Concurrent Duties

This paper offers an account of concurrent liability, and in particular the existence of, and interaction between, concurrent contractual and non‐contractual duties. It argues for five essential propositions: (1) a defendant can owe simultaneous private law duties towards a claimant, the content of which overlaps in whole or in part; (2) cases of concurrent liability in contract and negligence involve independent duties, which are concurrent but not coextensive; (3) the doctrine of concurrent liability is conceptually distinct from the rule that the claimant must elect between inconsistent remedies; (4) if the defendant commits a wrong in breach of more than one duty, the claimant has a prima facie choice to sue for any of those breaches; and (5) the content of one any duty might affect the content of the other. The last of these principles, it is argued, provide an explanation for the recent decisions in Wellesley Partners v Withers and AIB v Mark Redler.     

Legal Advice Privilege and its Relevance to Corporations

This article considers whether the rationale for legal advice privilege applies to corporations. It examines the rationale for legal advice privilege in the aftermath of the disagreement between the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in the Three Rivers litigation, and argues that the rule of law rationale for advice privilege endorsed by the House of Lords is based largely on the needs and behavior of individuals. The paper examines the case for recognising advice privilege for corporations. Recent developments in corporate law and governance, especially in relation to directors' duties, have arguably reduced the need for a corporate privilege. Public and large private companies in particular already have sufficient incentives to obtain accurate legal advice about their affairs even without a privilege. There are also sound policy reasons for restricting the right of corporations to claim legal advice privilege given its costs to the administration of justice.     

EU Citizenship without Duties

Many believe that duties should be at the essence of citizenship. This paper dismisses this view, using EU law as the main context of analysis, by making five interrelated claims. (1) There are no empirically observable duties of EU citizenship; (2) such duties would lack any legal‐theoretical foundation, if the contrary were true; (3) legal‐theoretical foundations of the duties of citizenship are lacking also at the Member State level; (4) EU law plays an important role in undermining the ability of the Member States where residual duties remain to enforce them; (5) this development is part of a greater EU input into the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the Member States and reflects a general trend of de‐dutification of citizenship around the democratic world. If these conclusions are correct, it is time to stop categorising EU citizenship duties among the desiderata of EU law.     

Legitimate Political Authority and the Duty of Those Subject to It: A Critique of Edmundson

According to William Edmundson, a legitimatepolitical authority is one that claims tocreate in its subjects a general duty ofobedience to the law, and that succeeds increating in its subjects a duty to obey stateofficials when they apply the law in particularcases. His argument that legitimate politicalauthority does not require the state's claim tobe true rests on his analysis of legitimatetheoretical authority, and the assumption thattheoretical and practical authority are thesame in the relevant respects, both of whichare challenged here. In addition, Edmundsonfails to demonstrate that a general,content-independent, duty to obey officials whoadminister the law avoids the criticismsphilosophical anarchists pose to a general,content-independent duty to obey the law. Finally, Edmundson requires a legitimate stateto sincerely claim to create a generalduty to obey the law, yet he also argues thatin some cases the state ought to make literallyfalse claims regarding the particular dutiesincumbent upon its subjects. DespiteEdmundson's recent efforts to reconcile thesetwo claims, the conflict remains.     

Profiling,Information Collection and the Value of Rights Argument

In the United States and elsewhere, there is substantial controversy regarding the use of race and ethnicity by police in determining whom to stop, question, and investigate in relation to crime and security issues. In the ethics literature, the debate about profiling largely focuses on the nature of profiling and when (if ever) profiling is morally justifiable. This essay addresses the related, but distinct, issue of whether states have a duty to collect information about the race and ethnicity of persons stopped by police. I argue that states in the U.S. do have such a duty on the grounds that such information collection would help secure the value of persons' human rights against discrimination and unfair policing. Nonetheless, a large number of states do not require it. I begin by distinguishing rights from the value of rights, and arguing that under certain conditions persons have claims to the value of rights themselves, and that states have duties to secure that value. I then turn to the issue of profiling and offer the value of rights argument in favor of information collection about the race and ethnicity of persons stopped by police.     

The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured

The Insurance Act 2015 is the first piece of legislation since the eighteenth century to seek to lay down new principles governing the formation and operation of insurance contracts. Exactly 250 years after Lord Mansfield articulated the routinely‐cited principle of utmost good faith in insurance law in Carter v Boehm (1766) 2 Burr 1905, that principle has been recast, with important implications for both the pre‐ and post‐contractual duties of the parties. The Insurance Act has also imposed important restrictions on the enforcement of policy terms by insurers, and clarifies the law affecting fraudulent claims. The Marine Insurance Act 1906, a codifying measure, looks increasingly outmoded.     

