Issue compensation and right‐wing government social spending

It is well‐established that prolonged left‐wing incumbency has a positive long‐term effect on welfare effort in terms of high levels of social spending and reduced levels of economic inequality and poverty. Prolonged left‐wing incumbency also influences the institutional set‐up of welfare states, in particular generating strong support for existing arrangements in countries with large welfare states. The issue ownership literature furthermore shows that the public comes to distrust right‐wing parties as defenders of the welfare state. In countries that have a tradition of left‐wing incumbency it is particularly important for right‐wing governments to compensate for the distrust of the public because of the popularity of the welfare state and strong vested interests. While right‐wing governments on average are negatively associated with social spending, there is a strong positive association between right‐wing government and social spending in traditionally left‐wing countries. It is even the case that right‐wing governments in these countries spend more on social welfare than left‐wing governments. This indicates that right‐wing governments are forced to compensate for the lack of public trust by being even more generous than the left.     

Breaking the Mould? Roy Jenkins’ ‘Radical Centre’ and British Social Democracy in the ‘New Hard Times’

Social democratic politics in Britain requires compelling answers to three animating questions that Roy Jenkins posed in his landmark 1979 Dimbleby lecture. Firstly, how can the British system of democracy be reformed to develop a culture of political participation and pluralism that leads to more equitable economic and social policies? Secondly, how can the centre‐left and left unite to forestall long periods of Tory dominance in electoral politics, thereby avoiding calamities such as the 2016 referendum on EU membership? And, thirdly, how can a flourishing intellectual ecosystem be cultivated on the progressive left that generates radical ideas for economic and social reform, recognising the importance of concerted dialogue between political traditions? This article revisits Jenkins’ 1979 lecture by considering the prospects for ‘breaking the mould’ of British politics in the ‘new hard times’ of Brexit and ‘permanent austerity’.     

The electoral consequences of two great crises

Who benefits from deep economic crises: the left, the right or neither? On the basis of evidence from elections in 1929–1933 and 2008–2013 in all states that were democracies in both periods, it is argued in this article that the electoral consequences of the Great Depression and the Great Recession were surprisingly similar: in both periods, right‐wing parties were at first more successful than left‐wing parties, although this effect only lasted for a few years. The manner in which a crisis develops over time should be taken into account when examining the effects of deep economic downturns on the electoral fortunes of the left and the right.     

Revealing preferences: Does deliberation increase ideological awareness among the less well educated?

Research suggests that the rightist discourse on immigration appeals to left‐leaning citizens with lower levels of education. The opposite is, however, not true for right‐wing voters with lower educational levels, and this asymmetry leaves left‐wing parties at a disadvantage compared with the right on immigration and integration issues. Deliberative theory promises that discussion, information and reflection can promote a more balanced political discussion and a more enlightened citizen. This article assesses the extent to which deliberative polling increases the ideological awareness of citizens with lower educational levels. More specifically, it gauges the extent to which especially less well educated left‐wing voters – those whose attitudes research finds to be particularly out of tune with their ideological predispositions regarding immigration and integration – adjust their attitudes as a consequence of deliberate exposure to informational input and the presentation of two‐sided arguments. Use is made of unique data generated during the first European‐wide deliberative polling project, ‘EuroPolis’, held in 2009. The results indicate that less well educated left‐wing voters indeed have slightly more negative attitudes towards immigrants than leftist voters with secondary or post‐secondary educational levels. Turning to the micro‐mechanisms of attitude change in a deliberative setting, the analyses show that both levels of education and ideological predispositions play a role in the extent to which participants of the deliberative poll adjust their attitudes. In three out of four models, evidence is found that less well educated left‐leaning citizens are indeed most likely to adjust their attitudes on immigration and integration after being presented with a more balanced discussion of the topic.     

