Unpacking the Path‐Dependent Process of Institutional Change for PPPs

In the recent past, several countries and states have begun to use Public‐Private‐Partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure development and have attempted to create institutional environments that enable PPPs. Providing an enabling environment for PPPs entails a combination of institutional creation and changing existing institutions relating to project procurement. This paper attempts to understand how path‐dependant institutional change takes place in the context of PPPs and their enabling environments, and why different institutional environments evolve differently, using two cases: the implementation of PPPs in the road sector in the Netherlands and in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. We identify two factors that can be used as predictors of the direction of institutional change: a long‐term orientation towards institutional change and a willingness to learn and modify transitional institutions. Where these factors exist, and thereby provide a goodness of fit, institutional change is likely to occur.     

The long and the short of it: Electoral institutions and the dynamics of party system size, 1950–2005

While institutional theories of party system size are usually examined cross‐nationally, there is ample reason to expect that changes in electoral institutions will affect party system size within countries as well. Although some of this effect may occur immediately, most of the effects are likely to be realised over time and across subsequent elections. A series of error‐correction models examine the short‐ and long‐term effects of changes in electoral institutions on party system size. The results indicate that changes in electoral institutions do produce the expected effects on party system size, and that these effects occur mostly over the long term.     

Economic Voting in Latin America: Rules and Responsibility

The impact of institutions on the economic vote stands as a well‐established proposition for the advanced democracies of Europe. We know less, however, regarding the institutional effects on the economic vote in the developing democracies of Latin America. Carrying out an analysis of presidential elections in 18 Latin American countries, we offer evidence that the usual Eurocentric conceptualization of the clarity of responsibility is not ideal for understanding the economic vote in this region. There does exist a powerful effect of institutions on the economic vote within Latin American democracies, but one uniquely associated with its presidential regimes and dynamic party systems. Rules for these elections—such as concurrence, term limits, and second‐round voting—suggest that we should reconceptualize the notion of the clarity of responsibility in Latin America, focusing more on individuals in power and their constraints, and less on the political parties from which they hail.     

Why Right‐Leaning Populism has Grown in the Most Advanced Liberal Democracies of Europe

Immigration and new class divisions, combined with a growing anti‐elitism and political correctness, are often used as explanations for the strong gains for right‐leaning populist parties in national elections across Europe in recent years. But contrary to what we might assume, such parties have been very successful in the most developed and comprehensive welfare states, in nations—such as the Nordic countries—with the best scores on economic equality and social inclusion and long established political and judicial institutions enjoying a high degree of popular legitimacy. As argued in this article, this seems to happen because a duopoly of the centre‐left and centre‐right political establishment has kept issues such as immigration and new class divisions off the public agenda and hence paved the way for right‐leaning ‘disruptor’ populist parties with an anti‐immigration agenda in times of increasing immigration.     

Labor market policy: A comparative view on the costs and benefits of labor market flexibility

I review theories and evidence on wage‐setting institutions and labor market policies in an international comparative context. These include collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection laws, unemployment insurance (UI), mandated parental leave, and active labor market policies (ALMPs). Since it is unlikely that an unregulated private sector would provide the income insurance these institutions do, these policies may enhance economic efficiency. However, to the extent that unemployment or resource misallocation results from such measures, these efficiency gains may be offset. Overall, Scandinavia and Central Europe follow distinctively more interventionist policies than the English‐speaking countries in the Northern Hemisphere. Possible explanations for such differences include vulnerability to external market forces and ethnic homogeneity. I then review evidence on the impacts of these policies and institutions. While the interventionist model appears to cause lower levels of wage inequality and high levels of job security to incumbent workers, it also in some cases leads to the relegation of new entrants (disproportionately women, youth, and immigrants) as well as the less skilled to temporary jobs or unemployment. Making labor markets more flexible could bring these groups into the regular labor market to a greater extent, at the expense of higher levels of economic insecurity for incumbents and higher levels of wage inequality. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Mixing God's Work and the Public Business: A Framework for the Analysis of Faith‐Based Service Delivery

Over the past thirty years, there has been a dramatic transformation in the way the American political process operates. There has been a growing public perception that traditional political institutions lack the capacity to meet existing challenges. This has led many observers to call for a rethinking of how government does its work. Numerous alternatives, including the use of faith‐based organizations, have been suggested. The current popular debate on the appropriate role of faith‐based organizations in public service delivery has shed little light on a number of important issues raised by engaging such actors in governance issues. The impact of using faith‐based institutions to design and implement public policy must be considered not only in terms of traditional evaluation standards, but also regarding potential long‐term impacts on the political process itself. This article outlines a theoretical framework for the evaluation of faith‐based organizations as “alternatives” to conventional governance structures. It identifies key practical and theoretical issues raised by such substitution, in both short and long range systemic terms.     

