Sincere Cooperation,Respect for Democracy and EU Citizenship: Sufficient to Guarantee Scotland's Future in the European Union?

The position of an independent Scotland within the European Union (EU) has recently been a subject of considerable debate. The European Commission has argued that any newly independent state formed from the territory of an existing Member State would require an Accession Treaty. This article critiques that official position and distinguishes between a set of claims that could be made on behalf of an independent Scottish state, and a set of claims that could be made on behalf of the citizens of an independent Scottish state vis‐à‐vis the EU. It argues that the general principles of the EU Treaties ought to govern how Scotland is treated, and that a new Accession Treaty is not necessary. Furthermore, notwithstanding the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the area of EU citizenship, we conclude that EU citizenship itself is not sufficient to guarantee or generate membership of the EU.     

‘Caminante,no hay camino,se hace camino al andar’1: EU Citizenship,Direct Democracy and Treaty Ratification

Abstract: This article argues that obligatory, simultaneous, and simple Treaty ratification by referenda is the next step in the consolidation of the political core of European citizenship. In the first part, general remarks about the special nature of EU citizenship highlight the relevance of referenda on EU Treaties for EU citizenship. In the second part, the normative and empirical case in favour of direct democracy is put forward. It is followed by the assessment of direct democracy in European integration as we have known it so far. The practice is irreversible and gaining in momentum. But it is in need of substantial reform due to procedural dysfunctions and discriminatory consequences for the citizens. Section V relates this result to a legal analysis of EU citizenship. The suppression of the discriminatory consequences of the Treaty ratification procedure is necessary from a legal point of view, but it cannot be expected from the ‘judicial incrementalism’ that has characterised the development of EU citizenship regarding free movement and residence. In section VI , the conclusions of the previous sections are drawn into the final proposal of obligatory, simultaneous and simple Treaty reform by referenda in all Member States. At the end, five counter‐arguments to the proposal are discussed.     

The Rule of Reason in European Citizenship

Abstract:  This article reviews the European Court of Justice's case-law on European citizenship in the light of aspects of the rights theories of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. More specifically, the free movement right in Article 18(1) EC is conceptualised as a Dworkinian principle and as a prima-facie right or 'optimisation precept' in Alexy's sense. Against this backdrop the article argues that Article 18(1) can best be interpreted by drawing an analogy with the economic free movement provisions. The central argument is that the rule of reason also applies to European citizenship, or that there is a rule of reason in European citizenship. The analogy encompasses both the definition of the scope of Article 18(1) and its limitations. With regard to the latter, it is contended that there is no conceptual distinction between the 'limitations' and 'conditions' referred to in that provision. Particular emphasis is placed on the recent case-law concerning the question of access to welfare benefits. In this regard it is suggested that the notion of a 'structural link' constitutes both a threshold criterion to trigger the prima-facie right in Article 18(1) as well as a benchmark for assessing the degree of solidarity owed to the migrant citizen. The rule of reason approach leads to the stipulation of a thin, juridical conception of European citizenship that does not rely in any way on thick, essentialist properties.     

The EU ‘Stress Tests’: The Basis for a New Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Safety

Among the constitutional tensions at the heart of the European integration process, the relationship between ‘mainstream’ EU Law (framed by the Treaty on European Union) and Euratom Law has often been overlooked. Nonetheless, the EU's response to the nuclear power plant accident in Fukushima provides an opportunity to revisit this relationship. This article specifically aims to highlight the dysfunctions of the prevailing understanding of the Euratom's provisions on nuclear safety matters as well as to identify, under a joint interpretation of all EU Treaties, how to develop a European nuclear safety regime that reinforces the compensatory role of EU law and contributes to enhance the EU's legitimacy.     

