Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility

This article examines the role that command responsibility currentlyplays in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The ad hoc tribunals rely in principleon a broad concept of command responsibility – which canbe applied to all superiors, including political and civilianones. However, in practice, accused persons have only rarelybeen successfully charged under this form of liability. Indeed,recent case law has gradually adopted a rigorous approach withrespect to the legal requirements of command responsibility.This has made it more difficult to establish criminal liabilityof superiors who have not directly participated in the commissionof international offences. The ad hoc tribunals have expressedan explicit preference for forms of ‘direct’ liabilitywhere the accused can be convicted both under ‘direct’and command responsibility. While the ICTY and ICTR have progressivelyinterpreted other international legal concepts to deal effectivelywith collective crimes committed by leaders of organized groups,they seem to have confined command responsibility to internationalcrimes perpetrated in typical military-like contexts.     

The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).     

Legal Aid,Self-Representation,And The Crisis At The Hague Tribunal

The unfolding of the case of Prosecutor v. Vojislav ŠeŠelj at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been dramatic and more than a little chaotic. The author argues that it is diagnostic of a broader crisis at the Tribunal. As an experiment in international justice, the ad hoc tribunal model has proved to be expensive and slow, but on several points also procedurally arbitrary, intellectually unconvincing, and vulnerable to improper political considerations. These problems have attained a critical mass in ŠeŠelj’s case, as illustrated here. The accused ŠeŠelj, an ultranationalist politician and former paramilitary leader, has vowed to bring the Tribunal to its knees. He is self- represented at trial. This privilege was twice reaffirmed in 2006 by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, having been twice revoked by a bench of trial judges. In 2007, the new pre-trial judge in the case (now presiding judge), Jean-Claude Antonetti, declared that a self-represented accused who can prove indigence is entitled to legal aid. He ordered the Registrar of the Tribunal to pay ŠeŠelj’s defence expenses from the Tribunal’s legal aid budget if ŠeŠelj could prove his indigence. The author argues that while there is good reason to disburse legal aid funds to an indigent accused who has been granted privileges of self-representation, this entitlement was not convincingly explained by Antonetti. Moreover, ŠeŠelj’s destructive aims were improperly set aside by Antonetti in reaching his decision on the public financing of his defence. The current situation, which represents the combined effort of the Appeals Chamber and Antonetti, allows ŠeŠelj to bully participants in the proceedings, issue thinly veiled threats to prospective witnesses and the public at large, and bend the trial procedure to the requirements of his political populism. The poor handling of this case by the Tribunal as a whole calls into question the ad hoc tribunal model of international criminal justice. In the period 2003–2007, the author was a legal advisor to ICTY trial judges, working for a short time on the Vojislav ŠeŠelj case prior to its transfer to Judge Antonetti.     

The invisible/visible claims to justice: sexual violence and the university camp(us)

If the relationship between international tribunals and reconciliation remains empirically under‐researched within the transitional justice literature, this is even truer in respect of hybrid and local courts. Seeking to address this gap, the purpose of this article is to explore whether the State Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) – and more particularly its War Crimes Chamber (WCC) – can contribute to reconciliation in BiH. Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the State Court is located in the country itself. Hence, in theory at least, it has greater potential to involve local people and thus to facilitate the reconciliation process. In practice, however, the Court faces many of the same problems as the ICTY, including perceptions of bias and the difficulty of satisfying victims. What this ultimately demonstrates is that criminal trials are not a panacea or “magic bullet” and that reconciliation – both in BiH and in post‐conflict societies more generally – requires a comprehensive and holistic approach to transitional justice that does not over‐rely upon the administration of retributive justice. The State Court, therefore, is merely one potential path to reconciliation.     

The Requirement of an 'Express Agreement' for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdanin

The mode of liability known as joint criminal enterprise (JCE)has emerged in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a means of assigning criminalliability to individuals for activities carried out by a collective.As a result, the doctrine must be carefully defined so as notto allow it to extend a defendant's liability beyond the appropriatelimits of individual criminal responsibility. In this regard,a recent ICTY Trial Chamber decision in Branin held that, wherea defendant is not alleged to have participated in the physicalperpetration of the crimes charged but to have contributed insome other way to the commission of the crimes by a group, theprosecution must demonstrate that the defendant entered intoan express agreement with the physical perpetrators to committhe crimes charged. The author argues that this ‘expressagreement requirement’ is both conceptually unsound andpractically unhelpful. Conceptually, it would be inconsistentwith core principles of JCE liability to require an expressagreement between a defendant and the physical perpetratorsof crimes, at least in circumstances in which it is allegedthat there existed a structure of two or more overlapping JCEs.Moreover, because this structure allows the accused and thephysical perpetrators to be operating in two separate JCEs,they need not even share a common criminal purpose. On a practicallevel, arguably in a ‘system-criminality’ contextsuch as the one that developed in the former Yugoslavia duringthe time period in question, the organizers of criminal activityare unlikely to enter into express criminal agreements withthose who physically carry out crimes, because existing organizedhierarchies provide much more efficient mechanisms by whichleaders are able to ensure the realization of their criminalplans.     

