Taking Others into Account: Self‐Interest and Fairness in Majority Decision Making

Research on the formal properties of democratic aggregation mechanisms has a long tradition in political science. Recent theoretical developments, however, show that in the discussion of normative contents of democratic decisions, the actual shape of preferences deserves just as much attention. However, our knowledge about the concrete motivations of individual behavior in democratic decisions is incomplete. Using laboratory experiments, this article examines the existence of social preferences in majority decisions. Contrary to earlier experiments of committee decision making, we develop a design that controls for the conditions of communication and the level of information between subjects. This allows us to comparatively test the predictive power of several theories. We find strong evidence that self‐interest and fairness motivate human behavior in majority decisions.     

Taking a Closer Look at the Empowerment‐Performance Relationship: Evidence from Law Enforcement Organizations

This article examines the influence of empowering leadership practices on police officers' job performance, perceptions of managerial effectiveness, and unit performance. These relationships are examined using multisource survey data collected from 100 law enforcement managers, 446 of their subordinates, and 98 of their direct supervisors. The analysis shows that empowering leadership contributes positively to subordinate officers' job performance and unit effectiveness. Empowering leadership is also positively associated with subordinate but not with supervisor ratings of managerial effectiveness. Task‐oriented leadership, however, is positively associated with both subordinate and supervisor ratings of managerial effectiveness. Implications of these results for managerial leadership in law enforcement organizations are discussed.     

Paid Family Leave,Fathers’ Leave‐Taking,and Leave‐Sharing in Dual‐Earner Households

Using difference‐in‐difference and difference‐in‐difference‐in‐difference designs, we study California's Paid Family Leave (CA‐PFL) program, the first source of government‐provided paid parental leave available to fathers in the Unites States. Relative to the pre‐treatment mean, fathers of infants in California are 46 percent more likely to be on leave when CA‐PFL is available. In households where both parents work, we find suggestive evidence that CA‐PFL increases both father‐only leave‐taking (i.e., father on leave while mother is at work) and joint leave‐taking (i.e., both parents on leave at the same time). Effects are larger for fathers of first‐born children than for fathers of later‐born children.     

Taking the Measure of Congress: Reply to Chiou and Rothenberg

e-mail: binder{at}gwu.edu Chiou and Rothenberg raise important questions about how tomeasure key concepts in the study of legislative stalemate inthe U.S. Congress. In challenging my choice of measures to capturebicameral differences, Chiou and Rothenberg argue that my findingsare the artifact of measurement error. In this reply, I reviewthe hurdles involved in measuring policy views over time andacross institutions and suggest that the preferred measure ofChiou and Rothenberg falls short for measuring bicameral differences.Second, I assess the extent to which measurement choices affectthe robustness of my findings about the determinants of gridlock.Drawing on new measures and model specifications, I show thatmy results are robust to alternative specifications. I concludewith an assessment of the broader challenges posed by how wemeasure critical concepts in the study of congressional performance.     

Representation as a median mandate: Taking cross‐national differences seriously

The extent and ways in which popular preferences influence government policy are absolutely central to our understanding of modern democracy. Paul Warwick's discussion of these in the European Journal of Political Research in 2010 puts itself at the heart of the debate with its critique of the median mandate theory of McDonald and Budge, proposing an alternative ‘bilateralist’ concept of representation. This article questions whether this concept has much to add to our theoretical understanding of representational processes. However, Warwick's further conceptual points deserve serious consideration. These concern the time horizons within which representative processes work, and the status of the median position given multi‐motivated voting. At the evidential level, Warwick argues that survey‐based measures of voter and party left–right positions fail to produce the correspondence between median and government policy positions that median mandate theory would have us expect. However, survey‐based measures of median voter and party placements obscure important cross‐national variation. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems ( CSES 2007 ), as Warwick does, this article shows that survey respondents norm their own and their country's party positions to their national context. The consequence is to make the political centre in all nations appear similar. Allowing for the relevant cross‐national differences brings the relationship between the median voter and government position back in line with expectations.     