The Scope of Article 12 EC: Some Remarks on the Influence of European Citizenship

Abstract:  According to European Court of Justice (ECJ) case-law, the scope of application of the EC Treaty is engaged under the following conditions when the free movement of persons has been established: a cross-border connection is given; the Union citizen concerned resides legally in the host Member State; and the measure in question or the regulation has a connection with the residence or facilitates it. This condition will regularly be fulfilled since nearly every (national) regulation has a direct or indirect effect on the stay. A general link to primary or secondary law is, on the other hand, not necessary. Secondary law, however, can be significant in connection with the lawful residence. Even if partly vehement critiques have been formulated against this approach of the ECJ, it is convincing with regard to the aim of guaranteeing the free movement to European citizens.     

Forward or Back: The Future of European Integration and the Impossibility of the Status Quo

This article considers how the legal and political order of the EU can cope if the ‘Ever Closer Union’ envisaged by the Treaties ceases to be inevitable. In particular, it focuses on what are the likely consequences if previously successful integration mechanisms such as integration through law (including adventurous pro‐integration interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)) and functional integration can no longer successfully push forward the integration process. It considers whether it is possible for the Union to ‘stand still’, that is, to maintain the current level of integration without either moving forward to more intensive integration or engaging in costly and disruptive disintegration. In order to substantiate this claim, the article looks at three areas, the law of citizenship, the Eurozone and the legislative structures of the Union, showing in each case that the neither the current degree of integration nor methods used in recent times to move the integration process forward provide a long term basis for policy.     

Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in the EC Legal System

Abstract:  This article contrasts species of regulatory and tax arbitrage with the ECJ's approach to abuse of rights. Its aim is to explain the concepts, describe their relationship and identify the legal and policy issues which they raise within the EC legal system. Arbitrage and abuse figure prominently in the ECJ's case-law, especially on the freedom of movement. In its more recent case-law, the ECJ has adopted a more developed approach to abuse of rights by laying down a two-prong test. This article seeks to draw legal and policy conclusions by examining inter alia the virtues and vices of the EC doctrine of abuse of rights.     

The Schengen Law: A Challenge for Legal Accountability in the European Union

This article examines challenges for accountability arising from the development of the Schengen law within the framework of the European Union. Building upon the substantive body of research by other authors on general implications of the integration of the Schengen acquis , it focuses on recent developments after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and evaluates to what extent the European institutions have so far met the challenges for accountability stemming from the intergovernmental origin of the Schengen law. The article identifies various persisting deficiencies in the areas of transparency, institutional balance and judicial review and proposes specific actions, which should be addressed vigorously by the European institutions.     

The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case

There is little doubt that the European Union suffers from a legitimacy deficit. However, the causes of this deficit and, as a consequence, the remedies are contested. This article wants to show that an important, but often overlooked, cause for the legitimacy deficit lies in the overconstitutionalization of the EU. The European Treaties have been constitutionalized by the ECJ, but are full of provisions that would be ordinary law in states. Constitutionalization means de‐politicization. What has been regulated on the constitutional level is no longer open for political decision‐making. Thus, in the EU political decisions of high salience are not only withdrawn from the democratically legitimized institutions, but also immunized against political correction. Therefore, the consequences from the constitutionalization have to be drawn: The Treaties should be reduced to those norms that reflect the functions of a constitution, whereas all the other parts have to be downgraded to the level of secondary law.     

Constitutionalism and Dissonances: Has Europe Paid Off Its Debt to Functionalism?

Abstract The negative outcomes of the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty have opened a period of profound constitutional disenchantment in relation to the EU. This impression seems confirmed by the recent Presidency Conclusions of the European Council which, although salvaging many important solutions contained in the Constitutional Treaty, explicitly sanction that ‘the constitutional concept . . . is abandoned’. In the light of this context, what role could the constitutional scholarship play? How to make sense of a polity in which the claims of constitutionalism as a form of power are politically unappealing though legally plausible? This article tries to respond to these questions by reaffirming functionalism as a valid analytical and normative perspective in facing the current constitutional reality of European integration. The analytical value associated with functionalism is evidenced by testing against the current context of the EU legal framework the accounts for EU constitutionalism which postulate functional equivalence between the EU and the Member States. The normative potential of functionalism, then, is discussed by arguing that there may be a value worth preserving in a degree of functional discrepancy between the EU and state constitutionalism and, notably, that the transformative and civilising dividend inherent in functionalism could still be exploited, at least in certain areas of EU policy making. Finally, the article suggests that the difficulties in accounting for EU constitutionalism in the light of state‐centred constitutional theory could be regarded as symptoms of European integration marking a moment in the theoretical evolution of constitutionalism.     