The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism

What can explain the strong euroscepticism of radical parties of both the right and the left? This article argues that the answer lies in the paradoxical role of nationalism as a central element in both party families, motivating opposition towards European integration. Conventionally, the link between nationalism and euroscepticism is understood solely as a prerogative of radical right‐wing parties, whereas radical left‐wing euroscepticism is associated with opposition to the neoliberal character of the European Union. This article contests this view. It argues that nationalism cuts across party lines and constitutes the common denominator of both radical right‐wing and radical left‐wing euroscepticism. It adopts a mixed‐methods approach, combining intensive case study analysis with quantitative analysis of party manifestos. First, it traces the link between nationalism and euroscepticism in Greece and France in order to demonstrate the internal validity of the argument. It then undertakes a cross‐country statistical estimation to assess the external validity of the argument and its generalisability across Europe.     

Review Article: Isaiah Berlin's Contribution to Modern Political Theory

Three recent studies of Isaiah Berlin's moral and political thought stress the significance of value pluralism for his oeuvre. Whilst this emphasis enables us to dispense with some rather misleading characterizations of Berlin's liberalism, it is less apparent that his political thought can be successfully grounded within moral pluralism. Indeed his liberal beliefs sit rather more awkwardly within this ideological family than is usually assumed. Scholars seeking to revive Berlin's value pluralism in relation to contemporary challenges, such as multiculturalism, have not successfully demonstrated the utility of his thinking in relation to such problems, and have developed their arguments by downplaying the geo-political contexts which shaped his intellectual purposes. Yet his critics have neglected the fertility and range of his thought, aspects of which remain pertinent for those studying political thought in general and liberalism in particular.     

Pathways to power: Women's representation in the 2014 European Parliament elections

The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections produced a record proportion of women MEPs overall (37 per cent). Yet, these results vary widely across countries and parties. This article aims to explain these variations, evaluating not only who the elected representatives of the 8^th EP are, but also how they got there. Are the paths to the EP the same for women and men? Are there gender differences in terms of MEPs’ political experience? A unique dataset listing more than 700 elected MEPs and their background, party and country characteristics is used to empirically examine who makes it to the EP and through which route. The results of the analysis suggest no significant gender differences in the pathways to the EP. Yet, parties matter: more women were elected to the 8^th EP from left‐wing than from right‐wing or ‘new’ parties, and both men and (especially) women representing right‐wing parties tend to be politically more experienced than their fellow MEPs from other types of parties. Furthermore, it is found that men are more likely than women to be promoted straight from party office to the EP, suggesting that some pathways to the EP are less open to women than others.     

Beyond protest and discontent: A cross‐national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support

Studies on populist parties – or ‘supply‐side populism’ more generally – are numerous. Nevertheless, the connection with demand‐side dynamics, and particularly the populist characteristics or tendencies of the electorate, requires more scholarly attention. This article examines in more detail the conditions underlying the support for populist parties, and in particular the role of populist attitudes amongst citizens. It asks two core questions: (1) are populist party supporters characterised by stronger populist attitudes than other party supporters, and (2) to what extent do populist (and other) attitudes contribute to their party preference? The analysis uses fixed effect models and relies on a cross‐sectional research design that uses unique survey data from 2015 and includes nine European countries. The results are threefold. First, in line with single‐country studies, populist attitudes are prominent among supporters of left‐ and right‐wing populist parties in particular. Second, populist attitudes are important predictors of populist party support in addition to left‐wing socioeconomic issue positions for left‐wing populist parties, and authoritarian and anti‐immigration issue positions for right‐wing populist parties. Third, populist attitudes moderate the effect of issue positions on the support for populist parties, particularly for individuals whose positions are further removed from the extreme ends of the economic or cultural policy scale. These findings suggest that strong populist attitudes may encourage some voters to support a populist party whose issue positions are incongruous with their own policy‐related preferences.     