Interest group–party linkage in the twenty‐first century: Evidence from Denmark,the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

This article systematically investigates interest group–party interactions in the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom based on cross‐national surveys with responses from 1,225 interest groups. The findings show that interest groups and parties still interact in the beginning of the twenty‐first century, but that the vast majority of their interaction involves a low degree of institutionalisation. Using fractional logit analysis, it is demonstrated that the strength of interest group–party linkage is primarily affected by systematic differences in state–society structures and organisational group characteristics. Moreover, differences are found in what conditions different types of interaction. Whereas historical legacies and partisan origin influence an interest group's structural party links, group resources make interactions of a less institutionalised, ad hoc nature more likely.     

利益集团理论视角的中国行政审批制度改革

行政审批制度改革实质上是一个利益重新分配和调整的过程,是有着利益冲突的相关利益集团相互博弈达成利益均衡的过程。改革所涉及的相关利益集团在这项制度变迁中有着冲突的利益和目标,导致了他们对改革采取不同的态度和行动策略,从而对改革进程产生不同程度的积极或消极影响。行政审批制度改革是一个渐进的动态的过程,不同阶段的改革成效取决于各相关利益集团之间的博弈而达成的一种均衡,这种动态的渐进过程在宏观层面上表现为中央政府主导的强制性制度变迁的过程。     

Civil War and Social Cohesion: Lab‐in‐the‐Field Evidence from Nepal

We study effects of wartime violence on social cohesion in the context of Nepal's 10‐year civil war. We begin with the observation that violence increased levels of collective action like voting and community organization—a finding consistent with other recent studies of postconflict societies. We use lab‐in‐the‐field techniques to tease apart such effects. Our causal‐identification strategy exploits communities' exogenous isolation from the unpredictable path of insurgency combined with matching. We find that violence‐affected communities exhibit higher levels of prosocial motivation, measured by altruistic giving, public good contributions, investment in trust‐based transactions, and willingness to reciprocate trust‐based investments. We find evidence to support two social transformation mechanisms: (1) a purging mechanism by which less social persons disproportionately flee communities plagued by war and (2) a collective coping mechanism by which individuals who have few options to flee band together to cope with threats.     

The Retention of State Level Concealed Handgun Laws: Empirical Evidence from Interest Group and Legislative Models

The present research extends the work of Lott and Mustard (1997) by offering the first categorical examination (using an ordered logit model) of various types of right-to-carry handgun legislation across the50 states for 1997. Such an examination is based on the “market for laws” construct built by Crain (1979) and Benson and Engin (1988), which points out that various interest group (demand side) and legislative (firm, supply side) considerations are important in modeling legislation activity at the state level. To that end, we include a number of property rights, demographic and legislative institutional variables as explanatory factors in ordered log it models and tests for nonnested hypotheses. In general, we find that the property-rights movement has significantly shaped these statewide laws as pointed out by variables which measure the amount of federal land present within each state, per-capita income, and death-row inmate executions. Population density, Republican representation, length of legislative sessions and female legislative representation have also had significant impacts on the retention of various forms of right-to-carry legislation.     

Interest groups and the regulation of pesticides: Congress,coalitions, and closure

This article is essentially a rejoinder to Christopher Bosso's piece, Transforming Adversaries Into Collaborators: Interest groups and the regulation of chemical pesticides, which appeared in this journal (21: 3–22). The case of pesticides regulation is re-examined and some new insights are offered. At the center of Bosso's argument is the contention that Congress is passive. John Kingdon's agenda/alternative distinction is utilized to arrive at an alternative way to think about the role of Congress in today's permeable pressure system.     

The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab‐in‐the‐Field Experiment in Uganda

Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining “lab‐in‐the‐field” experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers’ behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers’ natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma.     

