反垄断宽恕政策的理论分析与实证考察

宽恕政策是卡特尔执法的有效政策工具，它有利于破坏卡特尔的稳定性，有利于提高卡特尔的执法效率。设计合理的规则是宽恕政策有效发挥作用的基础，具体、确定、透明是宽恕政策的基本要求。宽恕政策的实施效果与卡特尔的立法、执法状况密切相关，严厉的法律制裁、坚定的执法态度和有力的执法措施能够有效促进宽恕政策的实施。为了加强卡特尔执法，我国反垄断执法机构应当根据《反垄断法》的有关规定尽快出台宽恕政策。     

论核心卡特尔中的宽恕制度及我国《反垄断法》对其规制和完善

核心卡特尔通过相同的定价、一致的行动、固定的份额来获取高额的利润,给竞争带来重大的危害,但是其隐蔽性强,难以为执法机关所侦破.宽恕制度,通过豁免卡特尔协议成员的方式以鼓励其对卡特尔协议的披露,成为西方国家打击卡特尔的重要武器.我国<反垄断法>虽对宽恕制度做了规制,但尚且不足.仍待完善.     

A note on antitrust damages and leniency programs

The European Commission has in recent years initiated an effort to facilitate private actions for damages in cartel cases. This paper demonstrates in a stylized game-theoretic framework that an increase in antitrust damages can be pro-collusive when a leniency program is already in place. The result holds true even if antitrust authorities are allowed to re-shape their leniency program in reaction to the higher damage level. Larger damage payments imply lower incentives to self-report if damages are not fully encompassed by the leniency program; in effect, the program has to be more generous to enforce self-reporting. But if antitrust authorities are not allowed to offer cash rewards to whistle-blowers, the sufficient level of generosity might be unattainable.     

反垄断从宽处理制度及其中国化

反垄断从宽处理制度旨在减免公法责任以吸引卡特尔成员主动投案并揭发他人的违法事实,是国际上通行的一种发现和打击卡特尔的有效机制。从宽处理制度分为多种类型,其共同的先决条件有三个,即:提出申请、提供有效信息、完全配合反垄断执法机构的查处。中国具有与该制度相契合的传统法律土壤,也具备建构该制度的现实法律依据。但是,我国反垄断法律体系内部的冲突、执法权归属的模糊、行政法律责任的薄弱与缺失等因素,使得该制度在中国的实施面临隐忧。     

欧盟卡特尔案件宽大制度及启示

欧盟宽大制度是一种减轻或免除卡特尔行为人罚款责任的制度。自1996年欧盟引入该项制度以来,现已历经2002年和2006年两次修改。现行宽大制度包括罚款全额免除和部分减免两方面：前者适用于最先提供可使欧盟委员会展开调查或发现违法行为证据的企业;后者适用于提供对欧盟委员会已掌握之证据具有显著附加价值证据的企业。同时,为保证宽大制度的有效实施,欧盟在宽大制度程序保障机制及规制机关自由裁量权控制等方面做出了完善规定。     

反垄断从宽处理制度及其中国化

Aiming at attracting cartel members to surrender or expose illegal acts of others by reducing or exempting them from public law responsibilities, the leniency program in anti-monopoly law is an effective mechanism throughout the world to discover and crack cartels. The leniency program can be divided into various categories, all of which are based on three preconditions: Filing an application, providing effective information and fully cooperating with anti-monopoly authorities. China has a legal tradition similar to the program as well as legal grounds for establishing such program. However, implementation of the program in China may face potential problems arising from various factors including inner conflicts of the anti-monopoly legal regime, ambiguity of enforcement rights and weakness and lack of administrative law liabilities. Li Junfeng, Ph.D, is a lecturer at Shanghai University, an attorney-at-law, and a legal adviser of Shanghai Entrepreneur Coalition. His major research is on law and economy, competition law and commercial law. He presided or participated some projects funded by Shanghai governmental institutions. He has released over ten articles in academic journals, such as Studies in Comparative Legal Science, Economic Law Forum, Economic Review, etc. His monograph — Research on Private Enforcement of Anti-monopoly Law — is to be published.     