Sub-Constitutional Engineering: Negotiation, Content, and Legal Value of Interinstitutional Agreements in the EU

Abstract:  This article analyses the roles and impact of Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs) in the EU, taking into account their relationship to primary law. Concretely speaking, these roles range from (a) explicitly authorised specifications of Treaty provisions via (b) not explicitly authorised specifications of vague Treaty law to (c) pure political undertaking. Based on the distinction between the constitutional and the operational level of the political game, we challenge the assumption that IIAs usually strengthen the European Parliament. As our case study, the 1993 interrelated package of IIAs on democracy, transparency and subsidiarity, illustrates, the European Parliament is not the only institution that benefits from IIAs, especially if they lack a sufficiently precise Treaty basis. Furthermore, if Treaty provisions underlying IIAs are precise, they also tend to produce precise and thus legally relevant content. Conversely, if IIAs deal primarily with elusive concepts they are likely to be legally ambiguous or even irrelevant at all.     

The rule of law as the lodestar of the European Convention on Human Rights: The Strasbourg Court and the independence of the judiciary

The rule of law is a constitutional principle under the European Convention on Human Rights. Throughout its history, the rule of law has been the lodestar guiding the development of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In recent years, the normative impact of this principle has been increasing in the case-law of the Court, in particular in cases dealing with the independence of the judiciary. The article discusses the conceptual core of the rule of law under the Convention system as a fundamental component of “European public order”. Subsequently, the three-dimensional normative status of the rule of law is explored as well as the Court's statement that the principle is “inherent in all the Articles of the Convention”. On this basis, an in-depth analysis is undertaken of the application in recent Strasbourg case-law of the independence of the judiciary as a fundamental organic component of the rule of law. Finally, the author reflects on the “symbiotic” relationship in the field of judicial independence between the Strasbourg Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union.     

Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures—The Yusuf and Kadi Judgments of the Court of First Instance

Abstract:  In the Yusuf and Kadi judgments of 21 September 2005, the Court of First Instance endorsed the Community practice of sanctioning individuals blacklisted by the United Nations (UN). It accepted that the Community uses its competence to adopt state sanctions in combination with Article 308 EC to freeze the assets of civil persons, including European citizens. The court also reduced its jurisdiction to a basic scrutiny of whether jus cogens was violated. The Court of First Instance's decisions can be criticised on various grounds. First, the application of these Articles is contrary to the wording of the Treaty and the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Further, as a consequence of the Court of First Instance's judgments, decisions of the UN Sanctions Committee become the supreme law within the EU, provided they meet the requirements of jus cogens as defined by the Court of First Instance. In addition, the individual is deprived of all fundamental rights guaranteed under European law.     

From vocational training to education: the development of a no‐frontiers education policy for Europe?

This article focuses on developments towards an EU educational policy. Education was not included as one of the Community competencies in the Treaty of Rome. The first half of the article analyses the way that the European Court of Justice and the Commission of the European Communities between them managed to develop a series of substantial Community programmes out of Article 128 on vocational training. The second half of the article discusses educational developments in the community following the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of Amsterdam. Whilst the legal competence of the community now includes education, the author's argument is that the inclusion of an educational competence will not result in further developments to mirror those in the years before the Treaty on European Union. If the 1980s were a decade of expansion, the medium‐term future is likely to be one of consolidation.     

