Politics and Unemployment in Industrialized Democracies

This paper provides an empirical appraisal of the influence ofpolitics on the evolution of unemployment rates in 13industrialized democracies (12 European Union countries andthe U.S.) from 1960 to 1999. We conduct new tests ofopportunistic and partisan business cycle models, using richerdata and more general specifications than previous studies. Incontrast to most previous studies, we pay particular attentionto the importance of labor market structure in conditioningthe influence of politics on unemployment. We also investigatethe relationship between political stability and economicstability. The results suggest the existence of partisan effects, withhigher unemployment rates prevailing under ``right'' partiesthan ``left'' parties. There is more support for ``rational''partisan models that embody transient partisan impacts thanfor models with permanent effects. We find evidence that unionpower is associated with higher average unemployment rates,but that centralized bargaining institutions tend to lowerunemployment rates. The evidence also suggests that morefragmented coalition governments are associated with higherunemployment rates than single party governments.     

Digital Politics in Western Democracies: A Comparative Study

Satisfaction with democracy is driven by the two mechanisms that affect citizens’ income: the market and the state. When people consider that the levels of economic growth and redistribution are sufficient, they are more satisfied with the performance of democratic institutions. This relationship is moderated by personal income: since low-income citizens are more sensitive to changes in personal economic circumstances than high-income citizens, they give more weight to economic perceptions and opinions about redistribution. In this paper evidence is found of this conditional relationship in survey data from 16 established democracies. The results offer a rich characterisation of the state and market-based mechanisms that affect satisfaction with democracy.     

Buttery Guns and Welfare Hawks: The Politics of Defense Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies

In this article, we present a new theory that, given the economic consequences of military spending, some governments may use military spending as a means of advancing their domestic non‐military objectives. Based on evidence that governments can use military spending as welfare policy in disguise, we argue that the role of ideology in shaping military spending is more complicated than simple left‐right politics. We also present a theory that strategic elites take advantage of opportunities presented by international events, leading us to expect governments that favor more hawkish foreign policy policies to use low‐level international conflicts as opportunities for increasing military spending. Using pooled time‐series data from 19 advanced democracies in the post–World War II period, we find that government ideology, measured as welfare and international positions, interacts with the international security environment to affect defense spending.     

Divergence in Diversity? The Dissimilar Effects of Cleavages on Electoral Politics in New Democracies

Recent theory on ethnic identity suggests that it is constructed and highly influenced by contextual factors and group leaders' strategies. Therefore, while the notion that social cleavages stabilize electoral politics is well established, which cleavages matter and why remain open questions. This article argues that in new democracies the effects of diffuse ethnic cleavages on electoral politics diverge depending on the amount of information they provide to their constituency. The information provision, in turn, depends on how well the cleavage lends itself to the formation of ethnic parties. A formal model of voting stability is developed and empirically tested using data on electoral volatility in all new democracies since 1945 and on individual voting in democratizing Bulgaria. The results show that in the sample examined only identity that centers on language jump-starts party-system stabilization, while race and religion do nothing to stabilize the vote in early elections.     

In Search of Successful Reform: The Politics of Opposition and Consensus in OECD Parliamentary Democracies

Why are some governments able to undertake controversial policy reforms and others are not? Conventional wisdom argues that single-party majority governments are best able to implement reforms because there are fewer veto actors within the government that can block the reforms. However, these accounts fail to consider the veto power of societal actors and particularly of trade unions, which can stall reform even in the presence of a unified executive. This paper argues that controversial reforms require broad societal and, consequently, political consensus, which are easier to achieve under minority governments or governments of broad coalitions. Evidence from 22 OECD parliamentary democracies over 35 years shows that minority and large coalition governments have been more successful in reducing social security contributions and pensions than narrower majority governments. This is especially true in countries where trade unions are militant and often resort to industrial action.     

Work Sharing Policy: Power Sharing and Stalemate in American Federalism

Work sharing benefits are partial unemployment benefits, andfederal policy related to them is in an administrative muddle.A lack of leadership by the federal government has stalled stateimplementation. During economic downturns when political voltageis high, policy makers look to work sharing as one way to managejob loss. Conversely, work sharing is often forgotten duringprosperous times. This article describes how federalism sometimesfacilitates state initiation of work sharing policy and at othertimes impedes it. The authors discuss work sharing through sixpolicy phases during a thirty-year era of devolving federalauthority to states for employment services and job training,and they make observations about the stalemate in federal policy.     