Fiduciary Duty under the Microscope: Stewardship and the Spectrum of Pension Fund Engagement

UK pension fund trustees’ interpretations of their fiduciary duties may shape pension fund approaches to corporate stewardship and engagement envisioned by the UK Stewardship Code. Data from interviews with pension fund trustees, executives, investment intermediaries and pensions experts reveals interpretive pluralism of the concept of fiduciary duty in the area of pension funds. This article develops a model identifying the spectrum of pension fund engagement, linking interpretations of fiduciary duty to intensity and methods of engagement in practice. The findings help disambiguate the concept of ‘Fiduciary Duty’, highlighting the practical challenges of Stewardship Code application. These insights are relevant to the ongoing revisions of the Stewardship Code and policy clarifications of the nature of fiduciary duty by the UK Financial Conduct Authority. The paper encourages trustees, regulators and others to consider what role pension fund trustees should have in stewardship, which may not be directly relevant to their fiduciary duties as trustees.     

Contract Negotiations and the Common Law: A Move to Good Faith in Commercial Contracting?

Classically a duty to negotiate commercial contracts in good faith has been seen as part of the civil, not the common, law world. Common law commercial lawyers have long resisted the lure of “good faith” as a contractual concept, despite engagement with civil law principles in harmonisation projects, by virtue of membership of the European Union and their use in international conventions such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). This paper will examine whether this situation is changing, focusing on two common law jurisdictions—England and Wales and Canada. In England and Wales and the common law of Canada, case-law in the last 10 years has indicated a movement towards acceptance of express and implied duties of good faith in relation to contractual performance, see e.g. Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) and, most recently, Essex CC v UBB Waste (Essex) Ltd (No. 2) [2020] EWHC 1581 (TCC) in England and Wales; Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 SCC 71 and Callow v Zollinger 2020 SCC 45 in Canada. This paper will examine the extent to which these cases may open the way more generally for a duty to negotiate commercial contracts in good faith. It will examine the reception of these cases and whether they indicate (i) greater acceptance of “good faith” as part of contract law thinking and (ii) a possible extension of good faith into the pre-contractual period.

     

The Management of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary

Abstract: At the Copenhagen summit of 1993, the European Union introduced three criteria for accession to the European Union—political, economic, and adoption of the acquis—combined in 1995 with the necessity, for the candidate states, to have the institutional capacity to implement the acquis.?Until the reform of the PHARE programme in 1997, the European Union did not have any cooperation programme for institution‐building. Conceived as an innovative instrument in European external cooperation, institutional twinnings are inspired, in their design and their implementation, by new methods of governance emerging from the internal policies of the European Union (new public management, open method of coordination). How did the candidate countries interpret and implement institutional twinnings? Can one simply speak of institutional transfers or are the results of cooperation between Western and Eastern élites and experts of a more complex nature? This article attempts to draw some lessons from the experience of twinning on the basis of sectoral case studies in two countries, Estonia and Hungary, which took part to the EU enlargement of May 2004.     

Rethinking The Ends of Harm

In The Ends of Harm, Victor Tadros claims that the general justifying aim of the criminal law should be general deterrence. He also takes seriously that we cannot use people as a means, and thus he argues that we may only punish people in the name of general deterrence who have a ‘duty’ to suffer. Tadros claims that this duty arises as follows: An offender initially has a duty not to harm the victim. If the offender violates that duty, the offender still has a duty to stop the harm from occurring (so that, for example, an offender would have to jump in front of his own bullet). And if the harm does occur, then the offender has a duty to rectify that harm. This duty to rectify, argues Tadros, requires the defendant not only to compensate the victim but also to protect the victim to the extent that he would have been able to have been harmed to prevent the threat from occurring. Tadros further advances intricate arguments for why the state may therefore punish the offender to protect other potential victims to the extent of the offender’s duty to rectify. This symposium contribution seeks to explore three problems with Tadros’ analysis, ultimately arguing that Tadros’ theory fails on its own terms. First, attempts present a substantial problem for Tadros’ regime because attempts do not give rise to duties to prevent harm because there is no harm to be prevented. Tadros’ attempt to account for attempts, as completed offenses of diversions of security resources, ultimately leads to punishments that bear little resemblance to the crime attempted. Such a wildly counterintuitive result creates problems for a regime premised on general deterrence, which must be understood and respected. Second, Tadros’ regime will often exempt the rich from suffering criminal punishment. Tadros claims that duties to prevent harms from occurring (by jumping in front of bullets) are only enforceable when compensation will be inadequate. However, affluent offenders may be able to fully compensate. Moreover, since the scope of the duty to suffer will be determined by what remains of the duty after the victim is compensated, affluent offenders will be able to compensate more and thereby suffer less. Again, the actual sentences will thereby bear little resemblance to the rationale for criminalization, thus threatening the deterrent message of the law. Moreover, a system that exacerbates distributive inequalities will not achieve public respect. Third, Tadros cannot justify taking the duty that the defendant owes to the victim and forcing the victim to transfer this asset to the state. In his quest to articulate a theory that does not impermissibly use defendants, he ultimately endorses a theory that impermissibly uses their victims. He thus fails to achieve the very goal he sets for himself, which is to achieve general deterrence without impermissibly using anyone.     

