Proportional Representation and the Framers

Techniques for conducting elections developed since 1800 have raised a question about the soundness of the American framers’ majoritarianism. John Stuart Mill notably argued that the framers’ desire to reward merit, as opposed to party loyalty, would be better served by a system of proportional representation that gave deserving minorities a voice. This article considers the likelihood that a system such as Mill proposed would have the results he hoped for; it concludes that such a system is more likely to worsen problems with the existing system of representation than to solve them.     

Proportional Representation with Citizen Candidates

We construct a simple model incorporating bothcitizen-candidates and proportional representation andinvestigate its properties in a basic case with auniform distribution of citizen ideal points and purepolicy motivations, and in further cases which allowof office rents and other distributions ofpreferences. The idea of citizen-candidates, developedby Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate(1997), endogenises the decision to stand as acandidate and allows explicit study of the number andtype of candidates as an equilibrium phenomenon. Theidea of proportional representation allows a moreflexible relationship between the pattern of votescast and the final policy outcome, and also providesa richer model of political representation. Ourdiscussion points to the widespread possibility ofequilibria involving non-median policy outcomes;provides insights into the relationship betweenproportional representation and the equilibrium numberof candidates; and also provides an explicit accountof the trade-off between candidate benefitsdistributed on a winner-take-all basis and those thatare mediated through proportional representation.     

Proportional Representation in Scandinavia: Implications for Finland

The comparative study of electoral system requires uniform methods easily applicable to every country's electoral data. In this paper we have presented two such possibilities: a new graphical method that portrays the proportionality profile of a country's electoral rule, and measures to calculate the systematic and random deviation from proportionality. The empirical data consist of election results from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Around 1950, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden changed from the d'Hondt method of allocation to the modified Sainte Lague rule. The consequences of this shift represent the primary focus of this article. What can the present Finnish constitutional reformers learn from the Scandinavian experience? According to the empirical results, three distinct patterns of proportionality profiles can be distinguished: 1) systems involving nationwide adjustment seats, 2) modified St. Lague (without adjustment seats) and 3) d'Hondt (without adjustment seats). The d'Hondt system gives a high advantage ratio to large parties, the modified Sainte Lague method favors middle-size parties, and the adjustment seats system overrides the basic characteristics of both the d'Hondt and modified Sainte Lague methods. The proportionality indices show the modified Sainte Lague to be more proportional than the d'Hondt method. The proportionality of elections is nearly perfect with adjustment seats system irrespective of the method of allocation applied.     

A Note on the Electoral Rules for the Welsh Assembly

A recent article in this journal highlights,using simulated data, potential paradoxes inherent in thesystem of election to the Welsh assembly. This paper examinesthe data for the assembly elections held in 1999 to illustratethe occurrence of yet another paradoxical outcome, theelection of the first ever First Minister due to a fall insupport for his own party.     

Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties

This article examines the relationship between electoral systems and extremist political parties. Focusing on the West European parties of the extreme right, it first investigates the extent to which district magnitude and electoral formula - the two main dimensions of electoral systems - influence the scores of these parties. It then considers the overall impact of the disproportionality of the electoral system. The article concludes that whilst proportional electoral systems do undeniably make it easier for extremist parties to gain legislative representation, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that they promote extremism. Instead, the share of the vote going to extremist parties appears unrelated to the type of electoral system employed.     

Perceptions of Fairness and Support for Proportional Representation

This paper explores the causes and consequences of evaluations of the political system and support for electoral system change. In 1993, New Zealand voters adopted a referendum that fundamentally changed the way representatives are elected, moving from a plurality to a proportional (PR) electoral system. We examine the role of cynicism about the political system in adopting PR and how electoral change may shape evaluations of the political system. We expect that political minorities and those dissatisfied with the current performance of government are more likely to be cynical about the fairness of the political process and that these evaluations are related to support for PR. In turn, supporters of the referendum should judge the political system more favorably once the reform is implemented. Using panel data from the 1993 and 1996 New Zealand Election Studies, we find that support for PR is based on more general evaluations of the fairness of the political system and partisan self-interest. Those who supported PR and are politically aware are also more likely to have an increase in favorable evaluations of the political system.     

Proportional Representation,Majoritarian Legislatures,and Coalitional Voting

Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives. In proportional representation systems, voters face more complex incentives as electoral outcomes don’t translate as directly into policy outcomes as in plurality rule elections. A common approach is to assume electoral outcomes translate into policy as a vote‐weighted average of all party platforms. However, most of the world’s legislatures are majoritarian institutions, and elections in PR systems are generally followed by a process of coalition formation. Results obtained using this assumption are not robust to the introduction of even minimal forms of majoritarianism. Incentives to engage in strategic voting depend on considerations about the coalitions that may form after the election, and the voters’ equilibrium strategies are shaped by policy balancing and the postelectoral coalition bargaining situation, including considerations about who will be appointed the formateur.     