Tariq Ramadan and the Quest for a Moderate Islam

Tariq Ramadan calls himself a bridge builder between Muslims and European culture, but contradictions in his theology prevent him from fulfilling this role. He is an Islamic intellectual who espouses democracy and pluralism, yet he believes that shari‘a law is universal. He exhorts his European followers to refrain from anti-Semitic violence, yet he cites as an authority Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is an apologist for Palestinian suicide bombers. He calls for Muslims to be full participants in Western civic societies, yet he calls on Muslims to “resist” the neo-liberal economic order that forms the basis of Western society. Ramadan has made alliances with left wing politicians and academics in France, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States, but he has a pattern of disappointing and frustrating his leftist allies. In the wake of terrorist attacks in Britain and the Netherlands, the British and Dutch governments called upon Ramadan to support peaceable brands of Islam in these traumatized countries. These efforts failed because Ramadan’s most important constituency has always been “the Muslim street,” and this makes it difficult for him to embrace liberal principles.     

Party ideology and clientelistic linkage

How does parties' ideology affect their linkage strategies? While scholars maintain that economically right wing parties are more clientelistic, there has been no systematic study testing this argument. We examine the conservative ideology-clientelism nexus with multi-level quantitative analyses of parties' clientelistic appeals. Our analysis reveals a robust, yet nuanced relationship between ideology and clientelism. Specifically, right wing parties are more clientelistic than left wing parties, but only with regard to providing broad economic rents to clients. In contrast, economically conservative parties are not more likely to engage in individual targeted clientelism. Moreover, parties' ties with economic interests mediate the relationship between ideology and clientelism. Finally, the association between parties' linkage to business interests and rents clientelism is attenuated by country-level economic liberalism.     

Metaphysics Postponed: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Neutrality

Many recent liberal theorists have argued that state neutrality is supported by a metaphysical thesis about value, namely pluralism , which asserts that there are some conceptions of the good life which neither form a hierarchy nor represent versions of a single good. It is however doubtful whether neutrality is supported by pluralism; indeed, it may in some cases be precluded by it. Arguments for pluralism can, in many cases, be reconciled with a monistic metaphysics of value, and pluralism itself fails to support neutrality. This is particularly true of traditional liberal policy positions such as religious toleration and opposition to censorship, where attention to diverse conceptions of the good may favour, or demand, non–neutral policies. The political problems which neutrality addresses arise before we accept the metaphysical 'truth' of pluralism, and often remain even if the parties to a political conflict have false conceptions of value. A sharp question for the pluralist neutralist is why conflicting conceptions of the political cannot themselves feature in plural conceptions of the good life. Dispensing with pluralism may not, however, be enough to rescue neutrality, since the disputes which neutrality was designed to deal with may not be resolvable neutrally; and more particularly, some of the traditional liberal policies may be incapable of neutral justification. If so, liberals may find a more traditional form of non–neutral liberalism more attractive.     

Inequality,marketisation and the left: Schools policy in England and Sweden

It is argued in this article that the marketisation of schools policy has a tendency to produce twin effects: an increase in educational inequality, and an increase in general satisfaction with the schooling system. However, the effect on educational inequality is very much stronger where prevailing societal inequality is higher. The result is that cross‐party political agreement on the desirability of such reforms is much more likely where societal inequality is lower (as the inequality effects are also lower). Counterintuitively, then, countries that are more egalitarian – and so typically thought of as being more left‐wing – will have a higher likelihood of adopting marketisation than more unequal countries. Evidence is drawn from a paired comparison of English and Swedish schools policies from the 1980s to the present. Both the policy history and elite interviews lend considerable support for the theory in terms of both outcomes and mechanisms.     

Opposition Policy Influence through Agenda‐setting: The Environment in Denmark, 1993–2009

This article addresses the opportunities that the opposition has to influence policy – a topic that has been neglected in existing party policy research. The idea that is developed is applied to a remarkable environmental policy development during the Danish right‐wing government in the 2000s. Contrary to its position when it took office in 2001, the right‐wing government turned green and adopted a series of green policy initiatives. It is argued in this article that vehement and persistent criticism from the left‐wing opposition provides an explanation for this turn. Taking media coverage, public opinion, carbon dioxide emissions and the government's approval ratings into account, the empirical estimation based on unique quarterly data shows that opposition criticism had a systematic impact on the government's pro‐environmental policy development. The implications for party policy research are important. If the aim is to understand how parties matter to policy, the opposition should be taken more seriously.     