Long‐term care reform and the role of housing finance

Abstract

The Clinton administration's recently announced home and community‐based care proposals have potentially important implications not only for long‐term care policy, but also for housing policy in the United States. This article attempts to draw out some of those implications. The first section examines problems inherent in the current “medical/welfare” system of financing long‐term care, which constrains consumer choice by limiting the supply of providers to control costs and by increasing medical professionals’ control over the types of services provided in the name of quality control. The medical/welfare dominance of long‐term care policy has resulted in an overreliance on nursing homes as providers, resulting in both escalating costs and continued consumer dissatisfaction.

The second half of the article looks at recent market and policy developments in response to consumer demand for lower cost alternatives to nursing homes. These alternatives promote more consumer autonomy and control in supportive housing arrangements. A more comprehensive services and housing policy could promote these developments in an approach that combines the security of public financing of supportive services with the benefits of consumer choice, market competition, and legal protections that characterize housing markets. In such a scenario, housing finance institutions—including government agencies, lenders, developers, and investors—could play a pivotal role in the long‐term care debate not only by unlocking substantial financial resources but, equally important, by transforming the provision of long‐term care services to promote consumer choice and autonomy.     

Book reviews

This essay challenges the conventional wisdom that political pacts intended to consolidate the transition to democracy have the paradoxical consequence of compromising or freezing democracy. It suggests, instead, that political pacts have a neutral impact and that whether they are good or bad for democracy depends upon the inclusiveness and political diversity of the bargaining cartel and its ties to societal organisations. These arguments are derived from an analysis of the case of Spain, where political pacts led to a widely praised process of democratisation, with contrasting perspectives from Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil, cases that loom large over the debate about how pacts freeze democracy.     

Trying not to lose: The electoral consequences of unilateral reform efforts and the social pact formation process

The existing social pact literature claims that governing parties offer social pact proposals because they anticipate they will receive an electoral benefit from social pact agreements. Yet the available data on social pacts inform us that in a substantial minority of cases social pact proposals fail to become social pact agreements. In an effort to better determine the political calculations made by governments before they propose a social pact, this article examines the effect of implementing reform legislation unilaterally, social pact proposals, social pact proposal failures and social pact agreements on the vote share of government parties in 15 Western European countries between 1981 and 2006. It is found that social pact proposals do not have any electoral consequences for governing parties, unilateral legislation and social pact proposal failures reduce the vote share of governing parties, and social pact agreements provide an electoral benefit to parties in minority governments only. These findings suggest that governing parties propose social pacts in a good faith effort to complete a social pact agreement; and that such an agreement is not a way for these parties to gain votes, but to avoid the electoral punishment associated with enacting unpopular reforms unilaterally.     

Sharing the Rewards,Dividing the Costs? The Electoral Consequences of Social Pacts and Legislative Reform in Western Europe

Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysing whether governments’ pursuit of pacts affects their vote share and increases the probability that they gain re-election for 16 West European countries between 1980 and 2012. It is found that the presence of social pacts has a significant and positive effect on incumbents’ vote shares at the next election and also results in a higher probability of re-election. These results are conditioned by government type: While all types of governments benefit electorally from pacts, the electoral penalties from the pursuit of unilateral legislation on policy reforms harm single-party majorities the most, minority governments moderately, and coalition majorities the least.     