Electoral Justice as a Criterion for Different Systems of Proportional Representation

Studies of the properties of different electoral systems have generally concentrated upon the question of proportionality. This article introduces the concept of electoral justice which also incorporates the decision-making process into models of proportionality. Hypotheses derived from the concept are then tested against post-1945 Finnish electoral data.     

The Settlement and Process of Devolution: Territorial Politics and Governance under the Welsh Assembly

Devolution has been the most notable feature of the Labour government's plan to modernize the constitution. Principal consideration is given to Wales and to events since the formation of the National Assembly, which are examined by recourse to theoretically informed analysis on territorial politics and the nature of governance. The central question concerns the extent to which the Assembly can develop an autonomous policy position. Contemporary theories argue that internal and external developments have left central government in a less powerful position, which potentially can further augment the prospects for devolution. Events prior to and after the formation of the Assembly question whether government has moved into a new phase of development. Central government still commands an extensive range of resources and powers, especially over territorial bodies. At the same time, comparative analysis shows that such institutional parameters need not remain fixed. There is institutional space within the state for these powers to be contested and that the continued significance of territory can act as the basis of such political struggle.     

Coalition-Targeted Duvergerian Voting: How Expectations Affect Voter Choice under Proportional Representation

Inspired by analyses of majoritarian systems, students of consensual polities have analyzed strategic voting due to barriers to party success, namely, district magnitude and threshold. Given the prevalence of coalition governments in proportional systems, we analyze a type of strategic voting seldom studied: how expected coalition composition affects voter choice. We identify Duvergerian behavior by voters targeted at the coalition formation stage. We contend that when voters perceive their preferred party as unlikely to participate in the coalition, they often desert it and instead support the lesser of evils among those they perceive as viable coalition partners. We demonstrate our argument using data on coalition expectations from the 2006 Israeli elections. We find an appreciable albeit differential effect of coalition expectations on voter choice. Importantly, results hold controlling for ideological and coalition preferences. Lastly, we explore a broad cross-national comparison, showing that there is less, not more, proximity voting where coalitions are prevalent.     

The Impact of Proportional Representation on Government Effectiveness: The New Zealand Experience

It is often claimed that proportional representation (PR) undermines government effectiveness, including decisional efficacy, fiscal prudence, electoral responsiveness and accountability. Drawing on New Zealand's experience since the introduction of a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1996, this article examines the impact of the new voting system on government effectiveness. Although government durability has been substantially reduced and the policy-making process has become more complex, governments under MMP appear to be no less able to address major policy problems or respond to changing economic circumstances. Moreover, New Zealand has maintained continuous fiscal surpluses under MMP — a radical departure from the protracted, and often large, deficits that characterised the previous two decades under a majoritarian electoral system.     

Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation

Proportional representation systems affect the extent to which elected legislators exhibit various attributes that allow them to earn a personal vote. The sources of variation in personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) lie in informational shortcuts voters use under different electoral rules. List type (closed or open) and district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a district) affect the types of shortcuts voters employ. When lists are closed, legislators' PVEA are of decreasing usefulness to voters as magnitude (and hence the number of candidates on a list) increases. When lists are open, legislators' PVEA are increasingly useful to voters as magnitude increases, because the number of candidates from which voters must choose whom to give a preference vote increases. As predicted by the theory, the probability that a legislator will exhibit PVEA—operationalized as local birthplace or lower-level electoral experience—declines with magnitude when lists are closed, but rises with magnitude when lists are open .     

The Paradox of Proportional Representation: The Effect of Party Systems and Coalitions on Individuals' Electoral Participation

Empirical findings based on aggregate data have found that proportional representation (PR) has a mixed relationship with electoral participation. Large party systems, thought to be one of the benefits of PR in increasing turnout, instead depress turnout. This article examines two theories that seek to account for this paradox – that coalition governments resulting from larger party systems serve to depress turnout, and that larger party systems increase the complexity of the decision environment for voters. By combining individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems with contextual measures of effective number of parties, coalition structure and disproportionality, this article tests for interactions between the characteristics and attitudes of individuals and the contextual influences on electoral participation. The frequency of coalitions that violate the minimal-winning rule depresses turnout, especially among supporters of major parties. By accounting for variations in coalition governments, larger party systems appear, on balance, to enhance, rather than depress, individuals' propensity to vote. Limited evidence is reported that indicates that this participation-enhancing role of larger party systems is not evenly distributed across the electorate, as those lacking a university degree may find the decision environment created by larger party systems more complex.