EUROPE AND THE PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN POST COLD WAR AFRICA: HOW SERIOUS IS EUROPE AND FOR WHAT REASON?

The ending of the Cold War brought new topics on the agendaof the international aid donors. Questions of democracy andhuman rights were voiced with rising intensity not least bythe European Union and by individual European countries. However,when it came to implementing the ambitious principles, boththe EU and the bilateral donors lacked a ‘serious’commitment. This is indicated by European policies towards SouthAfrica, Kenya, Niger and Algeria. The policies of the Europeanstowards Africa in the 1990s have primarily been influenced bysecurity concerns and thus by the narrow national interestsof individual donors. This is particularly manifest in the caseof France which has a dominating position within the developmentcooperation of the EU. Thus, only in very few exceptional instancesis it in the national interest of European donor states to promotemoral issues such as democracy and respect for human rights.In the 1990s such themes have become little more than the rhetoricof politicians and treaties, just as it was during the ColdWar.     

UNDERSTANDING JAPANESE DEMOCRACY IN A POPULIST AGE

In this article, Sir David Warren, who was British Ambassador to Japan from 2008 to 2012, lays out the historical background to modern Japan, its political and economic structures (and international relationships); explores why we tend not to think of Japan as affected by the populism that we see in other Western democracies; and asks why Japan still presents itself as such a ‘different’ country.     

INDONESIA’S 2019 ELECTIONS: A FRACTURED DEMOCRACY?

In April 2019, Indonesia carried out simultaneous presidential and legislative elections. With an estimated 192 million voters acceding to 800,000 polling stations, this was the world's largest direct presidential election. Barring some dispersed claims of irregularities, the mammoth task of electing public representatives at the national as well as provincial and local levels was successfully carried out. Indonesia's voters had to decide on the 575 members of the national parliament, as well as some 20,000 seats in the country's many provincial and local legislatures, including 2,207 provincial level MPs from 34 provinces and 17,610 local councillors from more than 500 local authorities. Voter turn-out was an estimated 81.9 percent, the highest yet since Indonesia's transition to full democracy. Thus, at first blush, this electoral exercise can be seen as a logistical and political achievement, and an addition to Indonesia's track record of successfully-held elections. Yet, despite its technical proficiency and solid participation, the 2019 polls highlight pervasive societal and geographic fault-lines and raise questions about the strength of Indonesia's democratic institutions.

In order to analyse the importance of these elections, this article is comprised of six parts. Following this introduction, the second section briefly discusses the salient aspects of Jokowi's first administration. The subsequent part sets out the run-up to the presidential campaign, paying particular importance to changes in ‘rules of the game’ that altered the structural dynamics of the elections. The fourth section compares and contrasts the campaigns of the two opposing coalitions and the fifth analyses the electoral results. The final section concludes by discussing the denouement of the elections before looking forward.     

CONSOLIDATING SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ARITHMETIC OF BUDGETARY REDISTRIBUTION

An absence of legitimacy of an economic dispensation cannotbe overcome by democratization alone. In unequal societies,new regimes also seek to increase economic legitimacy and thereforetheir own political legitimacy through redistribution. Socialspending is the most promising redistributive device availableto South Africa's new democracy to reduce racial inequalities,but there are constraints on increasing social spending or evenredistributing existing spending. To maximize political impact,spending will thus probably be concentrated on the most visibleprogrammes and concentrated in die cities. The impact on blackmaterial living standards of complete redistribution of socialspending is shown to be fairly large, but still may not satisfythe newly enfranchised. Coloureds, Indians and poorer whiteswould lose most from budgetary redistribution. As demands exceedresources, resource allocation then becomes a question of politicalarithmetic. This may assist in consolidating democracy amongsturban black ‘insiders’, but would effectively leavethe unorganized rural poor fiscally disenfranchised.     

DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE OF MALAWI

The collapse of the Banda regime in 1994 has led to a renewedinterest in the nature of the Malawian political tradition.This paper seeks to contribute to the debate by focusing onthe political beliefs of nationalist politicians in the decadeleading up to the cabinet crisis of 1964 which marks, in someviews, the true origin of the Banda dictatorship. It suggeststhat early nationalist politicians like James Frederick Sangalaand Levi Mumba combined a belief in the importance of unitywith a democratic awareness of the virtues of civil society.As Congress grew in popularity, however, elements of a totalitarianideology, deeply intolerant of dissent, began to appear, notonly in Dr Banda's speeches but in those of his lieutenantsand subsequent opponents such as Masauko Chipembere and KanyamaChiume. This tendency increased with the founding in 1959 ofthe Malawi Congress Party which developed as an absolutist bodyboth in terms of its own internal structure and in the demandsit made on Malawian society. Some politicians drew on the autocratictradition of the colonial era to produce justifications forthe establishment of an African-controlled dictatorship. OnlyDunduzu Chisiza provided a coherent democratic alternative tothese views. And even Chisiza had difficulty in reconcilinghis belief in strongman government with the need to protectindividual rights. A totalitarian strain, deeply intolerantof dissent, had thus entered Malawian politics prior to 1964.But this strain coexisted with a democratic tradition, articulatedin particular by Mumba and Chisiza.     

