法律实证主义的强立场——兼评拉兹《法律的权威》

在法律与道德的关系上,拉兹认为有效法律的鉴别标准完全排除道德论证,这就是拉兹的渊源论.渊源论表明所有的法律都具有渊源,渊源论的论据来自权威论.权威以理由为基础,是改变行为理由的能力.法律也要主张权威,法律主张合法性权威是它的一个本质特征.权威性理由是排他性理由,排除了道德因素的可能性,权威论支持了渊源论.权威论受到了来自包容性实证主义者和德沃金的批评,他们的争论共同推进了对法律与道德关系问题的研究.     

法律解释中的意图与权威

在拉兹的权威意图论中,立法意图实际上具有两种功能：不仅可以为制定法提供正当性来源,还能够在具体的法律解释实践中发挥较弱的作用。但这两种功能都有改进的空间。通过区分“具备权威性”和“实现权威性的方式”,我们可以发现,拉兹主张的“意图关乎正当性”这一结论,实际上是因为“创制意图”与“制定法权威性实现方式”的偶然重合,真正为制定法提供正当性来源的是权威性本身,这使得拉兹版本的权威意图论得以在“权威”的部分变得更薄,以至于能够适用于包括判例法和习惯法在内的所有法律类型。另外,通过论证深层意图应当且能够和最低限度意图共同构成权威意图论之“标准意图”,拉兹版本的权威意图论在“意图”的部分变得更厚,从而使其在具体法律解释实践中发挥更大的作用。     

法律权威的可能性——关于国家与法律的规范分析

法律能否主张权威？这既是法哲学思考的核心命题之一,也是政治哲学中的难题。本文通过深入当代西方实践法哲学与政治哲学的语境中,借助分析与规范的方法,以行动与理由的解释核心,阐释权威概念的哲学内涵。借助法哲学家拉兹给出的权威的服务观念,证明法律能够主张正当权威,但是法律的权威并不是道德性权威,法律的权威性并不能产生服从法律的一般性的道德理由,因此不存在服从法律的一般义务。本文试图通过以法律权威的探讨为主线,借助实证主义的分析方法,对国家与法律的含义做出规范性的解释,来廓清法哲学与政治哲学中的权威难题。     

法律权威与行动理由——基于拉兹实践哲学进路的考察

权威可以分为理论权威与实践权威、事实权威与合法权威,拉兹讨论的是合法的实践权威。权力与承认这两个概念都无法有效地界定合法的实践权威,在一定意义上可以说,拉兹的实践权威理论批判性地借鉴了权力论的分析模式并用行动理由作为基本分析概念。法律主张合法权威是法律的一个本质特征,法律规范也是一种强制性的行动理由,即一种内容独立的排他性理由。     

没有服从义务的实践权威——与陈景辉教授商榷

法律是最典型的实践权威,探讨实践权威的一般性质直接关系到对法律权威和法治的理解。对实践权威的说明需同时协调两个要求：一是解释权威指令的拘束性;二是保证服从权威的理性化。权威的拘束性表现为权威与行动者的不对称,解释这种不对称就是阐述权威来源在提供行动理由上扮演何种角色。由于专家建议既无法加重既有行动理由的分量,也无法通过排除行动者审思的方式改变实践理由,认知型权威不能创造实践差异,所以其对实践权威(拘束性)的解释是失败的。认知型权威的失败“倒逼”服务权威观必须在概念上主张：作为排他性理由的权威指令排除的是理由本身,而非行动者对理由的审思或信念。在理性辩护上,通常证立命题需要维持排他性理由的中介角色,即维护“依赖性理由—正当权威—具体指令”的双层结构。依赖性理由仅在一般证成层次为特定指令提供“内容独立的证成”,但这意味着权威指令再次面临退化成“排除审思之决策工具”的风险。服务权威观面临概念主张与证成论据不匹配的难题,这一难题的根源在于排他性理由作为行动理由的资格与拉兹的外在理由论立场相冲突,因此难题的解决也必须在元伦理学层面完成。     

