An Integrated Theory of Budgetary Politics and Some Empirical Tests: The U.S. National Budget, 1791–2010

We develop a general theory of budgetary politics and examine its implications on a new data set on U.S. government expenditures from 1791 to 2010. We draw on three major approaches to budgeting: decision‐making theories, primarily incrementalism and serial processing; policy process models; and path dependency. We show that the incrementalist budget model is recursive and that its solution is exponential growth, and isolate three periods in which it operates in pure form. The equilibrium periods are separated by critical junctures, associated with wars or economic collapse. We assess policy process dynamics by examining the deviations within equilibrium periods. We offer three takeaways: (1) exponential incrementalism is fundamental to a theory of budgeting; (2) disjoint shifts in the level of exponential incrementalism are caused only by critical moments; (3) temporally localized dynamics cause bends in the exponential path, longer returns to the path within budgetary eras, and annual punctuations in budget changes.     

State Budgetary Processes and Reforms: The California Story

This paper analyzes state budgetary processes and reforms to inform California budgetary policy. We consider key institutional provisions, including budget periodicity, tax and expenditure limitations, balanced budget and reserve requirements, and supermajority vote requirements, and analyze the extent to which changes are likely to advance procedural norms. Our analysis suggests that empirically unproven assumptions and poorly articulated linkages between budgetary processes and outcomes have undermined the state's ability to understand the budgetary problem and identify effective reforms. We recommend a focus on procedural norms and related reforms that promote effective budgeting processes as a less partisan framework for reform.     

THE SAUDI ARABIAN BUDGETING SYSTEM: AN INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

This article describes and evaluates the budgetary institutions in Saudi Arabia. The primary sources of information for this study are publications from the Saudi Ministry of Finance and a survey implemented to investigate the different aspects of budget formulation and execution. We find that the Saudi budget experiences difficulties associated with incremental annual line‐item budgeting systems. Although capital expenditures in the education and health sectors are guided by five‐year plans developed by the Ministry of Planning, the rest of the budget preparation procedure is mainly driven by requests from government agencies to increase spending (i.e. a bottom‐up approach), instead of being based on an early determination of the macroeconomic constraints and the acceptable level of deficit (i.e. a top‐down approach). The result is an exacerbation of tragedy of the commons problems associated with information asymmetry and conflict‐avoidance strategies. We discuss possible reasons for this finding and offer budgetary reform proposals. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ideas, Inheritances, and the Dynamics of Budgetary Change

Long the lifeblood of public administration, budgeting in the United States acquired a new importance during the 1980s and 1990s because of the fiscalization of the policy debate. But how much has American national budgeting really changed? This article examines the evolution of federal budgeting over the past half-century, exploring such developments as the massive growth of entitlements, congressional budget reform, and the protracted battle over the budget deficit. It finds that year-to-year changes in budget results have been relatively small even while budgetary rules and procedures have experienced sweeping change. At the same time, the composition of federal spending has undergone a quiet revolution. The traditional concept of budgetary incrementalism offers an incomplete explanation for these dynamics. To make sense of them, the article focuses on two key factors: the impact of policy inheritances, and the role of actors' causal and normative beliefs. These factors shape the ideational and material context within which boundedly rational actors negotiate decisions. The tension between changes in ideas and entrenched budgetary commitments has often served to stimulate institutional reform.     

The Problem with Programs: Multiple Perspectives on Program Structures in Program‐Based Performance‐Oriented Budgets

Often the transition to performance‐based budgeting requires the initial development of a program structure. While a substantial body of literature is available to assist governments in developing performance measures, program development has received little recent attention in the scholarly literature. This research draws on a case study of the State of Georgia's effort to develop a program structure. The problems encountered by Georgia provide the foundation for an analysis that explains how programs interact with competing budgetary purposes and agendas. The analysis in turn suggests ways that budget structures might be adjusted to better balance competing purposes.     

Punctuations and agendas: A new look at local government budget expenditures

Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) is an agenda‐based theory that offers a theoretical foundation for large budget shifts. PET emphasizes that the static, incremental nature of agendas is occasionally interrupted by punctuations. These punctuations indicate shifts in priority among the agenda items, and with those agenda shifts come trade‐offs. This article expands the discussion of punctuated budgets to the level of local government by determining that local government expenditures have the characteristics espoused by the punctuated equilibrium theory. The article also determines the frequency of punctuations and the probability for future punctuations. The findings show that some budget functions and policy types are more prone to punctuations and, therefore, have a less stable agenda. The practical significance of extending PET to local government budgeting is the implication on planning, forecasting, and the agenda‐setting process. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Spending Preferences of Public Sector Officials: Survey Evidence from Finland

We examine the determinants that shape the spending preferences of public sector officials on several budgetary appropriations. Following Niskanen's budget‐maximizing theory, we test whether these officials prefer larger budgetary appropriations rather than less. We measure their preferences to increase their own bureau's appropriations and compare those against their preferences for other bureaus' appropriations. The empirical evidence is gathered via a mail survey targeting high‐level officials from different ministries in Finland. The analysis of the responses suggests that Niskanen's theory is in part supported.     