The DutchAlgemene Rekenkamer and its role in light of practical experience

TheAlgemene Rekenkamer functions in the area around government and parliament. This chapter focuses on two questions: How does theRekenkamer ascertain loss of efficiency and effectiveness within government, and how does theRekenkamer restrict loss of efficiency and effectiveness within its own organization?

The goal of theRekenkamer is to provide parliament with reasonable assurances of the validity of expenses incurred and to promote the efficiency of the ministries and the effective spending of state funds. TheRekenkamer pursues a policy aimed at achieving these goals. Some central elements in this active policy are

• ? An independent position,

• ? Optimum reliability,

• ? Strategic planning,

• ? Both regularity and performance audits.

• ? The political and social relevance of research subjects, and

• ? Dialogue between parliament and theRekenkamer.

With regard to the audit theory of W.J. Van Braband, some suggestions for improvement are given.

     

Tarasoff in Missouri: The jurisprudence of a mental health provider's duty to warn and protect non-patients of potential risks from patients

In 1976, the Supreme Court of California issued its well-known Tarasoff Principle. From this principle, other courts found a duty to warn, and some found more than just a duty to warn, a duty to protect. As courts in other states adopted a version of the Tarasoff Principle, they issued a wide variety of third-party liability rules. In light of the dynamic, everchanging Tarasoff jurisprudence in the United States and recent relevant appellate court opinion in Missouri, a timely updated summary and update of Tarasoff-related jurisprudence in Missouri is warranted. In the present analysis, we compiled the four appellate court decisions that pertained to the questions of Tarasoff-like third-party liability in the State of Missouri: Sherrill v. Wilson (1983), Matt v. Burrell (1995), Bradley v. Ray (1995), and Virgin v. Hopewell (2001). We reviewed all legal measures for clinicians to protect nonpatients in Missouri, not just those that relate to protecting nonpatients from violence as in a Tarasof-like scenario. Thus, this paper concisely provides a compendium of such options and allows for a meaningful comparison of which legal, protective measures are mandatory and which are permissive, thereby evoking the question of whether measures of protecting nonpatients from a patient's violent acts ought to be mandatory duties or permissive application of professional judgment.     

"Independence" and the nonprofit board: a general counsel's guide

In the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulations that govern the public company sector, standards are emerging to assure that nonprofit corporate boards are maintaining appropriate levels of independence. This Article provides a summation of the current trends in the development of independence standards for nonprofit corporate governance, from both tax and corporate law perspectives. The authors consider independence standards for nonprofit boards of governance and discuss the evolution of independence standards as they relate to the duty of good faith, and the distinction between independence and conflicts of interest. The authors also seek to examine the evolution of current federal regulations and study state models that have been successfully implemented to insure the independence of nonprofit corporations. Finally, the authors propose a set of core guidelines to be considered when addressing board and committee independence issues.     

All Anchors Are Not Created Equal: The Effects of Per Diem versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and Suffering Awards

This experiment examined whether different quantifications of the same damage award request (175,000 lump sum,175,000 lump sum, 10/hour, 240/day,240/day, 7300/month for 2 years) influenced pain and suffering awards compared to no damage award request. Jury-eligible community members (N = 180) read a simulated personal injury case in which defendant liability already had been determined. Awards were: (1) larger for the 10/hour and10/hour and 175,000 conditions than the 7300/month and control conditions and (2) more variable for the7300/month and control conditions and (2) more variable for the 10/hour condition than the $7300/month and control conditions. No differences emerged on ratings of the parties, their attorneys, or the difficulty of picking a compensation figure. We discuss the theoretical implications of our data for the anchoring and adjustment literature and the practical implications for legal professionals.     

