则认为私法救济优先。我国环境法学说传统上采第二种进路,而《生态环境损害赔偿制度改革方案》和“民法典草案”则有采扩张损害概念的整合进路的趋势。我国目前立法与司法实践仍存在体系上的龃龉。应当贯彻扩张损害的思路,在构成侵权的情况下,在责任范围中考虑生态利益。在不构成侵权的情况下,具体考量生态环境损害赔偿能否类推适用民法的规则。     

Legal Order,Legal Pluralism,Fundamental Principles. Europe and Its Law in Three Concepts

The essay analyses the way in which the concepts of legal order, legal pluralism and fundamental rights have been used to describe (and decide) what European integration is (and what it ought to be) from the perspective of the law. The essay does not provide a legal theory but limits itself to investigating how certain concepts have been employed to justify legal decisions and to construct legal theories. The juridical discourse on Europe is examined to identify some trends in contemporary legal culture: the decline of a tradition of legal thought, ‘legal dogmatics,’ the vanishing of the distinction between internal and external law (between domestic law and international law, and between positive law and morality), the growing importance of fundamental rights discourse, the centrality of balancing test, the widespread criticism of legal science's claim to neutrality and the consequent normative turn affecting legal scholarship.     

Negligence and Human Rights Law: The Case for Separate Development

A number of judges and academics have argued in favour of the convergence of negligence law with human rights law. By contrast, the thesis of this article is that the two legal orders should develop independently, so that for the most part the law of negligence ought not to be affected by human rights considerations. It is argued that the case for convergence is based on two false assumptions, namely that human rights law and negligence law perform similar functions within our legal order and that the norms of human rights law are more fundamental than the norms encapsulated in negligence law. It is also argued that convergence would undermine the coherence of negligence law. Ultimately, the case for separate development rests on the desirability of recognising public law and private law as autonomous normative systems with their own distinctive rationales, concepts and core principles.     

Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption,Social Norms,and Collectivist Business Cultures

The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.     

行政侵权初论

所谓行政侵权是指行政主体通过公务员实施了违法或不当的行政职权行为,造成了行政相对方法益的损害,其结果是国家通过行政侵权主体给予受害的行政相对方一定的法律救济。作为事实状态的行政侵权自古存在,作为法律形式的行政侵权也并不与民主政制相伴始终。行政侵权法产生的逻辑起点是民主制度的确立及私人利益与国家利益的调和。