The quest for a better performing health system: Public expertise and corporate management recipes in France

Though the government pledged to cut the public deficit from 7.7% of the gross domestic product in 2010 to 3% by 2013, thereby responding to EU Normative power, health expenditures continue to rise, because public demands are higher and more social problems are handled in the health care setting. With French budget deficit threatening France's credit rating, novel instruments were needed. These included corporate management recipes (e.g., pay for performance contracts, patient volume targets, and management by objectives), new compensation mechanisms (e.g., activity‐based accounting and a nationwide scale of health care costs) and far‐reaching laws (e.g., the 2009 HPST bill). Our approach investigates some critical elements of the French health care system. We focus on primary (e.g., family physicians and General Practitioners) and secondary (e.g., hospital and specialty) care. We explore how policies such as the standardization of health services, the regrouping of health policy decisions within the larger Regional Health Agencies, affected citizens' engagement and physicians' autonomy. A French welfare elite pursued a hybrid strategy, regulating quasi‐markets of care providers in a postcompetitive government, while creating supportive conditions for a vibrant private hospital sector. Reforms also emphasized evidenced‐based policy, outputs‐rather than outcome‐measurement, and performance evaluation in a bid to streamline the delivery of health services.     

Government, interest groups and incrementalism

Abstract. This paper is concerned with the two underlying dimensions of the people's welfare – economic growth and social protection – and their realization in the diverse processes which determine the character of budgeting and of budgetary outcomes. These conflicting conceptions of welfare and the diverse agents involved in the budgetary process generate a government fiscal policy, which expresses the clash between ideology and political feasibility and between politicians' intentions and actual outcomes. This paper focuses primarily on the budgetary process in West Germany, but also makes some reference to fiscal policy in the UK and the USA.     

State Saving Behavior: Effects of Two Fiscal and Budgetary Institutions

This paper explores how state saving behavior is affected by two fiscal/budgetary institutions—budget stabilization funds (BSF) and balanced budget requirements (BBR). While adopted for different reasons, BSF and BBR could have significant effects on state savings behavior depending on their design features. We empirically examine the effects of BSF and BBR using a panel data set that covers three business cycles, controlling for budgetary institutions, state economy, social services, politics, and business cycles. The paper finds that adopting BSF and BBR can raise savings by 2 and 3 percentage points, respectively; however, the effects depend crucially on the devices' design.     

Budgeting for Fiscal Stability over the Business Cycle: A Countercyclical Fiscal Policy and the Multiyear Perspective on Budgeting

This essay is a theoretical exploration of a new budgetary system to cope with fiscal uncertainty and instability. ¹ It examines policies requiring positive year-end balances and infers that annual budget cycles lead to a mismatch between the budget cycle and the continuity of public service provision. The author considers a multiyear perspective on budgeting as a potential solution, with countercyclical fiscal reserves to help ensure stability during fluctuating economic conditions. By adopting budget stabilization funds and keeping sufficient reserves, states can better maintain trend-level public services during recessions. Panel data analysis provides empirical evidence that such funds helped stabilize state general expenditures during downturns. The adoption of countercyclical fiscal policy and budget stabilization funds is a step toward a longer-term perspective on budgeting, thus promoting fiscal stability over the economic cycle.     

Nonpartisan Legislative Budget Offices: A Tentative Step toward Improving Legislative Oversight

Strengthening the budgetary powers of legislatures through nonpartisan budget offices adds to the capacity‐building repertoire of development donors. Budget offices are supposed to provide legislatures with information and analysis independent from the executive. The United States Agency for International Development believes that strengthening the legislature's power of the purse improves governance. We highlight USAID‐funded legislative strengthening projects implemented in Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Afghanistan to show how these budget offices function. There is a significant potential for these units to assist members of parliament in understanding the budget process, the broad fiscal challenges facing government, and expenditure control and budgetary trade‐offs that affect present and future spending. These cases demonstrate the challenges of creating and sustaining a parliamentary budget office. Finally, in an effort to make budget offices effective and sustainable, we outline several key steps that we believe are important both for donors and the legislative bodies.     