法庭警察权研究

法庭警察权乃法院为维护法庭秩序及审判的威严所享有的采取秩序措施及施加秩序罚的权力。法庭警察权有妨害预防作用、妨害排除作用与妨害制裁作用三种基本形态。基于法庭秩序维护的实效性与法庭警察权实施基础的客观实在性,法庭警察权依附于裁判权,由担当裁判权的法院行使。法庭警察权以功能意义上的法庭为其实施的时空范围,以妨害法庭秩序及审判威严的行为及状态为规制对象。对于妨害法庭秩序的行为实施何种作用形态的法庭警察权取决于法院的合目的性裁量,应受比例原则的规制。法庭警察权在我国由三大诉讼法分别规范,不仅未能科学地体认法庭警察权的性质,也未能正确地廓清法庭警察权应有的实施边界,加剧了司法实务中法庭警察权制度适用之乱象,亟待统一立法构建。     

法院“人财物”问题研究——以法院审判权的独立行使为视角

我国之所以出现法院对地方政府的依赖以及地方政府对法院审判权的不当干预现象,根本原因在于目前法院的"人财物"管理方式存在制度性缺陷,即法院行政化的人事制度、依赖政府财政拨款的经费保障制度与现代审判权的运行规律存有内在冲突。它"后台"式地消解着法院的独立性,必须建立以符合法官职业特性和审判权运行规律的"人财物"管理制度,这是审判权独立运行的基石。     

Self-Representation versus Assignment of Defence Counsel before International Criminal Tribunals

After examining the drafting history of Article 14 of the UNCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, which lays down a defendant'sright ‘to defend himself in person or through legal assistanceof his own choosing’ — the relevant national andinternational case law and scholarly commentary — theauthor argues that the underlying purpose of the right at issueis to ensure a fair trial. This objective can best be met incases of former leaders accused of international crimes by assigningthe defendant a highly qualified attorney who is vigilantlycommitted to representing his client's interests. In his view,there are two main reasons why a court in international crimestrial should be able to require the defendant to work throughcounsel: (1) the likelihood that a defendant will act in a disruptivemanner; and (2) the unique need in a complex international crimescase for an orderly trial.     

Constructing Achievement in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): A Corpus-Based Critical Discourse Analysis

The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the UN Security Council in 1993 to prosecute persons responsible for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan wars. As the first international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals set up after WWII, the ICTY has attracted immense interest among legal scholars since its inception, but has failed to garner the same level of attention from researchers in other disciplines, notably linguistics. This represents a significant research gap, as the Tribunal’s public discourse (notably its case law and Annual Reports) can open up interesting avenues of analysis to researchers of law, language, and legal discourse alike. On its official website, the Tribunal claims that it has “irreversibly changed the landscape of international humanitarian law” and lists six specific achievements: “Holding leaders accountable; bringing justice to victims; giving victims a voice; establishing the facts; developing international law and strengthening the rule of the law”. While a number of legal scholars have studied and critiqued the level of ‘achievement’ actually attained by the Tribunal against these metrics and others, of interest to linguists is the ways in which this work might be conveyed discursively. In this paper, we demonstrate how methods from the linguistic field of corpus-based critical discourse analysis can be utilised to explore the discursive construction of such achievements in the language of the ICTY.     

The Duty to Bring Terrorists to Justice and Discretionary Prosecution

In Res. 1373 (2001), the Security Council laid down the dutyto bring terrorists to justice and to deny them safe haven.Whereas such duty expressed a clear political imperative inthe aftermath of 11 September 2001, it is less clear how nationalauthorities are supposed to translate it into a set of enforceablelegal obligations. If it is interpreted as ‘obliging’states to prosecute and try terrorists, as the Security CouncilCounter Terrorism Committee seems to suggest, the power of prosecutorsto decide whether or not to bring a case to court may be severelyimpaired. An unconditional obligation to bring terrorists tocourt would not necessarily strengthen states’ judicialresponse to the threat of international terrorism. A sensibleexercise of prosecutorial discretion may be instrumental inarticulating a flexible and more effective response in variouscircumstances. Moreover, a rigid interpretation of the requirementto bring terrorists to justice does not find support in SecurityCouncil and General Assembly resolutions on terrorism. Far frommandating that alleged offenders be unconditionally broughtto trial, the universal counter-terrorism conventions and protocolslimit themselves to requiring that the jurisdiction of nationalcourts be established, which is conceptually different fromimposing its actual exercise.     

