Rating the Chancellors and their Budgets

The annual budget presentation is one of the most important forms of public, partisan behaviour in a parliamentary democracy. As such, it should share many features with the addresses of US presidents, including their presumed efficacy. Yet public reactions to budget presentations have been studied only indirectly, and a link between these reactions and government standing has not been established. We use Gallup data over four decades to investigate how voters assess Chancellors of the Exchequer and their budgets. We find that voters' assessments are a product of the performance of the economy, the content of the budget, the media's reaction to the budget and political factors, and are not simply derivative of general feelings about the government in power or intended vote. While developed independently, evaluations of the Chancellor and the budget affect short-term voting intentions of the public. Thus, in unitary, parliamentary governments, as in federal and presidential systems, voters use more than one focal point (in a single party) to evaluate the government and its actions.     

How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?

Empirical evidence is collected and discussed regarding the influence of public bureaucrats on government sector outcome in their capacity as consumer-voters. It is necessary to isolate the specific effect of working in the public sector (compared to other occupations) on voting participation and on the probability to support an increase in the public budget. For a balanced evaluation of public bureaucrats' power, other forms of their influencing the government sector outcome need to be taken into account.     

Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles

Political budget cycles (PBCs) can result from the credibility problems office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit public debt, because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate PBCs. Since the legislature must typically authorize new debt, divided government can make these fiscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the budget law, which can help explain why PBCs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.     

Factors Explaining Public Participation in the Central Government Budget Process

This paper attempts to examine which factors explain public participation in the budget process in an international comparative approach. In particular, we investigate which socioeconomic, institutional, and political factors promote public engagement in the central government budget process. Using a sample of 93 countries, our results indicate that Internet penetration, population diversity, governmental financial situation, and budget transparency determine opportunities for public engagement in the central government budget process. In addition, we show that not only budget transparency promotes public participation but also public participation is necessary to enhance budget transparency.     

Trust Matters: Enhancing Government Legitimacy through Participatory Budgeting

Legitimacy is a problem of contemporary governance. Communities lack trust in elected officials—in their effectiveness, fairness, and representation of the public interest. Participatory budgeting (PB)—a set of democratic processes where residents determine how to spend a public budget—helps bridge that distance by letting the public make spending decisions. Since 2011, some of New York City’s (NYC) council members have been implementing PB with their capital budget—setting aside a million dollars in their districts each budget cycle for PB. Participatory budgeting has the potential to rebuild relationships between government and communities. Using data from over eighty interviews conducted by New York University (NYU) graduate students in 2013 and 2014 with PBNYC participants over two years, this article suggests that in council districts using PB, residents have greater feelings of access to and voice in local government, and better understanding of the complexities of spending public monies, often leading to a more positive view of government officials, and bolstering legitimacy of local government.     

Budget institutions and taxation

While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.     

Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy

The allocation of a government budget between a public good and transfers is modeled under different systems of government. The relatively even distribution of political power among groups in a democracy favors spending on nonexclusive public goods. The more concentrated pattern of political power in a dictatorship favors spending on transfers targeted to powerful groups. The hypothesis on public good provision is examined using cross-country data on public good provision and empirical indicators of political regime. Dictatorial governments are found to provide public schooling, roads, safe water, public sanitation, and pollution control at levels far below democracies.     

Budgeting for Accountability: A Comparative Study of Budget Reforms in the United States during the Progressive Era and in Contemporary China

Budgeting is an important mechanism for ensuring public accountability. How do budget reforms in the United States during the Progressive Era compare to those in contemporary China? Are administrative and legislative budget controls essential to an effective, efficient government? Though the two countries differ in many respects, significant parallels between their budget reforms are evident. In the United States, electoral accountability alone does not guarantee overall government accountability if proper budgetary institutions are absent. China's recent budget reform reveals that it is possible to develop accountability, absent open elections, but with limitations and constraints. Lessons on budgeting and accountability for other developing and transitional countries are drawn from this comparative study.     

Tax Expenditure Budgets, Budget Policy, and Tax Policy: Confusion in the States

A tax expenditure budget should contribute to efficient and effective public decisions by quantifying the division in the tax structure between provisions that represent revenue policy (distribute the cost of government according to the legislated tax base) and parts that represent budget policy (substitute for direct spending). For this transparency to have the desired impact, however, the tax expenditure budget process and the direct expenditure process must be properly integrated and the tax expenditure budget must make an accurate division between the parts of the tax structure. A review of the 33 states with tax expenditure systems shows many weaknesses in application of the concept and poor linkage to the direct spending budget system. Their most significant flaw is in dividing the tax structure into normal and preference elements; states need greater attention to defining their basic tax structure if they are to have a meaningful tax expenditure budget.     

Public Enterprises and the Budget in Developing Countries

Public enterprises have a substantial fiscal impact in developing countries. This has led to the enterprises impinging on the budgetary process of the government while public enterprises are burdened by budget policies and macroeconomic policies. Such difficulties may necessitate the restructuring of public enterprises, either through privatization or reform to make them more competitive with the private sector.     

The Case Against Balanced Budgets

A proposal by the Fahey government in late 1994 to amend the NSW state Constitution so as to require 'balanced' budgets is one of a number of signs which suggest that the simple notion that total government expenditure should not exceed total tax revenue has gained real influence in Australia, particularly at the state level. This article explains why fiscal responsibility does not require overall budget balance. A balanced budget requirement of this type is not appropriate even if one were to make allowances for recession-induced ('cyclical') deficits, and to seek to ban only 'structural' deficits. The reason for this is there are inherent irregularities in capital expenditure, and only through varying debt levels is it possible to reconcile reasonable stability of tax levels with stable levels of provision of public services (including services from public capital infrastructure).     

Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation

What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.     

Budget Control in Virginia Public School Districts

This article examines the selection and use of a budget approval technique. Specifically, two research questions are addressed: (1) Does the use of a particular budget approval method by a governmental body impact the execution of the budget? (2) What characteristics of a local government are associated with its decision to use a particular budget approval method? Both research questions are addressed by analyzing data from public school systems in the Commonwealth of Virginia, specifically, whether using categorical budget approval differs in the accuracy of budgeting versus using a lump-sum approval method. Characteristics of Virginia school districts are also analyzed according to whether any of them are likely to be associated with school districts using a particular approval method. The remainder of this article is organized as follows: the next section describes the role of budgeting control in schools; subsequent sections review Virginia school district budgeting practices, develop the empirical model used to test the hypotheses, describe the sample, analyze the results of empirical tests and discuss implications of the findings.     

Fiscal Consolidation and Australia's Public Debt

Australia has experienced one of the fastest growing public debt levels in the world post‐Global Financial Crisis due to a series of large federal budget deficits driven by high government spending. In this paper we examine the balance sheet implications of this escalating public debt, before proposing some macro‐fiscal objectives for determining its sustainable level. These objectives are to (i) restore the federal government's solvency; (ii) eliminate foreign public debt; and (iii) achieve budgetary balance over the business cycle. Empirically, we first examine how much fiscal consolidation is required for debt stabilisation at current levels, before considering what sized budget balances are needed to achieve the target debt to GDP ratios consistent with the proposed objectives. The results show that no target debt to GDP level consistent with the optimal levels will be met on current fiscal settings in the medium term. This implies significantly greater fiscal consolidation is required to minimise future fiscal risk.     

Policy Target Populations and Public Participation in Agency Decision Making

Why are some government agencies more open to public input than others? Although many agree about the normative desirability of involving citizens in administrative decision making, there is significant variation across agencies in the extent of public participation. This article investigates the conditions under which public managers solicit greater public participation. We argue that, in addition to normative rationales, participation also serves instrumental considerations related to agency constituency. We draw on a rich body of literature examining participation in the policy process to develop empirically testable hypotheses about the patterns of participation in the administrative decision making of public agencies. Using data on the approaches to gathering citizen input in the budget process at four state departments—environmental protection, transportation, child protective services, and corrections—we find that the characteristics of target populations (namely, their political power and social construction) are strong predictors of an agency's openness to the public.     