分离命题与法律实证主义

法律与道德的分离命题是法律实证主义的一项重要主张,它包含了弱的和强的两种分离命题。哈特主张的是弱分离命题,它主张在法律的合法性标准的外在方面法律与价值的必然分离。弱分离命题需要社会事实命题的支持,它没有资格作为法律实证主义的基础命题。而在合法性标准的内在方面,法律与道德存在必然联系。内在必要联系命题可以为法律的规范性提供合理说明,并为消除自然法与法律实证主义的对立和融合两者提供了新的理论前景。     

拉兹的法律权威论

渊源论和法律权威理论是拉兹法律理论的两个重要组成部分 ,前者是其法律分析理论的基本立场 ,而后者则是他研究法律与政治的关系的结合点。他提出了服务性权威观 ,认为权威的作用应该在于为被统治者服务 ,法律的权威作用则在于仲裁与媒介。最后 ,本文分析了拉兹法律权威论的政治伦理与道德价值背景。     

法律实证主义的基本命题

法律实证主义具有其独特的主张，其基础主要在于三个命题，即谱系命题、因袭命题和分离命题。由这三个命题出发，可以了解其理论主张到底具有什么样的意义，以及恶法亦法和法律命令说如何有意义。     

权威与法律的性质

约瑟夫·拉兹在法律性质上的核心看法是,法律必然主张自己是正当权威。但是,由于要在概念上区分权威与纯粹的暴力,所以权威必然是规范权力,而不是物理力量。但是,法律作为事实权威,如果它是规范权力,那么正当权威在概念上就不成立;反之,则事实权威无法区别于暴力。另外,权威所要求的断然性,使得行动者必须以遵从来回应法律的要求,但遵从和一致在外观上无法区分,这就必须动用法律观点,也因此就会区别官员与民众,从而整体上改变拉兹最初的理论设想。     

权威、共同善与内在观点——菲尼斯的权威论及其与法实证主义的区分

菲尼斯同哈特、拉兹等实证主义论者一样认为权威是一种内容独立的排他性理由,在概念上排他性理由构成了权威的核心意义。但是,菲尼斯认为,排他性理由要具有规范性必须具有某些实质性的内涵,从规范存在("是")推不出"应当",真正意义上的法律权威必须是道德权威。所以行动理由要安置共同善,法律要体现实践合理性的要求。这些理论主张在方法论上源于菲尼斯对哈特"内在观点"所做的古典自然法的重新阐释,即强化了内在观点,并对行动者与法律都作了更为严格的限定。由此,菲尼斯与法律实证主义论者关于权威论在理由的内容、就法律与权威所做的关于法律性质的判断以及判断的方法论(描述性法理学与规范性法理学)等方面都存在着细微却根本的差异。     

Law as Co-ordination

Abstract. The concept of co-ordination problems helps solve the problem of authority and obligation in legal theory, but only if the concept is carefully distinguished from the game-theoretical concept of co-ordination problems and their solutions. After explaining the game-theoretical concept, the author defends its application to legal theory by reviewing the exchange he has had with Joseph Raz about the authority of law. Extending that debate, he argues that criticisms from Raz and others miss the point of the co-ordination thesis; its primary benefit is that it illuminates the source of law's moral authority in the way law enables individuals to co-ordinate their actions for the common good without imposing a national common enterprise upon them.     

Form and Agency in Raz’s Legal Positivism

As two parts of one overarching legal positivist project, it is likely assumed that the constitutive elements of Joseph Raz’s analysis of the rule of law are compatible with his thinking on the nature of legal authority. The aim of this article is to call this assumption into question by reading Raz in light of the core, if under-recognised, preoccupation of the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller: namely, the latter’s concern to illuminate the relationship between the distinctive form of law and human agency. This not only opens up a new engagement between Raz and Fuller that was far from exhausted within debates about law and morality, but also reveals tensions between Raz’s analysis of the rule of law and his analysis of legal authority that proponents of Raz’s legal positivism need to address.     