Investigation and Prosecution of Large-scale Crimes at the International Level: The Experience of the ICTY

Although the prosecution of large-scale crimes at the internationallevel shares some similarities to the prosecution of organizedcrime at the national level, there are a number of importantdifferences that make the two areas hardly comparable. Two distinctivetraits of international criminal proceedings stand out in thisregard: (i) the lack of any enforcement agency that would allowprosecuting authorities to carry out investigations on the territoryof an interested state without its assistance and the absenceof a general power to carry out such arrests, which render statecooperation of prime importance and (ii) the fact that the proceduralmodel of international criminal tribunals is mixed containingelements of accusatorial (common law) as well as inquisitorial(civil law) systems. As far as prosecutions are concerned, usefulconcepts and procedures adopted from both legal traditions canbe found in the Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidenceas well as in the approach of prosecutors, defence counsel andjudges to the introduction of evidence and, more generally,to the manner in which proceedings are conducted. One of themain examples of this is the acceptance of proof of facts bymeans other than oral evidence as a result of the influenceof the civil law tradition, which has progressively made itsway in the procedural system of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Yet, on the other hand, somemethods normally resorted to in national criminal prosecutionmay turn out to be useful at the international level, such asresorting to insider witnesses. Although known to domestic systems,such practice may have a particular significance in the contextof the prosecution of international crimes. So have additionalforms of criminal participation (such as the notion of jointcriminal enterprise). Only a mixing of traditional and innovativeinvestigative tools and the proper balance of the differentlegal cultures can ensure effective prosecution of internationalcrimes.     

Who is Afraid of Punishing Aggressors?: On the Double-Track Approach to International Criminal Justice

Since 1947, no alleged crime of aggression has ever been prosecuted,in spite of the many instances in which states have committedacts of aggression with the Security Council sometimes deemingan act to be such. A dual system of international criminal justicehas taken shape slowly. Crimes consisting of serious violationsof jus in bello, that is, war crimes, usually considered lessegregious than the crime of aggression, have been severely prosecutedand punished, in particular by the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Yet, the ‘supreme internationalcrime’ — aggressive war — mostly committedby political and military authorities of major powers, has beenignored and its perpetrators still occupy the summit of internationalpower undisturbed.     

The International Criminal Court and Africa: Exemplary Justice

This is a theoretical and empirical investigation into the causal link (if any) between international criminal trials and preventing violence through exemplary prosecutions. Specifically how do representative trials of persons accused of having the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, supposedly bind recurrent violence? The argument pursued is that by using an accused as an example, a court engages in an indirect and uncertain substitution of personal rights for social harmony and order. These prosecutions combine a peculiar rhetoric, logic and aesthetic, all which substitute the responsibilities for a society in general to a particular individual in order to redeem that society by transferring its communal responsibility onto the individual punished as a form of atonement or expiation. International and domestic trials, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions, are part of a suite of options addressing communal mass violence that can work in tandem. However, because those convicted do not have a monopoly on criminality, nor do those merely reconciled have a monopoly on virtue, exemplification through punishment only targets a few on behalf of the many. Indeed such a redemptively sacrificial economy distinguishes legal justice from mere vengeance.     

Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?

The nature of command responsibility is still open to debatein international criminal law: is a superior to be held criminallyresponsible for the crimes committed by his subordinates ‘asan accomplice’, for having participated in the commissionof the crime by omission, or as a perpetrator of a separateoffence of dereliction of duty? This article surveys the post-WW2case law and the first international instruments on this point,and then analyses the jurisprudence of the International CriminalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The judges appearto have recently adopted a new approach to Article 7(3) ICTYSt.in that the superior is held responsible ‘for failureto prevent or punish with regard to the crimes of the subordinate’and no longer ‘for the crimes of his subordinates’.It is a responsibility ‘sui generis’ indeed, wherethe crime of the subordinate plays a central role in the attributionof responsibility to the superior. It is, therefore, necessaryto carefully consider the relationship between the superior'sfailure to act and the subordinate's crime, both with regardto objective and subjective elements. The same question finallyarises in relation to Article 28 of the Rome Statute, the literalinterpretation of which implies that a superior shall be punishedfor the same crime committed by his subordinates. In order toavoid the risk of holding a person guilty of an offence committedby others in violation of the principle of personal and culpablecriminal responsibility, it is crucial to consider separatelythe different cases of command responsibility, which are basedon distinct objective and subjective requirements.     