论核心卡特尔参与者获得宽大的必要条件

核心卡特尔是世界各国公认的最严重的竞争违法行为,打击核心卡特尔已经成为主要市场经济国家竞争机构的首要工作任务。由于核心卡特尔行为具有很强的隐蔽性,竞争机构传统上采用的调查和办案手段往往对其无法奏效。为了解决这一问题,各国纷纷制定了从内部瓦解卡特尔、鼓励卡特尔参与者自首的宽大方案。根据各国宽大方案,申请人必须满足一系列条件才能获得宽大,本文旨在考察主要市场经济国家宽大方案基础上,对宽大的必要条件进行深入的研究和分析,为我国相关制度的进一步发展提供一定借鉴。     

TRIGGERING INSPECTIONS EX OFFICIO: MOVING BEYOND A PASSIVE EU CARTEL POLICY

The implementation of leniency programs is considered a successboth at a EU Community level and in individual member states.The paper discusses the value of ex officio investigations forcartel detection in light of leniency and complaint-based cases.Are ex officio investigations still needed? Should a competitionauthority concentrate its scarce resources exclusively on theprosecution of leniency or complaint-based cases or follow aproactive market monitoring policy? It is argued that investigationstriggered ex officio are an important complementary enforcementtool to the other passive instruments available to a competitionauthority. A bottom-up methodology for triggering inspectionsbased on economic criteria is presented allowing for a moreproactive cartel policy.     

Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption,Social Norms,and Collectivist Business Cultures

The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.     

ON THE ALLEGEDLY INVISIBLE DUTCH CONSTRUCTION SECTOR CARTEL

This paper considers an extensive cartel contamination of marketsin the Dutch construction sector. Overwhelming legal evidenceof bid rigging in this sector was obtained in 486 leniency applicationsin which complete secret accounts were submitted. I offer acase study and a broadly based post mortem of methodologiesthat were applied earlier to detect malfunctioning markets inthe Netherlands, but failed to identify the construction sectoras problematic. It is concluded that these studies were seriouslyflawed. Theoretical and empirical economic forensics (if properlyapplied) creates value for antitrust authorities in detectionof antitrust violations directly, or by informing them whereto look for direct evidence.     

On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis

In order to enhance the enforcement of Antitrust Law, leniency policies were introduced in nearly all industrialized countries. These programs aim at deterring and eliminating cartels. In this paper we analyze the rationale of the current European and German leniency regulation. We challenge the contemporary view that the standard leniency privilege is incentive-compatible with respect to its aim to enhance competition. Instead, we argue for it to be used as a preemptive strike against competitors under circumstances where cartels become unstable. This implies a tightening of markets in subsequent periods and, thus, a potential reduction in competition intensity. Given strategic reasoning by agents, the principal witness may assure an economically privileged position in the future. This consequence might not be intended by the bonus regulations. Nevertheless if the leniency policies lead to more competition in the market the results should be welcomed by the national cartel offices. We give anecdotal evidence of the German cement case and base our arguments on a game-theoretical model.

Business Collusion as a Criminological Phenomenon: Exploring the Global Criminalisation of Business Cartels

Over the last dozen years or so there has been a burgeoning of criminal law for purposes of dealing with business cartels in a number of jurisdictions (for instance, the new ‘cartel offence’ introduced under the Enterprise Act 2002 in the UK). The discussion here provides first of all some account of this process of criminalisation, mapping it in terms of jurisdictions and the legal character of this category of cartel offending. It then seeks to explain and account for the phenomenon and more particularly to determine the extent to which it may be seen either as an element of more forceful prosecution strategy, or alternatively as a sea-change in moral perception and evaluation. Put another way, is this a development led by legal policy, or a genuine shift in outlook, which has produced a new legal policy? It will be argued finally that, in a more pragmatic perspective, the success of the criminalisation project in any case depends on the emergence of a genuine sense of ‘hard core’ delinquency, without which effective regulation by means of criminal law is unlikely to be achieved. In this respect, a manufactured sense of moral censure, fostered by prosecutors to facilitate leniency programmes, may (outside the US) eventually prove to be a point of vulnerability in such strategies.     

CRIME BY COMMITTEE: CONSPIRATORS AND COMPANY MEN IN THE ILLEGAL ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY CARTEL, 1954–19591

We show how cartels rely on the adaptive social structure of committee meetings to ameliorate the competitive difficulties of markets. We distill the structure of the cartel committee and test hypotheses relating market structure to committee structure and ultimately to the efficacy of cartel price‐fixing. Cartel continuity and the corporate authority of the cartel are strong predictors of cartel effectiveness. Cartel continuity is responsive to market conditions that favor cartel formation. Centralization of cartel authority in decision making results in improved collusive pricing effectiveness. Centralization of cartel authority responds to expanding industry volume that bring about incentives to increase firm level market share at the expense of other cartel members.     

