The Marble Cake: Introducing Federalism to the Government Growth Equation

A great deal of A great deal of literature has examined thefactors that explain government growth in the United States.Analyses have typically been conducted either nationally orby states, but virtually no systematic attention has been givento the role federalism plays in shaping patterns of growth acrossdifferent orders of government. In this research note, we useGranger causality methods to assess the degree to which governmentgrowth is an interactive process across local, state, and nationalgovernments. Our findings indicate that state governments arean important force in this process; hence, future models ofgovernment growth need to incorporate federalism explicitly.     

Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries. A Voting Power Approach

We test for the influenceof government strength and dispersion ofpower among the parties of coalitiongovernments on the size of annual debtaccumulation through budget deficits inOECD-countries from 1970 to 1999.Government strength and power dispersion incoalition governments are measured by theBanzhaf index of voting power, respectivelythe standard deviation of Banzhaf indicesof coalition parties. We believe that theseare better-suited proxies than most of whathas been applied so far. Governmentstrength turns out to be insignificant.However, coalitions with equally strongpartners run significantly higher deficitsthan coalitions with one dominating party.     

Voters AS A Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants

Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referendum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.     

Wisconsin's Budget Deficit: Size, Causes, Remedies, and Consequences

Wisconsin's lawmakers increased spending and cut taxes during the 1990s. Then, in January of 2001, they faced an estimated $2.4 billion budget gap or deficit for the FY 2001–2003 biennium. They cut spending and generated additional revenue by borrowing against future tobacco settlement income. Still, by January of 2002, the estimated deficit had grown by an additional $1.3 billion, and more cutting and borrowing took place. Despite these actions, a $3.5 billion deficit was projected for FY 2003–2005. In this study, the causes of the deficit, the "remedies" selected, and their effects are examined. "Lessons" highlighted by Wisconsin's experience include the risks associated with nonincremental policy making, the high costs of excessive political partisanship, and the corrosive effects of "fiscal brinksmanship."     

Globalization and Fiscal Federalism: Does Openness Constrain Subnational Budget Imbalances?

Recent research has shown that more globalized countries—defined as those with stronger international trade and financial linkages—tend to have larger governments. The empirical evidence reported in this paper shows that globalization is also associated with the government's fiscal stance, nationally and subnationally. Greater access to external sources of finance, which can be facilitated through globalization, is associated with increased market scrutiny over policies, resulting in a higher premium on fiscal discipline.     

The Status of State Governments in Nigeria's Federalism

Nigerian states have almost completely lost their autonomy.The Babangida years and, in particular, 1991–1992, havewitnessed unprecedented reductions in states' powers. The entrenchmentof local government autonomy and the loss of some state powersto local authorities, the reduction of states' financial powersand their share of the Federation Account, as well as the decreeof a highly centralized two-party system, all have, within theframework of structural economic adjustment and the transitionto civil rule (expected to be completed in January 1993), worsenedthe position of the state governments. However, with the establishmentof civilian governance in the states and the return of constitutionalgovernment after January 1993, the state governments may reasserttheir autonomy.     

The State of American Federalism, 2005: Federalism Resurfaces in the Political Debate

After several years during which federalism was rarely a prominentor explicit issue in political debates, it was in several waysthrust into the public consciousness in 2005. It was not thatthe president or Congress ceased sacrificing state and localinterests to substantive policy goals, as shown by the costlyREAL ID Act, stringent new federal requirements in the TemporaryAid to Needy Families reauthorization, and congressional interventionin the Terri Schiavo case. However, Hurricane Katrina, and particularlythe delayed and ineffective intergovernmental response, generatedsubstantial debate about the appropriate federal role in disasterrelief. In addition, state and local governmental oppositionto the No Child Left Behind Act intensified and generated significantattention during the year, particularly as a result of a Utahstatute asserting the precedence of state over federal law anda Connecticut lawsuit against the act. Meanwhile, state governmentscontinued to address a number of policy problems that federalofficials were unable or unwilling to confront, especially regardingenvironmental, health-care, and labor issues. Finally, althoughthe Supreme Court in 2005 continued its recent (2003–2004)trend of pulling back somewhat from its late-1990s Congress-curbingdecisions, federalism issues figured quite prominently in thesenate confirmation hearings for Chief Justice John Robertsand Justice Samuel Alito.     

The States, Federalism and Political Science: A Fifty-Year Appraisal

The role of the states within the Australian federation has evolved significantly over the past 50 years. So has the interpretation of that role by political scientists. Until the early 1970s, the states seemed to be declining into financial and policy subservience notwithstanding their continuing primary responsibility for the delivery of public services. They then experienced a political and policy renaissance, accompanied by a more balanced political-science appreciation of the virtues of federalism. Since the early 1990s, the states' trajectory has become more uncertain.     

基于完善科层制的县级政府管理体制创新

科层制是工业社会中有效的组织体制，形式合理性是其理论精髓，并由此表现出等级制、非人格化、规则化等特征。当前我国县级政府管理体制是一种发展并不充分的科层制，不仅未发挥出科层制的优势，而且在我国社会工业化、信息化进程中还暴露出诸多弊端。现时条件下，消除弊端、创新我国县级政府管理体制的合理路径不是盲目摒弃科层制，而是完善科层制，充分挖掘其合理性因素。     