LAWYERS AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS WORKING TOGETHER: RECONCILING THE DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND MANDATORY CHILD ABUSE REPORTING

Lawyers are increasingly finding themselves working in conjunction with a social worker and/or a psychologist. This dynamic can be found in organizations that take a multi‐disciplinary approach to the law, such as New York City's Legal Aid Society and Lawyers for Children. Collaborative law is another such example. Collaborative law is an increasing trend in family law; it provides a divorcing couple the opportunity to work with professionals from different disciplines, without being subject to the court system. While a multi‐disciplinary approach to the law has the ability to maximize the value of representation, it also can create tension when inconsistent duties are imposed by conflicting professional obligations. A major area of conflict is between the lawyer's duty to maintain client confidences and the mental health professional's duty to report child abuse. This Note discusses the important policies behind these opposing duties. The Note recommends amending state child abuse and neglect laws in order to eliminate the conflict between the professions' duties and allow lawyers and mental health professionals to work together more harmoniously. Amending state child abuse and neglect laws will allow for mental health professionals working with a lawyer who represents a client the same reporting duties as lawyers in the process.     

Rule‐Intermediaries in Action: How State and Business Stakeholders Influence the Meaning of Consumer Rights in Regulatory Governance Arrangements

The boundaries between public and private actors are increasingly blurred via regulatory governance arrangements and the contracting out of rights enforcement to private organizations. Regulation and governance scholars have not gained enough empirical leverage on how state actors, private organizations, and civil society groups influence the meaning of legal rules in regulatory governance arrangements that they participate in. Drawing from participant observation at consumer law conferences and interviews with stakeholders, my empirical data suggest that consumer rights and, in fact, consumer law, mean different things to different stakeholders tasked with adjudicating consumer rights. Rights afforded consumers who purchase warranties are now largely contingent on first using alternative dispute resolution structures, some created and operated by private organizations with soft state oversight and others run by stakeholders but with greater state oversight and involvement. Using new institutional sociology and regulatory governance theories, I find that stakeholders involved in overseeing and administering these dispute resolution systems filter the meaning of consumer rights through competing business and consumer logics. Because consumer laws mean different things to stakeholders tasked with adjudicating consumer rights, two different rights regimes simultaneously exist in this field. I conclude that how rule‐intermediaries administering private and state‐run dispute resolution systems conceptualize what consumer laws mean in action may have implications for regulatory governance and more broadly, consumers' access to justice.     

Tacticians,Stewards, and Professionals: The Politics of Publishing Select Committee Legal Advice

At Westminster, there are increasing pressures on select committees to publish in‐house legal advice. We suggest that examining the process of deciding to publish provides useful insights into the provision, reception, and use of legal advice, and the dynamics of select committees generally. We argue that the autonomy of select committees to decide what use they make of evidence and advice they receive is, in practice, constrained by the intra‐institutional dynamics and practices of select committees. Committee actors – parliamentarians, clerks, and parliamentary lawyers – each have overlapping, sometimes competing, roles. Most of the time, these roles and the responsibilities they encompass coincide, but the prospect of publication reveals clear tensions between the different actors. This is the politics of publication: the tactical approach of politicians is in tension with the stewardship of clerks and the professional norms of parliamentary lawyers. We suggest this tension will only increase in the near future.     

Vicarious Liability and Non‐Delegable Duty for Child Abuse in Foster Care: A Step Too Far?

In NA v Nottinghamshire County Council the Court of Appeal held that a local authority is not liable under vicarious liability or for breach of a non‐delegable duty when foster parents sexually or physically abuse a child that it has placed in their care. The note discusses the decision in the light of recent developments in the law. It is argued that the result is unsatisfactory in terms of doctrine and policy. It is further suggested that non‐delegable duty, rather than vicarious liability, offers the most appropriate route for establishing liability.     

Punishment and the Duties of Offenders

This paper offers a partial critique of one of the central lines of argument in Victor Tadros’ The Ends of Harm: his attempt to show that a system of deterrent punishment can avoid the objection that it treats those who are punished ‘merely as means’ to our goals, by arguing that we may legitimately use someone as a means if in doing so we are simply forcing her to do what she anyway had an enforceable duty to do. I raise some questions about the idea of forcing someone to do what she has a duty to do; about what duties a wrongdoer incurs towards his victim, and how they may be enforced; and about whether we can move from such duties to a justification of criminal punishment as a deterrent.