POLITICS WITHOUT PARTIES: AFGHANISTAN’S LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRACY

Democracy has not brought stability to Afghanistan in the almost two decades since the fall of the Taliban. But it would be wrong to conclude that the soil of Afghanistan is not conducive to the tree of democracy, when in reality it was never planted with any skill. Democracy did not fail in Afghanistan; it was never even tried.

A series of connected mistakes began with the introduction of a flawed electoral system, no insistence on a transparent register of voters, lack of proper scrutiny of polling, and a lack of support for the development of reformist political parties and other functioning civil society institutions. From the start the US did not see this as a ‘nation-building’ project, but nevertheless US officials made far-reaching decisions about the nature of Afghan democracy. These were seriously unsound, and the electoral system introduced itself operated against the development of strong democratic institutions.

This article outlines the problems inherent in the Single Non-Transferable Vote system, examines the history of Afghan political parties through the twentieth century and asks whether alternative and traditional forms of Afghan government provide any real obstacles to the development of modern politics. The 2004 constitution was the seventh since 1923: this was not a green field site in terms of institution-building as it was seen by many of the international officials who flooded in after the fall of the Taliban.     

THE GHANAIAN ELECTIONS OF 1996: TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY?

Foreign donors expended over $23 million on micro-managing theDecember 1996 Ghanaian elections in an attempt to ensure thatthe process was technically ‘free and fair’. Owingpartly to this expenditure and partly to the efficiency andimpartiality of the Electoral Commission, the conduct of theelections was in fact remarkably technically correct. The losingopposition parties still complained, however, that PresidentRawlings and his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC),exploited the advantages of incumbency to a degree that renderedthe result ‘free but not really fair’. The articleargues that such very limited acceptance of election results,however justified or unjustified, is almost bound to obtainin economically underdeveloped African societies where, partlyfor structural and partly for cultural reason, politics continuesto be very much a zero-sum game characterized by high levelsof distrust. This in turn suggests limits to the likely consolidationof multi-party democracy. The article also analyses the reasonsfor the electoral victory of Rawlings and the NDC, arguing thatit hinged on the rural population's trust in Rawlings' abilityto provide rural development and political stability.     

RECONSTRUCTING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRACY IN GHANA, 1979-81

This article attempts to contribute to an understanding of thechallenges involved in trying to bring military and securityagencies under constitutional rule in new democracies by analysingthe case of the Limann regime and the failed democratic transitionin Ghana in 1979–81. In the aftermath of democratizationin 1979 the civilian government made aggressive (and not alwaysdiplomatic) efforts to bring the armed forces under its control.In this instance both the civil government and the militarycommand were threatened by the possibility of a coup from belowand were anxious to prevent it. The analysis tries to answerthe question of why the government and the military commandfailed to make common cause, examining first the conflict betweencivilian officials and the military high command over jurisdictionaland other issues, and then between the security agencies themselvesthat provided the opening for the overthrow once again of democracy.The coup itself was the result of the double crisis of civiland military authority. The institutional arrangements throughwhich civil command has been exercised are examined; it is arguedthat civil control of the military in independent Ghana hashistorically been a myth, and that the existence of a civilianregime does not necessarily suggest civil control of the military.     

HOW THE QOR'AN LED TO THE DOWNFALL OF MOSSADEGH

Apparently, in 1953 the World Bank put forward a compromise proposal to break the impasse between Mossadegh and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh asked Hassibi, a devout Muslim, to advise him whether he should accept the proposal. Hassibi consulted Abbas Parkhideh, a member of the oil company board, another devout man. As the story goes, the two men decided to resort to Estekhareh, the Persian practice of using the Qor'an to help with a difficult decision. On the basis of the ensuing consultation of the Qor'an, Habibi advised Mossdegh to reject the Bank's proposal. He did so. The coup that overthrew him occurred within a month.     

HOW THE WEST LOST ITS BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN

The article asserts that the current situation in Afghanistan could have been quite different. Well before 9/11, Abdul Haq, a Pushtun and a veteran commander in the war against the Russians, put forward a plan to overthrow the Taliban from within, a plan which had significant support inside Afghanistan. Haq, who was subsequently killed by the Taliban, was ignored by the West, which chose instead to intervene militarily, to support the war lords of the Northern Alliance and thus to marginalise the Pushtuns. The 2002 Loya Jirga was the crucial moment for the West, which failed to realise that Pakistan had its own, very different agenda.