Interest Group Strategies: Navigating Between Privileged Access and Strategies of Pressure

The literature often contrasts interest groups possessing insider status and outsider groups forced to seek influence through more indirect means. Drawing on data from a survey of all national Danish interest groups, this article demonstrates that most groups have an action repertoire including both direct contacts to bureaucrats and parliamentarians and indirect activities such as media campaigns and mobilizations of members. Different strategies of influence are correlated positively, hence, there is no contradiction between pursuing strategies associated with insider access to decision-making and strategies where pressure is put on decision makers through media contacts and mobilizations. An analysis of four distinct strategies – an administrative, a parliamentary, a media and a mobilization strategy – finds interesting variations in the factors that affect the pursuance of the various strategies of influence. Groups with a privileged position vis-à-vis decision makers have high levels of activities targeting these decision makers, but the lack of a privileged position does not lead groups to pursue indirect strategies. Indirect strategies are most intensively pursued by cause groups and groups who find themselves in a competitive situation with regard to attracting members.     

Determinants of Pay‐as‐You‐Go Financing of Capital Projects: Evidence from the States

Although states have long practiced pay‐as‐you‐go in financing their capital projects as a supplement to debt, academia has paid scarce attention to pay‐go financing. This study fills in the niche by providing empirical evidence on what determines the use of pay‐go in financing capital projects. It develops a model that considers the preferences of both voters and politicians when they make capital financing decisions in a given institutional setting. The empirical results suggest that the use of pay‐go is affected by a state's income level, its economic conditions, the presence of a divided government, as well as its budgetary institutions.     

Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule‐Making in the Public Interest

Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent's action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal–agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent's financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further, the article posits that exogenous changes in the macro-political climate can deeply affect the nature of principal–agent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States, a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals.     

Learning from Second‐Hand Experience: Methodology for Extrapolation‐Oriented Case Research

Critics of public management reform complain that governments copy legitimated foreign practices. Recent work by Eugene Bardach helps to explain why: neither government analysts nor academic researchers possess an adequate methodology to examine practices in source sites, with a view toward adaptation in target sites. Rather than complain, Bardach takes steps to develop such a methodology, drawing analogies with reverse engineering. This article offers specific guidance about how researchers can effectively investigate practices in source sites to prepare the ground for disciplined and ingenious extrapolation of practices from source to target sites. The resulting translation is illustrated by an extrapolation‐oriented case study.     

Neo‐patrimonialism and Corruption: Evidence from 8,436 Firms in 17 Countries in Sub‐Saharan Africa

This article introduces four innovations to the literature on administrative corruption. First, it employs a neo‐patrimonialism framework by addressing measurement, identification, and endogeneity issues that beset the literature. Second, unlike cross‐country studies, it uses firms as the unit of analysis. Third, unlike the conventional literature, the article uses large‐n (n = 8,436) panel survey data of key informants in 17 countries in sub‐Saharan Africa. Finally, unlike the conventional literature, the article focuses on a particular type of corruption: the supply and demand for bribery. The authors find that the uncertainty associated with neo‐patrimonialism has a strong, positive, and significant effect on the propensity of civil servants to demand bribes in exchange for services and for firms to supply bribes in exchange for winning government contracts. The results are robust to controls on the characteristics of firms and their regulatory environments. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.     

Federalism and Interest Group Cohesion: A Comparison of Two Peak Business Groups in Australia

The stock opinion among students of interest groups has, untilrecently, posited that groups in countries with a federal systemof government are less cohesive and more prone to disunity thaninterest groups in unitary states. This article addresses thisrelationship bet ween federalism and weak group cohesion inan attempt to explain the contrasting patterns of cohesion intwo peak Australian business groups, each a confederation instructure. The literature on federalism and group cohesion givesinsufficient attention to the divisive impact of three factors:party go vernment, size and wealth inequalities among a group'sconstituent units, and a group's decision and payoff rules.The literature also gives insufficient attention to the determinantsof group secession. It is the contention of the article thatconflicts over the fairness of a federated organization's rules,particularly when the large, wealthy units find themselves outvotedby the small, poor units, can be sufficient to provoke the aggrievedunits to secede.