Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort under Probabilistic Voting

Congleton (1984) shows that a rent awardedby a committee results in smaller aggregaterent-seeking expenditures than a similarrent awarded by a single administrator.This note modifies Congleton's model byconsidering a model in which voting isprobabilistic instead of deterministic. Ishow that the relative magnitudes ofrent-seeking expenditures could go eitherway depending on the relative weightedsensitivities (to rent-seeking efforts) ofthe committee and the single administrator.I show how the distribution of votingpowers of committee members affectsrent-seeking efforts. I also examine thecase where there is some probability thatthe rent may not be awarded, if thecommittee is unable to reach a majoritydecision. My results diverge from Congleton(1984) because of the absence ofmajoritarian cycles in my model.     

Retrospective Voting on the Party Level: An Icelandic Test

This research note adds to the emerging body of literature arguing that retrospective voting works on the level of political parties – for government and opposition parties alike – by investigating the generalisability of previous research findings. Furthermore, it tests whether there is a knowledge gap in retrospective voting on the party level. Using the data of the Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES), support is found for the argument that mechanisms of electoral accountability work both for incumbent and opposition parties. Second, while previous research raised doubts on the electorate’s ability to hold governments accountable, there is no evidence of a knowledge gap in retrospective voting on the party level.     

The Voting Rights Act in North Carolina: An Evaluation

This study evaluates the impact of the Voting Rights Act onthe black electorate in North Carolina. A quasi-experimentalresearch design compares progress made in the forty countiescovered by the act (the experimental counties) with an equivalentgroup not covered by the act (the control counties). The resultsindicate that blacks in the experimental counties have madesignificant gains in registering voters, electing black officials,and improving their social and economic conditions.     

Ecological Inference and Entropy-Maximizing: An Alternative Estimation Procedure for Split-Ticket Voting

Publication of King's A Solution to the Ecological InferenceProblem has rekindled interest in the estimation of unknowncell values in two- and three-dimensional matrices from knowledgeof the marginal sums. This paper outlines an entropy-maximizing(EM) procedure which employs more constraints than King's EImethod and produces mathematical rather than statistical procedures:the estimates are maximum-likelihood values. The mathematicsare outlined, and the procedure's use illustrated with a studyof ticket-splitting at New Zealand's first (1996) general electionusing the mixed-member proportional representation system, forwhich official figures provide a check against the EM estimateof the number voting a straight party ticket in each constituency.     

工资的省际差异与平衡——一个基于效用均衡观点的分析

近几年来,公务员的工资在不断地上涨,而同时存在的事实是:各地公务员的工资收入存在着较大的差异,公务员的工资与其它行业的工资相比也存在着很大的差异。对于公务员工资是高是低的争论由来已久,那么,如何衡量公务员工资的高低?公务员工资调整的依据是什么?以Adams的公平理论和Niskanen的官员(Bureaucrats)效用模型为基础,结合修正的Mulligan,Sala-I-Martin人力资本投入模型,计算了全国各个省(自治区、直辖市)的均衡水平工资。结果表明:东部地区的均衡工资与实际水平偏离较小,而西部欠发达地区偏离较大。经过分析为公务员工资的调整提供了一个定量分析的参考依据。     

Expressiveness and Voting

It has been suggested that voting may be an ``expressive''action taken without regard to any hope of actuallyinfluencing election outcomes on the margin. However, therehas been no real-world evidence brought to bear on thequestion of whether the propensity of an individual to voteand the propensity of that same individual to engage in otherforms of ``expressive'' behavior are correlated in anystatistically meaningful sense. Drawing from longitudinal datafound in the National Election Surveys we report compellingevidence of a strong, positive relationship between what weterm ``political expressiveness'' and the act of voting.     

Mobilization Around New Convenience Voting Methods: A Field Experiment to Encourage Voting by Mail with a Downloadable Ballot and Early Voting

Political Behavior - Election reform has allowed citizens in many states to choose among convenience voting methods. We report on a field experiment that tests messages derived from theories about...     

Crashing the Party: An Experimental Investigation of Strategic Voting in Primary Elections

The effect of primary formats on voting behavior and candidatefortune has been the topic of recent political, academic andlegal arguments. We address these debates by examining voterbehavior and election outcomes across primary systems in thelaboratory. While we find the rate of strategic voting isgenerally low, the rate varies across primary formats and thepotential impact on election outcomes differs fromconventional perceptions. Results suggest that more openprimary systems generate more strategic voting, but contraryto conventional wisdom, more open systems do not necessarilylead to more moderate election winners.     

Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-Party System: An Application to the Netherlands

This paper is an empirical study to the effects of economic outcomes on party choice for the Netherlands. In the first part of the paper we employ a multinomial logit model to examine the links between voters' characteristics and party choice. The results suggest that there are long-run movements in party choice which are unlikely be the result of changing economic outcomes. In the second part, we use time series analysis to determine the effects of economic conditions on short-run and medium-run movements in votes shares. The estimations results provide support for the responsibility hypothesis and for the predictions of the partisan voter model that left-wing (right-wing) parties benefit (suffer) from favourable economic growth prospects.     

Conceptualizing Usage in Voting Behavior for Political Marketing: An Application of Consumer Behavior

Political marketing has borrowed and adapted many terms from mainstream marketing, such as image management (segmentation, targeting, and positioning) and consumer (voter). In marketing, the terms “user” and “usage” have been established, yet their application to political marketing is less clear. This paper analyzes the feasibility and usefulness of usage in the political context. Drawing from the literature on usage, a model is developed and applied to four voting environments: Britain, Australia, Russia, and Belarus. One critical factor that emerges is the concept of choice, whereby the voter may chose to indicate their preference for one party yet be forced to use a different party as chosen by collective choice. Another issue is the potential for habitual voting behavior to limit decision making. It is concluded that usage needs to be contextualized specifically for political marketing.     

Compulsory Voting Rules,Reluctant Voters and Ideological Proximity Voting

Political Behavior - Political theorists have argued that democracies should strive for high turnout, leading to an argument for the introduction of compulsory voting, one of the surest ways to...     

Distance and Voting: Evidence from Danish Municipalities

Living far from the assigned polling station possibly renders voting less convenient than if the polls are right around the corner. Using a cross‐sectional dataset of about 2.3 million potential voters, including the distances between each household and the assigned polling station, a substantial impact of distance on the propensity to vote is found. An individual living five kilometers from the polling station has a ten percentage‐point lower propensity to turnout than an individual living right next to it. The relationship between distance and turnout is found to be approximately logarithmic. Additionally, the impact of distance appears to be conditional on the availability of cars in the household. The policy implications of the results are discussed in the concluding section.     

Reprecincting and Voting Behavior

Despite the expansion of convenience voting across the American states, millions of voters continue to cast ballots at their local precincts on Election Day. We argue that those registered voters who are reassigned to a different Election Day polling place prior to an election are less likely to turn out to vote than those assigned to vote at the same precinct location, as a new precinct location incurs both search and transportation costs on reassigned voters. Utilizing voter file data and precinct shape files from Manatee County, Florida, from before and after the 2014 General Election, we demonstrate that the redrawing of precinct boundaries and the designation of Election Day polling places is not a purely technical matter for local election administrators, but may affect voter turnout of some registered voters more than others. Controlling for a host of demographic, partisan, vote history, and geospatial factors, we find significantly lower turnout among registered voters who were reassigned to a new Election Day precinct compared to those who were not, an effect not equally offset by those voters turning to other available modes of voting (either early in-person or absentee). All else equal, we find that registered Hispanic voters were significantly more likely to abstain from voting as a result of being reassigned than any other racial group.     

Economic Voting in Latin America: Rules and Responsibility

The impact of institutions on the economic vote stands as a well‐established proposition for the advanced democracies of Europe. We know less, however, regarding the institutional effects on the economic vote in the developing democracies of Latin America. Carrying out an analysis of presidential elections in 18 Latin American countries, we offer evidence that the usual Eurocentric conceptualization of the clarity of responsibility is not ideal for understanding the economic vote in this region. There does exist a powerful effect of institutions on the economic vote within Latin American democracies, but one uniquely associated with its presidential regimes and dynamic party systems. Rules for these elections—such as concurrence, term limits, and second‐round voting—suggest that we should reconceptualize the notion of the clarity of responsibility in Latin America, focusing more on individuals in power and their constraints, and less on the political parties from which they hail.     

Democratic Accountability and Retrospective Voting: A Laboratory Experiment

Understanding the incentives of politicians requires understanding the nature of voting behavior. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether voters focus on the problem of electoral selection or if they instead focus on electoral sanctioning. If voters are forward‐looking but uncertain about politicians’ unobservable characteristics, then it is rational to focus on selection. But doing so undermines democratic accountability because selection renders sanctioning an empty threat. In contrast to rational choice predictions, the experimental results indicate a strong behavioral tendency to use a retrospective voting rule. Additional experiments support the interpretation that retrospective voting is a simple heuristic that voters use to cope with a cognitively difficult inference and decision problem and, in addition, suggest that voters have a preference for accountability. The results pose a challenge for theories of electoral selection and voter learning and suggest new interpretations of empirical studies of economic and retrospective voting.