Budgeting for Accountability: Municipal Budgeting for the 1990s

The emphasis of a public budget depends on the time and circumstances in which it is developed. During the 1990s, for example, the emphasis has increasingly been on accountability due to widespread public belief in recent years that government is uncontrollable and responds only to special interests. Over the past few years, local budgeters have begun to adapt to this new environment by improving the accountability of the budget to the public. This article summarizes some of the changes taking place and suggests some additional changes that could be adopted to make local budgeting more accountable.     

Corporatisation and Community Service Obligations: Are They Incompatible?

This article asks whether corporatisation is compatible with the notion of community service obligations (CSOs). Corporatisation provides only a minimal framework for the identification of social objectives as CSOs and their funding by government from budget. The community has certain expectations of utilities in relation to CSOs, which may be different from expectations held by governments. Models of corporatisation which have two shareholding ministers with competing objectives introduce a further potential source of conflict.
Historically, the characteristics of a CSO are ambiguous (IC 1991:81) and this presents difficulty in their costing and identification. Governments and corporatised entities have attempted to clarify the issues of definition, identification and costing. These and other issues such as transparency, budget funding, coverage, jurisdiction, public interest and community spirit are discussed in the context of corporatised government electricity utilities.     

The Evolution of Local Government Budgeting in Poland: From Accounting to Policy in a Leap and a Bound

The evolution of U.S. public budgeting has been described by Schick (1966) as a progression from a control orientation to a management and then a planning orientation. Lee (1992) has tracked the evolution of central budgeting staff largely from a group of accountants to a more varied set of backgrounds, dominated by public administration and general liberal arts educations. As Poland decentralizes fiscal and administrative responsibilities and powers to gminas (local self-governments), the gmina councils are beginning to view the budget as more than a financial accounting tool proscribed and prescribed by the central government. They are beginning to see the potential for using the budget as a policy and management tool. The evolutionary transformation of budgeting, which took fifty years in the United States, may take only five years in Poland. The evidence for this metamorphosis is based on interviews with several gmina city budgeters, with special attention devoted to the city of Lublin.     

Accuracy and Accountability in Reporting Local Government Budget Activities: Evidence From the Newsroom and From Newsmakers

The author surveyed newspaper managing editors and municipal finance directors about the effect of newspaper coverage on the accountability of local government budget activities and policies. Using the survey findings, he argues that newspapers are selective about what constitutes news, and that while newspapers receive adequate information from public officials, many reporters and editors lack the training to understand and interpret complex budget activities and policies. A content analysis of newspapers supports the survey findings and presents additional evidence. The result is a weakening of any assessment by the press. Overall, the results challenge the commonly accepted argument that press publicity provides an effective external control over the competence, responsiveness, and accountability of public officials. The article suggests that budget officials can take steps to improve accuracy in reporting and accountability by taking a more active approach with the press.     

参与式预算与政治生态环境的重构——新河公共预算改革的过程和逻辑

新河的参与式预算为我们提供了一份从体制外自发生长到体制内有机融洽为过程,以民主理财,完善委托代理机制为主要内容,以公众参与为基础,以激活人大机制为目的,以重构政治生态环境为指归的独特的文本.通过对其的解读,试图回答公共预算改革为什么会发生在新河;如何使政府的目标函数与公众的偏好相符合;通过什么样的路径缩短委托代理链;新河预算改革的实际意义和应用价值何在;今后的指归是什么.新河的参与式预算是一个基于公众与政府之间和谐理念而设计出来的制度创新,是对传统公众与政府之间关系的一种变革.通过这样的创新和变革,树立了凡是与公众有关的事情都应让公众知道的思想,提高了预算编制的透明度和参与度,践行了治国的根本.这是一次人大与政府互动关系的良好发端,通过激活人大而对政府实行真正的制衡,是政治生态环境的重构过程,是新河参与式预算的实际意义所在.新河的阳光试验,正在为我国的公共预算改革探路,并为之积累经验,它将成为我国民主政治建设的一个新的起点.