The Service Conception: Just One Simple Question

It is crystal clear that the Service Conception includes at least three conditions, what I shall call: the ‘normal justification condition’, the ‘independence condition’ and the ‘dependence condition’. The overarching rationale of these conditions is that they ensure that authority is only justified when it provides the best means for the subject to conform to the reasons for action that she actually has. However, it is difficult to clarify whether Raz implicitly presupposes a fourth necessary condition. This condition might be called a ‘reliable belief condition’, that is, that the putative subject must reliably believe that the putative authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception (or more precisely, its other three conditions). In sum, the purpose of this paper is to pose Joseph Raz one simple question: is it a necessary condition of your Service Conception, that the subject believes that the authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception? As a matter of interpretation, different parts of Raz’s work appear to lead in entirely opposite directions: some parts clearly support the reliable belief condition, others do not. Regardless of Raz’s ultimate answer, however, the question reveals a broader inconsistency. Only if the Service Conception does include the belief condition will it support Raz’s claim that authority is consistent with one’s rational ‘self-reliance’, that is, acting upon one’s own judgement (including, as to who has authority). Only if the Service Conception does not include the belief condition will it support Raz’s perfectionist account of government. It seems Raz must choose between one or other.     

The Purity Thesis

Hans Kelsen’s purity thesis is the basic methodological principle of the Pure Theory of Law. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that virtually everything that is peculiar to Kelsen’s legal theory stems from the purity thesis. This includes Kelsen’s normativism or non‐naturalism and his polemic against various dualisms in legal science. I set out Kelsen’s position on these issues after looking at the nomenclature of purity in his writings as well as the philosophical and contextual sources of purity as he understands them.     

The Persistent Significance of Jurisdiction*

According to Joseph Raz's sources thesis, the existence and content of authoritative directives must be identifiable by resort to the social fact of their provenance from a de facto authority, without regard to any of the normative considerations that the authority in question is supposed to rely on in its judgment. This article argues that the sources thesis fails to account for the role of jurisdictional considerations (namely, considerations about the scope of a de facto authority's power) in the identification of valid law. It examines a legal system with a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review of legislation by the courts for its conformity with fundamental rights and argues that the special normative status of (at least some) authoritative directives in this legal system depends on respect for jurisdiction. An assessment of whether an authority has stayed intra vires involves recourse to the normative considerations that it is the authority's job to weigh up. This criticism of the sources thesis highlights the importance of incorporating jurisdiction into our philosophical accounts of legal authority.     

Cosmopolitan Duty and Legitimate State Authority

In this paper I apply a suitably developed version of Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority to the debate over the legitimacy of state action aiming to fulfill cosmopolitan moral obligations. I aim to advance two interrelated theses. First, viewed from the perspective of Raz’s service conception of authority, citizens’ moral duties to non-compatriots are an appropriate ground for authoritative intervention by agents of the state. Second, international law based on these duties can also enjoy moral authority over government decision makers. An important source of the moral force of international law is derived from the power of international law to improve officials’ ability to recognize and conform to the totality of their reasons, which contributes to their states’ legitimacy.     

权威命题与法律理由的性质:一个反思性的评论

法律理由的排他性与内容独立性是支撑权威命题的基础,也是排他性法律实证主义与其他法哲学流派相竞争的根据。Wilfrid Waluchow、Heidi Hurd与Larry Alexander对法律理由性质的批评都不足以推翻法律的排他性,但排他性并不必然产生义务,因此既要坚持以法律的制度性为基础的实践权威的特征,又要改进权威合法性的证成模式,使得权威理由能够产生服从的道德义务。法律的规范性不是一个事实问题而是一个证成问题,民主参与的因素可以把实践权威的排他性与行动者实践推理的内在性结合起来,从而权威可以使服从者产生服从的道德义务。