The political economy of sales taxes and sales tax exemptions

I analyze the choice politicians face when seeking votes from groups that lobby for sales tax rate decreases or tax exemptions, given the constraint that politicians want to raise a certain amount of revenue. Using data on sales taxes, I develop a model predicting a positive relationship between the number of exemptions and the sales tax rate. The estimation results provide support for this prediction. Each additional exemption is associated with an increase of between 0.10 and 0.25 percentage points in the tax rate.

     

The Consequences of Collective Action: An Incomplete-Contracts Approach

Public policy may be determined as much by what cannot be agreed to by politicians and organized interests as by what can. Focusing on the inability of organized groups to credibly promise that their members will fully report revenues to tax authorities, I develop an incomplete-contracts lobbying model that shows that the provision of collective goods may be influenced by the anticipated tax compliance of economic sectors as well as by the organization of interests. Data from a survey of firms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are broadly supportive of the theory: the ability of firms to hide revenues from tax authorities rivals conventional collective-action variables in explaining variation in collective-goods provision, but only in that part of the postcommunist world where differences in revenue hiding across sectors are especially large.     

税收负担、公共品层次与私人公共品需求——以山东省面板数据为例

个人税收负担的增长会对公共品需求产生负向影响,这一结论在西方的研究中被普遍证明。本文从中国实际出发,借助经典的中位选民模型,考察了个人税收负担对公共品需求的影响。通过对山东省17市1997～2007年的面板数据进行实证分析,发现个人税收负担对公共品需求的负向影响在中国并不普遍存在。就影响公共品需求的各因素来看,公共品需求的收入弹性以及人口拥挤效应普遍存在;个人税收负担对济南、烟台两市一般公共品需求产生负向影响,对其余15个市产生正向效应。为进一步揭示税收负担对不同层次公共品需求的影响差异,选取了教育和公共安全这两类特殊公共品进行研究。山东省17地市的个人税收负担对教育这类公共品普遍产生负向影响;对公共安全类公共品产生完全正向效应。因此,本文认为山东省一般公共品市场是供给导向的市场,税收弹性与公共品需求层次相关,建议建立引导公民合理表达公共品需求意向机制。     

Economic growth and alternative deficit-reducing tax increases and expenditure cuts: A cross-sectional study

This paper assesses empirically the relative desirability of alternative deficit-reducing tax increases and expenditure cuts in terms of their individual impact on economic growth, using cross-sectional data for a sample of 21 developed countries for the period 1972–81.Property taxes are by far superior to deficit financing, and are the best choice for implementing deficit-reducing tax increases. Income taxes and domestic taxes on goods and services, which are as bad for growth as are deficits, rank second with no difference between them. Foreign trade taxes are even worse for growth than are deficits, and are the worst choice for reducing deficits.     

Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature

What is the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on tax rates? What is preferable: a bureaucrat or a partisan politician? Does a flypaper effect occur when lobby groups influence public policies? This article tries to answer these questions by analyzing and comparing six different models of public choice: (1) the median voter model, (2) the Leviathan model, (3) the slack-maximizing model, (4) a general model of bureaucracy, (5) the partisan politicians model and (6) a general model of lobbying. Among several results, it is shown that the median voter’s income and tax share almost always play a significant role in the design of the public good/tax package, even if the government does not explicitly try to maximize the median voter’s utility. The article also provides a synthesis of the positive analysis of the flypaper effect.     

Federal tax reform and the financing of state and local governments

Although the Reagan Administration tax reform proposals would reduce federal income tax liabilities for most taxpayers, federal tax reform would also create strong pressures on state and local governments to cut taxes and public services. These pressures would arise primarily because itemizers would no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes in determining their federal income tax liabilities. In New York City and Boston, it is likely that the Administration's tax reform would induce cuts in spending that range from 2.5 to 7.5 percent. While the elimination of state and local tax deductibility may promote allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods, the cost would be a decline in the degree of redistribution through the state and local public sector, and a reduction in local public services for the poor.     