Politics and Power in the European Convention

The Convention on the future of the European Union has been heralded by many as a unique political setting. So far the process of EU Treaty change was subject to the collision of national political interests in Intergovernmental Conferences. By contrast, the Convention appears to promise a fundamentally open and normatively informed arena. This article probes the validity of this promise by dissecting the political dynamics of the Convention along three dimensions: political behaviour and alliance formation; agenda management; and the norms informing its proceedings.     

Politics and Power in the United Kingdom

PRODUCING an introductory text for any academic discipline isa challenging task; however, the work involved in compilingand writing a comprehensive user-friendly and contemporary workfor British Politics undergraduate students has to be one ofthe most daunting tasks to face the political scientist. With the trend towards receiving ever more information and newson politics and political events from the worldwide web, coupledwith the expansion of transmission time by a range of radioand television outlets, much political coverage tends towardssimplistic explanation, driven largely by personality ratherthan policy concerns. Consequently, the importance of producinga thorough introductory text removing misperception and misinformationhas intensified. However, in Politics and Power in the United Kingdom editedby Heffernan and Thompson, both established and well-respectedfigures in their subject disciplines,     

Power Politics and Wars without States

In order to evaluate the applicability of power politics theories of war and international stability to interactions among nonstate actors, I test hypotheses from power transition theory and from neorealist arguments about systemic polarity against the behavior of 20 state and nonstate actors in nineteenth‐century South America. I find considerable support for two of the three hypotheses tested and conclude that existing IR theory has more explanatory power within the empirical domain of nonstate relations than critics of such theory claim.     

Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes

I examine a fundamental problem of politics in authoritarian regimes: the dictator and the ruling coalition must share power and govern in an environment where political influence must be backed by a credible threat of violence. I develop a model of authoritarian politics in which power sharing is complicated by this conflict of interest: by exploiting his position, the dictator may acquire more power at the expense of the ruling coalition, which may attempt to deter such opportunism by threatening to stage a coup. Two power-sharing regimes, contested and established dictatorships, may emerge as a result of strategic behavior by the dictator and the ruling coalition. This theory accounts for the large variation in the duration of dictators' tenures and the concentration of power in dictatorships over time, and it contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of power sharing and accountability in authoritarian regimes.     

Paradoxes of Voting Power in Dutch Politics

In this paper we first evaluate thirteen seat distributions inthe Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament by means of severalindices of voting power. Subsequently, we search for theoccurrence of the paradox of redistribution, the paradox ofnew members, and the paradox of large size for each powerindex. The indices used are the Shapley-Shubik index, thenormalized Banzhaf index, the Penrose-Banzhaf index, theHoller index, and the Deegan-Packel index.     

The Politics of Inclusive Agreements: towards a Critical Discourse Theory of Democracy

This article offers a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas's discourse theory of democracy. It suggests that the main thrust of a discursive account of legitimacy is the attempt to show how the demands of maximal democratic inclusion might be reconciled with a politics of reasoned agreements. While this aim is endorsed, the thrust of the argument is that a critical theory of democracy requires that normative frameworks that bring certain substantive features of democratic life into focus should supplement Habermas's procedural approach. First, the account of maximal inclusion has to be developed in a way that clarifies the egalitarian demands of distributive justice. Secondly, the account of a politics of reasoned agreements has to be connected to a theoretical analysis of the bonds of solidarity that could underpin such a form of political engagement. These developments contribute to a critical theory that gives a more adequate account of the motivational basis of discursive democracy.     

Career De-Separation in Westminster Democracies

In Westminster parliamentary systems there was once a clear separation between the careers of public servants and of elected politicians. Politicians decided what policies they wanted to pursue, while public servants advised, devised and delivered the policies. This separation ensured that policy ideas were developed by a professional elite with experience and knowledge. Politicians came from a variety of backgrounds, entering politics for a variety of reasons. Over time, the source of policy advice for ministers has shifted from the professional public servant to political advisers lacking experience and with different career ambitions than public service. Increasingly, elected politicians are becoming ‘professionalised’—emerging from similar party and adviser backgrounds. The de-separation of what were once distinct career paths has led to poorer policy development, increasing public malfeasance, a lower-quality civil service, and democratic disenchantment. We need to separate the career paths once more.     

Democratic Quality in Stable Democracies

The major predecessor to Ringen’s and my own efforts to measure democratic quality in terms of the purpose of democracy is Robert Dahl’s seminal book Polyarchy (1971). Measuring the quality of democracy requires two prior judgments: (1) making sure that, in terms of institutional characteristics, a country is sufficiently democratic, and that, as a minimum, it has universal suffrage, and (2) that its democracy has been uninterrupted for a minimum number of years. To an important extent, higher democratic quality can be attributed to institutional characteristics of consensus democracy, especially proportional representation.