宽严相济刑事政策的定位与适用

宽严相济在当前仅仅是司法政策,不是基本刑事政策。宽严相济的刑事司法政策是对"严打"的反思,是回归惩办与宽大相结合的基本刑事政策。在刑事诉讼程序的每个阶段都需要贯彻该政策。     

Section 47 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013: A Flawed Reform of the UK Cartel Offence

On 1 April 2014, section 47 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA) entered into force, ensuring significant changes to the UK cartel offence. The criminal offence, contained in section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002, was enacted to secure the deterrence of cartel activity affecting the UK. Following almost ten years of enforcement, the cartel offence had failed to live up to expectations. Consequently, following a public consultation, it was reformed in substance. Section 47 ERRA, removed the (controversial) definitional element of ‘dishonesty’ from the offence, created a number of ‘carve outs’ from the offence, and created three additional defences. This article examines in detail the specific reforms of the cartel offence and argues that, although considerable improvement has been made, the UK offence is fundamentally flawed and unworkable in practice. Further reform is therefore advised.     

Juvenile Drug Court Program Admission,Demeanor and Cherry-Picking: A Research Note

The influence of demeanor in criminal justice research has predominantly centered on arrest and sanctioning outcomes. This study examines demeanor at the juncture of juvenile drug court admission by attributing behavior perceived to be favorable or unfavorable to program compliance and success to either juveniles or their parents/guardians. Analysis of 76 juvenile drug court case files enabled examination of how parent and child demeanor impacts specialty court admission. Findings suggest that program admittance (i.e., system leniency through diversion) is largely a function of projected attitude and behavior during screening interviews, but selection decisions are made irrespective of demeanor source. Implications of the findings for drug court processes and continued system involvement are discussed.     

认罪认罚案件上诉问题探讨

认罪认罚案件上诉权的设置存在多元价值冲突的情形,基于公正价值与效率价值的平衡需要,应当明确赋予认罪认罚案件被告人上诉权。在上诉权的设置上,应当对适用速裁程序审理的认罪认罚案件被告人的上诉权进行限制,要求速裁案件被告人上诉必须有正当理由,而认罪认罚案件适用其他程序审理的则无需附加理由。速裁案件被告人上诉的正当理由主要包括:定罪问题,主要包括被告人一审程序中的认罪是非自愿的以及一审判决作出后出现影响定罪的新事实、新证据等,量刑问题以及重大程序违法问题。为保障认罪认罚案件被告人上诉权的行使,应当要求被告人上诉向二审法院提出申请、二审法院对被告人的申请应当迅速及时审查;同时,二审法院在审理案件时应当遵循重点审查原则和上诉不加刑原则;采取措施限制检察机关提起"技术性抗诉"。     

酌定不起诉适用中面临的问题与对策——基于未成年人案件的实证研究

酌定不起诉具有贯彻宽严相济的刑事政策、程序分流、提高诉讼效率和合理配置司法资源等方面的功能。由于各种原因,酌定不起诉制度在实践中难以实现其承载的应有功能。基于对未成年人案件适用酌定不起诉的实际情况和适用中存在的突出问题,尽快修改酌定不起诉相关规定、改革考评机制、建立社会支持保障系统,才是解决酌定不起诉适用面临问题的关键。     

认罪认罚从宽制度实施中的五个矛盾及其化解

认罪认罚从宽制度在实施过程中暴露出以下五个矛盾:一是认罪认罚的自愿性前提与压制型法之间的矛盾,二是认罪认罚从宽的合意基础与实体真实原则之间的矛盾,三是不规范的从宽处罚与刑事法基本原则之间的矛盾,四是“检察官司法”与法官中立裁判原则之间的矛盾,五是简化、速决的一审程序与续审制的上诉审构造之间的矛盾。出现这五个矛盾的原因在于,作为认罪认罚从宽制度运行环境的基础性诉讼制度不健全,认罪认罚从宽制度的设计缺乏系统思维和整体考虑,相关的配套措施不完善。要化解上述矛盾,必须深入推进以审判为中心的刑事诉讼制度改革,努力提高刑事程序正当化水平;进一步完善认罪认罚从宽制度,健全公正与效率总体平衡的制度规范体系;完善相关配套措施,确保不因追求司法效率而损害司法的基本公正。     

Estimating damages from price-fixing: the value of transaction data

We use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive.