The paradox of policy analysis: If it is not used,why do we produce so much of it?

This article explores the apparent paradox that our society invests heavily in policy analysis when empirical studies, political science theory, and common wisdom all suggest that analysis is not used by policymakers to make better policy decisions. It offers a critique of the traditional view of policy analysis and presents an alternative view derived from contemporary literature on the policy process and decisionmaking. The alternative view suggests that there are legitimate uses for analysis other than the problem‐solving use originally envisioned but apparently rarely attained. The two views imply different patterns of use of analysis by legislative committees—a contrast that I subject to an empirical test. An examination of quantitative data on policy analysis use by congressional committees from 1985 to 1994 lends support for the alternative view. The research has two implications. First, despite its scientific origins, policy analysis may be a more effective instrument of the democratic process than of the problem‐solving process. Second, the profession of policy analysis may be in better shape than many who are calling for fundamental changes to its practice seem to believe. © 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

New Zealand experience with public management reform—or why the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence☆

This article provides an analysis of how New Zealand has achieved the successes made to date, issues and problems yet to be resolved, and directions on how to address current shortcomings in public managment reform of the New Zealand model. Four issue pillars provide the framework for the analysis: Political—problems that are inherent to the political arena under a range of public management regimes; Incompleteness—problems that reflect that the system is incomplete in some areas, but that do not suggest inherent difficulties; Implementation—problems to do with the way the system has been implemented; Inherent—problems inherent in the New Zealand regime, but not necessarily in other systems. The overall conclusion drawn is that relatively few of the problems are inherent in the New Zealand model and that most problems fall under the first of the four issue pillars: politics. The author concludes that there is much to be done—but that it can be done within the framework of the Public Finance Act and the State Sector Act by changing how the system is operated.     

State aid programs for equalizing spending across local school districts: does the structure of the program matter, or only it’s size?

This paper provides interesting insights into an important causal mechanism underlying Murray, Evans and Schwab’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 88(4):789–812, 1998) finding that court mandated reforms result in less inequality in spending per pupil levels across rich and poor school districts within a state. Treating the choice of an education program’s structure as endogenous, following the analysis of Leyden (Public Finance/Finances Publiques 47:229–247, 1992; Public Choice 115(1–2):83–107, 2003), yields empirical results suggesting that court mandated reforms increase the likelihood that a program’s structure will include a price effect and that the inclusion of a price effect in turn results in a decrease in spending inequality.