Regression Discontinuity Designs Based on Population Thresholds: Pitfalls and Solutions

In many countries, important features of municipal government (such as the electoral system, mayors' salaries, and the number of councillors) depend on whether the municipality is above or below arbitrary population thresholds. Several papers have used a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to measure the effects of these threshold‐based policies on political and economic outcomes. Using evidence from France, Germany, and Italy, we highlight two common pitfalls that arise in exploiting population‐based policies (compound treatment and sorting), and we provide guidance for detecting and addressing these pitfalls. Even when these problems are present, population‐threshold RDD may be the best available research design for studying the effects of certain policies and political institutions.     

“Big Tigers,Big Data”: Learning Social Reactions to China's Anticorruption Campaign through Online Feedback

This article examines the effect of campaign‐style anticorruption efforts on political support using the case of China's most recent anticorruption drive, which stands out for its harsh crackdown on high‐ranking officials, known as “big tigers.” An exploratory text analysis of more than 370,000 online comments on the downfall of the first 100 big tigers, from 2012 to 2015, reveals that public support for the top national leader who initiated the anticorruption campaign significantly exceeded that afforded to anticorruption agencies and institutions. Further regression analyses show that support for the leaders with respect to intuitions increased with the tigers' party ranking. Findings suggest that while campaign‐style enforcement can reinforce the central authority and magnify support for individual leaders, it may also marginalize the role of legal institutions crucial to long‐term corruption control.     

Citizen satisfaction under changing political leadership: The role of partisan motivated reasoning

There exists a gap in our understanding of what citizen satisfaction evaluations actually represent. While recent years have witnessed a move away from performance‐based models to cognitive‐implicit models of citizen satisfaction, the inherent political nature of government, its institutions, and services has been largely ignored. Drawing on the functional responsibility chain between political principals and governmental, public‐service‐delivering institutions, we outline a theory of citizen satisfaction that accounts for the political nature of these institutions. In the context of two consecutive general elections, we find a partisan bias in citizen satisfaction with government and the legislative branch, but not for institutions that are more clearly separated from national government. These mixed findings are suggestive of a dispersion effect of the partisan bias in citizen satisfaction, namely, that citizens are less likely to use their partisan lenses in cases where the responsibility of political principals is dispersed across multiple actors.     

STAR METRICS and the Science of Science Policy

STAR METRICS is a data platform that is being voluntarily and collaboratively developed by U.S. federal science agencies and research institutions to describe investments in science and their results. It initially emerged as a result of reporting requirements associated with the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; it has developed in response to a recognized need to begin to systematically document federal investments in science and their immediate and long‐term results. The eventual goal is to draw information from existing data on scientific and economic activities as well as from research institutions' and federal science agencies' systems to provide data that can be used for a more scientific analysis of science investments and their outcomes.     

Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission

Credible commitment problems arise whenever decisions made according to short‐term incentives undermine long‐term policy goals. While political actors can credibly commit themselves to their long‐term policy goals by delegating decisions to independent regulatory agencies, the member states of international institutions rarely sacrifice control over regulatory decisions. Against the backdrop of the United Nations Compensation Commission established by the Security Council to settle claims on damage from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, we present an institutional arrangement that promises to credibly commit member states to their previously defined interests without excluding them from the decision process. It separates the stages of rulemaking and rule application, and is reinforced by conditional agenda‐setting of an advisory body. We probe the theoretical claim with evidence from a unique data set that shows that the Commission settled compensation claims in a remarkably consistent way. The arrangement provides a blueprint for comparable regulatory tasks in many areas of international, European, or domestic politics, in which independent regulation is not feasible.     

A Concurrent Analysis of Three Institutions that Transform Health Technology‐Based Ventures: Economic Policy,Capital Investment,and Market Approval

Drawing on institutional theory, this article articulates qualitative insights from a program of research on Canadian health technology‐based ventures to examine the rules that characterize economic policy, capital investment, and regulatory approval as well as the way these institutions enable and constrain the development of ventures at an early stage. Our findings clarify how economic policy integrates these ventures into the entrepreneurial domain, how capital investment configures them for economic value extraction, and how regulatory approval fully releases their market value. These findings help to revisit current policy modernization initiatives by calling attention to the convergence among the three institutions. Rather than operating solely as a source of constraints, these institutions provide a highly integrated market‐oriented space for health technology‐based entrepreneurial activities to unfold.     

Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992

What are the most important sources of institutional variation among authoritarian regimes, and how do such institutions influence these dictatorships' propensity to initiate military disputes? This article argues that most existing studies in both comparative politics and international relations employ a flawed conceptualization of authoritarian institutions. Excessive focus on the personalization or institutionalization of authoritarian regimes' decision‐making procedures has distracted attention from the more critical issue of what institutions these regimes deploy to enhance social control and secure political incumbency. Since military regimes are systematically less effective than single‐party regimes at developing these types of authoritarian institutions, they more frequently resort to desperate measures to fend off domestic challenges to their power. In particular, we find compelling empirical support for our hypothesis that military regimes are more likely than single‐party regimes to initiate military disputes, irrespective of whether those regimes are highly personalized or not.     

Land and Water Institutions in the Blue Nile Basin: Setups and Gaps for Improved Land and Water Management

This study undertook an assessment and gap analysis of the institutional arrangements for improved land and water management in the Tana and Beles Sub‐basins highlands of the Blue Nile Basin. We explored the mandates and design features of the major land‐ and water‐related institutional arrangements. Focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and a literature review were used in the analysis. The results of our work reveal that a lot of progress has been made in creating an institutional framework for improved land and water management and the policies and laws hitherto developed reflect global policy changes consistent with the widespread adoption of the integrated water resources management (IWRM) principles. There are also cases where informal institutions replace formal institutions. Judged by their enforcement, the water resources management, pollution control standards, and regulations and land use rights are not enacted effectively because of poor enforcement capacity. Overall there is a tendency to focus on command‐and‐control type policies. There is a need to strengthen traditional institutions by drawing lessons from their strengths and establish the legitimacy of these institutions. There is also a need to improve formal policy design, developing policies with specific objectives, goals, targets, and overall institutional changes and resources through active adaptive management to maximize the level and effectiveness of institutional learning. Finally, more focus needs to be given to incentive‐based policies through increased use of positive incentives and more emphasis needs to be given to self‐enforcement rather than third‐party enforcement.     

Governmentalities without policy capacity

The professional community of policy experts takes it for granted that all governments seek to strengthen their policy capacity, considering it a key indicator and requisite of their success. Yet this assumption is far from universal, even in some European Union countries with long and complex institutional histories. If we look at the informed and explicit use of policy analysis tools in France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, we have to conclude that this paradigm is not completely integrated into their governmentality. In these countries, three disciplinary approaches warrant especial attention as generators of competencies recognized as usable knowledge for public decisions: ‘law,’ ‘public finance’ and ‘public administration.’ Where the standard operating procedures of democratic institutions appear to be fully defined on the basis of these three categories, the inclusion of the policy perspective encounters major difficulties. In these contexts, the most important obstacle is the fear that the new paradigm will threaten the balance among the constitutional bodies, especially to the detriment of the legislature, and that it will constrict the political leadership. This explains why some countries, such as France and, most recently, Italy, have attempted to resolve the impasse by resorting to the strongest of legitimations: inclusion in their constitutions of public policy evaluation as a function of Parliament. This choice is certainly important, but in itself it does not guarantee recognition of the policy paradigm as a science for democratic institutions.     

Worth the Wait? The Effect of Early Term Birth on Maternal and Infant Health

Early term birth is defined as birth at 37 or 38 weeks gestation. While infants born early term are not considered premature, the medical literature suggests that they have an increased risk of serious adverse health outcomes compared to infants born at term (39 or 40 weeks). Despite these known harms, we document a rise in early term births in the United States from 1989 to the mid‐2000s, followed by a decline in recent years. We posit that the recent decline in early term births has been driven by changes in medical practice advocated by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, programs such as the March of Dimes’ “Worth the Wait” campaign, and by Medicaid policy. We first show that this pattern cannot be attributed to changes in the demographic composition of mothers, and provide some evidence that efforts to reduce early term elective deliveries (EEDs) through Medicaid policy were effective. We next exploit county‐level variation in the timing of these changes in medical practice to examine the effect of early term inductions (our proxy for EEDs) on infant and maternal health. We find that early term inductions lower birth weights and increase the risks of precipitous labor, birth injury, and required ventilation. Our results suggest that reductions in early term inductions can explain about one‐third of the overall increase in birth weights between 2010 and 2013 for births at 37 weeks gestation and above.