How Tame Will Leviathan Become in Institutional Competition – Competition Among Governments in the Provision of Public Goods

This article critically examines thehypothesis of Brennan and Buchanan that competition amonggovernments in the provision of publicgoods can serve as a substitute forconstitutional constraints on governments.Since Leviathan-type governments withfree choice of tax instruments will be ableto escape competitive pressure by shiftingtaxes to immobile factors, one could thinkof a rule of competition which prohibitstaxes on immobile factors. Indeed, such arule leads to a Nash-equilibriumwhere the tax burden lies on the mobilefactor. However, net income of the citizensmay or may not increase as a result fromsuch a rule, depending on a number ofvariables presented in this article. Acomplete substitution of constitutionalconstraints by the rule of competition may,depending on the same variables, evendecrease net income. Moreover, somepotential for increases in net income maybe forgone, since capital allocation andthe supply of public goods will usually beinefficient in equilibrium. Finally,applying the rule in a real-worldenvironment will be difficult and may evenlead to further serious inefficiencies. Forthese reasons, such a rule will hardly everbe introduced. Hence, competition amonggovernments cannot be viewed as a propersubstitute for constitutional constraints.Whoever is afraid of Leviathan shouldthus not rely on competition amonggovernments (alone).     

Fiscal Policy Composition,Public Debt,and Economic Activity

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model i) toinvestigate how changes to different spending and revenue items of the budgetaffect economic activity and public finance; and ii) to evaluate thewelfare costs of alternative fiscal policy maneuvers. The paper shows that,unlike an increase in government purchases of final goods, an increasein public employment and transfers can have a contractionary effect onthe economy in the same way as a rise in tax rates. It also suggests thatfiscal adjustments implemented by cutting spending items increasehouseholds' welfare and are more effective in reducing the primary deficitand public debt than are increases in tax rates.     

Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and political contest

This paper considers a political contest model wherein self-interested politicians seek rents from the public budget, while general voters make political efforts to protest against politicians’ rent seeking directly (for example, through voting in referendums such as the passage of Proposition?13) or indirectly (for example, through donating money to organized groups such as the National Taxpayer Union). We show that the political contest may ironically lead to the Laffer paradox; that is, rent-seeking politicians may intend to set the tax rate higher than the revenue-maximizing rate. For taming Leviathans, political protests may not be as effective as competition among governments.     

Cities as Lobbyists

Individual cities are active interest groups in lobbying the federal government, and yet the dynamics of this intergovernmental lobbying are poorly understood. We argue that preference incongruence between a city and its parent state government leads to underprovision of public goods, and cities need to appeal to the federal government for additional resources. We provide evidence for this theory using a data set of over 13,800 lobbying disclosures filed by cities with populations over 25,000 between 1999 and 2012. Income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are also highly related to federal lobbying activities. Using an instrumental variables analysis of earmark and Recovery Act grant data, we show that each dollar a city spends on lobbying generates substantial returns.     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in a Median Voter Model

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income. It turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of i) economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii) political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions. A negative welfare effect is more likely, the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter's labor income to average labor income. We also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination; it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters.     

Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study

We consider an economy composed of two regions. Each of them provides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries. In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a region are spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two regions are pooled and used to finance both public goods according to the population size of each region. The experiment shows that centralization induces lower tax morale and less efficient outcomes. The reasons are that centralization gives rise to an interregional incentive problem and creates inequalities in income between regions.     

Do elections lead to informed public decisions?

Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. We analyse a model in which the electorate wants an office-motivated incumbent to design, examine and implement public policies. We show that voters can always encourage politicians to design projects. However, they cannot always induce politicians to examine projects. In fact, politicians who would examine policies without elections, say because of a concern about the public interest, may shy away from policy examination with elections.     

Preferences,beliefs, and values in negotiations concerning aid to Nicaragua

The paper argues that in the context of public choice for non-market goods, two assumptions of the simple model of the rational economic actor may not hold. The assumptions are that there is a direct connection between choice and outcome, and that preferences are not affected by the act of making a choice. Consequently, to understand people's preferences for public goods, it is important to measure their beliefs and values separately rather than simply to observe their choice behavior or to ask them what they would be willing to pay for the public good. In an example study, people's preferences for U.S. policies toward Nicaragua were measured and further analyzed into their beliefs about the effects of those policies on Nicaraguan outcomes, and their evaluations of the Nicaraguan outcomes. It was shown that the process of making a two-person choice changed the preferences, and that the separate measures or beliefs and values gave insight into the process of the change that would not have been available had only the preferences been measured. Implications for the contingent valuation method are explored and an alternative approach is proposed.     

