The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Public Spending: The Korean Case

The local government reforms of the 1980s and 1990s in Korea involved devolution of substantial resources from the central to local governments. Fiscal realignment between the levels of government occurred during the same period of time. This article places these changes within the context of fiscal decentralization, using a variety of time-series regression techniques, in an effort to assess its impact. Findings suggest that fiscal decentralization serves as a constraint on the behavior of central government, while it serves as a booster on behalf of underdeveloped local governments. Fiscal decentralization may be a very effective means of self-government, and plays a key role in improving the fit between the provision of public goods and citizens' demand in Korea.     

Bureaucratic politics,innovation compatibility,and the dynamic diffusion of subnational decentralization reforms in China

Despite the widely recognized significance of policy attributes in explaining innovation diffusion, limited research has emphasized the underlying endogenous mechanisms dictating the construction of innovation attributes. This study points out that bureaucratic politics could dynamically shape an innovation's compatibility with the potential adopters and its diffusion likelihood. Based on the subnational decentralization reforms in China, we note that compared to administrative and fiscal decentralization, political decentralization is less likely to generate personal gains and more likely to negatively affect the career prospects of local officials in a layer-by-layer personnel management system. Therefore, the study speculates that political decentralization reforms have a lower level of compatibility, consequently reducing its diffusion likelihood among local governments. We confirmed our theoretical expectations by conducting an in-depth case study of the top-down diffusion of three types of “Province-Managing-County Reforms” among 102 counties in China's Henan Province (2004–2021).     

Decentralization and Democratic Instability: The Case of Costa Rica

This article examines the consequences of the decentralization process that is under way in Costa Rica and which may undermine, rather than bolster, democracy in that country. I first outline three key contextual variables relating to the reform process: existing sociopolitical realities (constructing local legitimacy), the dynamics of the reform process (bottom-up versus top-down), and the timing or sequencing of the proposed reforms (what is being decentralized and when). Though I focus here on Costa Rica, these three variables are generally applicable in any case of decentralization. After considering these contextual factors, I evaluate the likelihood of four negative side effects arising from the ongoing decentralization process: party-system fragmentation, reinforced or mutated clientelism, intermunicipal conflict and polarization, and local government instability. Early evidence suggests that some of these effects, particularly party-system fragmentation and municipal instability, have begun to manifest themselves.     

Recentralization and vertical alignment in the French health‐care system

In foreign exemplars, key new public management (NPM) features such as decentralization and devolution of health‐care responsibilities had outcomes below expectations. Other NPM traits such as the patient as overseer of reforms or the empowerment of patient remained elusive. In France, the integration of public values such as greater participation of patients and local actors (NGOs and elected officials) and NPM‐driven private values such as performance evaluation has yet to be seen. Taking advantage of NPM's failings and austerity agenda, a French welfare elite regained control over health‐care policy decisions at the expense of regions and other local actors. NPM outcomes were below expectations. Austerity cures led to weakening of the regional decision spaces, which can be explained under the principal–agent relationship. Accountability shifted to managerial (the professionalization of hospital managers) and legal (governance via regulations) forms in a bid to restore central government control. A democratic recess results from the lack of public engagement in recent health reforms.     

Decentralization and district development planning in Zimbabwe

One of the most important dimensions of rural development policy in Zimbabwe since independence has been rural local government reform, in particular decentralization policy. Evidence from a number of recent studies is used to present a comprehensive review of Zimbabwe's experience of local government decentralization during the first eight years of independence, 1980 to 1988. Section 2 presents a brief outline of some basic concepts on decentralization which have guided the discussion. Section 3 contains a short account of the local government system inherited from the colonial era. Section 4 outlines the major post-independence reforms, that is: the 1980 District Councils Act; the 1984-85 Prime Minister's Directive on Decentralization; the 1985 Provincial Councils and Administration Act; and the 1988 Rural District Councils Act. Section 5 presents an assessment of these reforms, paying particular attention to organizational, financial and planning issues. While some important improvements have been achieved in rural Communal Areas-in particular the extension of services and increases in local revenues and popular participation-the system of local government and administration remains a dual one. Other problems include the gap between the planning and budgeting processes, continued financial dependence of district councils on central government, and a lack of serious effort by central government to make use of provincial and district development plans.     

LOCAL GOVERNMENT DISCRETION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN TURKEY

After ratification of the European Charter of Local Self‐Government in 1993, Turkey has witnessed major local government reform efforts in 2000s. The policy objectives of these reforms were granting more political, administrative and fiscal discretion to local governments along the principles of democratic decentralization and strengthening accountability linkages between citizens and local governments. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyse the impact of these reforms. We argue that reforms have achieved limited success in improving decision‐making autonomy and accountability of local governments. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Autonomy and Performance: Decentralization Reforms in Zhejiang Province,China

Decentralization reforms rarely live up to the high hopes and expectations of the reformers for a variety of reasons rooted in actions and omissions of the governments pursuing it or in the context in which it is undertaken. The paper examines the experience of Zhejiang Province where decentralization was successful in achieving and indeed exceeding initial expectations. The remarkable feature of its reforms was ‘performance‐based’ decentralization wherein localities showing superior performance were awarded additional autonomy at a faster speed while the rest were given additional support to build their capacity for assuming more responsibility in the future. To understand the effects of this unique pattern of decentralization, the paper compares the performance of participating and non‐participating counties under five waves of reforms between 1992 and 2008, based on indicators such as gross domestic product, industrial output and local government revenue. It finds that performance‐based decentralization not only helped overcome the problem of capacity deficits but also fostered capacity in weaker counties to assume more autonomy in the future. The paper confirms that speed and sequence of transfer of autonomy and responsibilities to local governments are as important as the content of decentralization. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The rise and fall of the national ‘decentralized agencies’ in Colombia

The public sector in Latin America has been characterized by the proliferation of national semi-autonomous bodies known as ‘decentralized agencies’. This article focuses on such agencies in Colombia from the 1960s onwards. Attention will be paid to their institutional proliferation and how this affected local government, particularly in the fields of water and sanitation. Such changes in state organization have not been problem free. The growth of ‘decentralized agencies’ has been associated with problems of inefficiency, administrative confusion and problems of social and political unrest. Indeed, such contradictions have resulted in the issue of decentralization being placed on the political agenda and the development of innovative and administrative reforms that could breathe new life into local government.     

Decentralization as a strategy of regime maintenance: The case of Yemen

Proponents of decentralization often argue that decentralization makes governments more accountable and responsive to the governed. This is perhaps why the decentralization literature tends to overlook Middle Eastern regimes as these are among the most authoritarian and most centralized regimes in the world. However, many of these regimes have included decentralization in their legal framework. This article shows how a weak regime can use decentralization as a regime maintenance strategy when formal decentralization reforms strengthens external and internal legitimacy. The articles main argument builds on the literature on decentralization and elite capture to show how weak regimes can use formal decentralization reform to undermine local autonomy. The article uses the case of Yemen to make this argument. Yemen has a long tradition for local bottom-up initiatives and there is widespread internal support for decentralization. Simultaneously, donors have seen decentralization as a way of strengthening the Yemeni state, leading to international support to the formulation of the Local Authority Law of 2000, Law 4/2000, an extensive legal decentralization framework.     

Local government discretion and accountability in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso opted for a progressive approach to decentralization reforms, aiming at building local government capacity first before transferring responsibilities. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyze local government discretion and accountability in Burkina Faso. We find that local governments have a very low degree of discretionary power accompanied with weak accountability towards citizens at all levels. In the political and administrative spheres, the center plays a dominant role in local government affairs leaving little space for discretion. In the fiscal sphere, taxing powers are restricted, while transfers are insufficient and unpredictable, making local financial management extremely difficult. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

IMPACT OF DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS IN PAKISTAN ON SERVICE DELIVERY—AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

By bringing decision making closer to people, decentralization is expected to improve governance and service delivery outcomes. Yet, the empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization on macroeconomic performance and public sector size presents a mixed picture. However, the findings of cross‐country studies in the literature are sensitive to the way decentralization is defined, and how its extent and impact are measured. This article avoids the unwanted effects of incomparability and aggregation in cross‐country analysis. We use a unique panel data set from 183 villages in Pakistan to analyze the impact of decentralization reforms implemented in 2001 on the provision of services—street paving, construction of water canals, sanitation sewer lines, and school facilities. Our results show that the magnitude of provision of all services increased significantly following decentralization reforms. We further show that the four services are impacted differently and service delivery improvement is not uniform, but not in ways that conform to the hypotheses of patronage theory. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Iron Houses in the Tropical Heat: Decentralization Reforms in Africa and their Consequences

Abstract

Decentralization reforms introduced to Africa have not always delivered the intended outcomes. Through interaction with the broader historical, political, social and economic context, reforms seem to have engendered political consequences beyond decentralization itself. Most of the literature on decentralization and development emphasizes questions of institutional design and policy, but here we expand the focus of analysis and incorporate the harder-to-pin-down political patterns marking the workings of decentralization in Africa. Through the case-studies of Ghana, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Ethiopia and Uganda we seek to connect the debates on development with the scholarly literatures on comparative federalism, comparative decentralization and local democracy. The conclusion that emerges is that no magic formula which can turn countries into peaceful, stable and prosperous democracies overnight exists. And, importing formal institutions without regard to the local historical, political, social and economic context risks leaving us with elegant but dysfunctional iron houses in the tropical heat.     

Personnel Reform in the States: A Look at Progress Fifteen Years after the Winter Commission

Trends in states’ civil service reforms since the Winter Commission’s report was published in 1993 are described and evaluated in the context of its recommendations. The authors argue that the commission’s reform agenda relies on a public service bargain that requires public employees, elected officials, and other stakeholders to respect, trust, and support each other’s efforts to serve the public interest. Its recommendations for modernizing state and local personnel systems are discussed and related to the “reinvention” and New Public Management initiatives of the past 20 years. Many of these ideas have been adopted by state governments, but there is no single reform model that has been followed across the states. Some states, such as Georgia and Florida, have engaged in radical reforms that include replacing traditional merit systems with at‐will employment models. The general pattern involves decentralization, deregulation, and limitation of employee protections. While many of the management‐oriented changes advocated by the Winter Commission are staples of states’ civil service reforms, its emphasis on a “trust and lead” strategy based on public service values, partnership, and leadership in the public interest has not received much attention. In general, objective evaluations of states’ reforms are needed to determine whether their purposes are being achieved.     

Federalism and Decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Five Patterns of Evolution

Abstract

The 1990s were marked by democratic reforms throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. This went in tandem with decentralization reforms which either created or strengthened subnational levels of government. More than twenty years later it seems everywhere to the south of the Sahara there is a gap between the institutional/constitutional blueprints introducing the reforms and the facts on the ground. Understanding and explaining this gap in the workings of federalism and decentralization is important to both theorists and practitioners. This article proposes five benchmarks in order to map out the evolutionary patterns of the last two decades: a) symmetrical recentralization; b) differentiated performance; c) legitimizing traditional authority structures and indigenous conflict resolution; d) politicization of local conflicts over land, water, and other natural resources; and e) federal extinction.     

The practice of regional development in Indonesia: Resolving central-local coordination issues in planning and finance

Renewed interest by the Indonesian government in decentralization and cost-recovery practices has led to both real and illusory reforms, though the distinction between the two is often not clear. This is particularly true with respect to infrastructure planning and finance. Recently, the allocation criteria for capital grants to local governments have been substantially revised, nearly every year, to reflect long lasting concerns regarding differences in interregional development needs and resources. In addition, the level of funding for local government investment has risen dramatically to support increased local responsibility in planning. Most development spending does not pass through local budgets, however. In either case, the project planning process has remained firmly under the direction of the central government's technical ministries. Infrastructure investment thus tends to be segmented, not only by sector, but also by funding source. The rate at which these two factors balance off in current practice does not indicate a strong commitment to effective decentralization. The article suggests that greater regional government participation in the national planning process would be beneficial. To deal with the fragmented nature of sectoral planning is more problematic, as a more integrated approach would in the long term require either a new layer of bureaucracy or a substantial reorganization of the technical ministries. In the shorter term, a gradual shift toward general purpose grants would also generate regional development plans more consistent with the goals of decentralization while maintaining substantial central control and oversight.     

Complexity in local stakeholder coordination: decentralization and community water management in Northern Ghana

Stakeholder coordination is a prominent theme in current development discourse. Experience with decentralization and community water management in northern Ghana highlights the complexities of coordinating stakeholders at the local level. In this case, roles and responsibilities must be clarified between legislated sub‐district structures on the one hand, and civic water groups on the other. This is especially important with regard to resolving which party should collect revenues and manage assets and expenditures in the water sector. The key mechanism for addressing these issues is the District Assembly, which is empowered under the decentralization law to coordinate stakeholders, both ‘horizontally’, across social actors, and ‘vertically’, between the national and sub‐district levels. While such local‐level dynamics are indeed complex and challenging, they are at the same time probably more amenable to at least medium‐term resolution than stakeholder competition issues at the national level. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Indonesia: what do we mean by decentralization?

Decentralization has been a major theme in many countries in recent years. In Indonesia it has been part of the rhetoric of the Government for some time, but recent initiatives have suggested some more substance. This article reviews two main concepts: inter-governmental decentralization and management decentralization. It examines the Indonesian approach to decentralization in law and in practice, focusing on some recent initiatives in reforming the grant system and the declaration of a ‘pilot areas’ decentralization project. The aim of such initiatives appears to be to reap the efficiency gains of management decentralization without transferring power. However, the Indonesian system lacks some of the institutional requirements for effective management decentralization, notably the absence of performance measures and an effective framework of constraints, as reflected in the shortcomings of the systems of central controls over local government. The article concludes with an analysis of the reasons why the Indonesian Government appears to be so wary of western notions of decentralization. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. Vol. 17 , 351–367 (1997). No. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 2. No. of Refs: 49.     

The Zambian administrative reforms: An alternative view

In 1968 administrative reforms were announced in Zambia which have been interpreted as involving a commitment to decentralization. The announcement came against a background of moves to strengthen party control over the bureaucracy, and a feature of the reforms was the reinforcement of this control. Subsequent developments have been characterized by the establishment of greater control over governmental administration in provinces and districts by party political appointees and by closer control over local party officials by party appointees from the centre. These developments have not been accompanied by decentralization within ministries, and functional ministries retain control over their field agents.     

The decentralization of primary health care delivery in Chile

The article argues that during the 1980s the process of decentralization in Chile under the military government of General Pinochet shifted the delivery of primary health care to the municipal level. Despite the return to more democratic forms of government in 1990 the overall structure of local‐level service delivery has remained largely unchanged. The municipalities have retained responsibility for service delivery but resources remain centrally determined. In an attempt to enhance accessibility, choice and the responsiveness of the system to individual and local need, reform has been made to the financial transfer mechanisms and a new model of primary health care delivery has recently been introduced. However, problems of resourcing and implementation limit the effectiveness of some of the changes that have accompanied decentralization. Problems have resulted in primary health care delivery because administrative decentralization has not been accompanied by fiscal decentralization, nor effective political decentralization. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.