Conditionality and Enlargement in Light of EU Constitutional Developments

Abstract: Conditionality has deeply affected European integration, particularly in what concerns EU human rights external policy on the one hand, and the enlargement process on the other hand. This paper affords a picture of the problems which conditionality has raised, not only on legal grounds, but also for the shaping and the understanding of the European identity. Moreover, the paper investigates how recent EU developments, such as the further stages of the enlargement process and the ‘Treaty establishing a European Constitution’, might change the course of, and might be affected by, conditionality.     

Gender Equality, Citizenship, and the EU's Constitutional Future

Abstract:  While gender equality has been a matter of some concern for EU law and policy makers over the past half century, this concern has tended, at least historically, to focus upon equal treatment in employment and has not yet materialised into the delivery of a broader package of civil, political, and social rights for women. Taking the concept of EU citizenship as a framework within which to view the promotion of gender equality, this article assesses the debate on the constitutional future of the EU. This is with a view to examining the possible amelioration of women's social position through the exploitation of opportunities that the constitutionalisation of EU law presents. Looking at women's citizenship through the lens of political rights to participate in the debate on the EU's future, together with examining substantive aspects of the Constitutional Treaty for their gender equality content, the article suggests that a more comprehensive endeavour by all institutional actors to engage in gender mainstreaming is needed in order to give effect to a broader form of equality between women and men.     

The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged Union

Abstract The concept of citizenship is analysed on three seemingly contradictory levels: its integration by the recent case law of the European Court of Justice into the existing free movement acquis, its restriction in the accession treaties with new Member States concerning free movement of workers, and its redefinition by new Member States themselves. The result is a somewhat blurred picture: While the European Court of Justices uses citizenship to fill gaps left by primary and secondary law mostly with regard to non‐discrimination, the accession treaties have allowed a ‘re‐nationalisation’ of free movement, against the promises of equality inherent in the citizenship concept, which also includes nationals from new Member countries. The concept of citizenship itself in new Member countries, as the examples of Latvia and Estonia on the one hand, and Hungary on the other demonstrate, is very much related to the (somewhat sad) lessons of the past and therefore highly politicised; it has not been shaped with regard to free movement in the EU. The author suggests a gradual ‘communitarisation’ of citizenship itself even though the EU seems to miss competence in this area, for example, by paying greater attention to residence as basis for Community rights.     

Independence of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Unchecked Member States power after the Sharpston Affair

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the apex of the EU legal order, and is the supreme arbiter of EU law. For decades, it has delivered judgments, collectively shaping European integration and ‘integration through law’. It has undoubtedly been an authoritative leader in entrenching a European judicial culture, and has benefited from the cardinal principle of judicial independence enshrined in the EU Treaties, which in turn, it has insisted on being upheld as regards national courts. Questions have rarely arisen, however, about judicial independence of the CJEU. The Sharpston Affair of 2020–2021 opened the door to questioning such judicial independence. Is the CJEU at the mercy of the Member States? If so, what are the consequences for the EU legal order? This article reflects on the judicial independence of the CJEU, and offers reflections on how it can be preserved in the future.     

Taking Care of Strasbourg: The Status of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights in Kosovo’s Domestic Legal System

This paper addresses the position of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law in Kosovo’s domestic legal order. To begin with, it reviews the background of the issue of human rights in Kosovo highlighting its distinct position and perspective. This article then analyses the position held by the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols in Kosovo’s legal order while also addressing the ECHR’s constitutionalization, its direct effect and the constitutional review on basis of it. The paper then examines whether the case-law of the ECtHR is binding in Kosovo, whether it is directly effective, and whether Kosovo’s Constitutional Court can use it as a ground in the conduct of constitutional reviews. This paper argues that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR both hold a privileged status under Kosovo’s constitutional law, despite Kosovo not being a party to the ECHR and, therefore, having no international liability to implement the ECHR. In addition, the paper offers certain arguments regarding the relative positions of the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR within the current practice of Kosovo’s judicial system. This paper concludes with the argument that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR hold a privileged status in the context of Kosovo’s domestic legal order—one which could serve as a precedent in respecting human rights and freedoms.