风险治理情境下基层政府的责任逻辑:基本范畴、现实样态与实践进路

人类社会面临的风险越来越具有复杂性和系统性,而规避和应对风险是现代国家治理的重要内容。基层政府在国家治理体系中具有承上启下的枢纽功能,在一国风险治理体系中基层政府担负何种责任、履责状态如何直接关系到风险治理的实际效果。基层政府风险治理的责任逻辑可以从责任归属、责任评价和责任追究等三个层面加以考察,由此引申出个体责任与集体责任、过程责任与结果责任、追溯性责任与前瞻性责任等三个基本逻辑关系范畴。在风险治理情境下,一些基层政府遵循一定的责任逻辑,在现实治理活动中呈现出主体转嫁型、形式泛化型和行动迟滞型等三种避责样态。在未来的风险行动中,基层政府责任逻辑的实践进路应是：通过集体认知的聚合,规避基层官员个体责任的陷阱;通过风险治理流程的再造,形塑基层政府的结果责任状态;通过行动韧性的培植,催生基层政府的前瞻性责任能力。     

The Road to South Carolina: Intergovernmental Tax Immunity and the Constitutional Status of Federalism

In South Carolina v. Baker the Supreme Court struck a powerfulblow at constitutional federalism. As a result of this landmarkcase, the question of whether issuing tax exempt bonds is asovereign right of the states or a privilege they are accordedby the national government has been settled. Relying in parton precedent from Garcia, the Court determined that immunityis not a right under the Tenth Amendment. In addition, SouthCarolina established a new doctrine of intergovernmental taximmunity which formally accords superior powers to the nationalgovernment. Taken together, these results have implicationsfor the future course of intergovernmental fiscal policy aswell as the basic character of the relationship between thenational and state and local governments.     

The Racial Bureaucracy: African Americans and the Federal Government in the Era of Segregated Race Relations

This article employs archival research to examine how the segregationist order was introduced and maintained in the Federal civil service between the 1890s and 1945. In the article a racial bureaucracy is defined by two characteristics. First, one group of employees was placed in a subordinate position to others, both formally and informally, as a consequence of their race. Second, physical working conditions and daily routines were constructed around the segregation of one group of employees because of their race and, furthermore, advancement and promotion within the bureaucracy was delimited by race. This framework is used first, critically to assess two common views of the composition of the US federal government (the local race state thesis and the weak state thesis), and second, to illustrate how segregation impinged directly upon African American employees in a range of agencies and positions.     

Coordinating the Government Bureaucracy in Hong Kong: An Institutional Analysis

The change in sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997 has brought about an interesting puzzle: despite a high degree of institutional continuity, the Hong Kong bureaucracy that was considered highly efficient during the colonial era has appeared to turn into an inept administrative structure generating blunder after blunder. The bureaucracy seems to face greater difficulties in horizontal coordination under the new governance, and has lost the ability to produce coherent policy actions.
Drawing upon a literature of institutional analysis, this article examines the institutional design for coordination in the Hong Kong government. The article argues that the bureaucracy in Hong Kong is designed upon a logic of colonial rule. Like any institutional arrangements, the colonial administrative system has inherent coordination limitations. During the colonial era, some smoothing mechanisms were developed as the lubricant for the bureaucracy's operation, but the new governance has inevitably impinged upon some of these—making the bureaucracy more prone to coordination problems.     

Identification,Agreement and Government Performance: The Relative Impact on Voting*

Debating explanations of electoral behavior, American scholars have focused on three main theories: The identification model relying on underlying loyalty of voters towards specific parties; the political agreement or proximity model assuming a rational calculation of parties' ideological positions or stand on salient political issues as the yardstick for choice of party; and the investment model relying on voters' ability to calculate which government alternative will bring most utility for the individual voter. Examining these theories with the use of Norwegian data from the elections of 1965, 1969 and 1977, we find that the identification model is far the most powerful in predicting individual voting behavior. This model also has an edge in explaining support for the individual parties and the total distribution of voters. However, at the major postwar government election in 1965, the investment model certainly is of importance, and at the election in 1977 the significance of the proximity model has increased.     

The Debate on Australian Federalism: Local Government Financial Interrelationships with State and Commonwealth Governments

The nascent debate on Australian federalism has hitherto focused almost entirely on Commonwealth-state interrelationships to the virtual exclusion of local government. Since Australian local government employs around 156,000 people and spends in excess of $10 billion this neglect is unfortunate. In an effort to at least partly remedy this oversight, the present paper seeks to assess various unsettled questions in local government financial relationships with both Commonwealth and state governments, especially the issue of financial assistance grants and their efficiency consequences.     

The State of American Federalism, 2004: Is Federalism Still a Core Value?

Federalism as a political issue was conspicuously absent fromthe 2004 presidential contest. Unlike many previous campaigns,neither party's candidate made much mention of problems besettingstates and localities. The war against global terrorism andthe changing situation in Iraq shaped the election. Progresswas made on homeland security, but intergovernmental wranglingover federal grants continued unabated. Federal-state feudswere common in several policy areas, including education, environmentalprotection, and health care. State finances received a revenueboost as economic growth picked up, but rising costs for Medicaid,education, employee pensions, and prisons clouded states' financialforecasts. The U.S. Supreme Court decided several cases witha federalism dimension, and these decisions plus those of thepast several years suggest the Court has moved not so much togrant more power to the states but to prune back the power ofCongress. Much of what has happened during the first Bush administrationmust be seen against the larger background of changes in theAmerican political party system. Changes in party organizationand policy control, especially during the first Bush administration,reaffirm David Walker's assessment that over the past quartercentury American federalism has become more nationalized.     

Government Budget Reforms: Agenda for the 1980s

A previous article (Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1980) examined the progress and problems of budgetary innovation in the postwar era. Through a succession of reforms, budgeting maintained its coherence and continuity, It is likely, however, that future innovations will take a different path, one less certain of its success and more a product of fiscal stress than of government affluence. This article considers the reform issues likely to emerge in the coming years.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.