How Michael Foot Won the Labour Party Leadership

This paper examines the voting motivations of Labour parliamentarians in the final parliamentary ballot of the Labour party leadership election of 1980. By constructing a data set of the voting behaviour of Labour parliamentarians and by determining the ideological disposition of the 1980 parliamentary Labour party (PLP) this paper examines the ideological disposition of the candidates' vis‐à‐vis their electorate, and offers a challenge to traditional interpretations of how and why Foot was elected. The traditional interpretation has sought for explanations as to how a right‐wing dominated PLP elected a left‐wing candidate. Whilst citing the traditional interpretations of the impact of the impending Electoral College, mandatory reselection and the assumed weaknesses of the Healey campaign, this paper argues that there was considerably more left‐wing sentiment within the 1980 PLP in terms of economic management, defence and the Common Market, than previously considered. As such this paper suggests that, taken with the impact of the other factors, the victory of Foot should not be seen as that surprising.     

The Real Winner's Curse

Traditional theories of democracy suggest that political representation of excluded groups can reduce their incentives to engage in conflict and lead to lower violence. However, this argument ignores the response of established elites when (1) their interests are threatened by the policy stance of new political actors and (2) elites have a comparative advantage in the exercise of violence. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we show that the narrow election of previously excluded left‐wing parties to local executive office in Colombia results in a one standard deviation increase in violent events by right‐wing paramilitaries. We interpret this surge in violence as a reaction of traditional elites to offset the increase in outsiders' access to formal political power. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that violence by left‐wing guerrillas and other actors is unaffected and that violence is not influenced by the victory of right‐wing or other new parties in close elections.     

Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism Revisited

This article is meant as a contribution to the ongoing debate about the relative importance of numerical democracy and corporate pluralism, which was initiated by the late Stein Rokkan and has been recently taken up in the United States by Robert Dahl, and also by Don Schwerin.
The existence of Norwegian data that can throw some light on the subject is indicated.     

Family Leave Policies and Labor Market Segregation in Germany: Reinvention or Reform of the Male Breadwinner Model?1

abstract The historically dominant male breadwinner and female carer model in West Germany has resulted in comparably low female employment rates and a gender‐structured labor market. Since the 1970s, the decline of traditional patterns and sectors of male employment has been accompanied by the expansion of the female‐dominated service sector. Supplemented by women's higher educational attainment, a pluralism of household forms, and German unification, the result has been constant growth in female employment. With more working mothers, the question of combining work and family has provoked policy responses that, in West Germany, have mainly centered on family leave policies. In addressing the question of whether these policies have resulted in a more equitable sharing of paid and family work, this article presents longitudinal empirical data on the working patterns of women entitled to different forms of family leave. These show how changing regulations have led to the institutionalization of a “baby break” for younger women and to the promotion of labor market exclusion.     

The authoritarian logic of regulatory pluralism: Understanding China's new environmental actors

Over the last decade, Chinese citizens, judges, and prosecutors have started to take action against industrial pollution, pluralizing a regulatory landscape originally occupied by administrative agencies. Regulatory pluralism here has an authoritarian logic, occurring without the retreat of party‐state control. Under such logic, the party‐state both needs and fears new actors for their positive and negative roles in controlling risk and maintaining stability. Consequently, the regime's relation to regulatory pluralism is ambivalent, shifting between support and restriction. This prevents a development of a regulatory society that could bypass the regulatory state. Theoretically, this special edition argues for a subjective definition of regulation in a context of pluralism. Moreover, it finds that regulatory pluralism need not coincide with a decentring of regulation. Finally, it highlights how entry onto the regulatory landscape affects the non‐regulatory roles of new actors, creating unintended consequences for regulatory pluralism.     

Right‐wing populist party supporters: Dissatisfied but not direct democrats

Right‐wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right‐wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right‐wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right‐wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right‐wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.     

The Political Management of Pluralism

The problem for religion today is not that God is dead, but that there are too many gods. The focus, understandably, has been on the global increase of religious pluralism in the contemporary world. It is important to note, however, that there has been pluralism in earlier periods of history. The topic of this symposium is the exploration of such cases, both in the West and outside it.