Incremental Thinking: "The Lack of a Budgetary Theory"

Editor's Note: More than 40 years ago. V.O. Key identified the basic budgeting question as: ”On what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?“ Despite decades of budgetary research and innovation, the question remains unanswered and probably unanswerable. As Key recognized, a solution to this problem would constitute a full-blown theory of government. Although neither Key nor others have provided a firm answer to this basic question. Key's article is a valuable reminder that budgeting is much more than technique. This lesson is immediately forgotten when the latest reform comes to market promising a neat formula for dividing the budget pie. The lesson is relearned again when administrative and political pathologists seek cause and effect for the failure of the most recent promising innovation.     

Earmarking as a Strategy Against Budgetary Constraints: San Francisco's Children's Amendment

The passage and implementation of the San Francisco Children's Amendment, or Proposition J, in 1991 represents an important expansion of the increasingly common strategy of budgetary earmarking by human service organizations. The core of the initiative was a city charter amendment that earmarked a portion of existing property taxes and established a baseline budget for children's services. Of these provisions, the baseline budget has proven most important in preserving children's services and preventing any substitution effects in a time of increasing fiscal stress for the city/ county of San Francisco. This case also illustrates the role of a strong political appeal in passing technical budgetary initiatives over the objections of elected officials and others. While there was concern about the reduced flexibility created by earmarking a city's budget during a period of retrenchment, this concern was overlooked because of the overwhelming political support for the children's cause. However, conflict between groups was created by the measure as groups fought to be included in the provisions of the amendment and over whether each group had obtained its fair share of funding.     

Federal Budgeting and Finance in 1991: The Future is Now

The large federal deficits run throughout the 1980s generated concern that we were mortgaging our future. In 1991, the note came due. The potential for aggravating the long-run deficit problem constrained fiscal policy from reacting to the recession. Institutional and partisan conflict and the controls established by the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) limited responses to a remarkable budgetary opportunity—the dissolution of the Soviet Union—and to a serious budgetary threat—exploding health care costs. The BEA controls were applied rigidly with a few minor exceptions, and credit reform was implemented successfully; on the other hand, Congress and the president made no headway on further deficit reductions even though long-run projections worsened. The agenda-setting role of the president's budget for the fiscal year 1993 diminished, as the document's format was heavily influenced by the upcoming presidential election. In contrast to this mixed record for federal budgeting, progress was made in building a financial management structure and developing accounting standards.     

Pressure and the division of a public budget

This paper considers the division of a public budget among competing interests. The planner determines the optimal allocation by maximizing a weighted social welfare function. These weights reflect society's attitudes to different recipient groups, and are not constrained to be constant. By exerting “pressure”, the recipients can attempt to manipulate the weights and hence influence the division of the budget. The amount of resources used on pressure, and the effects on the preference weights are calculated. An important parameter in the model is the elasticity of pressure, for which an appropriate estimate is presented from the case of competition for a share of a health services budget in Norway.     

Social Security: Reliance on Cash Flow Accounting and Projections Disguises an Inherent Upside Cash Flow Bias

The federal unified budget reports social security program results on a cash flow basis. Policy is established through projections of cash flows for 75 years into the future. This paper discusses how reliance on cash flow accounting and projections disguises an inherent upside cash flow bias that makes the program's finances appear better than they actually are and, when combined with the long‐standing pay‐as‐you‐go funding policy, leads to periodic solvency crises. The paper does not propose changing the budgetary accounting basis from cash to accrual but does explore the possible application of accrual accounting to the social security program for reporting purposes.     

Program Budgeting and Accountability in Local Government

Much has been written about program budgeting and its relevance to improved efficiency and effectiveness. However, there is little discussion about the relationship between the use of program budgeting and accountability. While, organisations using program budgeting focus on the issues of performance, the accountability of management to an elected body, such as a local council has been given little attention. In this article three questions are posed: (1) Is the performance information available to enable councillors to form a judgment about management's performance?; (2) Is management involved in determining issues of policy, such as objectives, programs and performance measurement?; and (3) Are councillors confronted by a greater volume of budgetary documentation but with no increase in time to consider it? The results show that program budgeting does not always enhance accountability in local government.     

Implementing Program Budgeting in the Serbian Ministry of Defense

The Republic of Serbia's Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to implement a program‐oriented, multi‐year budgeting system in 2010. This paper reveals several challenges that threaten the success of this initiative. First, we find that the proposed budget system confuses organizations and programs. Second, there does not appear to be a centrally coordinated effort to implement program budgeting, leading to significant disparities in comprehension, organization, and implementation amongst the subordinate commands in MoD. Finally, there is a distinct lack of communication within the MoD regarding the necessity of a program budget and how the process should move forward. These issues inhibit the implementation of program budgeting in the MoD and diminish the possible gains associated with the multi‐year, programmatic allocation of defense resources.