公共物品供给的交易费用多维度分析

制度分析学派通过不同制度的交易费用状况的比较,对各种制度的特征进行了较充分的分析.但是,对于公共物品的供给制度来说,由于公共物品的公共性价值特征导致的交易费用的复杂性,不能在单一维度的视角下笼统地仅考虑费用的数量大小,由此来评判制度安排和公共决策的好坏.因为除了信息不对称因素所产生的交易费用以外,有相当一部分被视为诱发交易费用的行为实际上是在体现和保证物品的公共性,这些费用表现为公共协商的成本和对损失方补偿的费用.试图从多种维度对公共物品供给中的交易费用进行分析,不仅对信息不对称如何产生交易费用进行了描述,还对公共协商和对损失方补偿产生的费用所表现出的公共性价值进行了解析;并借用了公共选择学派的广义宪政经济学理论,探讨了交易费用的最优解;最后倡导建立具有公共性特征的公共物品供给的交易费用现.     

Intergovernmental Political Competition in American Federalism

Many policies in the United States are jointly determined by federal and state actions. In the game theoretic model offered here, politicians in both the state and national governments seek credit for providing goods desired by the public and avoid blame for the taxes necessary to provide the goods. In line with Peterson's (1995) theory of functional federalism, the level of government that is better able to supply particular goods and services tends to take the lead in their provision, even to the extent of fully crowding out much less efficient governments. However, under a broad set of circumstances, both state and national politicians seek credit via public spending, and their joint provision leads to a relative "oversupply" of public goods and services, and thus to "overtaxation." Under joint provision, states vary in their responses to changing federal spending patterns based both on the causes of the national changes and on state characteristics .     

Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy

This article explains why dissatisfaction with the performance of individual politicians in new democracies often turns into disillusionment with democracy as a political system. The demands on elections as an instrument of political accountability are much greater in new than established democracies: politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics of undesirable candidates who view this period as their “one‐time opportunity to get rich.” After a repeatedly disappointing government performance, voters may rationally conclude that “all politicians are crooks” and stop discriminating among them, to which all politicians rationally respond by “acting like crooks,” even if most may be willing to perform well in office if given appropriate incentives. Such an expectation‐driven failure of accountability, which I call the “trap of pessimistic expectations,” may precipitate the breakdown of democracy. Once politicians establish reputations for good performance, however, these act as barriers to the entry into politics of low‐quality politicians. The resulting improvement in government performance reinforces voters’ belief that democracy can deliver accountability, a process that I associate with democratic consolidation. These arguments provide theoretical microfoundations for several prominent empirical associations between the economic performance of new democracies, public attitudes toward democracy, and democratic stability.     

村庄公共品供给中的“好混混”

1990年代以后,两湖平原村庄中出现了好混混。好混混的出现源于村庄公共品供给的困境。乡村组织难以抑制公共品供给中的搭便车行为,村庄公共品合作常常因此难以达成。好混混则可以依靠暴力和暴力威胁遏制搭便车行为,维系村庄公共品合作和供给,他们的好由此体现出来。取消农业税后,乡村组织的公共品供给能力更加弱化,农民因此对好混混的需求更甚。好混混这一怪异现象,反映了国家权力在基层社会存在局部不足。     

Will you still trust me tomorrow? The causal effect of terrorism on social trust

The absence of a deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for the polity. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving the willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible and a fixed pension scheme. While in the fixed scheme, performance has no impact on the pension, the pension increases with short-term performance in the flexible scheme, using the vote share of the officeholder’s party in the next election as a performance indicator. Such a pension choice improves the well-being of citizens since officeholders are encouraged to invest in those activities that are beneficial for society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result.     

Why Vote with the Chief? Political Connections and Public Goods Provision in Zambia

Why are voters influenced by the views of local patrons when casting their ballots? The existing literature suggests that coercion and personal obligations underpin this form of clientelism, causing voters to support candidates for reasons tangential to political performance. However, voters who support candidates preferred by local patrons may be making sophisticated political inferences. In many developing countries, elected politicians need to work with local patrons to deliver resources to voters, giving voters good reason to consider their patron's opinions of candidates. This argument is tested using data from an original survey of traditional chiefs and an experiment involving voters in Zambia. Chiefs and politicians with stronger relationships collaborate more effectively to provide local public goods. Furthermore, voters are particularly likely to vote with their chief if they perceive the importance of chiefs and politicians working jointly for local development.