Seeing the improvement of the criminal trial structure from China’s criminal courtroom arrangements (tribunal design)

The setting of criminal court has become an important representation of the criminal trial structure due to its visual and vivid reflection of the legal position and relations among the three parties of litigation, i.e. the prosecuting party, the advocating party and the judge. As a result of the influence of ancient “inquest” centered trial mode, lack of the defendant’s right to silence and incomplete revolution of the criminal trial mode, the existing criminal court setting features an umbrella shaped structure. To reform the criminal trial structure in China, we should eliminate the air of “inquest” from the existing court interrogation mode, strengthen the hearing of evidence and set up a equiangular triangle shaped trial structure of neutral trial, equality between the prosecuting and advocating parties and litigant oriented. __________ Translated from the Jurist Review, 2005, (2) (in Chinese)     

论卢旺达国际刑事法庭的管辖权

卢旺达国际刑事法庭的管辖权包括五类:其属地管辖权涵盖卢旺达及其邻国;其属人管辖权限于自然人;其属事管辖权包含种族灭绝罪、反人道罪和战争罪;其属时管辖权仅限于1994年度发生的犯罪,遭到卢旺达政府的批评;其并行管辖权和优先管辖权则与前南斯拉夫国际刑事法庭规定的同名管辖权有着质的区别。     

Enrollment in Mental Health Courts: Voluntariness,Knowingness, and Adjudicative Competence

Mental health courts (MHCs) are rapidly expanding as a form of diversion from jails and prisons for persons with mental illness charged with crimes. Although intended to be voluntary, little is known about this aspect of the courts. We examined perceptions of voluntariness, and levels of knowingness and legal competence among 200 newly enrolled clients of MHCs at two courts. Although most clients claimed to have chosen to enroll, at the same time, most claimed not to have been told the court was voluntary or told of the requirements prior to entering. The majority knew the “basics” of the courts, but fewer knew more nuanced information. A minority also were found to have impairments in legal competence. Implications are discussed.     

From Calculated Cruelty to Casual Violence – The United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Prosecution of Torture and Ill-Treatment

The article looks at the records of both the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) and national courts with respect to the post-World War II prosecution of the crimes of torture and ill-treatment. It illustrates how the UNWCC and national courts dealt with the relevant legal questions, applicable laws, crimes at hand, as well as issues of retroactivity and defenses. The article also discusses the UNWCC’s contribution to the development of relevant international law, both in terms of state practice and precedent. Finally, it acknowledges the legacy of the UNWCC and post-World War II prosecutions, which constituted a collaborative effort to bring perpetrators of international crimes to justice.     

White-collar,organised and cyber crimes in the media: some contrasts and similarities

This article examines the media reportage of white-collar crimes, organised crimes and cybercrimes, principally in the British but also in the US media. It illustrates the ways in which different newspapers depict crime seriousness and how some defendants adapt to these portrayals. It examines competing explanatory models and suggests that although reportage has an ideological component, ‘news values’ and production pressures as well as ‘action triggers’ such as prosecutions or regulatory interventions are important.

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The Mengistu Genocide Trial in Ethiopia

This article analyses the sentencing judgment issued on 11 January2007 by the Ethiopian Federal High Court in the case of MengistuHailemariam and his co-accused who had been tried, among others,on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. This wasthe first African trial where an entire regime was brought tojustice before a national court for atrocities committed whilein power. Twenty-five of the 55 accused found guilty, includingMengistu, were tried in absentia (Mengistu remains in exilein Zimbabwe). The trial took 12 years, making it one of thelongest ever trials for genocide. In December 2006, Mengistuwas convicted by majority vote of genocide and crimes againsthumanity pursuant to Article 281 of the 1957 Ethiopian PenalCode, which includes ‘political groups’ among thegroups protected against genocide. A dissenting judge took theposition that the accused should have been convicted of aggravatedhomicide because the relevant part of the provision had beenrepealed. A few weeks later, the Court, by majority, sentencedthe top tier of the accused to life imprisonment, taking intoaccount certain extenuating circumstances. If not for these,the death penalty would have been imposed. In addition to ensuringsome accountability, the judgment is important for providingan official and detailed account of what happened in those yearsin Ethiopia under Mengistu's reign. Given that in Ethiopia thereare no official gazettes where court judgments are published,it is unlikely that the public will be able to read the judgmentand thus become aware of what had happened. In addition to analysingthe reasoning of the court, this article also looks into theprevailing political circumstances in the country and reflectsupon the trial and the reception that this important decisionhas had, and will receive, in the wider community.